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Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin's Russia
Looking beyond Putin to understand how today's Russia actually works
Media and public discussion tends to understand Russian politics as a direct reflection of Vladimir Putin's seeming omnipotence or Russia's unique history and culture. Yet Russia is remarkably similar to other autocracies--and recognizing this illuminates the inherent limits to Putin's power. Weak Strongman challenges the conventional wisdom about Putin's Russia, highlighting the difficult trade-offs that confront the Kremlin on issues ranging from election fraud and repression to propaganda and foreign policy.
Drawing on three decades of his own on-the-ground experience and research as well as insights from a new generation of social scientists that have received little attention outside academia, Timothy Frye reveals how much we overlook about today's Russia when we focus solely on Putin or Russian exceptionalism. Frye brings a new understanding to a host of crucial questions: How popular is Putin? Is Russian propaganda effective? Why are relations with the West so fraught? Can Russian cyber warriors really swing foreign elections? In answering these and other questions, Frye offers a highly accessible reassessment of Russian politics that highlights the challenges of governing Russia and the nature of modern autocracy.
Rich in personal anecdotes and cutting-edge social science, Weak Strongman offers the best evidence available about how Russia actually works.
Media and public discussion tends to understand Russian politics as a direct reflection of Vladimir Putin's seeming omnipotence or Russia's unique history and culture. Yet Russia is remarkably similar to other autocracies--and recognizing this illuminates the inherent limits to Putin's power. Weak Strongman challenges the conventional wisdom about Putin's Russia, highlighting the difficult trade-offs that confront the Kremlin on issues ranging from election fraud and repression to propaganda and foreign policy.
Drawing on three decades of his own on-the-ground experience and research as well as insights from a new generation of social scientists that have received little attention outside academia, Timothy Frye reveals how much we overlook about today's Russia when we focus solely on Putin or Russian exceptionalism. Frye brings a new understanding to a host of crucial questions: How popular is Putin? Is Russian propaganda effective? Why are relations with the West so fraught? Can Russian cyber warriors really swing foreign elections? In answering these and other questions, Frye offers a highly accessible reassessment of Russian politics that highlights the challenges of governing Russia and the nature of modern autocracy.
Rich in personal anecdotes and cutting-edge social science, Weak Strongman offers the best evidence available about how Russia actually works.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2021
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509 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 48 reviews
February 14, 2022
A useful, concise, and interesting book that nonetheless didn't fully persuade me. Frye's purpose in this book is to channel and summarize the best of contemporary polisci work on Russia. His main argument is that we should look at Russia as a personalist autocracies and compare it to other similar regimes. He shows the structural incentives, trade-offs, techniques of governance, and other factors that affect all autocracies at work in Russia. He wants us to look at Russia with this methodology rather than engage in cultural speculation (Homo Sovieticus, for example) or a kind of Russian exceptionalism (their political culture is hopelessly authoritarian, for example) or an excessive focus on Putin as the puppet master of everything in Russia.
This method can illuminate a lot about contemporary Russian political and foreign policy. At home, Frye usefully shows the trade-off between satisfying elites and satisfying the people, two things that personalist autocrats have to do but can't always do in times of crisis. His primary body of evidence is public opinion polling, and using this he manages to show that Putin is neither worshipped nor reviled in Russia. In fact, the main determinants of his popularity are fairly familiar to Western democracies: the health of the economy and the success of foreign policy. These data help us show that Putin is not necessarily the master manipulator of a brainwashed people but someone seeking legitimacy, albeit in different conditions than in a democracy. Furthermore, Frye shows that Russia allows more of a semi-independent civil society (universities, think tanks, media) than one might expect; the strategy here seems to be to give enough space to let the political/educated classes express themselves and to allow some free media that, when he succeeds, will have the credibility to project that success to the people (in contrast state-run media that might be inherently mistrusted). Finally, Frye makes the convincing argument that Putin's desire for power and longevity is quite rational, as leaders of personalist autocracies can rarely step down and fade into obscurity; their overthrows tend to be violent and vengeful even if other elites take them out. Overall, Frye ties to depict a Putin who would face the same political, geopolitical, and economic conditions that any ruler of Russia would face, and he shows how Putin has navigated that system to remain in power and even expand Russia's global presence.
The weaknesses of this book are consistent with those as a political science as a whole: the desire to stress rationality over irrationality, the minimalization of culture and personality, the focus on structure over agency. Frye doesn't whitewash Putin, but there seems to be a minimization of just how dark this man's worldview is, how committed he is to revanchist Russian nationalism, and how he may not be a fully rational actor. One problem I have with political science is that you can always find a rational reason for pretty much any action/decision, but that doesn't mean that rationality, proportionality, etc are guiding that decision; it's just that, within their methodology, focusing on rationality allows for prediction and comparison, which are two major priorities for the discipline.
I've always suspected that there is something darker going on with Putin; he isn't just navigating an authoritarian structure, he's largely responsible for creating that structure. His media system is a fount of lies and disinformation, including some truly insane stuff like the widespread conspiracy theory of gay pedophilia in Russia. He plays heavily on the prejudice and fear of Russians, and he's made anti-gay politics their violent and cruel, with real human costs. He seems to genuinely believe that the US is trying to overthrow him even as he meddles in Ukraine, the Baltic States, and elsewhere. While Russia remains a second world country with nuclear missiles, his fixation appears to be on restoring its great power status and control of Eastern Europe, even though there is no realistic threat from central Europe today (Germany? You kidding me?). Of course, NATO over-expansion was reasonable to see as a threat, but that isn't on the table today.
More is going on here than Frye's discussion implies; Putin's pattern of behavior internationally and his ideological pronouncements suggest that he sees democracy per se as a threat to his rule, especially when that democracy creeps up to his border in places like Ukraine. He's systematically sowing division and bolstering the extremes in Western democracies while trying to crush the autonomy of democratic states nearby; is this just so they will back out of his backyard or because he sees the example, the model of democracy as a threat to the implicit social contract of Russia today (political repression and massive inequality traded for stability, modest economic gain, and nationalist pride)? After all, there's evidence that Putin saw the example of West German success as crucial to the collapse of East Germany, where he was stationed at the end of the COld War. It seems like a lot more than the rationalist puruist of power is going on, but the political science model can really only handle one of those things (or it vastly prefers to operate in the rationalist paradigm). To me, Putin seems like a man with an extremely dark worldview, a willingness to lie and grin in your face as he does it, absolutely no moral center, and who will take bigger and bigger risks until he is met with resistance.
For example, we could explain Putin's pending invasion of Ukraine as a rational pushback against US/NATO power, in keeping with Russia's centuries-old desire to control its near abroad. However, does that really capture the totality of this situation? Ukraine, aside from asserting its sovereignty and national pride, isn't a threat to Russia other than in the sense that Putin seems to see any democracy on his borders as a threat. NATO expansion to Ukraine is not on the table. He is sure to take a massive economic hit for this invasion as well as diplomatic isolation and hostility from the US. If anything, an invasion now will strengthen NATO. Finally, as polls in this book from Russia's wars in Syria and Ukraine show, the Russian people have little patience for long conflicts abroad or high casualties, and a war with Ukraine promises both. SO why is he doing it? To me, there's something dark at work here; the man seems to have lost his sense of proportion, he's taking a huge gamble that could jeopardize his gov't and his life for what seem to be manufactured reasons.
So while I do think there are limitations to this book's perspective on Putin, Frye does a great job helping the reader understand Russia today. It's a clarifying study that uses the best of his discipline today and corrects more journalistic accounts (as good as Masha Gessen's book is, totalitarianism is not returning to Russia). If I were teaching a class on modern Russia, I'd probably assign this book, as it's interesting and accessible for scholars and for the general reader.
This method can illuminate a lot about contemporary Russian political and foreign policy. At home, Frye usefully shows the trade-off between satisfying elites and satisfying the people, two things that personalist autocrats have to do but can't always do in times of crisis. His primary body of evidence is public opinion polling, and using this he manages to show that Putin is neither worshipped nor reviled in Russia. In fact, the main determinants of his popularity are fairly familiar to Western democracies: the health of the economy and the success of foreign policy. These data help us show that Putin is not necessarily the master manipulator of a brainwashed people but someone seeking legitimacy, albeit in different conditions than in a democracy. Furthermore, Frye shows that Russia allows more of a semi-independent civil society (universities, think tanks, media) than one might expect; the strategy here seems to be to give enough space to let the political/educated classes express themselves and to allow some free media that, when he succeeds, will have the credibility to project that success to the people (in contrast state-run media that might be inherently mistrusted). Finally, Frye makes the convincing argument that Putin's desire for power and longevity is quite rational, as leaders of personalist autocracies can rarely step down and fade into obscurity; their overthrows tend to be violent and vengeful even if other elites take them out. Overall, Frye ties to depict a Putin who would face the same political, geopolitical, and economic conditions that any ruler of Russia would face, and he shows how Putin has navigated that system to remain in power and even expand Russia's global presence.
The weaknesses of this book are consistent with those as a political science as a whole: the desire to stress rationality over irrationality, the minimalization of culture and personality, the focus on structure over agency. Frye doesn't whitewash Putin, but there seems to be a minimization of just how dark this man's worldview is, how committed he is to revanchist Russian nationalism, and how he may not be a fully rational actor. One problem I have with political science is that you can always find a rational reason for pretty much any action/decision, but that doesn't mean that rationality, proportionality, etc are guiding that decision; it's just that, within their methodology, focusing on rationality allows for prediction and comparison, which are two major priorities for the discipline.
