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264 pages, Hardcover
First published April 6, 2021
“But just as Pascal detects an existential moan underneath the tinkling laughter of the Montaignean bon vivant, Tocqueville discerns a restless unease beneath the cheerful busyness of the American democrat. Indeed, he sees that the more successful the enterprise of democracy becomes, the more unsettled its citizens will be by this Pascalian malaise. The paradox animating the second volume of Democracy in America is that ever-increasing equality and prosperity do not cure restlessness but entrench it: our unease is the product of our success. Tocqueville’s effort to “teach democracy to know itself” is an effort to teach democratic human beings the Pascalian lesson that the goods that are their treasure, the justice that is their pride, and the happiness that is their aim can never be enough for a human soul.”
Why We Are Restless walks the reader through the thoughts of four French philosophers on the idea of contentment, which I relate to the concept of human flourishing which I have referenced in previous posts: Montaigne, Pascal, Rousseau, and Tocqueville. There are four philosophers, but the authors’ argument and emphasis are on the thread introduced by Montaigne which runs throughout the sections focused on the others and on into the conclusion. Montaigne is credited with introducing an idea of “immanent contentment,” and he might be my least favorite philosopher I’ve yet read (yes, worse than the philosophers behind Resistance, Rebellion, and Death and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement).
Immanent contentment is at once precisely what it sounds like, and far larger and more pernicious a concept. Montaigne elevated the pursuit of immanent contentment to a moral objective and an ultimate state of being. For him, the ultimate purpose and objective of the human life well-lived, the source of human fulfillment and flourishing, is the pursuit of proximal temporal pleasure and satisfaction. This should not be confused with Epicureanism, which is the pursuit of pleasure as an absence of pain and fear, making it technically but not colloquially a form of hedonism. Where Epicurus emphasized the so-called pleasures of the mind, for their impact on the extratemporal being, Montaigne emphasized the pleasures of the body, which exist only in the present, hence the “immanent” descriptor. The ideal of immanent contentment is a kind of bumbling from one dopamine spike to the next, ideally with friends who share this worldview, which I would compare to bees flitting from flower to flower, except that would be insulting to the bees, who perform that task with a purpose.
It is clear the authors’ thesis revolves around Montaigne’s ideas of immanent contentment; they are far less accepting of Pascal, for instance. You may be familiar with Pascal from mathematics, where he developed the famous Pascal’s triangle, amongst other theorems and proofs, but he was also a devoted polymath who turned to religion and philosophy after finding hard sciences like mathematics “too easy.” His reliance on, and praise of, religion as a source of moral virtue, purposefulness in life, and meaning to promote human flourishing and fulfillment sets a high standard, supposing, in effect, that humans must constantly strive towards an unattainable divinity in order to find fulfillment. Storey and Storey, it is clear, consider this idea rather archaic.
These first two philosophers, Montaigne and Pascal, form the core perspectives which the authors explore and expand upon through the sections on Rousseau and Tocqueville. Of the latter two, Tocqueville’s section would have been the most insightful had I not already read Democracy in America. As in that original text, his chapter in Why We Are Restless offers the significant benefit of a unique, outsider perspective on enduring qualities and fundamental assumptions of the fabric of the American experience, in many cases as relevant today as they were in the early nineteenth century. Rousseau, frankly, seems to have little to offer to the text, serving more as a way for the authors to highlight a form of dissatisfaction with Montaigne’s immanent contentment that is not a flat-out rejection of the notion and that is not framed in religious terminology.
Perhaps it is the nature of books like this one to overstate their positions, but Storey and Storey exhibit a significant blind spot with regards to America’s religious history, and how this makes the US, past and present, distinct from the determinedly secular democratization of France. To reuse a phrase which I leveraged heavily in a previous post, the US has a freedom for religion, whereas France has more a freedom from religion. The character of the waves of immigration to the US reflects this, and the authors’ analysis is fundamentally incomplete without considering the lingering impact of religious communities on American ideas of human flourishing. Denominations such as the Quakers, the Puritans, and others (arguably, most segments of the Abrahamic faiths have some wisdom in this area) emphasized (and continue to emphasize) the intrinsic value of hard work, which is one of the many ways in which religious ideas of human flourishing are distinct from prioritization of immanent contentment. Where Storey and Storey see a society that is restless because it cannot achieve the state of immanent contentment which it has been raised to idealize, I see a society whose restlessness is born from the fact that our society, far from idealizing immanent contentment, consistently conveys that there should be something more. I would go so far as to argue that mainstream American society is closer to idealizing Epicureanism than it is to idealizing Montaigne’s immanent contentment.
Another blind spot is demographic specificity. The authors provide anecdotal and some statistical evidence to support this malaise of discontent in higher education and early career “white collar” workers in the US, but they make little to no effort to see if this can be observed in other segments of American society, or in modern societies beyond the US, despite making sweeping claims about the universality of the problem which they spend an entire book describing. Nor, in the end, do they offer any substantial solutions. There is a vague acknowledgement that it is, in fact, immanent contentment itself as an ideal that is a primary contributor to the identified restlessness, but the authors are patently uncomfortable with suggesting alternatives and pointing out the moral flaws in the ideal of immanent contentment.
In a book like this, it’s not necessarily reasonable to expect to find answers, but some examination of alternatives in the broader philosophical tradition would be beneficial. Instead, Why We Are Restless leaves the reader with the impression that our democratic structure is necessarily tied to idealizing immanent contentment ala Montaigne, and that the only alternative is Pascalian religious self-deprecation and futile striving which will inevitably trend toward autocracy and inequality. So much which could be considered with regards to the topic of modern restlessness is left unexamined that the value of the authors’ arguments is quite undermined. Their identification and verbalization of the problem of restlessness might be insightful, but their analysis and conclusions are lacking, and their alternatives all but absent. Precisely because of those shortcomings mixed with my agreement on the basic premise of restlessness, I found Why We Are Restless one of the most frustrating and irritating books I’ve read in a long time. Reading it will affirm your notions that there is more to life than a quest for immanent contentment and universal, unmitigated approbation, but it may well leave you feeling more restless than when you began.