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The Punic Wars: Rome, Carthage, and the Struggle for the Mediterranean
The Punic Wars triggered an era of astonishing human misfortune. Resulting from a mighty power struggle between the military confederation of Rome and the trading empire of Carthage between 264--241 B.C., 218--201 B.C., and 149--146 b.c., the wars were fought over a period of 118 years. Massive man-made devastation on both sides left RB.C.ome’s population radically depleted and Carthage razed and erased from the map.
Sir Nigel Bagnall brings his military experience and a modern professional eye to bear in analyzing the Punic Wars here. He marshals classic military strategists such as Livy, Polybius, and Diodorus to plot the wars’ campaigns in Spain, Africa, Sicily, and the Peloponnese, and follows Hannibal’s daring but unsuccessful strike into the heart of Italy.
But Bagnall goes beyond military strategy to discuss the force, structures, and politics of Rome and Carthage at their heights. And he contrasts their conduct of battle at strategic, operational, and tactical levels to show how they were governed by the same military principles used by nations today. His thought-provoking final chapter relates these wars’ lessons to modern times in an impressive argument for adapting the experience of the past to the needs of the future. While the history of the Punic Wars dates back over 2000 years, Bagnall’s comprehensive account demonstrates that this ancient conflict is remarkable both for its scope and its contemporary relevance.
Sir Nigel Bagnall brings his military experience and a modern professional eye to bear in analyzing the Punic Wars here. He marshals classic military strategists such as Livy, Polybius, and Diodorus to plot the wars’ campaigns in Spain, Africa, Sicily, and the Peloponnese, and follows Hannibal’s daring but unsuccessful strike into the heart of Italy.
But Bagnall goes beyond military strategy to discuss the force, structures, and politics of Rome and Carthage at their heights. And he contrasts their conduct of battle at strategic, operational, and tactical levels to show how they were governed by the same military principles used by nations today. His thought-provoking final chapter relates these wars’ lessons to modern times in an impressive argument for adapting the experience of the past to the needs of the future. While the history of the Punic Wars dates back over 2000 years, Bagnall’s comprehensive account demonstrates that this ancient conflict is remarkable both for its scope and its contemporary relevance.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published September 15, 1990
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About the author
Nigel Bagnall
10 books2 followersField Marshal Sir Nigel Thomas Bagnall, GCB, CVO, MC (10 February 1927 – 8 April 2002) was a career British Army officer who served as Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine, from 1983 to 1985, and then as Chief of the General Staff (CGS), the professional head of the British Army, from 1985 to 1988. Early in his military career he saw action during the Palestine Emergency, the Malayan Emergency, the Cyprus Emergency and the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation, and later in his career he provided advice to the British Government on the future role of Britain's nuclear weapons.
In retirement he became a military historian and fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. He wrote a history of the Punic wars published in 1990 and, two years after his death, he had a history of the Peloponnesian War published.
In retirement he became a military historian and fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. He wrote a history of the Punic wars published in 1990 and, two years after his death, he had a history of the Peloponnesian War published.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
June 14, 2012
This book was the first of two works by Sir Nigel Bagnall, who had been a field marshal in the British Army to which this book is dedicated. I had reviewed his later work, The Peloponnesian War: Athens, Sparta, and the Struggle for Greece, a short time ago. I was not a big fan of the other piece of history that this writer produced but I really liked this book. The Punic Wars is an incredible tale of two great civilizations that went on a collision course against each other that would result with one becoming a world power and the other completely annihilated. When writing about each of the three wars Bagnall focuses on one theater at a time, telling each theater's story rather than proceeding in complete chronological order. This helps the book flow better and does not harm the general narrative.
Bagnall starts of by giving the reader a bit of background of the two major civilizations; we know more about the Romans of course because they were not destroyed as thoroughly as they destroyed Carthage. He traces the rise of the two cities from mere cities to the heart of minor empires in the Mediterranean, one a land power and the other a sea power. Both cities have to adapt when they fought each other in the First Punic War. Rome would create a navy that would overtake Carthage, and Carthage would also learn how to use its natural military advantages such as trained elephants and a diverse Mercenary army composed of its subject peoples.
