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Faustian Bargain: The Soviet-German Partnership and the Origins of the Second World War
When Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, launching World War Two, its army seemed an unstoppable force. The Luftwaffe bombed towns and cities across the country, and fifty divisions of the Wehrmacht crossed the border. Yet only two decades earlier, at the end of World War One, Germany had been an utterly and abjectly defeated military power. Foreign troops occupied its industrial heartland and the Treaty of Versailles reduced the vaunted German army of World War One to a fraction of its size, banning it from developing new military technologies. When Hitler came to power in 1933, these strictures were still in effect. By 1939, however, he had at his disposal a fighting force of 4.2 million men, armed with the most advanced weapons in the world. How could this nearly miraculous turnaround have happened?
The answer lies in Russia. Beginning in the years immediately after World War One and continuing for more than a decade, the German military and the Soviet Union--despite having been mortal enemies--entered into a partnership designed to overturn the order in Europe. Centering on economic and military cooperation, the arrangement led to the establishment of a network of military bases and industrial facilities on Soviet soil. Through their alliance, which continued for over a decade, Germany gained the space to rebuild its army. In return, the Soviet Union received vital military, technological and economic assistance. Both became, once again, military powers capable of a mass destruction that was eventually directed against one another.
Drawing from archives in five countries, including new collections of declassified Russian documents, The Faustian Bargain offers the definitive exploration of a shadowy but fateful alliance.
The answer lies in Russia. Beginning in the years immediately after World War One and continuing for more than a decade, the German military and the Soviet Union--despite having been mortal enemies--entered into a partnership designed to overturn the order in Europe. Centering on economic and military cooperation, the arrangement led to the establishment of a network of military bases and industrial facilities on Soviet soil. Through their alliance, which continued for over a decade, Germany gained the space to rebuild its army. In return, the Soviet Union received vital military, technological and economic assistance. Both became, once again, military powers capable of a mass destruction that was eventually directed against one another.
Drawing from archives in five countries, including new collections of declassified Russian documents, The Faustian Bargain offers the definitive exploration of a shadowy but fateful alliance.
350 pages, Hardcover
Published June 28, 2021
33 people are currently reading
254 people want to read
About the author
Ian Ona Johnson
2 books6 followersIan Ona Johnson is the P.J. Moran Family Assistant Professor of Military History at the University of Notre Dame. A historian of war, diplomacy, and technology, he received his PhD from the Ohio State University in 2016, with a dissertation that explored secret military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany in the interwar period.
From 2015-2016, Ian was a predoctoral fellow with International Security Studies at Yale University. He then headed to Austin, Texas, where he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Clements Center for National Security and a lecturer in the department of history at the University of Texas at Austin. In 2017, he returned to Yale University as the Associate Director of the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy and lecturer in the department of history. He joined the department of history at Notre Dame in August 2019.
His research focuses on the origins and conduct of war, and the maintenance of peace. His first monograph, The Faustian Bargain: Secret Soviet-German Military Cooperation in the Interwar Period, appeared in print with Oxford University Press in June 2021. He has also edited the memoirs of a Russian veteran and revolutionary for publication, The White Nights: Pages from a Russian Doctor’s Notebook.
He is currently working on a new book project exploring the military history of the early Cold War, with a focus on plans for an international military force. His writing has also appeared in the National Interest, the Claremont Review of Books, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the Global Military Studies Review, the Journal of Global War Studies, Technology and Culture, and the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, among others.
He and his wife live in South Bend, Indiana with their daughter Madeleine and dog Patton.
From 2015-2016, Ian was a predoctoral fellow with International Security Studies at Yale University. He then headed to Austin, Texas, where he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Clements Center for National Security and a lecturer in the department of history at the University of Texas at Austin. In 2017, he returned to Yale University as the Associate Director of the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy and lecturer in the department of history. He joined the department of history at Notre Dame in August 2019.
His research focuses on the origins and conduct of war, and the maintenance of peace. His first monograph, The Faustian Bargain: Secret Soviet-German Military Cooperation in the Interwar Period, appeared in print with Oxford University Press in June 2021. He has also edited the memoirs of a Russian veteran and revolutionary for publication, The White Nights: Pages from a Russian Doctor’s Notebook.
He is currently working on a new book project exploring the military history of the early Cold War, with a focus on plans for an international military force. His writing has also appeared in the National Interest, the Claremont Review of Books, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the Global Military Studies Review, the Journal of Global War Studies, Technology and Culture, and the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, among others.