I've always suspected that there is something darker going on with Putin; he isn't just navigating an authoritarian structure, he's largely responsible for creating that structure. His media system is a fount of lies and disinformation, including some truly insane stuff like the widespread conspiracy theory of gay pedophilia in Russia. He plays heavily on the prejudice and fear of Russians, and he's made anti-gay politics their violent and cruel, with real human costs. He seems to genuinely believe that the US is trying to overthrow him even as he meddles in Ukraine, the Baltic States, and elsewhere. While Russia remains a second world country with nuclear missiles, his fixation appears to be on restoring its great power status and control of Eastern Europe, even though there is no realistic threat from central Europe today (Germany? You kidding me?). Of course, NATO over-expansion was reasonable to see as a threat, but that isn't on the table today.
More is going on here than Frye's discussion implies; Putin's pattern of behavior internationally and his ideological pronouncements suggest that he sees democracy per se as a threat to his rule, especially when that democracy creeps up to his border in places like Ukraine. He's systematically sowing division and bolstering the extremes in Western democracies while trying to crush the autonomy of democratic states nearby; is this just so they will back out of his backyard or because he sees the example, the model of democracy as a threat to the implicit social contract of Russia today (political repression and massive inequality traded for stability, modest economic gain, and nationalist pride)? After all, there's evidence that Putin saw the example of West German success as crucial to the collapse of East Germany, where he was stationed at the end of the COld War. It seems like a lot more than the rationalist puruist of power is going on, but the political science model can really only handle one of those things (or it vastly prefers to operate in the rationalist paradigm). To me, Putin seems like a man with an extremely dark worldview, a willingness to lie and grin in your face as he does it, absolutely no moral center, and who will take bigger and bigger risks until he is met with resistance.
For example, we could explain Putin's pending invasion of Ukraine as a rational pushback against US/NATO power, in keeping with Russia's centuries-old desire to control its near abroad. However, does that really capture the totality of this situation? Ukraine, aside from asserting its sovereignty and national pride, isn't a threat to Russia other than in the sense that Putin seems to see any democracy on his borders as a threat. NATO expansion to Ukraine is not on the table. He is sure to take a massive economic hit for this invasion as well as diplomatic isolation and hostility from the US. If anything, an invasion now will strengthen NATO. Finally, as polls in this book from Russia's wars in Syria and Ukraine show, the Russian people have little patience for long conflicts abroad or high casualties, and a war with Ukraine promises both. SO why is he doing it? To me, there's something dark at work here; the man seems to have lost his sense of proportion, he's taking a huge gamble that could jeopardize his gov't and his life for what seem to be manufactured reasons.
So while I do think there are limitations to this book's perspective on Putin, Frye does a great job helping the reader understand Russia today. It's a clarifying study that uses the best of his discipline today and corrects more journalistic accounts (as good as Masha Gessen's book is, totalitarianism is not returning to Russia). If I were teaching a class on modern Russia, I'd probably assign this book, as it's interesting and accessible for scholars and for the general reader.
July 13, 2021
In a time when only polemical headlines make money, this book is probably far too nuanced to find bestseller appeal with the left or the right - and that's exactly why you should read it. What a breath of fresh air!
One of the best books I've read this year. An unequivocal five stars. Most issues in the world require a great deal of nuance to understand, and Russian politics is certainly no exception. Common media portrayals of Putin as a near God-like powerful figure are far from the mark, as are explanations that Russian culture is simply genetically destined to be ruled by an autocracy of some kind. The truth is a different story altogether.
Frye presents logical and nuanced arguments explaining the tradeoffs and complications inherent to a personalist autocracy in language that is accessible to a non-statistician. Putin faces the same sets of tradeoffs and incentives as other autocrats, such as: Opening the country to more international trade stimulates growth in the economy, which makes a popular revolt less likely; but more influence in foreign hands makes his cronies and elites close to him upset, making a coup against him more likely. Or: Committing widespread and patent election fraud would keep Putin in power but show weakness if people found out about it, whereas committing no or very little election fraud risks Putin losing power. So what actually occurs is a very fine balance of quasi-illegal tricks to get just enough votes for the party to look legitimate, but not to overdo or underdo it. Having to play this fragile game carefully puts yet another limit to what Putin is able to achieve.
Frye eloquently explains how many tradeoffs like this limit the power Putin is able to wield.
Practically every sentence in this book has a footnote to source all the information Frye presents. The research is indepth, and while somewhat overdependent on polls, Frye explains the science of limits and tricks to overcoming those limits of polling techniques within the book itself.
One of the best books I've read this year. An unequivocal five stars. Most issues in the world require a great deal of nuance to understand, and Russian politics is certainly no exception. Common media portrayals of Putin as a near God-like powerful figure are far from the mark, as are explanations that Russian culture is simply genetically destined to be ruled by an autocracy of some kind. The truth is a different story altogether.
Frye presents logical and nuanced arguments explaining the tradeoffs and complications inherent to a personalist autocracy in language that is accessible to a non-statistician. Putin faces the same sets of tradeoffs and incentives as other autocrats, such as: Opening the country to more international trade stimulates growth in the economy, which makes a popular revolt less likely; but more influence in foreign hands makes his cronies and elites close to him upset, making a coup against him more likely. Or: Committing widespread and patent election fraud would keep Putin in power but show weakness if people found out about it, whereas committing no or very little election fraud risks Putin losing power. So what actually occurs is a very fine balance of quasi-illegal tricks to get just enough votes for the party to look legitimate, but not to overdo or underdo it. Having to play this fragile game carefully puts yet another limit to what Putin is able to achieve.
Frye eloquently explains how many tradeoffs like this limit the power Putin is able to wield.
Practically every sentence in this book has a footnote to source all the information Frye presents. The research is indepth, and while somewhat overdependent on polls, Frye explains the science of limits and tricks to overcoming those limits of polling techniques within the book itself.
January 29, 2024
When it comes to discussing Putin's Russia, it's tempting to reach for simple explanations as to why this country has returned, after the promise of the 1990's when it looked like Russia would embrace western style liberal democracy, to its historic reality of being ruled by an autocrat; "it must be in the Russians' genes!"
Likewise, given the regime's now twenty years in power and without ever facing any genuine threat to its survival, it would be easy to assume that Putin rules primarily through an iron fist, cowering the population into submission.
The reality of course is much more complex, and what this book does brilliantly is to challenge these lazy assumptions by utilizing extensive data from surveys (many of which were carried out by the author himself), combined with comparative historical and contemporary analysis with other "personalistic autocracies" to unearth the real picture as to how the country got to where it is today, and what the future might potentially hold.
Instead of regaling you with a synopsis of his arguments, here instead are some of the questions the book poses and answers, a much better way I think to encourage reading of this exceptional study:
- Does Putin's power depend more on his popularity or on his willingness to crush dissent?
- Are Putin's approval ratings real?
- If the system is rigged, why does the Russian govt bother with elections?
- Is the Russian economy a complete basket-case?
- How does the population react to state controlled TV propaganda? Do they really believe what they see?
- What comes after Putin in a personalistic style autocracy?
These and many more are answered in this superlative book that avidly avoids stereotype and busts myths where myths need some busting. It is a very clear eyed account of how modern autocrats adapt and survive in this age, and likewise how the populations react and adapt to their own relationship with that power.
I can't recommend it highly enough.
Likewise, given the regime's now twenty years in power and without ever facing any genuine threat to its survival, it would be easy to assume that Putin rules primarily through an iron fist, cowering the population into submission.
The reality of course is much more complex, and what this book does brilliantly is to challenge these lazy assumptions by utilizing extensive data from surveys (many of which were carried out by the author himself), combined with comparative historical and contemporary analysis with other "personalistic autocracies" to unearth the real picture as to how the country got to where it is today, and what the future might potentially hold.
Instead of regaling you with a synopsis of his arguments, here instead are some of the questions the book poses and answers, a much better way I think to encourage reading of this exceptional study:
- Does Putin's power depend more on his popularity or on his willingness to crush dissent?
- Are Putin's approval ratings real?
- If the system is rigged, why does the Russian govt bother with elections?
- Is the Russian economy a complete basket-case?
- How does the population react to state controlled TV propaganda? Do they really believe what they see?
- What comes after Putin in a personalistic style autocracy?
These and many more are answered in this superlative book that avidly avoids stereotype and busts myths where myths need some busting. It is a very clear eyed account of how modern autocrats adapt and survive in this age, and likewise how the populations react and adapt to their own relationship with that power.
I can't recommend it highly enough.
February 27, 2022
This book was helpful to comprehend modern Russia and Vladimir Putin, especially his rise in an autocratic Russian government that he’s customized to his liking, yet where he is still beholden to balancing the personal gains snd interests of all his billionaire cronies. Very accessible; good arguments for incorporating more academic research into your reading if only to combat the insidious popular myths about Russia.
May 9, 2021
In-depth assessment of modern Russia, that is based on actual statistical data. Felt like a breath of fresh air, when people so often go the easiest route and explain away Russia with generalized claims. Too often people avoid taking the extra step to try and see if that common-knowledge is supported by actual facts.