The Second Punic War focuses on the great general, Hannibal Barca. His training under his father, Hamilcar, and his rise in Spain are covered. Hannibal crosses the Alps and, for years, ravages Italy and nearly destroys Rome. The famous Fabius Maximus creates what is known as the `Fabian Strategy` in order to defend against Hanibal, that is do not fight him directly only indirectly by cutting supply lines and forms of harassment. The book covers how Rome had a hard time sticking to this strategy until the rise of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus who would ultimately beat Hannibal.
"On taking up his appointment, Scipio faced the task of welding a disparate lot into a cohesive fighting force: there were the dispirited survivors of the defeated legions, the raw reinforcements fresh out of Italy, and Spanish mercenaries of uncertain loyalty. No light task for a young man, especially one whose close relation had so intimately associated with disasters. But Publius Cornelius Scipio (later given the cognomen Africanus) was remarkable. As Polybius says, he was `perhaps the most illustrious man of any born before the present generation', and one of his first acts was to show his trust in Marcellus, the man who had striven so hard to rally the survivors of the two Scipios' shattered army, but who could now well be regarded as an awkward rival." p.206
The Third Punic War would be the end of mighty Carthage. The city would be defeated, raised, and destroyed by Scipio's grandson. The impact of Carthage, fulfilling the dream of Cato the Elder, would be erased even though another one of Scipio's own grandsons would try to argue against it.
"He pleaded that though Rome's position as the dominant power should be preserved, Carthage should not be destroyed as a rival. Were this to occur, there would be no check on Rome's arrogant disregard for the legitimate interests and the concerns of smaller states. She would lose all sense of shame when there was nobody of stature to pass judgment on her conduct and stand up for the rights of others. Moreover, in the absence of any external threat, the Roman Confederation would be in danger of disintegrating as fractious political and social groups pursued their own self-interested ends." p.307
I highly recommend this book to anyone. It is a thrilling read involving one of the greatest struggles in the history of the world: Rome and Carthage. Not until the Cold War would the world see another quite like it. This work of Nigel Bagnall was much stronger than his later work on the Peloponnesian War; however I leave open the possibility that the reason for his Punic Wars being easier to understand maybe due to the fact the the Punic Wars are an easier conflict to understand compared to the Peloponnesian War.
Bagnall starts of by giving the reader a bit of background of the two major civilizations; we know more about the Romans of course because they were not destroyed as thoroughly as they destroyed Carthage. He traces the rise of the two cities from mere cities to the heart of minor empires in the Mediterranean, one a land power and the other a sea power. Both cities have to adapt when they fought each other in the First Punic War. Rome would create a navy that would overtake Carthage, and Carthage would also learn how to use its natural military advantages such as trained elephants and a diverse Mercenary army composed of its subject peoples.
The Second Punic War focuses on the great general, Hannibal Barca. His training under his father, Hamilcar, and his rise in Spain are covered. Hannibal crosses the Alps and, for years, ravages Italy and nearly destroys Rome. The famous Fabius Maximus creates what is known as the `Fabian Strategy` in order to defend against Hanibal, that is do not fight him directly only indirectly by cutting supply lines and forms of harassment. The book covers how Rome had a hard time sticking to this strategy until the rise of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus who would ultimately beat Hannibal.
"On taking up his appointment, Scipio faced the task of welding a disparate lot into a cohesive fighting force: there were the dispirited survivors of the defeated legions, the raw reinforcements fresh out of Italy, and Spanish mercenaries of uncertain loyalty. No light task for a young man, especially one whose close relation had so intimately associated with disasters. But Publius Cornelius Scipio (later given the cognomen Africanus) was remarkable. As Polybius says, he was `perhaps the most illustrious man of any born before the present generation', and one of his first acts was to show his trust in Marcellus, the man who had striven so hard to rally the survivors of the two Scipios' shattered army, but who could now well be regarded as an awkward rival." p.206
The Third Punic War would be the end of mighty Carthage. The city would be defeated, raised, and destroyed by Scipio's grandson. The impact of Carthage, fulfilling the dream of Cato the Elder, would be erased even though another one of Scipio's own grandsons would try to argue against it.
