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The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century
How the Chinese Communist Party maintains its power by both repressing and responding to its people
Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has maintained unrivaled control over the country, persisting even in the face of economic calamity, widespread social upheaval, and violence against its own people. Yet the party does not sustain dominance through repressive tactics alone--it pairs this with surprising responsiveness to the public. The Party and the People explores how this paradox has helped the CCP endure for decades, and how this balance has shifted increasingly toward repression under the rule of President Xi Jinping.
Delving into the tenuous binary of repression and responsivity, Bruce Dickson illuminates numerous questions surrounding the CCP's rule: How does it choose leaders and create policies? When does it allow protests? Will China become democratic? Dickson shows that the party's dual approach lies at the core of its practices--repression when dealing with existential, political threats or challenges to its authority, and responsiveness when confronting localized economic or social unrest. The state answers favorably to the demands of protesters on certain issues, such as local environmental hazards and healthcare, but deals harshly with others, such as protests in Tibet, Xinjiang, or Hong Kong. With the CCP's greater reliance on suppression since Xi Jinping's rise to power in 2012, Dickson considers the ways that this tipping of the scales will influence China's future.
Bringing together a vast body of sources, The Party and the People sheds new light on how the relationship between the Chinese state and its citizens shapes governance.
Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has maintained unrivaled control over the country, persisting even in the face of economic calamity, widespread social upheaval, and violence against its own people. Yet the party does not sustain dominance through repressive tactics alone--it pairs this with surprising responsiveness to the public. The Party and the People explores how this paradox has helped the CCP endure for decades, and how this balance has shifted increasingly toward repression under the rule of President Xi Jinping.
Delving into the tenuous binary of repression and responsivity, Bruce Dickson illuminates numerous questions surrounding the CCP's rule: How does it choose leaders and create policies? When does it allow protests? Will China become democratic? Dickson shows that the party's dual approach lies at the core of its practices--repression when dealing with existential, political threats or challenges to its authority, and responsiveness when confronting localized economic or social unrest. The state answers favorably to the demands of protesters on certain issues, such as local environmental hazards and healthcare, but deals harshly with others, such as protests in Tibet, Xinjiang, or Hong Kong. With the CCP's greater reliance on suppression since Xi Jinping's rise to power in 2012, Dickson considers the ways that this tipping of the scales will influence China's future.
Bringing together a vast body of sources, The Party and the People sheds new light on how the relationship between the Chinese state and its citizens shapes governance.
328 pages, Hardcover
Published May 25, 2021
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 31 reviews
July 9, 2022
Designed for a general audience, The Party and the People focuses on "big questions in Chinese politics", and that is still deeply valuable. Dickson describes the Chinese political system as having "responsiveness without accountability" - that is, responsive to concerns of the general population on material issues while still retaining one-party control.
Subsequent chapters discuss how the CCP retains power, how leadership is chosen, how policy decisions are made, if China has a civil society at all, if political protests threaten regime stability, the relationship between the CCP and organized religion, and the expressions of Han nationalism. The concluding chapters include some speculation on the process of democratization and the arguments for if democratization will happen or not; Dickson is ambivalent on this. He also provides some points of further tensions in administraiton, but notes that Leninist vanguard parties can be tenacious in holding on to power.
A solid look at the party-state; suitable for the general reader or maybe some undergraduate courses.
Subsequent chapters discuss how the CCP retains power, how leadership is chosen, how policy decisions are made, if China has a civil society at all, if political protests threaten regime stability, the relationship between the CCP and organized religion, and the expressions of Han nationalism. The concluding chapters include some speculation on the process of democratization and the arguments for if democratization will happen or not; Dickson is ambivalent on this. He also provides some points of further tensions in administraiton, but notes that Leninist vanguard parties can be tenacious in holding on to power.
A solid look at the party-state; suitable for the general reader or maybe some undergraduate courses.
April 23, 2024
I found this to be an excellent primer on contemporary Chinese politics and society. Each chapter introduces and then attempts to analyze and answer (without too much speculation) a pressing question: how nationalistic is China? does China have a civil society? what is the attitude toward religion? how are party leaders chosen, and how do they stay in power? The style can be a bit dry and academic at times, but I appreciated how uncluttered, sober, and even-handed this book was. Recommended for anyone who wants to cut through all the strident and histrionic headlines these days about China's rise.