He and his wife live in South Bend, Indiana with their daughter Madeleine and dog Patton.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
October 10, 2021
Ive read about the history of WWII - since I was young starting with ....Shirer's "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" - the information here was truly amazing and well told.
Beginning in 1919 the German Military although faced with losing WW I - wanted to preserve its options for a vibrant German Military and destruction of Poland. The Germany Military began discussions with the Soviet Union which culminated in the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 - whereby Germany and the Soviet Union exchanged military and technical information about aircraft, tanks and poison gas. At the same time the German Military transferred responsibility for Germany away from the German Military to a civilian government who eventually signed the Treaty of Versailles - creating the groundwork for a 'big lie'. This 'big lie' was that Germany was close to victory in WWI (not true) but was 'stabbed in the back' - by the international Jewish conspiracy.
The Germany Military under the Weimar Republic expanded the agreement with the Soviet Union to develop aircraft, tanks and poison gas in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. The Soviet Union did this because it was a pariah among international countries and needed German technical know how. In additional to technical know-how to deliver products - the Germans also developed their doctrine of Tank warfare - using radios to communicate between tanks and reorganizing the tank so that the Tank Commander could have view of the battlefield and didn't need to load weapons - but could concentrate on other leadership tasks.
The first half of the book details the various testing and storage facilities Germany and the Soviet Union had within the Soviet Union through the 1920's - and early 1930's - and what was developed.
This allowed the German Government who was bent on rearmament before Hitler came to power - to begin industrialization with designs from the joint German-Soviet bases in the early 1930's - with the observation that it takes between 4 to 6 years to bring tank or aircraft from design, through quality control into (mass) production. Hitler went to WWII with tank and aircraft designs from the early 1930's benefitting immeasurably from Soviet Union-German technical cooperation.
The second half of the book details how this 'jump start' on rearmament helped Hitler to both intimidate the British and French and aided Hitler with relatively easy victories in the beginning of WWII. Hitler was aided by the (non)part played by the British and French who had not the will or the equipment 'to fight' against the Germans at that time.
Puts later events into broader perspective - after initial losses to the Germans the Soviet Union outproduced Germany in Airplanes and Tanks during the later years of the War - especially with fine products such as the T-34 Tank. This information also puts into perspective the 1940 six week battle across France - where the Germans used Blitzkrieg - tanks and aircraft support to defeat a much larger French Army that suffered from low morale and relatively poor leadership.
That this German-Soviet Union relationship was not unknown - the Manchester Guardian newspaper broke a story about this in 1926 - The British Government didn't want to know - or even if it did know about this - couldn't/wouldn't have done much about it (See the "Weary Titan" - British Foreign Policy during the Inter War Years).
What about the League of Nations (The International body of the time) - it knew about this and did nothing - what does that say about the efficacy of International Bodies to keep the piece? What, if anything, can be inferred today about what is known about the U.S.' enemies and their technical alliances and technical capabilities?
A good piece of reporting- a little slow getting started (oriented) - but moves quickly.
The Soviet Union paid dearly during WWII for their engagement with the Germans - some say the Soviet Union incurred 25 Million dead - however the Soviet Union was an international pariah and couldn't trade with any other major power - so it chose to trade/exchange with Germany and paid the price.
Should be of interest to those who read about WWII - the backstory.
Carl Gallozzi
Cgallozzi@comcast.net
Beginning in 1919 the German Military although faced with losing WW I - wanted to preserve its options for a vibrant German Military and destruction of Poland. The Germany Military began discussions with the Soviet Union which culminated in the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 - whereby Germany and the Soviet Union exchanged military and technical information about aircraft, tanks and poison gas. At the same time the German Military transferred responsibility for Germany away from the German Military to a civilian government who eventually signed the Treaty of Versailles - creating the groundwork for a 'big lie'. This 'big lie' was that Germany was close to victory in WWI (not true) but was 'stabbed in the back' - by the international Jewish conspiracy.
The Germany Military under the Weimar Republic expanded the agreement with the Soviet Union to develop aircraft, tanks and poison gas in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. The Soviet Union did this because it was a pariah among international countries and needed German technical know how. In additional to technical know-how to deliver products - the Germans also developed their doctrine of Tank warfare - using radios to communicate between tanks and reorganizing the tank so that the Tank Commander could have view of the battlefield and didn't need to load weapons - but could concentrate on other leadership tasks.
The first half of the book details the various testing and storage facilities Germany and the Soviet Union had within the Soviet Union through the 1920's - and early 1930's - and what was developed.