"He pleaded that though Rome's position as the dominant power should be preserved, Carthage should not be destroyed as a rival. Were this to occur, there would be no check on Rome's arrogant disregard for the legitimate interests and the concerns of smaller states. She would lose all sense of shame when there was nobody of stature to pass judgment on her conduct and stand up for the rights of others. Moreover, in the absence of any external threat, the Roman Confederation would be in danger of disintegrating as fractious political and social groups pursued their own self-interested ends." p.307
I highly recommend this book to anyone. It is a thrilling read involving one of the greatest struggles in the history of the world: Rome and Carthage. Not until the Cold War would the world see another quite like it. This work of Nigel Bagnall was much stronger than his later work on the Peloponnesian War; however I leave open the possibility that the reason for his Punic Wars being easier to understand maybe due to the fact the the Punic Wars are an easier conflict to understand compared to the Peloponnesian War.
November 5, 2018
This is another area of history that I was very interested in learning more about. The author gives the story the perspective of a military strategist. It's not strictly written in chronological order but does at least move through them in sequence of the 1, 2nd and, 3rd war. Each of the wars ended either somewhat or decisively in Rome's favor, but when reading on the 2nd war, you get to read much about the extended land campaign in the italian peninsula and the amazing feats of Hannibal.
March 26, 2022
Second read. The book has some insights, based on Bagnall’s experience and education as a general, but the work doesn’t seem completely robust as a history. The book is better appreciated as an essay or opinion piece on these events, and even then some of his observations are not well thought out or convincingly argued.
A running theme is that the wars were a contest between the two political systems of Carthage and Rome. The fighting often became a war of attrition and endurance, as whole fleets and armies were destroyed and rebuilt. In this kind of war, Rome’s better integrated Italian confederation was able to outlast Carthage, which treated its dependencies poorly and may have suffered for it. Hannibal, it should be noted, tried to stir up the Italians against Rome after Cannae, and despite notable conversions like Capua, ultimately failed in undermining Roman recruitment and support.
He attempts to analyze the wars in terms of strategic, operational, and tactical execution. This is a mixed effort and sometimes lends itself to confusion. To start with, he acknowledges that both ancient societies didn’t have this military science framework going in, but then proceeds to criticize them though this lens anyway.
Sometimes, his approach works. In the First Punic War, for example, Xanthippus recognized that the Carthaginians should use their Numidian cavalry. Another general gave up this advantage, opting for positional defense, and lost. Xanthippus did the opposite, using his mobile arm effectively, and crushed a Roman army under Regulus.
Other times, though, Bagnall’s approach doesn’t work. In the same war, the Romans lacked a clear strategic objective and operations were conducted chaotically at best. This may be due to the fact that consuls served one-year appointments, and they led the warfighting. Even so, the Romans won. This deserves an explanation, as it seems to run contrary to his analysis, but Bagnall doesn’t offer one.
It’s therefore unclear what his thesis is, or the point of analyzing the battles this way, or why he chose this frame of reference vs others. One could just as well apply Sun Tzu maxims or the US military’s Principles of War to these events; Bagnall does not explain why his criteria are superior over any other.
He also includes leadership as another factor, but this is inconsistently developed. So, at Zama, Bagnall portrays the two armies were evenly matched, but Scipio won because he was the better general. And yet Bagnall rates Hannibal as the better overall commander. In arguing things like this, his conclusions seem superficial and don’t make much sense upon further reflection.
Yes, Hannibal won battles, but he didn’t achieve a break up of the Roman confederation, and he took an army into Roman lands but was too weak to besiege the capital or otherwise dictate terms. Worse, his army was worthlessly marking time in Italy while Scipio was dictating terms to Carthage. So, it is hard to see how Bagnall’s analysis stands up to scrutiny when examining it on his own terms.
It is also difficult to assess Carthaginian strategy because Bagnall does not explain how Carthage was working with Hannibal, who largely started the Second Punic War on his own. We are just to assume that each side was working on some coordinated plan, when decisions may have been ad hoc.
He seems to misunderstand the Gauls (and all similar peoples who attacked Rome) when he criticizes them for the operational failure of not seizing Rome, but rather returning home loaded down with loot. It doesn’t seem to occur to him that loot was the operational objective, that Rome would have provided the best source for it, and the raiders got what they wanted elsewhere. In any case, it’s not clear what the Gauls’ strategy was, or if they had a clear political aim, if only because their story is told through secondary Roman sources. So, applying this kind of outside analytical framework isn’t fruitful.
