This biography is highly readable throughout and provides a light-handed introduction to the major themes of Derrida's work. It puts many of his publications into context and I think will be a helpful guide for those wishing to proceed by reading Derrida himself. Despite covering in a very clear way the development of his ideas and the key influences to which he was responding (notably Husserl and Heidegger), I would not feel confident using this book as my only source to seriously comment on Derrida's philosophy; but it gives a good enough feel to recognise where Derrida himself might fit into the wider discussions in which he is so often invoked and to appreciate why it might be worth getting hold of some of his work. To be fair, I think that is what a good biography does for any writer.
Quotes
"This biography aims to set out the intellectual development of Jacques Derrida; to situate it in events both private and public; and to argue for its importance as an event in the history of philosophy and of thought more generally. It will argue that Derrida is one of the great philosophers of this or any age; that his thinking is a crucial component of any future philosophy; that his thinking is immediately – always already – applicable to the world as we find it; and that this application has political heft." [p13]
That his writings are abstruse is an effect of his philosophy. His thought generates his style just as Wittgenstein’s generated aphorisms, Spinoza’s numbered propositions, Heidegger’s compound neologisms and Plato’s dialogue. There is nothing fake here. [p16]
Looking back, Derrida characterised his exploration of Hegel as seeking a ‘kind of general strategy of deconstruction’. We must traverse a phase of overturning. To do justice to this necessity is to recognize that in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand. To deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment. This became one of the central methodological strategies of deconstruction, and perhaps has had the greatest practical and theoretical impact outside the academy of any of Derrida’s interventions. As we have seen, for Derrida the history of Western thought relies on the apparent ‘logic’ of binary oppositions, where the first term is privileged over the second. But, as Derrida points out, this is not a ‘peaceful coexistence of two terms, it is a violent hierarchy’. The task of deconstruction is to suspend the hierarchy at this moment and analyse and criticise it, in a sort of productive ambivalence.... As each of the terms has a constructed meaning, as all meaning is constructed, why does this opposition exist, why is one term privileged, whom does it serve, what does it fail to acknowledge, convey or understand? The answer may be political, cultural, philosophical and so on – each analysis may unearth more hidden assumptions – but the task of deconstruction is not then to efface the difference through synthesis, but to mark it, to note its undecidability and explore its complex interplay. [pp94,95]
What happens when we speak, in all the ways outlined above, and including the voice in our head? Philosophy, alongside common sense, tends to argue that I have a thought of more or less absolute clarity; I then change it into words. I say these words. My interlocutor (in a perfect world) understands my words, and the thought I have communicated, transparently, enters their mind. The interlocutor may be myself; and ideally for Husserl, that is exactly who she or he is. Each of these steps is highly problematic, Derrida resolved. Try having a thought without words. If such a thing is possible, how is that then turned into words? .... It is not, argues Derrida, that we have self-presence and the voice in our head (or out loud) expresses it; rather, the voice in our head (or out loud) gives us the illusion of self-presence. [p115]
Derrida’s criticism of structuralism (via Rousset) centres on the privileging of ‘form’ over ‘force’. Again, this is a question about time, about the static compared to the genetic... So while a book, any book, is only encountered in ‘successive fragments’, the task of the (structuralist) critic is to make the work ‘simultaneously present’, all its aspects presented as an immediate, punctual, total whole (like a Husserlian moment)... Against this, Derrida introduces ‘force’, which is a form of motion and therefore temporal. ‘Force’, for Derrida, is a product of language’s power of signification. The signifier always means more than it wants to, it escapes and exceeds the author’s intention. Criticism, in privileging form over force, the static over the genetic, freezes meaning... structuralism presents simultaneity as ‘the myth of a total reading or description, promoted to the status of a regulatory ideal.’ So here we are again. Derrida once again identifies the unacknowledged metaphysics behind a conventional reading ... As Merleau-Ponty puts it, ‘My own words take me by surprise and teach me what I think,’ echoing Flannery O’Connor, who said, ‘I write because I don’t know what I think until I read what I say.’ [pp125-127]
What can be forgotten in the deep woods of philosophy, the often abstruse and opaque world of ‘categorical imperatives’, ‘anarcho-primitivism’, ‘transcendental idealism’, ‘metaphysics of presence’, is that philosophy seeks to encapsulate, in some sense, what it is like to be alive. If a philosophy fails to do this, it is the philosophy that must yield. When, as we shall see, a philosopher of language such as J. L. Austin says that words can only be taken seriously if said seriously, he excludes a whole realm of meaning that most people, in a fairly mundane sense, regard as meaningful. Derrida seems to be saying that something should not be inexplicable to philosophy that is explicable to humans. [p135]
One shouldn’t complicate things for the pleasure of complicating, but one should also never simplify or pretend to be sure of such simplicity where there is none. If things were simple, word would have gotten around. – Limited Inc. [p142]
"Many have been willing to give M. Derrida the benefit of the doubt, insisting that language of such depth and difficulty of interpretation must hide deep and subtle thoughts indeed. When the effort is made to penetrate it, however, it becomes clear, to us at least, that, where coherent assertions are being made at all, these are either false or trivial." The letter was signed by eighteen academics from around the world, of whom W.V.O. Quine was probably the best known. Judging by the made-up ‘logical phallusies’ none of them had taken the time to read any of Derrida’s work – it is not as though neologisms ripe for this sort of mockery are hard to find. As Terry Eagleton noted, all that the dons who voted against him knew was probably that he was ‘radical, enigmatic, French, photogenic and wildly popular with students’. And quite what the ‘accepted standards’ Derrida failed to meet were anybody’s guess, but one suspects thinkers as diverse as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and Kierkegaard might have had a struggle on their hands too – as would Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and later Wittgenstein, all of whom tended to drift from the analytic. Socrates and Plato might have struggled as well, though the latter might have agreed about excluding Dadaists and concrete poets were they minded to apply to join the academy. [p274]