Is Matthew Arnold's 'Culture and Anarchy', with its Victorian prolixity and Anglican ethos, still relevant today? The answer, in our atomised and multicultural age, is a partial Yes, not because the original historical context is directly relevant, but because his criticisms of liberal, industrial society are still valid, even if his philosophical principles remain, as in his day, questionable.
Arnold's central proposition is that culture is the source of all true authority, and that this culture is, adopting Swift's phrase, made up of 'sweetness and light', that is beauty and intelligence. It is this sweetness and light that Arnold deemed insufficient in the society of mid-Victorian England, and indeed in all societies, including our contemporary own, where the focus is upon mechanistic processes and not the ends to which these should be directed, ends that for Arnold are the perfectibility of the individual best self as member of a society itself moving towards perfection though the use of right reason in pursuit of what is beautiful and therefore true.
After Heine, Arnold differentiates society not by social class determined by materialist function in the economic means of production, but by heritable position dependent upon wealth and the cultural status that provides, leading to the division of people into three observable groups: the Barbarians, who conform to the English-Germanic aristocracy; the Philistines, who are the industrious middle class; and the Populace, who make up the working class. This tripartite division therefore accords with other socio-economic classifications, but is culturally not economically derived, and, importantly, can be transcended by the individual, since such status only represents what Arnold calls the ordinary self and not the best self that can be attained if one rejects the pursuit of the material and instead cultivates the beautiful and the intelligent, that which is sweetness and light. Arnold rejects dialectical materialism, but retains the tenets of Hegelian dialecticism and teleology, seeking the perfectibility of man in mental processes pursued through cultural discipline, while also rejecting Carlyle's contemporary, intellectual Toryism of an innate aristocracy of talent, instead postulating that as the best self can only be obtained in a society that itself is the corporate manifestation of our best selves, where everyone is capable of attaining sweetness and light, regardless of their socio-economic relation, we can only become our best self if all others can similarly attain their best selves in what Arnold envisages as a truely equal, although not egalitarian, society.
Matthew Arnold consistently iterates that his social vision is a liberal one, but it is a liberalism that rejects utilitarianism, industrialisation, at least in so far it is an end in itself, and concepts of freedom that are based upon abstract theories of rights and which ignore the primary importance of duty, his instead being based upon the individual seeking through reading and disinterested observation what is beautiful and intelligent and what tends to human perfection, both individual and social. However, such a social and educative vision of culture ignores the real differences in human intellectual acuity and the wide disparities in educational and economic opportunities to be found across all societies, and, is that of an ironically self-defined Philistine who has escaped his Philistinism through membership of an elitist culture that is very much that of the affluent and educated, upper middle class, and is, whatever his aspirations for it, a culture that cannot be separated from his socio-economic class and the cultural privileges that ensue. Ironically, in his efforts to try to differentiate culture from materialism, Arnold inadvertently exemplifies how much what is defined as culture is materially derived.
Just as much as his epistemology is Hegelian, so is his theory of the State. Arnold regards the State as the guarantor of culture, while it is culture which provides the authority for the State as the corporate entity of the best selves of the nation. He conceives of the State as not only a higher body above the partisan interests of the different social classes, which are only the group manifestations of the ordinary selves of their constituent members, so rejecting Marxist and socialist materialism, but also, as the collective embodiment of the best selves of the population, as an ultimate, disinterested adjudicating body above the individual and with responsibility for both maintaining order and for curbing the excesses of a selfish individualism that Arnold characterised as anarchy. Arnold rejects the minimalist State of laissez-faire liberalism, and in his concern for social deprivation, education, and the raising up of the poorest to a higher culture and aesthetics, prefigures the Bismarckian social state of Imperial Germany and the welfare states of the twentieth century. However, in so doing he ignores the dangers arising from State corporatism and excessive state power over the individual, particularly as he discards the idea of human rights as too abstract and individualist, and fails to recognise that the State itself could develop in an anti-cultural manner as just a corporate projection of the ordinary selves of which he complained.
Of course, as he rejected democracy as a system of government - these essays were stimulated by the debates surrounding the 1867 Second Reform Act - which was to his mind merely government by the Populace as a partisan, social class, it could be argued that the State's manifold later failures were not its own, but due to the ordinary selves of its members and their failure to develop the culture which would give them their best selves and the proper authority for the State. And yet, what Arnold conceives in these essays as the ideal State looks very much like the Platonic model of government by philosopher-kings, that is by the educated and leisurely elite of which Arnold considered himself a distinguished member, guided by Hegelian dialecticism, and given authority by its own elite culture, which carried with it the intendant risks of descent into corporatism and extremism, as seen in the last century, and as dissected by Karl Popper in 'The Open Society and its Enemies', and into which we are on the verge of falling in our own age through the triumph of atomistic globalism and ideological conformism.