The fallacy of this approach is underscored when you think about how it may apply to other areas of ancient life. It doesn’t make much sense for an MBA to critique the olive oil for supply chain inefficiencies. Nor does it make much sense to criticize Roman and Greek doctors for not practicing medicine based on germ theory and the scientific method. These people did not think that way, simply because they did not have 2000 years to develop these intellectual systems.
Similarly, it is quite possible that warfare, like so many other aspects of these ancient civilizations, were still developing, and therefore were a long way away from the principles that we consider essentially true and correct today. Otherwise, we could just as plausibly condemn the Romans for not following the Geneva Conventions.
On balance, then, it’s questionable whether re-examining these wars through a twentieth-century military science lens has much meaning. It’s worth remembering that Rome, Carthage, or the (especially) Cisalpine Gallic tribes didn’t have a Pentagon, and so a reader should take Bagnall’s observations with a grain of salt. Instead, it may be better for us to try to understand these events as the Romans and Carthaginians themselves understood them; that is the job of a historian after all.
There are numerous editing oversights, which are distracting. Maybe I am too used to Kindle now, where I can adjust the type size, but the type in this print version seemed small and a challenge to read comfortably. Offsetting these quality issue are the seven maps that accompany the text. They are well drawn and detailed, and help follow the narrative in most places. They are generally better at the strategic level, less so at the operational and tactical.
A running theme is that the wars were a contest between the two political systems of Carthage and Rome. The fighting often became a war of attrition and endurance, as whole fleets and armies were destroyed and rebuilt. In this kind of war, Rome’s better integrated Italian confederation was able to outlast Carthage, which treated its dependencies poorly and may have suffered for it. Hannibal, it should be noted, tried to stir up the Italians against Rome after Cannae, and despite notable conversions like Capua, ultimately failed in undermining Roman recruitment and support.
He attempts to analyze the wars in terms of strategic, operational, and tactical execution. This is a mixed effort and sometimes lends itself to confusion. To start with, he acknowledges that both ancient societies didn’t have this military science framework going in, but then proceeds to criticize them though this lens anyway.
Sometimes, his approach works. In the First Punic War, for example, Xanthippus recognized that the Carthaginians should use their Numidian cavalry. Another general gave up this advantage, opting for positional defense, and lost. Xanthippus did the opposite, using his mobile arm effectively, and crushed a Roman army under Regulus.
Other times, though, Bagnall’s approach doesn’t work. In the same war, the Romans lacked a clear strategic objective and operations were conducted chaotically at best. This may be due to the fact that consuls served one-year appointments, and they led the warfighting. Even so, the Romans won. This deserves an explanation, as it seems to run contrary to his analysis, but Bagnall doesn’t offer one.
It’s therefore unclear what his thesis is, or the point of analyzing the battles this way, or why he chose this frame of reference vs others. One could just as well apply Sun Tzu maxims or the US military’s Principles of War to these events; Bagnall does not explain why his criteria are superior over any other.
He also includes leadership as another factor, but this is inconsistently developed. So, at Zama, Bagnall portrays the two armies were evenly matched, but Scipio won because he was the better general. And yet Bagnall rates Hannibal as the better overall commander. In arguing things like this, his conclusions seem superficial and don’t make much sense upon further reflection.
Yes, Hannibal won battles, but he didn’t achieve a break up of the Roman confederation, and he took an army into Roman lands but was too weak to besiege the capital or otherwise dictate terms. Worse, his army was worthlessly marking time in Italy while Scipio was dictating terms to Carthage. So, it is hard to see how Bagnall’s analysis stands up to scrutiny when examining it on his own terms.
It is also difficult to assess Carthaginian strategy because Bagnall does not explain how Carthage was working with Hannibal, who largely started the Second Punic War on his own. We are just to assume that each side was working on some coordinated plan, when decisions may have been ad hoc.
He seems to misunderstand the Gauls (and all similar peoples who attacked Rome) when he criticizes them for the operational failure of not seizing Rome, but rather returning home loaded down with loot. It doesn’t seem to occur to him that loot was the operational objective, that Rome would have provided the best source for it, and the raiders got what they wanted elsewhere. In any case, it’s not clear what the Gauls’ strategy was, or if they had a clear political aim, if only because their story is told through secondary Roman sources. So, applying this kind of outside analytical framework isn’t fruitful.