December 13, 2021
TLDR: Great and relatively concise book providing a general understanding and situation facing both Russia and its leader Putin who must balance numerous decisions in managing this vast country.
What an excellent book on multiple aspects of Russia!
I found out about Timothy Frye and his new book on Russia through an article that he wrote in Foreign Affairs . The article generally goes over his arguments and the realities facing Russia that he covers in the book. If you would like to read the article like I did and see if you would be interested in the book here it is.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...
Frye seeks to provide a book that covers multiple aspects of Putin's rule in Russia, the realities that he faces, and how he balances them. Some observers of Russia state that Putin is "playing a weak hand well". Frye looks at various aspects part of Putin's rule like Elections, Foreign Policy, Economy, Media, etc. He compiles a large amount of research and his primary aim is to serve it to a broader audience to give them a hopefully clearer understanding of a country whose reputation and aura are fueled by our fears and assumptions.
This paragraph from his book summarises the tradeoffs and how effective Putin appears to be in playing a weak hand.
"Cheat too much on elections and signal weakness, but cheat too little and risk losing office. Use anti-Westernism to rile the base, yet not so much that it provokes an actual conflict with the West. Use corruption to reward cronies, though not so much that it stunts economic growth. Manipulate the news, but not so much that people distrust the media. Repress political opponents, but not so much that there is a popular backlash. Keep the security services strong, yet not so strong that they can turn on you."
Throughout the chapters in the book, he goes over the tradeoffs and the realities that the country faces. Alongside looking at the misconceptions held by the American public, generally, I have to say this is a great read to have a more general understanding that scratches at the surface of this large complicated country and infamous leader.
What an excellent book on multiple aspects of Russia!
I found out about Timothy Frye and his new book on Russia through an article that he wrote in Foreign Affairs . The article generally goes over his arguments and the realities facing Russia that he covers in the book. If you would like to read the article like I did and see if you would be interested in the book here it is.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...
Frye seeks to provide a book that covers multiple aspects of Putin's rule in Russia, the realities that he faces, and how he balances them. Some observers of Russia state that Putin is "playing a weak hand well". Frye looks at various aspects part of Putin's rule like Elections, Foreign Policy, Economy, Media, etc. He compiles a large amount of research and his primary aim is to serve it to a broader audience to give them a hopefully clearer understanding of a country whose reputation and aura are fueled by our fears and assumptions.
This paragraph from his book summarises the tradeoffs and how effective Putin appears to be in playing a weak hand.
"Cheat too much on elections and signal weakness, but cheat too little and risk losing office. Use anti-Westernism to rile the base, yet not so much that it provokes an actual conflict with the West. Use corruption to reward cronies, though not so much that it stunts economic growth. Manipulate the news, but not so much that people distrust the media. Repress political opponents, but not so much that there is a popular backlash. Keep the security services strong, yet not so strong that they can turn on you."
Throughout the chapters in the book, he goes over the tradeoffs and the realities that the country faces. Alongside looking at the misconceptions held by the American public, generally, I have to say this is a great read to have a more general understanding that scratches at the surface of this large complicated country and infamous leader.
June 6, 2025
“Weak Strongman” by Timothy Frye is a brilliant, well-researched, and balanced look into the complexities of Putin’s Russia. Frye does an excellent job explaining how power functions under authoritarian rule, carefully separating myth from reality. The insights are sharp, the arguments grounded in data, and the tone refreshingly non-alarmist. However, the writing style can be a slog at times — overly structured and dry, with little narrative flow. It reads more like a political science lecture than a compelling story. Still, the content is so strong it’s worth the effort. A must-read for anyone interested in Russian politics — just be ready to work for it.”
May 31, 2023
Accessible to even the novice reader on Russian contemporary politics. Uses data-driven, balanced analyses to understand Putin and the Russian system. Few topics and issues missing from the book, but it helped keep the book at a manageable length. Interesting to read during Putin’s war in Ukraine to see how Frye’s 2021 writing holds up.
March 28, 2024
Probably the best book I’ve read regarding modern Russian politics and putinism. Frye does a great job on expanding the view of Russian policy outside of the basic lens of Russian historical tendencies and Putin’s background. As far as academic works go, it is obvious that Frye made more of an effort to emphasize the viewpoints of everyday Russian citizens apart from that of the Kremlin.
December 27, 2023
This, IMO, is THE book on modern Russia and her politics.
January 30, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
В одиночке при ходьбе плечо
следует менять при повороте,
чтоб не зарябило и ещё
чтобы свет от лампочки в пролёте
падал переменно на виски,
чтоб зрачок не чувствовал суженья.
Это не избавит от тоски,
но спасёт от головокруженья.
Как правильно замечает автор, Россия мало чем отличается от остальных стран, т.е. глобально, отличий нет, как нет никакого «особого русского кода» и прочей ерунды. Но как тогда Путину удаётся оставаться у власти и разве такой человек как Путин и тот режим, что он построил, мог бы воспроизвестись где-либо ещё в мире, кроме как России? Разумеется. В мире полно диктатур и авторитарных стран, так что в этом смысле я полностью согласен с автором в том, что Россия не является уникальной страной, ибо путины были, есть и будут. Эта книга была написана ровно для того чтобы развенчать мистическую сущность авторитарной российской власти. Примечательно, что многие выводы автора я встречал в интервью многих российских политологов, как например, у Дмитрия Орешкина и Екатерины Шульман, а также в книге «Staging Democracy: Political Performance in Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond» и «How to Rig an Election», когда речь шла о выборной системе и подкупе избирателей.
Выборы. Да, именно эта тема привлекла моё внимание больше всего, так как автор правильно отмечает, что Путин, несмотря на то, что его рисуют как царя с абсолютной властью, вынужден проводить выборы, и вынужден обращать внимание на свой политический рейтинг. Это российские цари могли игнорировать, что думают подданные, но нынешняя система уже не та, что была при царях и даже генсеках. С этой точки зрения я полностью согласен с духом книги в том, что Путин не построил в России ни аналог царской власти, ни аналог советской. Речь идёт о персоналистской диктатуре, которая вынуждена считаться с реальностью. Что же это за реальность? Как правильно отмечает автор, Путин всё время должен маневрировать, между «слишком сильно закрутить гайки» и «слишком сильно их ослабить» (во всех сферах), т.е. между диктаторскими практиками и политикой открытости страны XXI века.
Несмотря на то, что путинскую Россию рисуют как абсолютную диктатуру, как правильно замечает автор, при уходе в одну какую-либо выше обозначенную сторону, Путин может потерять власть. Ослабь Путин авторитарную хватку – повторится история Оранжевой революцией, но если Путин слишком сильно «закрутит гайки», то тогда его уберут его же силовики либо, как альтернатива, может вспыхнуть бунт, который не захотят подавлять силовые ведомства (см. историю падения Януковича в 2014). Об этом же говорят вышеназванные российские политологи: зачем силовикам промежуточная фигура, если они сами могут править? Собственно, автор этой книги лишь дополняет их взгляды, ничуть не противореча ни природе авторитарного правителя, ни общей политической реальности.
Cheat too much on elections and signal weakness, but cheat too little and risk losing office. Use anti-Westernism to rile the base, yet not so much that it provokes an actual conflict with the West. Use corruption to reward cronies, though not so much that it stunts economic growth. Manipulate the news, but not so much that people distrust the media. Repress political opponents, but not so much that there is a popular backlash. Keep the security services strong, yet not so strong that they can turn on you.
Получается, Путин не может ни полностью либерализовать Россию, ни полностью её изолировать, как это было при советской власти (заметим, что это западные компании ушли из России, а не Россия выгнала западные компании). Получается как раз та же самая картина, что была при Ельцине. Собственно эта книга вторит идеям, которые разделяю я, т.е. что Путин является логическим продолжением Ельцина, его политическим наследным сыном. Да, Путин усилил авторитарные тенденции, однако он не стал или не смог полностью трансформировать ельцинскую Россию в какое-то новое состояние, к примеру, в условный СССР 2.0. Всё что мы видим в СМИ, это то, о чём писал маркиз де Кюстин – фасад. Фасад «сильной страны встающей с колен», «строительства СССР 2.0.» и пр. Экономика, выборы (их легальность и легитимность в обществе), международное признание – всё это важно для Путина.
На примере с экономикой, автор показывает, что когда экономическая ситуация ухудшается, ухудшается и доверие населения к Путину. Я думаю, военное противостояние Грузии и РФ в 2008, было ответом на экономический кризис, который разразился в том же году в США. Т.е. это была попытка российских властей отвлечь внимание население от экономических проблем. Украина, уже после удачной военной операции в Грузии, стала таким искусственным заменителем экономического успеха, ведь экономический успех при Путине был как раз где-то до 2008 года и только в 2014 году выявился откровенный крен в экономический спад. Таким образом, всё политическое правление Путина, эта игра с общественным мнением с целью получить от населения одобрение, т.е., легальность и легитимность в качестве президента России. Но если Путин зависим от населения и от политической элиты, а экономика после 2008 года и особенно, после 2014, только ухудшалась, как ему удаётся сохранять легитимность и легальность? Автор отвечает на эти вопросы (коротко: кнут и пряник, как народу, так и элитам).