September 18, 2022
Interesting enough book but a bit dry. Reads a bit like a Phd thesis…chronological, with each chapter starting by telling you what is in the chapter and end telling you what the chapter has covered….so far too much stuff repeated.
I was primarily interested in how economic development changed the political sphere. Alas little on it, other than to say that classical political theory always has democracy evolving with rising living standards, a line that is trotted out a few times in the book. But this hasn’t happened in China, as the author points out.
However the Chinese Communist Party has changed since its inception in 1949, and each new President has wrought their own changes. As to the Party being monolithic, apparently this is not so as there is scope further down the political chain for both input and variable political appointments, nearly all however are top down appointees.
My thoughts on reading this is how Starmer’s Labour Party has taken a leaf from the CCP’s book with a committee appointed by the Labour Party hierarchy deciding on the shortlist candidates for Labour at General and By-Elections, where only the “loyal” and obsequious can join the list. The result of this is that local Branches are no longer selecting their own candidates, and are cancelling their membership in droves.
Also, in the USA potential candidates, mostly Democrats, have massive campaigns against them from the Superpacs, to ensure for example, only quiescent non-environmentalist or Palestine supporters / critics of Israel make it onto the ballot paper. So it is the corporation lobbyists who often determine the candidates: as was said many moons back, the US is the best democracy money can buy.
Not much difference between China’s political appointee and one moulded to suit the interests of one group or a corporation.
The book is totally silent on the soft diplomatic Belt and Roads projects, operating throughout much of Africa, Central and South Asia. This operation creates lots of new trade agreements, which create the wealth which buys off much dissent in China…not a single mention of it.
The author points out the different perspectives of democracy as seen in China and in The West. The hoped for democratisation of China is partially to do with the fact that “Democracies don’t fight each other”, another well-established finding in political science according to the author. Perhaps not: but if you look at how “democracies” …America especially, bully the rest of the world into coming under their sphere of influence. Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Venezuela and nearly all of Central and South America, Cuba, Yeman and currently Ukraine. Not wars as such, but total slaughter, often by proxies. And if not bombs and bullets, economic sanctions, as against Iran. And there is also the case of Israel, funded by the USA to murder and repress a nation. The proxy wars are effectively outsourced wars, which puts a halt the American troops coming back in body bags, which does not go down too well in the USA.
As to why those in power are reluctant to let it go, examples are given of regimes where this has happened…Ceaușescu in Romania being the most public and egregregious public, but also previous leaders in South Korea and Taiwan imprisoned their leaders when they lost power.
Mention is made of Chinese’s debt burden. I am not aware of this – I think they have the largest Sovereign Fund in the World – in 2021 it had US$1.2 trillion in assets under management, at least 10% of this is invested in the USA.
President Xi Jinping has warned of the possibility of black swan events – events which come as a surprise, are not previously legislated for, and break with the expected. The author mentions two such examples, of democracy evolving with rising living standards, and the fact that democracies don’t go to war against each other. Perhaps if the author widened his horizons and came to view his subject through the lens of classical political theory of the East, rather than the classical political theory of the West, he would realise that what he perceives as Black Swans are in fact standard happenings / events in the part of the world he is writing about…which is Russia and all points east.
Having previously been neutral, and fairly ignorant on the issue, having read the book I’ve decided that the CCP is a far better model of running society that our democracies. The CCP governs for all its people, which is China is 1,451,583,949 as of Sunday, September 18, 2022, but excluding the Uyghurs and Tibetan Buddhists… approx. 12m & 6m approx. Because it has improved the living standards of just about all its people in the last 20 /25 years, multipying their wages by 4 or 5 times and created a large comfortable middle class, the Chinese people by and large are supportive, both of its method of ruling and its results. Whereas we in the UK and USA have squirrelled our wealth to the 1%, with the other 99% having lower wages now than 20 years ago, as we head into a cataclysmic economic front
I was primarily interested in how economic development changed the political sphere. Alas little on it, other than to say that classical political theory always has democracy evolving with rising living standards, a line that is trotted out a few times in the book. But this hasn’t happened in China, as the author points out.
However the Chinese Communist Party has changed since its inception in 1949, and each new President has wrought their own changes. As to the Party being monolithic, apparently this is not so as there is scope further down the political chain for both input and variable political appointments, nearly all however are top down appointees.