The fallacy of this approach is underscored when you think about how it may apply to other areas of ancient life. It doesn’t make much sense for an MBA to critique the olive oil for supply chain inefficiencies. Nor does it make much sense to criticize Roman and Greek doctors for not practicing medicine based on germ theory and the scientific method. These people did not think that way, simply because they did not have 2000 years to develop these intellectual systems.
Similarly, it is quite possible that warfare, like so many other aspects of these ancient civilizations, were still developing, and therefore were a long way away from the principles that we consider essentially true and correct today. Otherwise, we could just as plausibly condemn the Romans for not following the Geneva Conventions.
On balance, then, it’s questionable whether re-examining these wars through a twentieth-century military science lens has much meaning. It’s worth remembering that Rome, Carthage, or the (especially) Cisalpine Gallic tribes didn’t have a Pentagon, and so a reader should take Bagnall’s observations with a grain of salt. Instead, it may be better for us to try to understand these events as the Romans and Carthaginians themselves understood them; that is the job of a historian after all.
There are numerous editing oversights, which are distracting. Maybe I am too used to Kindle now, where I can adjust the type size, but the type in this print version seemed small and a challenge to read comfortably. Offsetting these quality issue are the seven maps that accompany the text. They are well drawn and detailed, and help follow the narrative in most places. They are generally better at the strategic level, less so at the operational and tactical.
August 31, 2022
Despite a personal interest in the Roman Republic/Empire, I've always collected but never read books on the topic that veer perilously close to "textbook" quality. I have book lying around about the Byzantine economy, and another about Roman military technologies. This deep dive into the Punic wars was an attempt at getting deep into my hobby, and I managed to actually finish the book. Bagnall's contemporary commentary was welcome. I know others chafe at the modern politics and so discount the author's commentary, but I find a modern military mind's analysis means that ancient tactics and strategy are more approachable. Did the Roman's actually have a principle of defense-in-depth? Perhaps, perhaps not -- they just ended up with something that looks really similar through trial and bloody error. But explaining events through these modern principles makes ancient battles easily accessible and that's probably the greatest value that the author provides.
A hearty recommendation from me. You could read wikipedia, but you'd lose the insight that makes it valuable.
A hearty recommendation from me. You could read wikipedia, but you'd lose the insight that makes it valuable.
January 30, 2015
As far as second careers go, there are worse things for a career military man to do than write histories of two of the most famous conflicts in ancient history. Retired UK Field Marshal Nigel Bagnall first of these, in order of writing if not in order of historic occurrence, is his fine history of the Punic Wars, the long (the first two anyway) and bloody conflicts that saw Carthage's extermination and Rome's ascendancy as the paramount central and western Mediterranean power.
He starts with an overall survey of the two combatants with a précis of their respective histories, constitutions, military forces and religions. It's a good backgrounder although the relevance of the religions isn't made manifest in the book. His survey of Sicily is particularly good with an emphasis on Syracuse as a counterbalance to Carthage's power in Sicily and the chapter also presages his take on the causes of the First Punic War by arguing there were no overwhelming strategic reasons for the land-bound Rome to go to war with the maritime Carthage. The reasons sprang from unstable politics in what could be called a neutral zone in eastern Sicily between Rome and Carthage. The Roman move in Messana (which included evicting the Carthaginian garrison) which started the First Punic War is argued by Bagnall to be an act of short-term opportunism against a Carthage that posed no threat to Rome. Here I think Bagnall overlooks what Rome would've perceived as the importance of the Syracusan counterweight as a Carthaginian foothold there could've blocked off any future Roman intervention against a future move against Syracuse.
His narrative of the First Punic War sets the tone for the whole book. The narrative style is lucid and engaging and interspersed with his expert military analysis. One good example on a tactical level is Xanthippus correcting the earlier Carthaginian error of defending on broken ground which nullified their advantage in cavalry with an open-ground battle at Tunis where he crushed the Roman army.
