Reading this book in 2017 finds it to seem a bit of an exercise in misdirected prognostication: in many ways, circumstances have changed dramatically since 1972-73 when McPhee was researching and writing the book.
Since then we've had Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima; we've gone from groups like the Red Army Faction, Sin Fein, and the PLO to al-Qaeda and ISIS. We've seen the terrible carnage of Timothy McVeigh's attack on the Murra Federal Building in Oklahoma City, politically-inspired attacks in Madrid, London, San Antonio, Boston, Paris, Nice, San Bernardino, Moscow, Mumbai, Bali, Tokyo, Lockerbie, and many other places. We've seen plots broken up--sometimes well-organized, more often inept. Though the World Trade Center was destroyed in a terrorist attack, as McPhee suggested it could, destruction was not accomplished with a low-yield nuclear device, but with everyday transportation machines used unconventionally.
We have yet to see a successful terrorist attack (or criminal blackmail/hostage scheme) using nuclear materials. In part this seems to be because the logic of terrorism is one of natural force amplification--sowing fear and pursuing the disruptions and costs fear incurs is the real point, not merely racking up a large number of dead and wounded. This point seems ms obvious today, but was tangential to McPhee's thesis in 1973. In addition, McPhee assumes putative terrorists would want to survive the carnage their acts cause. This in particular seems a quaint presumption, for we now know that some terrorists are quite willing to sacrifice themselves/to commit suicide to accomplish their ends.
Despite the sense of alarm and the insistence on the ease in which an attack using nuclear materials that pervades McPhee's book, there do seem to be easier ways to disrupt the social order than through use of nuclear materials. Conventional arms and explosives do a fine job of accomplishing the goals of terrorism, thank you. Even chemical and biological terror attacks have been rare and are apparently substantially more difficult than attacks carried out with guns and bombs. Certainly, modern nations with their police state apparatuses have done at least a moderately successful job at suppressing and minimizing terror attacks, though at costs that are difficult to reckon fully. Nuclear security seems to have improved. The US has had some success in preventing the wholesale dispersion of nuclear materials after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Today the biggest nuclear threats seem to come from smaller countries that want parity with larger nations. At the moment, North Korea is the most dangerous example of that form of nuclear threat. And we don't know what the outcome might be.