Тут важно понимать, что за это отвечает не какое-то одно решение, а множество. К примеру, любой может увидеть, что политические репрессии во время правления Владимира Путина постоянно усиливались. Делалось это чтобы никто в России не думал, что от свободен от каких-либо последствий, т.е. репрессии являются «кнутом», в то время как «правильное» поведение - «пряником». С одной стороны, проводя всё усиливающиеся политические репрессии, Путин ослабляет политическое давление, которое естественно в условиях ухудшающейся экономической ситуации в России, а с другой, он предлагает «пряник» тем, кто его поддерживает либо кто хотя бы не выступает против него. Примеры? Весь путинский олигархат, который получил огромные куски собственности, невзирая на свои менеджерские способности (а также коррупцию), начиная от делёжки собственности бывшего ЮКОСа до дня сегодняшнего, когда Danone и другие западные компании перешли в руки лояльных Кремлю бизнесменов («пряник»). Но если бизнесмен или хотя бы худрук театра, проявляют нелояльность, таких людей, в лучшем случаи, увольняют, а в худшем, как Навального и его команду, сажают в тюрьму («кнут»). А как же закон? А когда в России законы имели значение? Да никогда. Так что получается очень ясная картина. Ситуация в экономике ухудшается? Тогда ищем внешних и внутренних врагов (благодаря чему сдерживаем любые проявление народного недовольства и как следствие, аналога Оранжевой революции). Но перегнуть репрессии тоже опасно, ведь тогда, во-первых, силовики могут от такого правителя просто избавиться, как это показал бунт Пригожина либо, п��лностью утерять в глазах населения и элиты легитимность и легальность быть президентом России и дальше. Именно поэтому Путину так важно сохранить весь этот цирк или, как обозначил это маркиз де Кюстин, фасад не тронутым. Люди должны думать, что в России существуют выборы, которые дают Путину легитимность и легальность, т.е. законность, соответствие правовым нормам править РФ и дальше (то же самое касается и всех остальных демократических институтов, таких как судебная система, свобода СМИ, свобода перемещения и пр.). Конечно, это чистый фарс, но если Путин полностью откажется от этого, народ может начать рассматривать его как нелегитимного и нелегального правителя. В контексте бунта Пригожина, а также явного недовольства российских элит тем как проходит противостояние, как с Западом, так и с Украиной, это может привести к утрате (смещению) властителя.
Однако я хочу особо подчеркнуть тему подкупа избирателей, в контексте книги Staging Democracy: Political Performance in Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond. Автор рассматриваемой книги также пишет о подкупе избирателей, а также о принуждении госслужащих, а также сотрудников государственных корпораций голосовать за Путина. Это важно, ибо именно это, с одной стороны, и имплементация политики аполитичности, с другой, как раз и помогают режиму балансировать между относительной свободой и полным тоталитаризмом. Делается это очень искусно, но именно в этом и кроется секрет пребывания Путина у власти. Качнись Путин в одну какую-нибудь сторону, и власть он, скорее всего, не удержит – сметут либо свои, либо оппозиция (не сразу, конечно). В этом смысле, Россия не является уникальной страной, а обычной авторитарной диктатурой. Да, ситуация заметно ухудшилась с 2022, однако это ещё большой вопрос - в какую именно сторону? Да, власти ликвидировали последние свободные СМИ (Эхо Москвы, Новая газета, телеканал «Дождь»), но информация всё ещё доступна для жителей России. Если Россия вступила на дорогу полного тоталитаризма, то, как объяснить работу YouTube и Телеграмма в РФ? В том же СССР никакого Интернета вообще не могло быть в принципе. Он есть в сегодняшней России именно по той причине, что Путин (пока) не может перевести Россию в какое-то иное состояние, которое бы радикально отличалось бы от состояния ельцинской России.
Чем же тогда объяснить начало полномасштабного военного конфликта с Украиной в 2022 году? Просчётом.
As the author correctly notes, Russia is not much different from other countries, i.e., globally, there are no differences, just as there is no "special Russian code" and other nonsense. But then, how does Putin manage to stay in power, and could a man like Putin and the regime he has built be reproduced anywhere else in the world but in Russia? Of course. The world is full of dictatorships and authoritarian countries, so in that sense, I agree with the author that Russia is not a unique country, for there have been, are, and will be putins. This book was written precisely to debunk the mystical nature of authoritarian Russian power. It is noteworthy that I have seen many of the author's conclusions in interviews with many Russian political scientists, such as Dmitry Oreshkin and Ekaterina Shulman, as well as in "Staging Democracy: Political Performance in Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond" and "How to Rig an Election".
Elections. Yes, this is the topic that caught my attention the most, as the author correctly points out that Putin, despite being painted as a czar with absolute power, is forced to hold elections and has to pay attention to his political rating. It was the Russian tsars who could ignore what their subjects thought, but the current system is no longer the same as it was under the tsars or even the general secretaries. From this point of view, I agree with the spirit of the book in that Putin has built neither an analog of tsarist power nor (an analog of) Soviet power in Russia. We are talking about a personalist dictatorship that has to reckon with reality. What is this reality? As the author correctly points out, Putin has to maneuver between "tightening the screws too much" and "loosening them too much" (in all spheres), i.e., between dictatorial practices and the policy of openness of the country of the 21st century.
Despite the fact that Putin's Russia is portrayed as an absolute dictatorship, as the author correctly points out, Putin could lose power if he goes in any of the above-mentioned directions. If Putin loosens his authoritarian grip, the story of the Orange Revolution will repeat itself, but if Putin "tightens the screws" too much, he will be removed by his own security forces or, alternatively, a rebellion may break out that the security agencies do not want to suppress (see the story of the fall of Yanukovych in 2014). This is what the above-mentioned Russian political scientists are also saying: why do the security forces need an intermediate figure if they can rule themselves? In fact, the author of this book only supplements their views without contradicting the nature of the authoritarian ruler or the general political reality.
Cheat too much on elections and signal weakness, but cheat too little and risk losing office. Use anti-Westernism to rile the base, yet not so much that it provokes an actual conflict with the West. Use corruption to reward cronies, though not so much that it stunts economic growth. Manipulate the news, but not so much that people distrust the media. Repress political opponents, but not so much that there is a popular backlash. Keep the security services strong, yet not so strong that they can turn on you.
It turns out that Putin can neither completely liberalize Russia nor completely isolate it, as was the case under Soviet rule (note that it was Western companies that left Russia, not Russia, that kicked out Western companies). The picture is exactly the same as it was under Yeltsin. Actually, this book echoes the ideas that I share, i.e., that Putin is a logical continuation of Yeltsin, his political hereditary son. Yes, Putin strengthened authoritarian tendencies, but he did not or could not completely transform Yeltsin's Russia into some new state, for example, into a conditional USSR 2.0. All we see in the media is what the Marquis de Custine wrote about - a facade. A facade of "a strong country rising from its knees," "building the USSR 2.0." and so on. Economy, elections (their legality and legitimacy in the society), international recognition - all these things are important for Putin.
Using the example of the economy, the author shows that when the economic situation deteriorates, so does the public's trust in Putin. I think the military confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008 was a response to the economic crisis that erupted in the US the same year. I.e., it was an attempt of the Russian authorities to divert the attention of the population from economic problems. Ukraine, after the successful military operation in Georgia, became such an artificial substitute for economic success because the economic success under Putin was just until 2008, and in 2014, there was a blatant bias towards economic decline. Thus, the entire political reign of Putin is a game with public opinion in order to get approval from the population, i.e., legality and legitimacy as president of Russia. But if Putin is dependent on the population and (on) the political elite, and if the economy has only deteriorated since 2008 and especially since 2014, how does he manage to maintain his legitimacy and legality? The author answers these questions (in short: carrot and stick, both to the people and the elites).
Here, it is important to realize that not just one decision is responsible for this, but many. For example, anyone can see that political repression during the reign of Vladimir Putin was constantly intensified. This was done so that no one in Russia would think that he was free from any consequences, i.e., repression is a "stick," while "correct" behavior is a "carrot." On the one hand, by conducting ever-increasing political repression, Putin is easing political pressure, which is natural in the context of the deteriorating economic situation in Russia, and, on the other hand, he is offering a "carrot" to those who support him or who at least do not oppose him. Examples? Putin's entire oligarchy, which has gotten huge chunks of property despite its management skills (as well as corruption), from the division of the former Yukos property to today, when Danone and other Western companies have been taken over by businessmen loyal to the Kremlin (the "carrot"). But if a businessman, or even a theater director, shows disloyalty, such people are, at best, fired, and at worst, like Navalny and his team, imprisoned (the "stick"). And what about the law? When have laws ever mattered in Russia? Never. So the picture is very clear. Is the situation in the economy deteriorating? We look for external and internal enemies (thanks to which we contain any manifestations of popular discontent and, as a consequence, an analog of the Orange Revolution). But it is also dangerous to overdo repression because then, firstly, the security forces can get rid of such a ruler, as Prigozhin's revolt showed, or completely lose the legitimacy and legality of being president of Russia in the eyes of the population and the elite. That is why it is important for Putin to keep this whole circus or, as the Marquis de Custine labeled it, the facade intact. People should think that there are elections in Russia that give Putin legitimacy and legality (the same goes for all other democratic institutions such as the judicial system, media freedom, freedom of movement, etc.). Of course, this is pure farce, but if Putin completely abandons this, the people may start to view him as an illegitimate ruler. In the context of the Prigozhin revolt and the apparent dissatisfaction of Russian elites with the way the confrontation with both the West and Ukraine is proceeding, this could lead to the overthrow of the ruler in the future.