This allowed the German Government who was bent on rearmament before Hitler came to power - to begin industrialization with designs from the joint German-Soviet bases in the early 1930's - with the observation that it takes between 4 to 6 years to bring tank or aircraft from design, through quality control into (mass) production. Hitler went to WWII with tank and aircraft designs from the early 1930's benefitting immeasurably from Soviet Union-German technical cooperation.
The second half of the book details how this 'jump start' on rearmament helped Hitler to both intimidate the British and French and aided Hitler with relatively easy victories in the beginning of WWII. Hitler was aided by the (non)part played by the British and French who had not the will or the equipment 'to fight' against the Germans at that time.
Puts later events into broader perspective - after initial losses to the Germans the Soviet Union outproduced Germany in Airplanes and Tanks during the later years of the War - especially with fine products such as the T-34 Tank. This information also puts into perspective the 1940 six week battle across France - where the Germans used Blitzkrieg - tanks and aircraft support to defeat a much larger French Army that suffered from low morale and relatively poor leadership.
That this German-Soviet Union relationship was not unknown - the Manchester Guardian newspaper broke a story about this in 1926 - The British Government didn't want to know - or even if it did know about this - couldn't/wouldn't have done much about it (See the "Weary Titan" - British Foreign Policy during the Inter War Years).
What about the League of Nations (The International body of the time) - it knew about this and did nothing - what does that say about the efficacy of International Bodies to keep the piece? What, if anything, can be inferred today about what is known about the U.S.' enemies and their technical alliances and technical capabilities?
A good piece of reporting- a little slow getting started (oriented) - but moves quickly.
The Soviet Union paid dearly during WWII for their engagement with the Germans - some say the Soviet Union incurred 25 Million dead - however the Soviet Union was an international pariah and couldn't trade with any other major power - so it chose to trade/exchange with Germany and paid the price.
Should be of interest to those who read about WWII - the backstory.
Carl Gallozzi
Cgallozzi@comcast.net
December 26, 2021
Superb - and compelling. Johnson writes clearly and with insight and stellar research of an overlooked, and much underappreciated, relationship between the USSR and Germany in the interwar years from 1920 up to the invasion of Russia in June 1941. He puts this aptly named Faustian bargain in the context of Versailles, international relations isolating both Germany and the USSR, Russian revolutionary politics, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, the Great Terror, German politics leading to Hitler's emergence and the resulting Nazi autocracy, international arms control of the times, and the military and economic cooperation between Germany and the USSR in all its ups and downs. This is a masterpiece of historical research, writing and contextual analysis filled with illustrative and engaging details and anecdotes throughout. Fascinating and revelatory from start to finish.
The predatory nature of the USSR under Stalin, and Hitler's Germany, on top of the lengthy and determined German rearmament strategies and goals that predated Hitler by decades are documented and narrated. The scope of it all is frankly surprising, and a huge factor (if not arguably the single most important factor) in the onset of World War II that should no longer be overlooked, thanks to Johnson's exhaustive research and narration.
A characteristic example drawn from Johnson's Introduction relates the meeting between the Polish ambassador in Moscow and the deputy commissar for foreign affairs on the night of September 16, 1939 as the remnants of the Polish army retreated towards Romania. Poland was seeking help from its Russian neighbor, with whom Poland had a treaty. "[T]he Soviet diplomat informed him that the 'Polish-German war has revealed the internal inadequacy of the Polish state ... the Soviet government intends to liberate the Polish people from the unfortunate war, where it was cast by its irrational leaders, and give them the opportunity to live a peaceful life.' A few hours later, half a million Red Army soldiers invaded Poland from the East without a declaration of war." It's heart-breaking, in retrospect. The entire twenty-year relationship is one of retroactive outrage, and regret - World War II did not need to happen, and yet it did largely because of this mutually beneficent relationship between two expansively oriented, tyrannical, totally antithetical regimes and the mistakes made by the West in response. Much to learn here.
The predatory nature of the USSR under Stalin, and Hitler's Germany, on top of the lengthy and determined German rearmament strategies and goals that predated Hitler by decades are documented and narrated. The scope of it all is frankly surprising, and a huge factor (if not arguably the single most important factor) in the onset of World War II that should no longer be overlooked, thanks to Johnson's exhaustive research and narration.
