Longacre's superb book addresses a significant gap in our understanding of the United States' victory in the American Civil War. —Barbara A. Gannon, Pennsylvania Heritage
Gen. David McMurtrie Gregg (1833–1917) was one of the ablest and most successful commanders of cavalry in any Civil War army. Pennsylvania-born, West Point–educated, and deeply experienced in cavalry operations prior to the conflict, his career personified that of the typical cavalry officer in the mid-nineteenth-century American army. Gregg achieved distinction on many battlefields, including those during the Peninsula, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Bristoe, Overland, and Petersburg campaigns, ultimately gaining the rank of brevet major general as leader of the Second Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac. The highlight of his service occurred on July 3, 1863, the climactic third day at Gettysburg, when he led his own command as well as the brigade of Brig. Gen. George Armstrong Custer in repulsing an attempt by thousands of Confederate cavalry under the legendary J. E. B. Stuart in attacking the right flank and rear of the Union Army while Pickett’s charge struck its front and center.Historians credit Gregg with helping preserve the security of his army at a critical point, making Union victory inevitable. Unlike glory-hunters such as Custer and Stuart, Gregg was a quietly competent veteran who never promoted himself or sought personal recognition for his service. Rarely has a military commander of such distinction been denied a biographer’s tribute. Gregg’s time is long overdue.
The title of this book is an accurate summation, as David Gregg was a consummate professional with little taste for the spotlight, an admirable quality which was of little personal value in a military where promotion often depended on a good press and good political connections. Still, coming off his professional zenith at the battle of Gettysburg, one is left with the question of why Gregg saw fit to resign from service in January of 1865. Longacre believes that family business, increasing ill health, and poor personal morale (by this point in the war Gregg was mostly a place-holder on an organization chart) are the most likely explanations. Set aside are more lurid theories such as an unwillingness to serve under Phil Sheridan (unlikely considering the post-war good relations of the two men), or being out of sympathy with late-war politics (a little more likely). Reading between the lines myself, one could speculate that Gregg might have lost the confidence of George Meade and some of the other corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac, due to a number of fights where Gregg can be interpreted as lacking a certain amount of "grip;" the ascendancy of Grant and Sheridan might well have saved Gregg's career, if not his promotion potential.
Apart from that, besides being a military life of Gregg, this book also works quite well as a focused analysis of the command politics of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac; the quality that lifts this study above being just another biography of a little-known general (otherwise I would have only handed out three stars).
Gregg left no letters or recollections. That makes any biography hard. Longacre does not though go any extra miles to warrant this book. He has no great insights here not even on Gregg's sudden departure from the army. Still, it is well written and argued book so not bad, just unremarkable and unneeded.