However, I want to emphasize the topic of vote-buying in the context of "Staging Democracy: Political Performance in Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond". The author of the book in question also writes about vote-buying, as well as the coercion of civil servants as well as employees of state corporations to vote for Putin. This is important because it is precisely this, on the one hand, and the implementation of apolitical politics, on the other, that helps the regime to balance between relative freedom and totalitarianism. It is done skillfully, but that is the secret of Putin's staying in power. If Putin swings to one side or the other, he will most likely not hold power - either his own people or the opposition will sweep him away (not immediately, of course). In this sense, Russia is not a unique country but an ordinary authoritarian dictatorship. Yes, the situation has deteriorated markedly since 2022, but it is still a big question - in which direction? Yes, the authorities have eliminated the last free media (Ekho Moskvy, Novaya Gazeta, Dozhd TV channel), but the information is still available to the people of Russia. If Russia has embarked on the road to totalitarianism, how can we explain the work of YouTube and Telegram in the Russian Federation? In the USSR, there could not have been any Internet at all in principle. It exists in today's Russia for the very reason that Putin (so far) cannot move Russia to some other state that would be radically different from the state of Yeltsin's Russia.
How then can we explain the beginning of a full-scale military conflict with Ukraine in 2022? Miscalculation.
В одиночке при ходьбе плечо
следует менять при повороте,
чтоб не зарябило и ещё
чтобы свет от лампочки в пролёте
падал переменно на виски,
чтоб зрачок не чувствовал суженья.
Это не избавит от тоски,
но спасёт от головокруженья.
Как правильно замечает автор, Россия мало чем отличается от остальных стран, т.е. глобально, отличий нет, как нет никакого «особого русского кода» и прочей ерунды. Но как тогда Путину удаётся оставаться у власти и разве такой человек как Путин и тот режим, что он построил, мог бы воспроизвестись где-либо ещё в мире, кроме как России? Разумеется. В мире полно диктатур и авторитарных стран, так что в этом смысле я полностью согласен с автором в том, что Россия не является уникальной страной, ибо путины были, есть и будут. Эта книга была написана ровно для того чтобы развенчать мистическую сущность авторитарной российской власти. Примечательно, что многие выводы автора я встречал в интервью многих российских политологов, как например, у Дмитрия Орешкина и Екатерины Шульман, а также в книге «Staging Democracy: Political Performance in Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond» и «How to Rig an Election», когда речь шла о выборной системе и подкупе избирателей.
Выборы. Да, именно эта тема привлекла моё внимание больше всего, так как автор правильно отмечает, что Путин, несмотря на то, что его рисуют как царя с абсолютной властью, вынужден проводить выборы, и вынужден обращать внимание на свой политический рейтинг. Это российские цари могли игнорировать, что думают подданные, но нынешняя система уже не та, что была при царях и даже генсеках. С этой точки зрения я полностью согласен с духом книги в том, что Путин не построил в России ни аналог царской власти, ни аналог советской. Речь идёт о персоналистской диктатуре, которая вынуждена считаться с реальностью. Что же это за реальность? Как правильно отмечает автор, Путин всё время должен маневрировать, между «слишком сильно закрутить гайки» и «слишком сильно их ослабить» (во всех сферах), т.е. между диктаторскими практиками и политикой открытости страны XXI века.
Несмотря на то, что путинскую Россию рисуют как абсолютную диктатуру, как правильно замечает автор, при уходе в одну какую-либо выше обозначенную сторону, Путин может потерять власть. Ослабь Путин авторитарную хватку – повторится история Оранжевой революцией, но если Путин слишком сильно «закрутит гайки», то тогда его уберут его же силовики либо, как альтернатива, может вспыхнуть бунт, который не захотят подавлять силовые ведомства (см. историю падения Януковича в 2014). Об этом же говорят вышеназванные российские политологи: зачем силовикам промежуточная фигура, если они сами могут править? Собственно, автор этой книги лишь дополняет их взгляды, ничуть не противореча ни природе авторитарного правителя, ни общей политической реальности.
Cheat too much on elections and signal weakness, but cheat too little and risk losing office. Use anti-Westernism to rile the base, yet not so much that it provokes an actual conflict with the West. Use corruption to reward cronies, though not so much that it stunts economic growth. Manipulate the news, but not so much that people distrust the media. Repress political opponents, but not so much that there is a popular backlash. Keep the security services strong, yet not so strong that they can turn on you.
Получается, Путин не может ни полностью либерализовать Россию, ни полностью её изолировать, как это было при советской власти (заметим, что это западные компании ушли из России, а не Россия выгнала западные компании). Получается как раз та же самая картина, что была при Ельцине. Собственно эта книга вторит идеям, которые разделяю я, т.е. что Путин является логическим продолжением Ельцина, его политическим наследным сыном. Да, Путин усилил авторитарные тенденции, однако он не стал или не смог полностью трансформировать ельцинскую Россию в какое-то новое состояние, к примеру, в условный СССР 2.0. Всё что мы видим в СМИ, это то, о чём писал маркиз де Кюстин – фасад. Фасад «сильной страны встающей с колен», «строительства СССР 2.0.» и пр. Экономика, выборы (их легальность и легитимность в обществе), международное признание – всё это важно для Путина.
На примере с экономикой, автор показывает, что когда экономическая ситуация ухудшается, ухудшается и доверие населения к Путину. Я думаю, военное противостояние Грузии и РФ в 2008, было ответом на экономический кризис, который разразился в том же году в США. Т.е. это была попытка российских властей отвлечь внимание население от экономических проблем. Украина, уже после удачной военной операции в Грузии, стала таким искусственным заменителем экономического успеха, ведь экономический успех при Путине был как раз где-то до 2008 года и только в 2014 году выявился откровенный крен в экономический спад. Таким образом, всё политическое правление Путина, эта игра с общественным мнением с целью получить от населения одобрение, т.е., легальность и легитимность в качестве президента России. Но если Путин зависим от населения и от политической элиты, а экономика после 2008 года и особенно, после 2014, только ухудшалась, как ему удаётся сохранять легитимность и легальность? Автор отвечает на эти вопросы (коротко: кнут и пряник, как народу, так и элитам).
Тут важно понимать, что за это отвечает не какое-то одно решение, а множество. К примеру, любой может увидеть, что политические репрессии во время правления Владимира Путина постоянно усиливались. Делалось это чтобы никто в России не думал, что от свободен от каких-либо последствий, т.е. репрессии являются «кнутом», в то время как «правильное» поведение - «пряником». С одной стороны, проводя всё усиливающиеся политические репрессии, Путин ослабляет политическое давление, которое естественно в условиях ухудшающейся экономической ситуации в России, а с другой, он предлагает «пряник» тем, кто его поддерживает либо кто хотя бы не выступает против него. Примеры? Весь путинский олигархат, который получил огромные куски собственности, невзирая на свои менеджерские способности (а также коррупцию), начиная от делёжки собственности бывшего ЮКОСа до дня сегодняшнего, когда Danone и другие западные компании перешли в руки лояльных Кремлю бизнесменов («пряник»). Но если бизнесмен или хотя бы худрук театра, проявляют нелояльность, таких людей, в лучшем случаи, увольняют, а в худшем, как Навального и его команду, сажают в тюрьму («кнут»). А как же закон? А когда в России законы имели значение? Да никогда. Так что получается очень ясная картина. Ситуация в экономике ухудшается? Тогда ищем внешних и внутренних врагов (благодаря чему сдерживаем любые проявление народного недовольства и как следствие, аналога Оранжевой революции). Но перегнуть репрессии тоже опасно, ведь тогда, во-первых, силовики могут от такого правителя просто избавиться, как это показал бунт Пригожина либо, п��лностью утерять в глазах населения и элиты легитимность и легальность быть президентом России и дальше. Именно поэтому Путину так важно сохранить весь этот цирк или, как обозначил это маркиз де Кюстин, фасад не тронутым. Люди должны думать, что в России существуют выборы, которые дают Путину легитимность и легальность, т.е. законность, соответствие правовым нормам править РФ и дальше (то же самое касается и всех остальных демократических институтов, таких как судебная система, свобода СМИ, свобода перемещения и пр.). Конечно, это чистый фарс, но если Путин полностью откажется от этого, народ может начать рассматривать его как нелегитимного и нелегального правителя. В контексте бунта Пригожина, а также явного недовольства российских элит тем как проходит противостояние, как с Западом, так и с Украиной, это может привести к утрате (смещению) властителя.