His analyses are the strongest draw. His extended commentary (a whole chapter after the close of the First Punic War) breaks down, for the uninitiated, the difference between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare. His analysis of the Roman and Carthaginian efforts will follow that breakdown. Strategically, he asserts that the opportunistic nature of Rome’s move into Messana also meant that they started with no coherent strategy. Carthage arguably missed a strategic opportunity in not using its naval assets to go on the offensive in Italy, something which Hannibal would rectify. Bagnall’s speculation that Carthage chose a more defensive strategy because of early reverses that led them to a permanent sense of tactical inferiority against the Romans is a good one. Again, this is something that Hannibal would rectify in the rematch. Rome also made the mistake of diffusive initiatives and failed to develop an effective cavalry arm. They would pay a far higher price for that in the next conflict.
He even subjects the conflicts of the entr’acte to this analysis, for example faulting the Illyrians in the losing war against Rome with objectives that their force structure couldn’t support. In fact, a strong point of this book is a close look at those conflicts with the Carthaginian conquest of Spain being particularly important for future events while Rome’s essentially shaking down a weakened Carthage for Sardinia and Corsica does much to explain Carthage’s desire for revenge.
Bagnall also does a fine job with the Second Punic War. He highlights Hannibal’s successful use of maneuver and mobile forces in his three epic victories at the Trebbia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae and overall illumines how much of Carthage’s effort in Italy owed to Hannibal’s genius. He explains Hannibal’s strategy as being fundamentally political. Hannibal didn’t expect to be able to take and burn down Rome, but he could break its political hold on its allies but repeatedly smashing Rome’s armies. This required that he exploit his superior operational and tactical mobility. However, as Bagnall observes, once Hannibal acquired allies which defected from Rome, his need to protect them smothered that flexibility.
His take on the Spanish and African campaigns of Scipio Africanus illustrates another argument of the book which is that victory would go to the party that could best move away from its preexisting doctinres. For example, Scipio’s willingness to bypass the Carthaginian armies to effect a coup de main against the Carthaginian base at Nova Carthago. Likewise, his brilliant victory at Ilipa was a function of his ability to wrong-foot the Carthaginian’s through a change in the disposition of his army.
The Third Punic War isn’t given as much coverage but it’s still done well. Bagnall’s epilogue is a good summing up of the strategic/operational/tactical lessons learned but I thought his attempt to analogize those to contemporary (for 1990) politics was awkward and misplaced. There are surely better ways to address the idea of NATO military preparedness, for example, then drawing attention to Carthage’s lack thereof at the onset of the First Punic War.
Although Bagnall became a fellow at Oxford's Balliol College after retirement, he was not a professional historian and this work is more of a narrative book than a scholarly one. You won't find indications of original research, there are no foot/endnotes and only a limited bibliography. On the other hand, where the classical sources conflict, his comparative analyses are plausible. It is a fine work nonetheless and I'd certainly recommend it as an introduction to the subject especially as it covers all three of the Punic Wars at once.
He starts with an overall survey of the two combatants with a précis of their respective histories, constitutions, military forces and religions. It's a good backgrounder although the relevance of the religions isn't made manifest in the book. His survey of Sicily is particularly good with an emphasis on Syracuse as a counterbalance to Carthage's power in Sicily and the chapter also presages his take on the causes of the First Punic War by arguing there were no overwhelming strategic reasons for the land-bound Rome to go to war with the maritime Carthage. The reasons sprang from unstable politics in what could be called a neutral zone in eastern Sicily between Rome and Carthage. The Roman move in Messana (which included evicting the Carthaginian garrison) which started the First Punic War is argued by Bagnall to be an act of short-term opportunism against a Carthage that posed no threat to Rome. Here I think Bagnall overlooks what Rome would've perceived as the importance of the Syracusan counterweight as a Carthaginian foothold there could've blocked off any future Roman intervention against a future move against Syracuse.
His narrative of the First Punic War sets the tone for the whole book. The narrative style is lucid and engaging and interspersed with his expert military analysis. One good example on a tactical level is Xanthippus correcting the earlier Carthaginian error of defending on broken ground which nullified their advantage in cavalry with an open-ground battle at Tunis where he crushed the Roman army.