A characteristic example drawn from Johnson's Introduction relates the meeting between the Polish ambassador in Moscow and the deputy commissar for foreign affairs on the night of September 16, 1939 as the remnants of the Polish army retreated towards Romania. Poland was seeking help from its Russian neighbor, with whom Poland had a treaty. "[T]he Soviet diplomat informed him that the 'Polish-German war has revealed the internal inadequacy of the Polish state ... the Soviet government intends to liberate the Polish people from the unfortunate war, where it was cast by its irrational leaders, and give them the opportunity to live a peaceful life.' A few hours later, half a million Red Army soldiers invaded Poland from the East without a declaration of war." It's heart-breaking, in retrospect. The entire twenty-year relationship is one of retroactive outrage, and regret - World War II did not need to happen, and yet it did largely because of this mutually beneficent relationship between two expansively oriented, tyrannical, totally antithetical regimes and the mistakes made by the West in response. Much to learn here.
May 5, 2024
An Interesting Book on a Little Covered Topic but Main Conclusion Weak
This is a review of the audio edition of this work
This book provides an in-depth study of German-Soviet armaments cooperation secretly conducted in the Soviet Union between the wars. This started almost immediately after the Soviet Union, a pariah state in the eyes of the West, had established itself after the Russian Civil War ended in the early 1920s. It continued through 1933, was suspended when Hitler came to power temporarily and then restarted in 1937.
The book not only covers the actual development, albeit at a high level (i.e., usually in terms of chemical weapons, aircraft and tanks at a high level – little specific weapon systems discussed in detail). This is one of the weaknesses of the book. This reviewer wishes that the author covered the weapons being developed in more extensive and specific detail. The book also covers the diplomatic, geopolitical and international political relations underlying this seemingly convoluted cooperation (i.e. the Treaty of Versaise was the main impetus for the Germans and for the Soviets it was their pariah status in the international political system).
The book concludes, incorrectly I this reviewer’s opinion, that it was this relationship that played a major role in the eventual war between the two nations. It is posited that the German experience in this cooperative pact was critical in Germany eventually declaring war. This was because the experience made the German army confident (more appropriately, over confident) of victory. This, in turn, was due to a number of reasons. One was that weapons the German army saw in the Soviet Union weapons that were inferior to its own. This turned out being incorrect as the Soviet Union, at least as posited in the book, was showing the Germans only its worse equipment and keeping secret its more advanced equipment. The book could have done better here by providing more specifics as opposed to higher level analysis.
Secondly, the German army gained a very poor opinion of the Soviet Union’s officer corps, technical crews and other human infrastructure based on its experiences (which was off-base here). The Germans, in this regard, thought the Soviet Union incapable of running a professional modern army.
Thirdly, the Germans, based on their first had experiences in the Soviet Union, ended up gaining a very poor opinion of the Soviet economy, the Soviet political system and the Soviet Union in general. This was not only due to first hand experiences with Soviet military personnel, but just as importantly, if not more so, by seeing the general chaos in the Soviet economy as well as the famine resulting from Stalin’s agricultural collectivist plans.
While the German army’s experience did play a role in their underestimation of the Soviet Union’s war waging ability, undoubtedly, it is difficult to see, based on what the author has written, that this played a very important or critical factor in Germany’s desire to directly invade the Soviet Union or, for that matter, war breaking out between the nations. Their dialectical natures, mistrust and opposing goals almost made it inevitable that such a war would come out. This was the critical driving force, not just German underestimation of the Soviet Union’s war machine.
All and all, however, a four-star book, especially considering that this is an aspect of history that has been little written about.
PS- one major critique this reviewer has of the audiobook is that of the voice over. The reader sounds like David Sedaris and just lacks the tone required to carry such a serious and academic topic. This book should have been narrated by performer who sounded like a German or English professor, not a comedian. This reviewer rates the narration, unlike the actual text of the book, a two star out of five as a result and, hence, recommends the written version of the work.
This is a review of the audio edition of this work
This book provides an in-depth study of German-Soviet armaments cooperation secretly conducted in the Soviet Union between the wars. This started almost immediately after the Soviet Union, a pariah state in the eyes of the West, had established itself after the Russian Civil War ended in the early 1920s. It continued through 1933, was suspended when Hitler came to power temporarily and then restarted in 1937.
The book not only covers the actual development, albeit at a high level (i.e., usually in terms of chemical weapons, aircraft and tanks at a high level – little specific weapon systems discussed in detail). This is one of the weaknesses of the book. This reviewer wishes that the author covered the weapons being developed in more extensive and specific detail. The book also covers the diplomatic, geopolitical and international political relations underlying this seemingly convoluted cooperation (i.e. the Treaty of Versaise was the main impetus for the Germans and for the Soviets it was their pariah status in the international political system).