Однако я хочу особо подчеркнуть тему подкупа избирателей, в контексте книги Staging Democracy: Political Performance in Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond. Автор рассматриваемой книги также пишет о подкупе избирателей, а также о принуждении госслужащих, а также сотрудников государственных корпораций голосовать за Путина. Это важно, ибо именно это, с одной стороны, и имплементация политики аполитичности, с другой, как раз и помогают режиму балансировать между относительной свободой и полным тоталитаризмом. Делается это очень искусно, но именно в этом и кроется секрет пребывания Путина у власти. Качнись Путин в одну какую-нибудь сторону, и власть он, скорее всего, не удержит – сметут либо свои, либо оппозиция (не сразу, конечно). В этом смысле, Россия не является уникальной страной, а обычной авторитарной диктатурой. Да, ситуация заметно ухудшилась с 2022, однако это ещё большой вопрос - в какую именно сторону? Да, власти ликвидировали последние свободные СМИ (Эхо Москвы, Новая газета, телеканал «Дождь»), но информация всё ещё доступна для жителей России. Если Россия вступила на дорогу полного тоталитаризма, то, как объяснить работу YouTube и Телеграмма в РФ? В том же СССР никакого Интернета вообще не могло быть в принципе. Он есть в сегодняшней России именно по той причине, что Путин (пока) не может перевести Россию в какое-то иное состояние, которое бы радикально отличалось бы от состояния ельцинской России.
Чем же тогда объяснить начало полномасштабного военного конфликта с Украиной в 2022 году? Просчётом.
As the author correctly notes, Russia is not much different from other countries, i.e., globally, there are no differences, just as there is no "special Russian code" and other nonsense. But then, how does Putin manage to stay in power, and could a man like Putin and the regime he has built be reproduced anywhere else in the world but in Russia? Of course. The world is full of dictatorships and authoritarian countries, so in that sense, I agree with the author that Russia is not a unique country, for there have been, are, and will be putins. This book was written precisely to debunk the mystical nature of authoritarian Russian power. It is noteworthy that I have seen many of the author's conclusions in interviews with many Russian political scientists, such as Dmitry Oreshkin and Ekaterina Shulman, as well as in "Staging Democracy: Political Performance in Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond" and "How to Rig an Election".
Elections. Yes, this is the topic that caught my attention the most, as the author correctly points out that Putin, despite being painted as a czar with absolute power, is forced to hold elections and has to pay attention to his political rating. It was the Russian tsars who could ignore what their subjects thought, but the current system is no longer the same as it was under the tsars or even the general secretaries. From this point of view, I agree with the spirit of the book in that Putin has built neither an analog of tsarist power nor (an analog of) Soviet power in Russia. We are talking about a personalist dictatorship that has to reckon with reality. What is this reality? As the author correctly points out, Putin has to maneuver between "tightening the screws too much" and "loosening them too much" (in all spheres), i.e., between dictatorial practices and the policy of openness of the country of the 21st century.
Despite the fact that Putin's Russia is portrayed as an absolute dictatorship, as the author correctly points out, Putin could lose power if he goes in any of the above-mentioned directions. If Putin loosens his authoritarian grip, the story of the Orange Revolution will repeat itself, but if Putin "tightens the screws" too much, he will be removed by his own security forces or, alternatively, a rebellion may break out that the security agencies do not want to suppress (see the story of the fall of Yanukovych in 2014). This is what the above-mentioned Russian political scientists are also saying: why do the security forces need an intermediate figure if they can rule themselves? In fact, the author of this book only supplements their views without contradicting the nature of the authoritarian ruler or the general political reality.
Cheat too much on elections and signal weakness, but cheat too little and risk losing office. Use anti-Westernism to rile the base, yet not so much that it provokes an actual conflict with the West. Use corruption to reward cronies, though not so much that it stunts economic growth. Manipulate the news, but not so much that people distrust the media. Repress political opponents, but not so much that there is a popular backlash. Keep the security services strong, yet not so strong that they can turn on you.
It turns out that Putin can neither completely liberalize Russia nor completely isolate it, as was the case under Soviet rule (note that it was Western companies that left Russia, not Russia, that kicked out Western companies). The picture is exactly the same as it was under Yeltsin. Actually, this book echoes the ideas that I share, i.e., that Putin is a logical continuation of Yeltsin, his political hereditary son. Yes, Putin strengthened authoritarian tendencies, but he did not or could not completely transform Yeltsin's Russia into some new state, for example, into a conditional USSR 2.0. All we see in the media is what the Marquis de Custine wrote about - a facade. A facade of "a strong country rising from its knees," "building the USSR 2.0." and so on. Economy, elections (their legality and legitimacy in the society), international recognition - all these things are important for Putin.
Using the example of the economy, the author shows that when the economic situation deteriorates, so does the public's trust in Putin. I think the military confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008 was a response to the economic crisis that erupted in the US the same year. I.e., it was an attempt of the Russian authorities to divert the attention of the population from economic problems. Ukraine, after the successful military operation in Georgia, became such an artificial substitute for economic success because the economic success under Putin was just until 2008, and in 2014, there was a blatant bias towards economic decline. Thus, the entire political reign of Putin is a game with public opinion in order to get approval from the population, i.e., legality and legitimacy as president of Russia. But if Putin is dependent on the population and (on) the political elite, and if the economy has only deteriorated since 2008 and especially since 2014, how does he manage to maintain his legitimacy and legality? The author answers these questions (in short: carrot and stick, both to the people and the elites).
Here, it is important to realize that not just one decision is responsible for this, but many. For example, anyone can see that political repression during the reign of Vladimir Putin was constantly intensified. This was done so that no one in Russia would think that he was free from any consequences, i.e., repression is a "stick," while "correct" behavior is a "carrot." On the one hand, by conducting ever-increasing political repression, Putin is easing political pressure, which is natural in the context of the deteriorating economic situation in Russia, and, on the other hand, he is offering a "carrot" to those who support him or who at least do not oppose him. Examples? Putin's entire oligarchy, which has gotten huge chunks of property despite its management skills (as well as corruption), from the division of the former Yukos property to today, when Danone and other Western companies have been taken over by businessmen loyal to the Kremlin (the "carrot"). But if a businessman, or even a theater director, shows disloyalty, such people are, at best, fired, and at worst, like Navalny and his team, imprisoned (the "stick"). And what about the law? When have laws ever mattered in Russia? Never. So the picture is very clear. Is the situation in the economy deteriorating? We look for external and internal enemies (thanks to which we contain any manifestations of popular discontent and, as a consequence, an analog of the Orange Revolution). But it is also dangerous to overdo repression because then, firstly, the security forces can get rid of such a ruler, as Prigozhin's revolt showed, or completely lose the legitimacy and legality of being president of Russia in the eyes of the population and the elite. That is why it is important for Putin to keep this whole circus or, as the Marquis de Custine labeled it, the facade intact. People should think that there are elections in Russia that give Putin legitimacy and legality (the same goes for all other democratic institutions such as the judicial system, media freedom, freedom of movement, etc.). Of course, this is pure farce, but if Putin completely abandons this, the people may start to view him as an illegitimate ruler. In the context of the Prigozhin revolt and the apparent dissatisfaction of Russian elites with the way the confrontation with both the West and Ukraine is proceeding, this could lead to the overthrow of the ruler in the future.
However, I want to emphasize the topic of vote-buying in the context of "Staging Democracy: Political Performance in Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond". The author of the book in question also writes about vote-buying, as well as the coercion of civil servants as well as employees of state corporations to vote for Putin. This is important because it is precisely this, on the one hand, and the implementation of apolitical politics, on the other, that helps the regime to balance between relative freedom and totalitarianism. It is done skillfully, but that is the secret of Putin's staying in power. If Putin swings to one side or the other, he will most likely not hold power - either his own people or the opposition will sweep him away (not immediately, of course). In this sense, Russia is not a unique country but an ordinary authoritarian dictatorship. Yes, the situation has deteriorated markedly since 2022, but it is still a big question - in which direction? Yes, the authorities have eliminated the last free media (Ekho Moskvy, Novaya Gazeta, Dozhd TV channel), but the information is still available to the people of Russia. If Russia has embarked on the road to totalitarianism, how can we explain the work of YouTube and Telegram in the Russian Federation? In the USSR, there could not have been any Internet at all in principle. It exists in today's Russia for the very reason that Putin (so far) cannot move Russia to some other state that would be radically different from the state of Yeltsin's Russia.
How then can we explain the beginning of a full-scale military conflict with Ukraine in 2022? Miscalculation.
March 6, 2022
I was totally drawn into Timothy’s thoughts, analysis, and writing style. So interesting and so approachable. And I truly appreciate how an academic perspective like this can help balance the attention-getting media outlets. And talk about timely work.
February 16, 2022
Easy to read. iInformative about Putin and his politics and aims for Russia. He is constrained by poor economy, and satisfying his cronies.
February 8, 2023
There is no Russian exceptionalism and, even more so, there is no "putinism". So we are left with just another gang of thugs that usurped the state. Through acknowledging the twenty-first-century means of personalist autocratic rule and by comparing it with other contemporary autocracies, this book sheds off the propaganda act from the Kremlin's performance and helps us realize the precarity of Putin's power balancing.
January 15, 2022
Vladimir Putin's must-maligned, much misunderstood Presidency is generally assumed to result from an absolute authoritarian power. Timothy Frye demonstrates that this is not the case and that the reality is (unsurprisingly) far more nuanced. Weak Strongman is an exceptional book in a growing genre of 'explaining Russia' books.
May 9, 2021
Interesting insights into the power structures, politics and potential weaknesses of Putin's Russia - always an area of interest, given that I happen to be living next door.
June 22, 2021
A perfectly average book: it generally explored the topic and gave some insight; but, I feel like it could have been a hundred pages longer, and it went off on a few tangents.