My thoughts on reading this is how Starmer’s Labour Party has taken a leaf from the CCP’s book with a committee appointed by the Labour Party hierarchy deciding on the shortlist candidates for Labour at General and By-Elections, where only the “loyal” and obsequious can join the list. The result of this is that local Branches are no longer selecting their own candidates, and are cancelling their membership in droves.
Also, in the USA potential candidates, mostly Democrats, have massive campaigns against them from the Superpacs, to ensure for example, only quiescent non-environmentalist or Palestine supporters / critics of Israel make it onto the ballot paper. So it is the corporation lobbyists who often determine the candidates: as was said many moons back, the US is the best democracy money can buy.
Not much difference between China’s political appointee and one moulded to suit the interests of one group or a corporation.
The book is totally silent on the soft diplomatic Belt and Roads projects, operating throughout much of Africa, Central and South Asia. This operation creates lots of new trade agreements, which create the wealth which buys off much dissent in China…not a single mention of it.
The author points out the different perspectives of democracy as seen in China and in The West. The hoped for democratisation of China is partially to do with the fact that “Democracies don’t fight each other”, another well-established finding in political science according to the author. Perhaps not: but if you look at how “democracies” …America especially, bully the rest of the world into coming under their sphere of influence. Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Venezuela and nearly all of Central and South America, Cuba, Yeman and currently Ukraine. Not wars as such, but total slaughter, often by proxies. And if not bombs and bullets, economic sanctions, as against Iran. And there is also the case of Israel, funded by the USA to murder and repress a nation. The proxy wars are effectively outsourced wars, which puts a halt the American troops coming back in body bags, which does not go down too well in the USA.
As to why those in power are reluctant to let it go, examples are given of regimes where this has happened…Ceaușescu in Romania being the most public and egregregious public, but also previous leaders in South Korea and Taiwan imprisoned their leaders when they lost power.
Mention is made of Chinese’s debt burden. I am not aware of this – I think they have the largest Sovereign Fund in the World – in 2021 it had US$1.2 trillion in assets under management, at least 10% of this is invested in the USA.
President Xi Jinping has warned of the possibility of black swan events – events which come as a surprise, are not previously legislated for, and break with the expected. The author mentions two such examples, of democracy evolving with rising living standards, and the fact that democracies don’t go to war against each other. Perhaps if the author widened his horizons and came to view his subject through the lens of classical political theory of the East, rather than the classical political theory of the West, he would realise that what he perceives as Black Swans are in fact standard happenings / events in the part of the world he is writing about…which is Russia and all points east.
Having previously been neutral, and fairly ignorant on the issue, having read the book I’ve decided that the CCP is a far better model of running society that our democracies. The CCP governs for all its people, which is China is 1,451,583,949 as of Sunday, September 18, 2022, but excluding the Uyghurs and Tibetan Buddhists… approx. 12m & 6m approx. Because it has improved the living standards of just about all its people in the last 20 /25 years, multipying their wages by 4 or 5 times and created a large comfortable middle class, the Chinese people by and large are supportive, both of its method of ruling and its results. Whereas we in the UK and USA have squirrelled our wealth to the 1%, with the other 99% having lower wages now than 20 years ago, as we head into a cataclysmic economic front
Read
February 16, 2024Great, easy-to-read primer on the CCP. Don’t know enough about China to judge how accurate it is, but I felt like I learned a lot :D
March 3, 2024
A very good read – suitable for general public also provides some useful academic references. The key takeaway from this book is that Chinese communist party is not always top down but powers are quite fragmented. Local powers also are important players. Very interesting aspects in examining too – election process, NGO, religion, etc. highly recommended if interested in post Mao Chinese politics.
January 11, 2025
In “The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century” (Princeton University Press, 2021), George Washington professor of political science and international affairs Bruce Dickson scrutinizes trends of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the decades since Deng Xiaoping’s liberalizing reforms but hews most closely to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Each chapter takes up one aspect of contemporary Chinese society and how the CCP interacts with it, including civil society, choosing leaders, shaping policy, religion, nationalism, and the question of whether China will eventually embrace democracy.
