Germany was never able to match the power of the Allied air forces with their great four-engine bombers, the Lancasters, Liberators and Flying Fortresses. Indeed, many have ascribed the defeat of Germany in the Second World to its lack of a strategic bombing force. There were, though, two occasions when the Luftwaffe’s twin-engine bombers undertook strategic objectives on a large scale. The first of these was the ‘Blitz’ of 1940-1941, in which the Luftwaffe attempted to wreck Britain’s industrial and military capacity. The second was on the eve of Operation Zitadelle, a major offensive against Soviet forces in the Kursk salient.
Hitler’s objective was to replicate the successful Allied mass-bombing of German cities, the Luftwaffe being tasked with destroying the main tank and aircraft production facilities and fuel depots. Hitler saw this as the necessary prelude to weaken the Russians before the ‘decisive’ onslaught of Zitadelle.
The aerial operation, Carmen II, lasted for a month and covered a huge target area from the Rybinsk reservoir to the Caspian Sea. For these complex and risky night missions, all the Ju-88 and Не-111 bombers available to Hitler in the East were employed.
The authors have collected a huge amount of factual material, reconstructing all the details of this little-known campaign, which was the largest operation Luftwaffe on the Eastern front. This book opens a completely new page in the history of the German air war and provides a comprehensive investigation into the nature of the targets attacked, the degree of damage suffered by the Soviet military machine, and how this affected Operation Zitadelle.
The descriptions of the dangerous missions carried out by Luftwaffe as part of this operation are presented in great detail and all these exclusive facts are complemented by a large number of unique photos and documents.
This book offer an insight into large scale and important but virtually unknown bombing campaign. Authors show how even in June 1943, when fortunes of war were already turning against Germans, Luftwaffe was able to launch and sustain large scale strategic offensive against selected Soviet industrial targets. In the end offensive was successful in that it destroyed selected targets and Germans suffered low casualties but not successful in that Germans selected wrong targets, kept bombing already disabled sites and that it didn't disrupt industry to the degree Germans hoped for.
Authors argue that for maximum effect Germans should have gone for few crucial power plants that would disrupt Soviet war industry to much greater degree that destroying few, even if large, industrial sites did. And that while destruction and disruption were immense Soviets were able to relatively quickly fix the issues, even if with shoddy work.
Authors also don't shy away from heaping criticism on Soviet air defences, from overall strategy to poor training and planning resulting in overall poor performance which allowed Germans to bomb same cities for several days, even using same entry and exit routes. Such criticism goes a bit too far in places where authors sympathise with Germans more than with Soviets "Germans managed to escape brutal Soviet captors". Overall a very interesting book using plenty of primary sources such as war diaries and reports that detail actual damage done and repair efforts. Final chapter where authors try to find link between Luftwaffe's bad performance during the war and Göring's personality and upbringing are best skipped, though.
Great overall book about an little known event on the Eastern Front . This is a compelling book that shows in livid ways the haphazard organizations of the Soviet Union that faced a strategic bombing campaign by the Luftwaffe mediums bombers(The Junker Ju 88 and Heinkel He)111.
Its written in a compelling side that truly seize on the inefficient anti-air and night fighters of the Soviet Union. In a way , just comparing the Volga area bombing of June 1943 at Gorki to the USAAF 1943 heavy bombers(Boeing B 17, Consolidated Liberators) campaign in Schweinfurt and the Rhine were the bombing whas mauled and suffered heavy lost for mitigating damage and the other totelly oblitared crucial factories.
The authors also mentions the effect of the Volga bombing campagin and also the whys it didn,t tips tha balance in 1943(lend lease supplies were arriving in great quantities at that time and the Ural industrial region was building more percentage of war material than in 1941 or 1942 so it mitigated the heavy loss of Gorki tank factory and Yaroslav tyre plant loss.
The authors even ponders in showing the effect of the multi fronts war the Luftwaffe had to fight some missed opportunities as bombing the Volga dams. The destruction or just even major damage to one of the Volga dams could have severly crippled the Soviet war effort. What are factories without a power source. It could have delayed or mitigated Bagration.