July 26, 2021
This is quite possibly one of the most informative books I've ever read.
It seemingly addresses every thought I ever had about Russia -- no surprising as it frequently comments on layman beliefs about Russia -- and provided clarification or, in some cases, debunks it completely.
Half way through the book, I felt like my entire understanding of Russia had been turned upside down. I really went from feeling like Russia/Putin is that this underhanded, pervasive enemy to a more understandable opposing country that tries to maintain its own balance through its own issues.
It's probably for the better that I changed my view. After the 2016 US elections, I was all too willing to support politicians that advocated an aggressive stance towards Russia without a rational mindset to temper it.
Better yet, I think (and the book clearly aimed for this) that the book increased my knowledge of how authoritarian countries operate in general. It answered a lot of 'whys' I had regarding other countries and provided clarification as to why yet others did so-and-so, e.g. China, Venezuela, and North Korea were high in my thoughts with those questions.
I didn't find everything in the book persuasive. At one point, the book addresses the common point that the United States also often interfere in other countries and, many times, in even worse ways, e.g. Bay of Pigs and Guatemala 1954 among MANY other instances. The book states that USA attempts to interfere has declined since 1989 and that USA 'democracy promotion' (yes, it used that phrase) did not seek to undermine that 'technical integrity of elections' (yes, it also used that phrase). It also adds that the USA often performs the task alongside other countries -- I suppose the idea being that doing so alongside other countries legitimizes the action?
It concludes the argument by saying that while the USA 'democracy promotion is hardly free of flaws and serious past mistakes', it is not like Russia which it states is far worse.
I felt like the book was involved in propaganda of its own at that point. Just remembering what happened in Libya alone (and that's just one of the MANY of instances post-1989) completely undermines that argument. I think the author would have be a lot better off not addressing that point at all as.
This is a minor point in an otherwise great book, though. For anyone looking to understand Russia or authoritarian countries, this is an excellent book.
It seemingly addresses every thought I ever had about Russia -- no surprising as it frequently comments on layman beliefs about Russia -- and provided clarification or, in some cases, debunks it completely.
Half way through the book, I felt like my entire understanding of Russia had been turned upside down. I really went from feeling like Russia/Putin is that this underhanded, pervasive enemy to a more understandable opposing country that tries to maintain its own balance through its own issues.
It's probably for the better that I changed my view. After the 2016 US elections, I was all too willing to support politicians that advocated an aggressive stance towards Russia without a rational mindset to temper it.
Better yet, I think (and the book clearly aimed for this) that the book increased my knowledge of how authoritarian countries operate in general. It answered a lot of 'whys' I had regarding other countries and provided clarification as to why yet others did so-and-so, e.g. China, Venezuela, and North Korea were high in my thoughts with those questions.
I didn't find everything in the book persuasive. At one point, the book addresses the common point that the United States also often interfere in other countries and, many times, in even worse ways, e.g. Bay of Pigs and Guatemala 1954 among MANY other instances. The book states that USA attempts to interfere has declined since 1989 and that USA 'democracy promotion' (yes, it used that phrase) did not seek to undermine that 'technical integrity of elections' (yes, it also used that phrase). It also adds that the USA often performs the task alongside other countries -- I suppose the idea being that doing so alongside other countries legitimizes the action?
It concludes the argument by saying that while the USA 'democracy promotion is hardly free of flaws and serious past mistakes', it is not like Russia which it states is far worse.
I felt like the book was involved in propaganda of its own at that point. Just remembering what happened in Libya alone (and that's just one of the MANY of instances post-1989) completely undermines that argument. I think the author would have be a lot better off not addressing that point at all as.
This is a minor point in an otherwise great book, though. For anyone looking to understand Russia or authoritarian countries, this is an excellent book.
June 13, 2021
Summary: Insightful exploration of the drivers of Russian politics. The author convincingly challenges the characterizations of Russian politics as being driven by Putin’s worldview and experience or a product of Russia’s unique history and culture. Well-researched and sourced, the author emphasizes that Putin is a “weak strongman” and Russia, like other personal autocracies, is constrained by policy tradeoffs required between elites and mass public, the bluntness of the tools for managing the country, and the uncertainty created by weak state institutions. A few of the most important insights from the book include:
- It is more important to understand the rules of the game then the personal characteristics of the ruler
- The increase in repression since 2012 is not a sign of strength, an outgrowth of Putin’s worldview, or result of Russia’s autocrat past but a sign that other tools are failing
- “Russia is a great power albeit a diminished one - Yeltsin would look on Russia’s global position with delight, but Brezhnev would view it with panic"
- Russia is a military power to be reckoned with, possesses economic influence, and a seat on the UN Security Council but is vastly outspent on defense by NATO/US, possesses limited “soft power” based mainly on declining attractiveness of Western-style democracy and capitalism, and has a public who is ambivalent about costs of pursuing great-power status and the strong anti-American views professed by policy elites
- Expectation that Putin will remain as President will reinforce the status quo of economic stagnation and heighten popular frustration with inability of Kremlin to raise standards of living
Overall the author highlights that Russia is an important actor on the world-stage and one worthy of study given the misperceptions that are out there, the challenges Russia faces, and the implications for the West. This is a book worth reading to provide perspective regarding common claims about the drivers of Russian policy and to understand some of the social science data behind it.
- It is more important to understand the rules of the game then the personal characteristics of the ruler
- The increase in repression since 2012 is not a sign of strength, an outgrowth of Putin’s worldview, or result of Russia’s autocrat past but a sign that other tools are failing
- “Russia is a great power albeit a diminished one - Yeltsin would look on Russia’s global position with delight, but Brezhnev would view it with panic"
- Russia is a military power to be reckoned with, possesses economic influence, and a seat on the UN Security Council but is vastly outspent on defense by NATO/US, possesses limited “soft power” based mainly on declining attractiveness of Western-style democracy and capitalism, and has a public who is ambivalent about costs of pursuing great-power status and the strong anti-American views professed by policy elites
- Expectation that Putin will remain as President will reinforce the status quo of economic stagnation and heighten popular frustration with inability of Kremlin to raise standards of living
Overall the author highlights that Russia is an important actor on the world-stage and one worthy of study given the misperceptions that are out there, the challenges Russia faces, and the implications for the West. This is a book worth reading to provide perspective regarding common claims about the drivers of Russian policy and to understand some of the social science data behind it.
July 8, 2022
Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin's Russia by Timothy Frye is a missionary effort on behalf of academia to make the case for an understanding of Russia and Putin rooted in Political Science. That comes with the expected caveats: Putin is not necessarily the important end all, be all unit of analysis, neither is Russian culture or history. In this, Frye is in pretty good company. Putin, while important, is not necessarily the driving factor for Russia's foreign policy. Without him, things could be better, but they could also be worse. The book has an extended dig into Homo Sovieticus, which was a way of saying that one mustn't focus too much on reading into Russian historical character or culture as a reason to explain modern Russian behavior. Some of the examples he used, like the wallet return experiment, were interesting, but perhaps not entirely compelling. He had particularly good chapters on Russia's economy and information operations, which are worth citing elsewhere. The main thesis of the book is rather sparingly highlighted, and that is Putin is an autocrat with constraints placed upon him similar to other states. He must hedge and commit to trade offs between elites and the people. He is similar to other post-Soviet leaders, and even authoritarians elsewhere. An oft cited example was, ironically, Fujimori in Peru. There are a couple of problems here, but not too many.
The reason for this is because Frye believes the policy discussion has gone wrong, with misinformed opinions about Russia potentially leading to disastrous foreign policy outcomes. He argues against Partisan arguments, wants to move away from overly inflating Putin's ability to infinitely rework Russia, and pokes a few holes at some leading scholarship. Kotkin, Hill, and Snyder each get a moments praise before receiving some criticism, as do others as well.
Overall, this is a good effort. Policy relevant political science at a pretty high level.
The reason for this is because Frye believes the policy discussion has gone wrong, with misinformed opinions about Russia potentially leading to disastrous foreign policy outcomes. He argues against Partisan arguments, wants to move away from overly inflating Putin's ability to infinitely rework Russia, and pokes a few holes at some leading scholarship. Kotkin, Hill, and Snyder each get a moments praise before receiving some criticism, as do others as well.
Overall, this is a good effort. Policy relevant political science at a pretty high level.
May 16, 2023
A Book Geared Towards the Layman Instead of the Knowledgeable or Specialist
This is a review of the audio version of this work.
Any review of this book would have to start out by stating who the intended of audience of this book is. That would be not the knowledgeable (even moderately so) or the specialist but the layman with little more than an inkling of knowledge about Russia and its recent past. For that audience the book would rate four star. For those with more knowledge of the subject less than that. For that audience there is really nothing noteworthy or novel to be gained from reading this book.
The author, an academic Soviet Union/Russia watcher (who started his career in the 1980s), emphasizes that albeit history (especially recent) and cultural differences are of some relevance to understanding Putin’s position in modern Russia a much more relevant model to view him through is that of a 20th century authoritarian regime. Putin’s position (strengths, weaknesses) are much more akin to a strong man in that model than any that, instead, emphasized Russia’s unique history, culture and geographic position. That is the only really novel aspect of this book, at least relative to how he is analyzed in most of today’s popular press.