His analyses are the strongest draw. His extended commentary (a whole chapter after the close of the First Punic War) breaks down, for the uninitiated, the difference between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare. His analysis of the Roman and Carthaginian efforts will follow that breakdown. Strategically, he asserts that the opportunistic nature of Rome’s move into Messana also meant that they started with no coherent strategy. Carthage arguably missed a strategic opportunity in not using its naval assets to go on the offensive in Italy, something which Hannibal would rectify. Bagnall’s speculation that Carthage chose a more defensive strategy because of early reverses that led them to a permanent sense of tactical inferiority against the Romans is a good one. Again, this is something that Hannibal would rectify in the rematch. Rome also made the mistake of diffusive initiatives and failed to develop an effective cavalry arm. They would pay a far higher price for that in the next conflict.
He even subjects the conflicts of the entr’acte to this analysis, for example faulting the Illyrians in the losing war against Rome with objectives that their force structure couldn’t support. In fact, a strong point of this book is a close look at those conflicts with the Carthaginian conquest of Spain being particularly important for future events while Rome’s essentially shaking down a weakened Carthage for Sardinia and Corsica does much to explain Carthage’s desire for revenge.
Bagnall also does a fine job with the Second Punic War. He highlights Hannibal’s successful use of maneuver and mobile forces in his three epic victories at the Trebbia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae and overall illumines how much of Carthage’s effort in Italy owed to Hannibal’s genius. He explains Hannibal’s strategy as being fundamentally political. Hannibal didn’t expect to be able to take and burn down Rome, but he could break its political hold on its allies but repeatedly smashing Rome’s armies. This required that he exploit his superior operational and tactical mobility. However, as Bagnall observes, once Hannibal acquired allies which defected from Rome, his need to protect them smothered that flexibility.
His take on the Spanish and African campaigns of Scipio Africanus illustrates another argument of the book which is that victory would go to the party that could best move away from its preexisting doctinres. For example, Scipio’s willingness to bypass the Carthaginian armies to effect a coup de main against the Carthaginian base at Nova Carthago. Likewise, his brilliant victory at Ilipa was a function of his ability to wrong-foot the Carthaginian’s through a change in the disposition of his army.
The Third Punic War isn’t given as much coverage but it’s still done well. Bagnall’s epilogue is a good summing up of the strategic/operational/tactical lessons learned but I thought his attempt to analogize those to contemporary (for 1990) politics was awkward and misplaced. There are surely better ways to address the idea of NATO military preparedness, for example, then drawing attention to Carthage’s lack thereof at the onset of the First Punic War.
Although Bagnall became a fellow at Oxford's Balliol College after retirement, he was not a professional historian and this work is more of a narrative book than a scholarly one. You won't find indications of original research, there are no foot/endnotes and only a limited bibliography. On the other hand, where the classical sources conflict, his comparative analyses are plausible. It is a fine work nonetheless and I'd certainly recommend it as an introduction to the subject especially as it covers all three of the Punic Wars at once.
October 31, 2016
If you want to understand how the Roman Empire evolved into the worlds greatest super power this is the book to read.
March 6, 2018
Recommended.
May 22, 2018
Excellent factual account of the events involved, with an emphasis on military strategy. Might be a bit dry for some, but as a history fan I got a lot out of it.
July 20, 2019
Strategically, tactically and operationally written.
September 12, 2020
Overall a great read since I had known little about the time period. Great commentary also helped me extract lessons from history.
November 29, 2009
This book by Nigel Bagnall, a Field Marshal in the British Army, is one of the best books I have ever read covering Ancient military history. This book introduced me to the lifes and times of such great leaders as Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal and Scipio Africanus to name a few. The author presents a well researched account of the military struggle between Rome and Carthage and does it so well that the book is a joy to read. The book covers the First Punic War, 264-242 BC, the period between the wars (241 - 218 BC), the Second Punic War, 218 - 201 BC and the third and final Punic War between 149 - 148 BC which saw the destruction of Carthage as a power and as a city! A great book!!!!
May 13, 2015
I usually don't like military history but Bagnall shows enough of the cultural and political history to put it into context. I thought he did a very good job of showing how and why the wars started as well as lessons to be learned (whether you agree or not).
December 29, 2015
One very interesting and quality history book.
Read
March 22, 2018brilliant book
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews