Immigration and Freedom

by Chandran Kukathas

A compelling account of the threat immigration control poses to the citizens of free societies

Immigration is often seen as a danger to western liberal democracies because it threatens to undermine their fundamental values, most notably freedom and national self-determination. In this book, however, Chandran Kukathas argues that the greater threat comes not from immigration but from immigration control.

Kukathas shows that immigration control is not merely about preventing outsiders from moving across borders. It is about controlling what outsiders do once in a whether they work, reside, study, set up businesses, or share their lives with others. But controlling outsiders―immigrants or would-be immigrants―requires regulating, monitoring, and sanctioning insiders, those citizens and residents who might otherwise hire, trade with, house, teach, or generally associate with outsiders. The more vigorously immigration control is pursued, the more seriously freedom is diminished. The search for control threatens freedom directly and weakens the values upon which it relies, notably equality and the rule of law. Kukathas demonstrates that the imagined gains from efforts to control immigration are illusory, for they do not promote economic prosperity or social solidarity. Nor does immigration control bring self-determination, since the apparatus of control is an international institutional regime that increases the power of states and their agencies at the expense of citizens. That power includes the authority to determine who is and is not an to define identity itself.

Looking at past and current practices across the world, Immigration and Freedom presents a critique of immigration control as an institutional reality, as well as an account of what freedom means―and why it matters.

Genres: Politics, Philosophy, Social Science, Nonfiction

384 pages, Hardcover

Published March 16, 2021

Reviews

[Andrew Norton · Rating 4 out of 5]

In Immigration and Freedom, Chandran Kukathas offers a distinctive analysis of the politics of immigration. His interest in migration goes beyond the usual concerns about jobs and culture to its effect on freedom. He argues that the conditions attached to migrant residency reduce freedom for both migrants and non-migrants.

In my country of Australia, migration control sometimes affects citizens as much or more than immigrants. Employers cannot always hire the staff they need and must understand complex distinctions between visas. Real estate agents can only sell some types of property to foreigners. Educational institutions are required to monitor international students and report potential breaches of visas conditions. Political parties must check that their donors are not foreigners. Citizens who fall in love with migrants suffer exorbitant visa fees and intrusive questions about their relationship to get their partner permanent residence (the book has a nice epilogue, ‘Imagine If You Needed a Visa to Fall in Love’).

Immigration and Freedom was written pre-COVID. With a later finish Australia’s prolonged COVID-motivated border closures would have shown how much border control affects citizens as well as migrants. We have learned that citizenship does not, as we previously thought it did, include a right of return. International arrivals are capped well below demand. Citizens stranded overseas pay a high financial, emotional and sometimes health cost. And we have discovered that tourists and temporary migrant visa holders in Australia have an important right that citizens do not: to leave.

Kukathas is a political theorist, and his book is strong on the political dimensions of migration. He notes that ‘migration is about demography, while immigration is about politics.’ People have been moving around for tens of thousands of years, but the institutions of immigration – states capable of defining borders, determining who belongs within them and under what conditions, and enforcing their decisions – are relatively recent.

While reading Immigration and Freedom I saw a news story about a Belgian farmer who moved a stone because it was in his tractor’s way. This seemingly mundane action was international news because the stone marked the border between Belgium and France, and the farmer had just taken French territory. The stone was put there in 1819, around the time that precise borders were replacing borderlands in Europe. But these clarified boundaries could usually still be freely crossed. Passports were not commonly needed for international travel until nearly a hundred years later, when World War I security concerns led to more controlled borders.

As states grew an increasing number of rights and obligations depended on a person’s relationship to them. Resident citizens are full members with all rights and obligations, but often prompted by migration many more categories of membership, with more limited rights and obligations, have been created. Who is and is not a member and at what level are not natural categories; in every country history and politics determine membership.

Countries define full membership in varying ways: place of birth, legal status of parents, varying levels of ancestry, and arrangements for acquiring citizenship. In the United States, everyone who is born there is a citizen. A person born in Australia, however, is only a citizen if at least one parent is a citizen or has permanent residence. Although such children can become citizens after ten years of residence, until that time they have the same legal status as a migrant, even if they never cross an international border.

People who cross international borders are not necessarily migrants, in the legal sense, either. The children of Australians born overseas can acquire citizenship by descent and then move to Australia. They have migrated but, legally, they were citizens before they arrived. Most people crossing borders plan to stay briefly and then return home. In neither their own minds nor the law are they migrants.

Being a migrant is a mix of psychology and law. A desire or a decision to stay in a country for a long or indefinite period mixes with the precise legal rules that distinguish visitors from migrants, migrants from citizens, and one type of migrant from another.

Migration politics is not just about who comes or in what numbers but how migrants will relate to the existing members. Will migrants add skills or take jobs, will they assimilate or stay apart? If they remain distinctive, is this positive diversity or negative division? On these topics Kukathas engages sceptically with the arguments of writers, mostly fellow academics, who prefer strong control of migration.

As much as culture or jobs, migration control is about welfare states. Since the early 20th century, welfare states have driven a huge increase in resident obligations (taxes and compulsory social insurance contributions) and rights (social security payments and free or subsidised social services). Who is liable to pay and who is entitled to benefit are therefore central political issues. This is why Milton Friedman, quoted in Immigration and Freedom, observed that open borders and welfare states do not mix.

Kukathas responds that most migrants come to work, not to go on benefits. He also notes that many states require a waiting period of several years before new migrants can get social benefits and services.

The costs to government of migration can be managed this way. Australia delays benefit entitlements for new permanent residents. It takes advantage of a temporary migrant workforce that pays tax but receives few of the services these taxes fund. Migration in Australia is a positive for the government’s budget, with its welfare state redistributing income from recent migrants to longer-term residents.

While these policies remove one objection to migration, the distinctions involved are problems in themselves. They contribute to the bureaucratic complexity of multiple categories of residence, the costs of which to migrants and non-migrants Immigration and Freedom highlights. They offend against principles of equality, which Immigration and Freedom sees migration rules as often undermining.

After reading Immigration and Freedom I see more clearly the tension between the freedom to cross borders and rights once across them. The fewer the rights on arrival the easier it is cross a border.

Visitor visas are often routinely granted in unlimited numbers but expire after short periods, do not permit work, and carry no entitlements to state services. Temporary migration visas usually have eligibility criteria but bring more benefits than a visitor visa – longer stays, work rights, and sometimes other entitlements. In Australia, temporary visa holder numbers, which had grown significantly pre-COVID, are not limited. Permanent residence allows an indefinite stay, work rights, eventual social security entitlement and provides a pathway to full citizenship. But it is restricted by eligibility criteria and annual grants are capped.

Australia is a high migration country, with 30 per cent of its population born overseas. But this happened because concerns about migration were addressed by selectively accepting migrants and limiting their rights after arrival. Immigration and Freedom emphasised to me that relative freedom to migrate comes at the price of restrictions on migrants and non-migrants, added bureaucracy, and sometimes invidious distinctions.

[Paul Crider · Rating 5 out of 5]

We naturally think of the freedom of the immigrant—and how this weighs against some interests of natives—but Kukathas spends most of his time talking about the freedom of the native, especially in terms of the ways restrictions on freedom of movement necessarily involve abridging native freedom as well. This of course includes the often cited freedom of association of natives who want to interact with migrants. But this goes further than the relatively shallow (however legitimate) freedoms to hire and rent to migrants. All kinds of relationships can and do cross borders, including romantic and family relationships. Migration controls introduce significant hardships for these relationships.

But there is a more profound loss of native freedom in the way immigration control necessarily categorizes people and imposes a hierarchy of more and less desirable people. Who are the people allowed to immigrate? Determining who qualifies introduces hurdles people must overcome to prove their right to enter or stay. Kukathas points out that, while racialization doesn't arise only from immigration controls, such controls have historically contributed to creating new racial categories. Once these categories exist, natives, citizens, and other "lawful" residents who "look like" they fit the categories are subject to greater surveillance and heavier burdens. 

For these reasons, immigration controls corrupt the rule of law—hey intrinsically introduce difference where the law is concerned. Further, it's simply a sociological reality that migration will continue regardless of immigration control. The rule of law is compromised when people have strong practical reasons to disregard laws.

Kukathas presents immigration restrictions as coming from a desire to control one's society. These desires are understandable, but ultimately unreasonable for their futility. Moreover, this desire for control is often given the imprimatur of "national sovereignty" or "local democratic control", but Kukathas persuasively argues that there really is nothing we can meaningfully say is a "voice of the people"—there are always dissenters, often a significant fraction of the native population, who very much would like to accept immigrants. And national and other governments should be seen as institutions with their own agency and objectives. Government agencies and other bureaucracies advance the agenda of immigration control for their own bureaucratic self-preservation. These don't intrinsically have more legitimacy than groups that push for less control, like religious organizations, trade and professional organizations, and similar that naturally cross national boundaries.

Finally, in other contexts we see the urge to control entry as irksome, if not vicious. Kukathas skewers the popular analogy of a nation being able to democratically choose its membership to being able to control who enters a private home by offering two alternative analogies. First, consider an apartment complex. Of course a libertarian would say the complex owner can choose who may enter, but we would still object to common modes of discrimation, like racial bias. But more to the point of *democratic* control, it would be both unmanageable and just generally hellish to expect visitors and indeed new residents to be approved by the incumbent community. 

The second analogy is to the family. Open borders advocates often riposte with the reductio ad absurdum that all the arguments against immigrants must apply to newborn babies as well. But a stronger version of this keeps the question in the family. While disapproving aunts, uncles, and inlaws aren't uncommon—they are the stuff of classic drama—we rarely honor such incumbents with anything like a veto over new children or spouses joining the extended family. And if we reject "democratic control" in the more intimate settings of communal living and extended families for intuitive reasons, then (a fortiori?) we might expect the principles of democratic control to carry even less weight.

Kukathas has given us a rich text on the philosophical issues that arise from immigration as it exists in the real world. Immigration is about freedom, not just of the migrant, but of the native, and of the institutions of the host nation. And immigration restrictions are about control. The issues Kukathas raises in Immigration and Freedom point especially to the importance of equality in any useful conception of freedom. "Learning to be free means learning to live with others as equals, for without equality, freedom is nothing more than an advantage of power."

[Zach Brandt · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well-argued, clear, detailed, thorough, this book is immensely helpful. While the author has a clear perspective on the issue, I found his handling of the data to be even-handed and transparent. In fact, he is so fair and even-tempered in his argumentation that it is easy to forget just how radical his conclusion is.

The argument itself:

- Immigration control is more than just border control.
- immigration control doesn’t just control immigrants; it also controls natives
- while concerns from economics and cultural identity are substantial, they are ultimately not significant enough to justify limiting freedom like immigration control requires

This is a really informative book that doesn’t easily map onto partisan splits in the USA. Sometimes it feels more libertarian than liberal, sometimes the reverse. Regardless, I really enjoyed it and learned a lot.

[Blair · Rating 3 out of 5]

“Immigration and Freedom” is a book outlining Chandran Kukathas’ argument against Immigration Control. Spoiler alert: At the same time, it’s an argument about unbridled immigration.

I agree with some the author’s thoughts that immigration control is both about controlling the entrance and participation of “Outsiders” in a society, and a way to control “Insiders” by first limiting their ability to work, socialise, and transact with immigrants.

In some instances, this control can be abused and expanded. We saw this with “Homeland Security” in the United States, as this department has expanded its powers beyond border control. Further, border control can be abused in other countries e.g., North Korea - where people are not generally permitted to leave the country.

But in many cases the apparent loss of freedom to hire or associate with immigrants is part of a "Social contract" where people sacrifice some of their freedom for a greater good. This greater good could be protection from criminals, drugs, or dangerous people. It might also be protection of jobs and salaries. For there are only so many immigrants than any country can absorb in any given time. And with modern transportation allowing for immediate influx of people, some controls are in fact necessary for at least the benefit of the local people - despite the author arguing against this.

That said, I found that Kukathas’ book to be biased almost exclusively against immigration controls. Rather than lay down the arguments for and against a subject and come to conclusion, he laid down a series of facts, paid lip service to any argument in favour of immigration control, and then literally jumped to a conclusion that immigration was almost universally justified and controls not necessary and in fact, wrong.

On many occasions this process failed because the conclusion did not flow from the facts and the author would simply move on from the discussion and brush the facts aside with a comment like “That is not enough for me”. (Page 252.)

While the author covered countries like Japan favour immigrations controls he did not put forth the arguments that supported their point of view. Many people love Japan because it’s unique and very different rom other countries. Part of this is because it selectively admits foreigners and foreign ideas.

How much should we want to change this? Wouldn't changing this destroy what we like most about Japan - it's difference from the rest of the world?

The Japanese also know that their population is declining. They accept this over the idea of broadly opening up immigration to shore up their numbers. The author does not factor this type of argument into his calculus – as it doesn’t lead toward his pro-immigration argument.

Kukathas also did not cover the ideology that some immigrants bring to other countries and the “Paradox of tolerance” i.e., the philosophical concept suggesting that if a society extends tolerance to those who are intolerant, it risks enabling the eventual dominance of intolerance; thereby undermining the very principle of tolerance. He was happy to dissect cultural differences within the societies that accept immigrants but he very much avoided discussions about the differences among immigrants. Again, the author was very selective in his consideration of the facts.

If you want a book that is biased only in favour of immigration, this one would work for you. But don’t expect balanced view of immigration and freedom.

[Attasit Sittidumrong · Rating 5 out of 5]

เล่มนี้เป็นตัวอย่างที่ดีของงานทฤษฎีที่เริ่มจากมิติของนโยบายสาธารณะ ประเด็นของผู้เขียนคือต่อต้านและไม่เห็นด้วยกับนโยบายกีดกันผู้อพยพของประเทศต่างๆ จึงพัฒนาฐานคิดเชิงปทัสถานเพื่อบอกว่าการกีดกันผู้อพยพเป็นสิ่งที่ผิด โดยปทัสถานที่ใช้ก็คือเสรีภาพ บนข้อถกเถียงว่าการบังคับใช้นโยบายกีดกันผู้อพยพนั้น ไม่ใช่แค่เรื่องของการให้อำนาจรัฐสอดส่อง ตรวจตราการอพยพในพื้นที่ชายแดน แต่ยังรวมถึงการให้ความชอบธรรมกับรัฐในการตรวจตรา สอดส่องกิจกรรมต่างๆของประชาชนภายในประเทศ เพราะนโยบายกีดกันผู้อพยพนี้จะรวมถึงการสอดส่องพฤติกรรมของผู้อพยพที่ได้รับอนุญาตให้เข้าประเทศว่าปฏิบัติตัวถูกต้องหรือไม่ โดยเฉพาะชนิดของความสัมพันธ์ต่างๆที่ผู้อพยพห้ามมีกับประชาชนภายในประเทศ จนทำให้นโยบายกีดกันผู้อพยพกลายเป็นต้นขั้วที่ให้ความชอบธรรมแก่รัฐในการสอดส่อง ตรวจตราชีวิตส่วนตัวของประชาชนบนข้ออ้างในการควยคุมความสัมพันธ์แบบไม่พึงประสงค์ระหว่างประขาขนกับผู้อพยพ ในแง่นี้ นโยบายกีดกันผู้อพยพจึงเป็นนโยบายที่ได้ไม่คุ้มเสีย เพราะแม้นโยบายนี้อาจตั้งต้นจากฐานเรื่อง membership ที่ประชาชนผู้เสียภาษีในประเทศควรมีสิทธิในทรัพยากรต่างๆของประเทศเหนือผู้อพยพ แต่สิ่งที่ต้องแลกไปก็คือเสรีภาพที่จะไม่ถูกควบคุม ตรวจตรา สอดส่องผ่านกลไกการจ้องมองโดยรัฐ โดยเฉพาะจิตสำนึกในการตั้วคำถามกับการใช้อำนาจต่างๆจากรัฐ ที่จะถูกแทรกแซงจนเปลี่ยนประชาชนผู้มีเสรีให้กลายเป็นเพียงมวลชนที่สำนึกของการคิดและตัดสินใจด้วยตนเองถูกทำลายลงไป

สนุกดี ผู้สนใจมิติเชิงนโยบายสาธารณะโดยเฉพาะเรื่องผู้อพยพ ควรลองอ่าน

[Daniel]

post.

The Totalitarian Logic of Immigration Controls. video.