Orations, Volume I: Orations 1–17 and 20: Olynthiacs. Philippics. Minor Public Orations

by Demosthenes, C.A. Vince (Translator), J.H. Vince (Translator)

Demosthenes (384-322 BCE), orator at Athens, was a pleader in law courts who later became also a statesman, champion of the past greatness of his city and the present resistance of Greece to the rise of Philip of Macedon to supremacy. We possess by him political speeches and law-court speeches composed for parties in private cases and political cases. His early reputation as the best of Greek orators rests on his steadfastness of purpose, his sincerity, his clear and pungent argument, and his severe control of language. In his law cases he is the advocate, in his political speeches a castigator not of his opponents but of their politics. Demosthenes gives us vivid pictures of public and private life of his time.

The Loeb Classical Library edition of Demosthenes is in seven volumes. The first of the seven volumes of the Demosthenes edition contains nine famous speeches in which he attempted to rouse athenian alarm about Macedonian ambitions: the three "Olynthiacs," the four "Philippics," "On the Peace," and "On the Chersonese." Here too are Philip of Macedon's letter to Athens declaring war and the Answer to Philip's letter.

Genres: History, Classics, Greece, Nonfiction, Law

640 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 323

About the author

Demosthenes was a prominent Greek statesman and orator of ancient Athens. His orations constitute a significant expression of contemporary Athenian intellectual prowess and provide an insight into the politics and culture of ancient Greece during the 4th century BC. Demosthenes learned rhetoric by studying the speeches of previous great orators. He delivered his first judicial speeches at the age of 20, in which he argued effectively to gain from his guardians what was left of his inheritance. For a time, Demosthenes made his living as a professional speech-writer (logographer) and a lawyer, writing speeches for use in private legal suits.

Reviews

[Tom · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perhaps Mark Twain read Demosthenes before making this statement: History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.

This was a fun read not only because Demosthenes was one of the greatest orators to have ever lived, but because of the parallels that become so apparent while reading his great speeches. For example...

In 350 BC, Philip of Macedonia threatened Olynthus, so the Olynthians appealed to Athens. Philip had taken over several territories, but Athens refused to act. Those in the "peace-at-any-price" party argued that Philip was too strong, so it was no use. Those in the "war-party" called for the appropriation of a "Fund" to support the Olynthians. The proposal was quashed as unconstitutional. Demosthenes was adamant that Athens should support the Olynthians against Philip to not only prevent Macedonia from expanding its empire, but to weaken the ever-aggressive Philip and ultimately protect Athens in the long-run.

After recounting the several territories Philip had taken, Demosthenes tells the Athenians, "if we had at that time shown the required zeal in marching to the help of the first that appealed, we should have found Philip today much more humble and accommodating. Unfortunately we always neglect the present chance and imagine that the future will right itself, and so, men of Athens, Philip has us to thank for his prosperity. We have raised him to a greater height than ever king of Macedonia reached before. Today this opportunity comes to us from the Olynthians unsought, a fairer opportunity than we have ever had before [to weaken Philip]. . . . But if we leave these men too in the lurch, Athenians, and then Olynthus is crushed by Philip, tell me what is to prevent him from marching henceforward just where he pleases."

Athens eventually sent support, but it was too late. Olynthus fell in 348.

Twelve years later, Philip was assassinated.

History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme. ~ Mark Twain

https://x.com/__Andersen__/status/176...

[Tony · Rating 5 out of 5]

There is a tradition of applying these speeches to the foreign policy of one's own day. These speeches against an aggressor appear strangely topical in 2022-23, with Putin's neo-imperial project in Ukraine providing parallels that can be drawn easily enough with Philip of Macedon's expansionist threats against Hellas. e.g. "Philip is drunk with the magnitude of his achievements and dreams of further triumphs" (Dem.4.49); "Philip is convicted of violating the peace" (Dem 6.2); "If we are going to wait for him to acknowledge a state of war with us, we are indeed the simplest of mortals; for even if he marches straight against [us], he will not admit it" (Dem 9.10); " calmly plundering and stripping the Greeks one by one, ... attacking their cities and reducing them to slavery" (Dem 9.22); "he will never desist from molesting all of us and bringing us under his sway, unless someone restrains him (Dem 10.10); "the first thing needful [is] to recognize in Philip the inveterate enemy of constitutional government and democracy" (Dem 8.43; repeated 10.15). And Demosthenes' counsel: "all who aim at their own aggrandizement must be checked" (Dem 6.3); "the object both of our words and deeds must be to check and chastise his arrogance" (Dem 9.1); "The patriots demanded a war-subsidy, the others denied its necessity; the patriots bade them fight on and mistrust Philip" (Dem 9.63); "if you offer a whole-hearted and unanimous opposition to Philip, you will beat him" (Dem. 10.59)