One of the key concepts that keeps appearing in Dickson’s recounting of the Party’s modus operandi is “responsiveness without accountability.” By this, Dickson means that Party officials pay attention to an issue to assuage Chinese citizens but will quickly become oppressive if it thinks Party stability or power may be jeopardized. Dickson’s chapter on Chinese civil society is a perfect object lesson in how the CCP handles many issues. One group’s activity (Dickson calls them “CSI” for Civil Society I) promotes economic, cultural, and social reforms that are considered “noncritical” by the Party; in other words, they present no substantive threat to Party interests. The other group (CSII) are essentially blacklisted, banned, or closely monitored. These include groups and activists who speak out against the regime and advocate for democracy, human rights, and intellectual freedom. To make a complex topic simple: if you don’t rock the boat on issues that the Party guards closely, civil society is generally encouraged, or at least not persecuted. Crossing the line will result in arrest and persecution not only of activists but sometimes also their family members depending on the severity of the infraction.
This is one of the reasons why there has been no massive public Chinese support for broad-based protest movements since 1989. The few quiet protests that have occurred are inevitably framed not in terms of wanting new rights but rather being denied ones that are already on the books. Interestingly, many Chinese citizens see the post-Mao era as one of bourgeoning democracy – not in terms of rule of law, elections, or institutional integrity, but how the Party attends to the (mostly material) interests of the public.
The CCP’s view on religion follows a similar trend. While the ideological position on religion is obviously atheism, it recognizes a handful of official religions – Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and Taoism. It explicitly excludes others, including Mormonism and Judaism. The Party is most critical and suspicious of Western religious traditions unless they develop, in the words of Xi Jinping, “Chinese characteristics.” Post-Mao leaders, especially Xi, are privy to the ways in which religions have galvanized broader social movements (think of how the American Civil Rights movement was first initiated in Protestant churches) and therefore monitor them very carefully.
Dickson ends the book by taking up the question of whether China will eventually become a democracy. He points out the basic tenet of modernization theory, which states that prosperous countries also tend to be democracies. However, because of a combination of factors that may be unique to China, including the Party’s durability, adaptability, ideological unity in the upper echelons of the CCP, and the legitimacy the CCP maintains because of the economic progress that has occurred since Mao’s death, China may brook the modernization thesis trend. Dickson is also right to point out that even if it did occur, party change isn’t synonymous with democratization. The last generation of international comparative science suggests that, if anything, when regimes change, they become more authoritarian.
The outwardly Marxist-Leninist economic policies of the CCP have been laid aside as the party has adapted to the exigencies of post-Mao liberalizing reforms. Under Mao, China’s economy was led through a centralized, state-controlled economy. In just a few decades, the exponential rise in Chinese wealth has lulled many Chinese citizens into a state in which they are happy to cede potential democracy and political reform for material prosperity. Since Mao’s death nearly half a century ago, the CCP has gambled on the idea that increasing economic prosperity will only create more loyal Communist citizens. While there have been occasional pro-democracy rumbles (1989’s Tiananmen Square being the most famous), the Party has been correct in its assessment that people have prioritized material prosperity over political and intellectual freedom.
Dickson’s presentation is clearly aimed at the generalist who wants more information about how the CCP operates than they can get in a 500-word New York Times article. The byzantine world of the CCP is clearly explained in the first few chapters, which is quite the feat itself. That combined with the rest of the book makes for a superb primer on the contemporary CCP and how it interacts with, responds to, and represses its citizens. It’s a great foot in the door for those who want some further insight into the arcane and murky world of the CCP’s attempt to maintain political power at all costs.
One of the key concepts that keeps appearing in Dickson’s recounting of the Party’s modus operandi is “responsiveness without accountability.” By this, Dickson means that Party officials pay attention to an issue to assuage Chinese citizens but will quickly become oppressive if it thinks Party stability or power may be jeopardized. Dickson’s chapter on Chinese civil society is a perfect object lesson in how the CCP handles many issues. One group’s activity (Dickson calls them “CSI” for Civil Society I) promotes economic, cultural, and social reforms that are considered “noncritical” by the Party; in other words, they present no substantive threat to Party interests. The other group (CSII) are essentially blacklisted, banned, or closely monitored. These include groups and activists who speak out against the regime and advocate for democracy, human rights, and intellectual freedom. To make a complex topic simple: if you don’t rock the boat on issues that the Party guards closely, civil society is generally encouraged, or at least not persecuted. Crossing the line will result in arrest and persecution not only of activists but sometimes also their family members depending on the severity of the infraction.
This is one of the reasons why there has been no massive public Chinese support for broad-based protest movements since 1989. The few quiet protests that have occurred are inevitably framed not in terms of wanting new rights but rather being denied ones that are already on the books. Interestingly, many Chinese citizens see the post-Mao era as one of bourgeoning democracy – not in terms of rule of law, elections, or institutional integrity, but how the Party attends to the (mostly material) interests of the public.
The CCP’s view on religion follows a similar trend. While the ideological position on religion is obviously atheism, it recognizes a handful of official religions – Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and Taoism. It explicitly excludes others, including Mormonism and Judaism. The Party is most critical and suspicious of Western religious traditions unless they develop, in the words of Xi Jinping, “Chinese characteristics.” Post-Mao leaders, especially Xi, are privy to the ways in which religions have galvanized broader social movements (think of how the American Civil Rights movement was first initiated in Protestant churches) and therefore monitor them very carefully.
Dickson ends the book by taking up the question of whether China will eventually become a democracy. He points out the basic tenet of modernization theory, which states that prosperous countries also tend to be democracies. However, because of a combination of factors that may be unique to China, including the Party’s durability, adaptability, ideological unity in the upper echelons of the CCP, and the legitimacy the CCP maintains because of the economic progress that has occurred since Mao’s death, China may brook the modernization thesis trend. Dickson is also right to point out that even if it did occur, party change isn’t synonymous with democratization. The last generation of international comparative science suggests that, if anything, when regimes change, they become more authoritarian.
The outwardly Marxist-Leninist economic policies of the CCP have been laid aside as the party has adapted to the exigencies of post-Mao liberalizing reforms. Under Mao, China’s economy was led through a centralized, state-controlled economy. In just a few decades, the exponential rise in Chinese wealth has lulled many Chinese citizens into a state in which they are happy to cede potential democracy and political reform for material prosperity. Since Mao’s death nearly half a century ago, the CCP has gambled on the idea that increasing economic prosperity will only create more loyal Communist citizens. While there have been occasional pro-democracy rumbles (1989’s Tiananmen Square being the most famous), the Party has been correct in its assessment that people have prioritized material prosperity over political and intellectual freedom.
Dickson’s presentation is clearly aimed at the generalist who wants more information about how the CCP operates than they can get in a 500-word New York Times article. The byzantine world of the CCP is clearly explained in the first few chapters, which is quite the feat itself. That combined with the rest of the book makes for a superb primer on the contemporary CCP and how it interacts with, responds to, and represses its citizens. It’s a great foot in the door for those who want some further insight into the arcane and murky world of the CCP’s attempt to maintain political power at all costs.
Read
December 27, 2021Good primer that hammers home the point that the CCP's governing recipe is "responsiveness without accountability". Some chapters are a bit too elementary (like the one explaining the Hong Kong protests) but my sense is this book is aimed at an audience new to China.
November 20, 2022
A comprehensive overview of Chinese politics and up-to-date to the developments after Xi. I learned useful facts, but I won't say it provides many new insights.
The one exception might be Bruce Dickson's sound bite: "responsiveness without accountability." CCP responds to the public's demands and even compromises with protesters. But this responsiveness is strictly limited on material matters and does not extend to appeal to rights. The public has internalized this unspoken rule and framed their activism accordingly. When people protest, they mainly seek to have national laws, regulations, policies properly implemented locally. The author also notes that CCP has been deviating away from this model since Xi took power.
The author also argues against the general impression that Chinese people, especially the young generation, are getting more nationalistic. The Beijing Area Survey between 1998 and 2013 shows that nationalist sentiments peaked in 2008 and declined afterward. The surveys also show that young respondents are less nationalistic than older respondents—a result also found in the author's nationwide survey of urban China in 2014. The national survey also shows that young people are less likely to agree with CCP's victimization statements.
Why do we get the impression that young people have more nationalistic fervor? The author claims the perception might originate from biased observation: we observe nationalistic sentiments via actions such as anti-Japan protests, and young people are more likely to act on their beliefs.
Side notes:
• Local leaders tend to be frequently rotated and have a short tenure. As a result, ambitious officials focus more on targets that are easier to achieve in the short term, such as economic growth. They focus less on improvements in education and healthcare, which are harder to measure and take a longer time to achieve.
• Local governments need NGOs to help them work. Examples include services to immigrant workers and poverty alleviation.
• NIMBY campaigns were quite successful. Anti-PX protests blocked the construction in Xiamen (2007), Dalian (2011), Maoming (2014), and Shanghai (2015). People in Shanghai also stopped the planned extension of the magnetic levitation train.
• I still have doubt with the author's claim that the education campaign that depicts China as the victim of international forces only started in 1990s. Isn't it always there in Mao's writings?
The one exception might be Bruce Dickson's sound bite: "responsiveness without accountability." CCP responds to the public's demands and even compromises with protesters. But this responsiveness is strictly limited on material matters and does not extend to appeal to rights. The public has internalized this unspoken rule and framed their activism accordingly. When people protest, they mainly seek to have national laws, regulations, policies properly implemented locally. The author also notes that CCP has been deviating away from this model since Xi took power.
The author also argues against the general impression that Chinese people, especially the young generation, are getting more nationalistic. The Beijing Area Survey between 1998 and 2013 shows that nationalist sentiments peaked in 2008 and declined afterward. The surveys also show that young respondents are less nationalistic than older respondents—a result also found in the author's nationwide survey of urban China in 2014. The national survey also shows that young people are less likely to agree with CCP's victimization statements.
Why do we get the impression that young people have more nationalistic fervor? The author claims the perception might originate from biased observation: we observe nationalistic sentiments via actions such as anti-Japan protests, and young people are more likely to act on their beliefs.
Side notes:
• Local leaders tend to be frequently rotated and have a short tenure. As a result, ambitious officials focus more on targets that are easier to achieve in the short term, such as economic growth. They focus less on improvements in education and healthcare, which are harder to measure and take a longer time to achieve.
• Local governments need NGOs to help them work. Examples include services to immigrant workers and poverty alleviation.
• NIMBY campaigns were quite successful. Anti-PX protests blocked the construction in Xiamen (2007), Dalian (2011), Maoming (2014), and Shanghai (2015). People in Shanghai also stopped the planned extension of the magnetic levitation train.
• I still have doubt with the author's claim that the education campaign that depicts China as the victim of international forces only started in 1990s. Isn't it always there in Mao's writings?
January 9, 2023
I really liked this! Interesting look at the functioning of the CCP without at all favouring a Western point of view, a criterion surprisingly hard to satisfy these days. It's insightful because it has a thesis that goes against the grain in many areas, for example in examining which groups are the most nationalist, how nationalism links to policy, how repression and responsiveness are balanced etc, but it is very convincing in its handling of data and analysis. Very carefully considered as well, for instance in the chapters breaking down China's response to different types of religions and surmising why, or showing us how China is responsive only in issues that don't threaten politically. Really fascinating for anyone who is actually interested in how and why decisions are made in China's present-day system.
July 20, 2021
A good primer on Chinese politics and how the CCP maintains and exerts its power as well as examining its relationship with the people. The book explores eight major questions about the CCP, devoting a chapter to each:
1. What keeps the party in power?
2. How are leaders chosen?
3. How are policies made?
4. Does China have a civil society?
5. Do political protests threaten political stability?
6. Why does the party fear religion?
7. How nationalistic is China?
8. Will China become democratic?
Reads very much like an academic book but isn’t necessarily dry. Recommended if, like me, you didn’t know a hell of a lot about the CCP to begin with.
1. What keeps the party in power?
2. How are leaders chosen?
3. How are policies made?
4. Does China have a civil society?
5. Do political protests threaten political stability?
6. Why does the party fear religion?
7. How nationalistic is China?
8. Will China become democratic?
Reads very much like an academic book but isn’t necessarily dry. Recommended if, like me, you didn’t know a hell of a lot about the CCP to begin with.
December 7, 2021
if you’re reading this book don’t waste your time only chapter 5 has real material.
i thought there would be more insightful analysis on this book but the chapters that could have had the most Material (e.g chapter 7—youre literally writing about tibet, xinjiang, hong kong and taiwan…) were quite bland in the sense that i wouldn’t be able to tell them apart from those (very helpful) “xxx in less than 500 words” briefs on BBC.
bonus points though for having the sheer balls to put pictures of winnie the pooh and xjp side by side with the caption “pooh and his real-life counterpart: general secretary xi jinping of the chinese communist party”.
i thought there would be more insightful analysis on this book but the chapters that could have had the most Material (e.g chapter 7—youre literally writing about tibet, xinjiang, hong kong and taiwan…) were quite bland in the sense that i wouldn’t be able to tell them apart from those (very helpful) “xxx in less than 500 words” briefs on BBC.
bonus points though for having the sheer balls to put pictures of winnie the pooh and xjp side by side with the caption “pooh and his real-life counterpart: general secretary xi jinping of the chinese communist party”.