In addition, the book provides an overview of many aspects of Russia today relative to Putin holding on (i.e., Russia’s klepto-oriented economy and associated corruption, the balancing act he must play with leading oligarchs and political institutions such as the FSB, the importance of maintaining the legitimacy through various policies such as putting on an ever changing façade regarding electoral support [along with the actual impact that has on the degree of actual impact of elections], etc.). Again, not much of this would be news to anyone who just reads leading newspapers and magazines such as the Washington Post, Financial Times, Economist and Business Week. Hence the weakness of the book.
Three stars.
This is a review of the audio version of this work.
Any review of this book would have to start out by stating who the intended of audience of this book is. That would be not the knowledgeable (even moderately so) or the specialist but the layman with little more than an inkling of knowledge about Russia and its recent past. For that audience the book would rate four star. For those with more knowledge of the subject less than that. For that audience there is really nothing noteworthy or novel to be gained from reading this book.
The author, an academic Soviet Union/Russia watcher (who started his career in the 1980s), emphasizes that albeit history (especially recent) and cultural differences are of some relevance to understanding Putin’s position in modern Russia a much more relevant model to view him through is that of a 20th century authoritarian regime. Putin’s position (strengths, weaknesses) are much more akin to a strong man in that model than any that, instead, emphasized Russia’s unique history, culture and geographic position. That is the only really novel aspect of this book, at least relative to how he is analyzed in most of today’s popular press.
In addition, the book provides an overview of many aspects of Russia today relative to Putin holding on (i.e., Russia’s klepto-oriented economy and associated corruption, the balancing act he must play with leading oligarchs and political institutions such as the FSB, the importance of maintaining the legitimacy through various policies such as putting on an ever changing façade regarding electoral support [along with the actual impact that has on the degree of actual impact of elections], etc.). Again, not much of this would be news to anyone who just reads leading newspapers and magazines such as the Washington Post, Financial Times, Economist and Business Week. Hence the weakness of the book.
Three stars.
May 23, 2023
The thesis of this book, published in 2021 prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, is that Putin is a Weak Strongman, meaning that Putin is obliged to make continuous tradeoffs in order to maintain power. Thus, Frye believes Putin can be easily compared with other personalistic autocrats, naming particularly Erdoğan, Orban, and Chavez. Frye seeks to demolish specifically the arguments 1) that Putin is sui generis, a Putinist, with exceptional personal authority and room for manoeuvre, and 2) the path dependent argument that sees Russia's trajectory in the longue durée of Tsarist and Bolshevik tyranny.
Frye is particularly dismissive of what he calls journalistic accounts of Russia that aren't sufficiently research grounded. He by contrast uses a lot of survey research data from Russia which he claims is of high quality and of interpretive value.
Unfortunately for Frye and for Ukrainians, Putin destroyed Frye's thesis by ordering an all out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 only a few months after publication of Frye's book.
In the subsequent 15 months it has become evident first that Putin had a considerable degree of leeway in action, as it was obvious most of his inner circle were opposed to the invasion but dared not try to stop him. Second, the justification of the invasion clearly and unequivocally drew upon all of the imperialist tropes that are unfortunately embedded in Tsarist and Stalinist mythology. Indeed it appears that the closest parallel to Russia under Putin is Germany under Hitler, both being driven by a deeply racist teleology; volk, lebensraum etc included.
Everyone can make mistakes and it is easy to criticise in retrospect, but Frye's book is a bit like Neville Chamberlain's speech at Munich in 1938.
What would be interesting for a well connected scholar like Frye to attempt, is to understand what possible ways out exist for Russia. Or is the only end utter defeat as for Germany in 1945?
Frye is particularly dismissive of what he calls journalistic accounts of Russia that aren't sufficiently research grounded. He by contrast uses a lot of survey research data from Russia which he claims is of high quality and of interpretive value.
Unfortunately for Frye and for Ukrainians, Putin destroyed Frye's thesis by ordering an all out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 only a few months after publication of Frye's book.
In the subsequent 15 months it has become evident first that Putin had a considerable degree of leeway in action, as it was obvious most of his inner circle were opposed to the invasion but dared not try to stop him. Second, the justification of the invasion clearly and unequivocally drew upon all of the imperialist tropes that are unfortunately embedded in Tsarist and Stalinist mythology. Indeed it appears that the closest parallel to Russia under Putin is Germany under Hitler, both being driven by a deeply racist teleology; volk, lebensraum etc included.
Everyone can make mistakes and it is easy to criticise in retrospect, but Frye's book is a bit like Neville Chamberlain's speech at Munich in 1938.
What would be interesting for a well connected scholar like Frye to attempt, is to understand what possible ways out exist for Russia. Or is the only end utter defeat as for Germany in 1945?
April 7, 2022
Fry's approach is to view Putin as a n authoritarian not with unlimited power, but instead with a tenuous grip over a selectorate elite that help him maintain power. He argues that it is a mistake to view Putin as the all-powerful leader, primarily because that is exactly the image that the Kremlin wants to project. Instead, he points to massive inefficiencies and corruption from within the Russian regime as evidence of this. He further points to the ways in which Putin does not seek to control society in the Soviet model through stifling freedom of speech and eliminating opponents, but instead focusses on building a system where the payoffs from opposition are extremely low, and the most extreme opponents are stifled (rather than society as a whole). Because of this, Putin is able to maintain an image in Russian society as providing a democratic capitalist free life that most of its citizens want, even if they are unaware of the extent of the corruption and inefficiencies of Putin's oligarchical rule. His views of the poor functioning of the Russian government (especially the military) seem to have been shown correct with the events of 2022.
October 31, 2024
Frye’s book is a short but dense analysis of what makes Putin and Russia tick. He downgrades Putin’s actual power to make things happen in Russia because he is subject to main constraints that are a consequence of his authoritarian regime and of rhetoric resources at his disposal. Russia is not particularly predisposed to autocracy. The institutional collapse after the end of the Soviet Union made it unavoidable that an autocratic regime would come about. In this sense, Putin’s regime is a manifestation of the Russian post-Soviet malaise rather than its determinant, rather like Tolstoy wrote about Napoleon in War and Peace. What is most interesting is the abundant data the author brings to bear. I didn’t know that in Russia there is still political polling and that it is actually quite possible to know a lot about what Russians really want. The book was finished around early 2020, so it would be interesting to learn what rhetorical author would make of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. I think he would say that Putin is following a pattern. Putin’s mandate was strengthened by his actions against supposed Chechen terrorists on the early noughts. He slowly lost favor with the public, which recaptured with his invasion of the Crimea in 2014, which was universally popular in Russia, particularly because it cost little in terms of lives or money. Against slowly the popular mandate ebbed, and Putin attempted to recapture it with the 2022 invasion, but that hasn’t come out as he expected. It is interesting to read about the limitations Putin faces and how many manifestations of his regime are not the result of strength, but of weakness.
December 7, 2022
In Weak Strongman, Timothy Frye attempts to tear down popular and often partisan ideas regarding Russia and put Putin's reign into a larger trend of strategies used by autocracies. He then looks at these trends and notes that, despite popular belief, Putin's personalist autocracy is a whole lot weaker. This is due to Putin needing to strike a balance in the economy, corruption, and the media, in order to serve both the elites that support him and the masses he has (some) control over.
I think Frye does a tremendous job at putting Russia in a complex light; however, I think there are two arguments here, and the former of Putin as larger trends rather than an effect of the Soviet Union's collapse is at times confusing and muddy.
I think Frye does a tremendous job at putting Russia in a complex light; however, I think there are two arguments here, and the former of Putin as larger trends rather than an effect of the Soviet Union's collapse is at times confusing and muddy.
April 11, 2022
Published a year ago, in 2021, one of the sentences in the conclusion states: "Russias next few years will likely be rocky”. - Too true and understatement of the year. The book is an evenhanded, fact-filled presentation of the weaknesses, strenghts and problems of a personalist authoritarian state. It helps us understand some of the background of our post-2022.02.24-world.
Not a page-turner per se; but I found myself rewinding whenever I had missed a few words or sentences to be sure I'd grasped most concepts. Recommended reading.
Not a page-turner per se; but I found myself rewinding whenever I had missed a few words or sentences to be sure I'd grasped most concepts. Recommended reading.
January 9, 2023
Good research and quite a useful insight at this time. I bought this book to continue my Russian education, as I know a little bit of the language and had been very invested in reading everything I could about modern Russia when I was young, so it had been a while away from the subject. This book definitely brought me up to speed on the pre-2022 politics and events happening in and around Russia’s political and geographical sphere.
October 16, 2022
This was a very good book about Russian politics. It does much to explain why Russia and Putin behave the way they do. It is a bit of a dry read. It would be a good book to review in a political science class and I would not recommend it for casual reading. But if you are interested in a detailed analysis of current Russian politics, I would recommend this book highly.
October 29, 2022
There's a lot of talk of Russia and Putin these days, so this book is well timed. Written by a long time academic on and historian of Russia, it delves into Putin's actual power and motivations, and does it in a way that's easy for laypeople to understand. (For the record, or perhaps as context, I love Russian history.)
May 20, 2023
A straightforward and very clear read. I appreciated that he didn’t try to get too fancy - the chapters each take on a distinct sector and his style is readable and meant for a popular audience but retains a clear structure and clean language that is the best of academic writing. Would recommend for any fellow amateur Russia watchers!
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