However, the speeches deserve to be put in their own context, rather than read instrumentally. In Olynthiac 3, Demosthenes accurately predicts that the menace from Macedonia would eventually threaten Attica itself, although he could not have known how bad the outcome would be in 338 BC after the Battle of Chaeronea. Demosthenes was, of course, ignored or under-appreciated every time he suggested it was better to fight Philip in far away places like Olynthus, or Byzantium, or the Chersonese ("throw away our present chances." Dem.3.9) before Philip turned to his ultimate goal of defeating Athens & Thebes. It may be that Demosthenes always knew that Athens was fighting a doomed rearguard action, as he puts it "the perils of a noble cause" (Dem. 18.201), although of course never admitting as much to his audience that he was attempting to gear up for war; he claims, after the Macedonians achieved their hegemony over all of Hellas, that "everything has turned out as [he] predicted" (Dem. 18.80). The reader of the Olynthiacs, the Philippics, etc. has the chance to witness the application of persuasive rhetoric in the formation of policy, oratory that ultimately put a force in the field in an attempt to withstand the advancing Macedonians, a policy that was brave but "under the dominion of chance" (Dem 8.69).

That force mustered against Philip was a combined Athenian & Theban force, but these speeches do not show how the two peoples/nations overcame their recent enmity to face the onslaught together, at Chaeronea; there's something missing in the Philippics, even before one philosophizes about the fortunes of war refusing to break their way. In part, the reason why the rapprochement between Athens and Thebes is not treated here is because two other orators, "Aristophon, and after him Eubulus," rather than Demosthenes, took the lead in the policy aiming "to promote a good understanding between Athens and Thebes" (Dem 18.162). But their overtures to Thebes were not as important as the facts on the ground: arguably, the point in time when the two rival cities overcame their differences and recognized together their common peril was the moment when Philip of Macedon seized Elatea (339 BC), under pretext of leading the Amphictyonic League, that's "When the Thebans saw the trick, [and] promptly changed their minds and joined our side." (Dem.18.153)

By the by, Demosthenes had to demonize Philip in order to rouse his fellow Athenians to fight against him, but Demosthenes was wrong that Philip was bent on the "annihilation" of Athens. (Dem. 8.60); Philip intended to gain control of it and its navy, in order to turn the Athenian resources against his next foe, the Persians in Asia Minor, a plan eventually carried out by Alexander. Nonethless, Philip had razed Phocis, as he had previously razed Olynthos; he destroyed Amfissa, Methone and Apollonia, and devastated Halus; and Alexander did raze Thebes, so the characterization of the Macedonian invaders as city-destroyers by Demosthenes seems fair enough. Demosthenes did the rounds of Hellas warning other Greek cities of this dire prospect, in a 'it-could-be-you-next' ambassadorship ("what do you think he will do when he has got each of us separately into his clutches?" Dem.9.35).

As to the translation, I can only offer some doubts about the prevelance of the language of 'interest of state' (raison d'état), in speeches made in Greek, 349-330BC. There are alternative translations in English available: perhaps more importantly is that all the appeals to 'interest', whether made by Philip in his letters or by Demosthenes in his speeches, appear to be red-herrings; the unmasking of Philip's true intentions was relatively easy enough, once he had betrayed his plan at Elatea, so that Demosthenes could cast aspersions on Philip for that "factitious humanity in which he clothed himself" (Dem. 18 231), pretending to be invading in the interests of those he was in the process of subjugating; however, it could be that appeals made by Demosthenes as well to the 'interests of the city' of Athens were not what they seemed; in the later On the Crown (see Vol.2) it's clear that in opposing Philip, Demosthenes always intended Athens to be making a play in a different kind of game, on a different and higher playing field than a mere battlefield, namely, "the perilous contention for primacy, and honor, and renown" (Dem. 18.203). In many respects, that background context in which Demosthenes was striving, and obliging both his city and that of Thebes to commit to—and at that, mostly without the knowledge of his compatriots whom he was hoodwinking, in a sense, in sending them off to fight against Philip—was antithetical to the immediate interests of the city, or of its forces sacrificed on the battlefield, sacrificed for a cause that Demosthenes may well have known could not be won.

In volume II, you can find the related speeches by Demosthenes: On the Crown (Dem.18) and On the False Embassy (Dem.19) = Public Orations XVIII and XIX. However, the latter (Dem.19) is both tedious, and over long, so it's no wonder Demosthenes failed to carry the day on that occasion. The misleading ambassadors in question were Aeschines and Philocrates, who misrepresented to the Athenian Assembly that Philip's real hostility was directed against the Thebans, rather than Athens, at a crucial point (in July 346 BC) when Athenian intervention against his advance could have made a difference. Aeschines gets his come-uppance finally in 330BC with Dem.18, a speech described as a complete victory for Demosthenes.

[Kristen Fort · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is kind of hard to really review a) ancient texts b) near ancient translations (kidding, slightly, but first printed in 1930) BUT if you find Philip and Alexander fascinating and the Athenians' response to Philip, Demosthenes should be checked out.