July 26, 2023
Dickson provides excellent insight into how the CCP engages with the public to stay in power, offering detailed, nuanced, and credible explanations for how China engages with the public, religion, and nationalism. The Party and the People challenges conventional wisdom where appropriate and details how the CCP engages society in a manner designed to bolster the party's ability to stay in power while still appeasing popular sentiments. This book is an excellent foundation for anybody seeking to understand why the CCP interacts with the public in the manner it does while vigorously defending its policies to domestic and international audiences.
September 8, 2024
A systematic and methodical look at how the government, legislature, and Communist party operate in China. I normally love systematic and methodical writing, but this was very dry. The author teaches political science and this book was filled with political science terms and references to Western academics. 3 stars because I wanted to skim this one so badly. I don't feel like I have a better idea how the government works in China after reading this book. I really need examples from real life of how things work. I guess this is a reflection of the fact I consider myself a casual reader of history.
October 13, 2021
This makes a good text book on the realities of the Chinese Communist Party system. A little dry at times, but still a good reference to understand the actual structures and practices of the CCP. This also helped relegate some of the myths and misperceptions. Very up to date with chapters devoted to Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong issues. My biggest takeaway was “responsive but not accountable” that theme was repeated in many forms of example.
November 15, 2024
The essential book that every American worried about a future war with China should read. This should be “must read” material at every American service academy, war college, and foreign service training center. I consider myself somewhat well informed, but have never learned so much about China’s political system in such an accessible way in less than 250 pages. If you only ever read one book about the CCP, this should be it.
August 13, 2022
Great book that largely avoids cliches, admits the limits of information on the inner workings of the CCP, and steers clear of simplistic narratives.
Negatives:
* it was a bit too charitable to the CCP at times. Some would argue it might be an important corrective, but still detracts from the book IMO.
* Book was too short. Wished it would explore some subjects in more detail.
Negatives:
* it was a bit too charitable to the CCP at times. Some would argue it might be an important corrective, but still detracts from the book IMO.
* Book was too short. Wished it would explore some subjects in more detail.
July 18, 2021
Richard McGregor's "The Party" is still the authoritative work on the CCP. The new developments covered in this book, largely pertaining to Xi Jinping, are available in news publications. The analysis didn't deepen my understanding of the CCP beyond what I'd learned from McGregor's work.
December 27, 2021
A 3.5 to me.
This is overall a good book. Professor Dickson obviously has done extensive research and has deep knowledge about Chinese politics.
I love the contents, but the writing is a little repetitive. It could have been an essay, instead of a book IMO.
This is overall a good book. Professor Dickson obviously has done extensive research and has deep knowledge about Chinese politics.
I love the contents, but the writing is a little repetitive. It could have been an essay, instead of a book IMO.
May 3, 2024
A must read for anyone who wants to understand the political system in China : how it evolved over time and how it works. The historical information are accurate and it’s not too difficult to read even for someone that doesn’t know much about China. Absolutely recommended!
August 31, 2021
without
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 25, 2021
A sobering look at PRC tenacity to power. The writer avoids both reductively ideological judgement and cheerleading. An engrossing read.
October 29, 2021
Good introduction to the Chinese system and the CCP but I was expecting a lot more depth, considering it was recommended by The Economist.
July 10, 2022
More of a 3.5
May 4, 2023
i have issues with the nationalism chapter but i digress
Read
October 2, 2023super interesting and accessible language
January 20, 2024
It's ok. A bit light on some topics, and had quite a few typos in the middle chapters.
May 10, 2024
moderately interesting synopsis of the current state of Chinese politics. Surprisingly stresses that the party's responsiveness is a key factor in its survival.
August 1, 2024
Thinking I need to learn Chinese
December 19, 2024
The best introductory book I've read so far on understanding Chinese politics today. It focuses on seomthing that I wish more people would keep in mind when looking at China: nuances.
October 2, 2021
A highly readable introduction on ways the party-state makes policies, interacts with the civil society, and maintains its right to govern.
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