While Arnold as social critic was perceptive about many of the failings of industrial society, his visions of the perfectibility of humankind and the ideal of the State were based upon the Platonism and Hegelism that was to evolve into the perverted extremes of fascism, communism, and other totalitarianisms, the intellectual, cultural, and social origins of which Hannah Arendt later explored, and which were to almost destroy the open societies that provided the only possibility of maintaining the culture that Arnold admired, and which only survived through the efforts of the very industrial and democratic societies he deplored. In the end, for all his idealism of sweetness and light, Arnold was a socially authoritarian elitist with no interest in individual freedom and human rights, and too concerned with the perpetuation of rule by people of his cultural and intellectual status, at the expense of the mass, democratic population. Like many Victorian thinkers, he was as much an opponent of democracy as many later idealists, who unintentionally paved the way for political extremism and totalitarianism, because when it was found that the people they could or would not understand would not conform to the ideals they held as manifestly true, it was determined that they must be coerced or oppressed into conformity - into becoming their better selves for their own and the social good - on the grounds that those who held social and political power and controlled the mechanisms of the State and media were the best determinants of what culture is, what right thinking should be, and how these should be asserted and defended against criticism and popular opposition.
To be fair to Arnold, in his distinction between Hebraism and Hellenism, he does explore the dangers of narrow thinking and the limitations of moral obedience, but he does so through the prism of nineteenth century liberal Anglicanism and principally in cultural terms, and so is unable to make the intellectual leap required to understand what classical political liberalism could be, how it could serve as the protector of the individual and his internally derived values, and how its ideas could serve as the basis of an open, diverse, and instructive (but not didactic) culture, as in the later ideas of Isiaih Berlin, with his definition of positive and negative liberalism, his analogy of the hedgehog and the fox, and in his defence of pluralism. But Arnold was not a political theorist, and neither was he a democrat nor pluralist, regarding the perfectibility of man as only possible through adherence to established religion and Christian culture, particularly that engendered by the Church of England, so that one often feels the image of what Matthew Arnold regarded as exemplar of the best self was what he saw when looking in his mirror, even when it is clear his cultural idealism was politically impracticable and as much flawed as his cultural criticism was perceptive.
However, what Arnold did clearly delineate, after Augustine of Hippo, was the categorical difference between means and ends, and how the confusion between the two in a society in which economic development, technical innovation, and free trade were becoming ends in themselves, and in which behaviours and beliefs were becoming increasingly mechanised and determined by the needs of material advancement, was leading to obliviation of the truth that these were not the objects of society, but only the means by which society could obtain its ends: the cultural and intellectual perfection of its members as their better selves within a culturally, not materially, derived better society.
Similarly in his exegesis, particularly of the Pauline Epistles, later expanded upon in 'St Paul and Protestantism', Arnold sought through his understanding of Greek thought, and the Hellenistic context within which Paul wrote, to reveal how these should not be read dogmatically, as instructions to be obeyed, but as spiritual and metaphysical texts through which the Christian could attain true understanding of the meaning of Christ's life and teachings. In this way, Arnold explains how the Resurrection of the believer is not a physical process undergone after death as reward for obedience and orthopraxis, but a spiritual, internal rebirthing obtained in life through personal reasoning. Just as with culture, so the individual through reason and understanding should first discover his faith within himself, and then, just as culture attained from within the individual, as his best self, should lead towards the perfectibility of not the individual alone, but the totality of society of which the collective best selves were its manifestation, so the faith of the best self of the believer brought about by right reason, should become manifest in communal worship. For Arnold, while both culture and faith had their origins in individual, subjective mental processes, they only had validity when objectivised as part of the collective, that is the culturally derived society and the faithfully formed Church, two interconnected and interdependent constructs of the same intelligibility and beauty, since, as with the Greeks, for Arnold, culture and religion, having the same origins, were but different emanations of the same things: sweetness and light. From this, it follows that the idealised, liberal Anglicanism that he propounded was the collective realisation of the best selves of believers, in the same way the State was the ultimate, cultural realisation of the best selves of the people.
Despite his often ironic characterisation as such, Matthew Arnold was not a prophet, and as a poet he never produced an oeuvre sufficient to rank him amongst the greats, but he was a first class cultural and social critic, and it as this he deserves to be read today. These essays, controversial then, and still today, have many faults, but that is because Arnold was willing to put his head above the parapet and make a claim for culture as the foundation of all authority and social values at a time of rapid industrialisation and class antagonism, and to see in culture the single binding force of a truly equal society dedicated to the common and interconnected individual good to be found in intelligence, intelligibility, and beauty. He was wrong about the benign role of the State and did not predict the deleterious cultural impact of welfarism, and his vision was elitist and overtly Anglican, but by criticism of the materialism of his age, and of subsequent ages, and of the atomisation of excessive individualism and its concomitant subjectivism, he made in 'Culture and Anarchy' an impressive argument for the social worth of a high culture accessible to all through personal internal development, intellectual and ascetic, and put forward a claim for the importance of objectivity and cultural cohesion that is as warranted now as much as it was in his age.