The book concludes, incorrectly I this reviewer’s opinion, that it was this relationship that played a major role in the eventual war between the two nations. It is posited that the German experience in this cooperative pact was critical in Germany eventually declaring war. This was because the experience made the German army confident (more appropriately, over confident) of victory. This, in turn, was due to a number of reasons. One was that weapons the German army saw in the Soviet Union weapons that were inferior to its own. This turned out being incorrect as the Soviet Union, at least as posited in the book, was showing the Germans only its worse equipment and keeping secret its more advanced equipment. The book could have done better here by providing more specifics as opposed to higher level analysis.
Secondly, the German army gained a very poor opinion of the Soviet Union’s officer corps, technical crews and other human infrastructure based on its experiences (which was off-base here). The Germans, in this regard, thought the Soviet Union incapable of running a professional modern army.
Thirdly, the Germans, based on their first had experiences in the Soviet Union, ended up gaining a very poor opinion of the Soviet economy, the Soviet political system and the Soviet Union in general. This was not only due to first hand experiences with Soviet military personnel, but just as importantly, if not more so, by seeing the general chaos in the Soviet economy as well as the famine resulting from Stalin’s agricultural collectivist plans.
While the German army’s experience did play a role in their underestimation of the Soviet Union’s war waging ability, undoubtedly, it is difficult to see, based on what the author has written, that this played a very important or critical factor in Germany’s desire to directly invade the Soviet Union or, for that matter, war breaking out between the nations. Their dialectical natures, mistrust and opposing goals almost made it inevitable that such a war would come out. This was the critical driving force, not just German underestimation of the Soviet Union’s war machine.
All and all, however, a four-star book, especially considering that this is an aspect of history that has been little written about.
PS- one major critique this reviewer has of the audiobook is that of the voice over. The reader sounds like David Sedaris and just lacks the tone required to carry such a serious and academic topic. This book should have been narrated by performer who sounded like a German or English professor, not a comedian. This reviewer rates the narration, unlike the actual text of the book, a two star out of five as a result and, hence, recommends the written version of the work.
May 27, 2024
My review of this book is quite nuanced. On the one hand, Johnson's book contains a lot of detail about German-Soviet cooperation during the years after WW I. Much of this has to do with tanks, of which I know very little! This section of the book runs 210 pages, and I found it a real slog to read it all. It is only @ Chapter 32 (curiously titled Fulfillment) that Johnson gets to the pre WW II era, where Hitler and Stalin become involved in a fascinating tit-for-tat cooperation agreement involving who invades what other countries? As the final sentence reminds us, this Faustian Bargain came at the cost of 30 million lives. Difficult reading, to be sure.
September 14, 2024
Interesting and good coverage of an area little discussed. However there were a few small places where he goes against the consensus of all other historians that concerned me, as I am unsure if there were larger errors I missed. 1. Hitler did not force the army to swear allegiance to him, they chose to implement the oath themselves. 2. Unfortunately, there is little to no evidence to support that the SA was responsible for the Reichstag fire.
July 2, 2022
Apart from being an excellent history of the Versailles and Rapallo eras, it also inadvertently answers why Stalin didn’t heed the intelligence on the buildup of Nazi troops at his borders and raises another — why did the Nazis underestimate the strength of the Red Army in 1941 despite the extensive experience of numerous leaders in the Soviet Union after Rapallo.
December 2, 2025
Thorough, well-researched, you learn a lot but it’s not an easy read
This is a very thorough discussion of the German-Soviet partnership leading into WWII, particularly the technological/industrial development of both nations and militaries. Can be a detailed, dense, difficult read.
This is a very thorough discussion of the German-Soviet partnership leading into WWII, particularly the technological/industrial development of both nations and militaries. Can be a detailed, dense, difficult read.
April 1, 2024
A definite read to understand the Soviet-German secret cooperation in building both armies to be the military might before WW2. This book is light on the Nazi-Soviet alliance as it mostly about the Weimar Republic time, but it is covered as well.
April 3, 2022
Well-researched and organized. Johnson's work provides great insight into one of the most consequential partnerships in modern history with strategic implications.
September 30, 2022
Excellent book, and very well written.
February 23, 2023
This book incredibly detailed about German and Russian cooperation in rearming both countries between WWI and WWII. It is aptly named as A Faustian Bargain with 2 devils.
December 26, 2024
Fantastic fascinating well researched. One has to wonder how the US ended up lied with the Soviets? As the Soviet and the Nazis seem like two sides of the same coin.
July 30, 2022
Really good book. I have read a lot on this time period still learned a lot!
October 6, 2025
Puncturing the story of Soviet Union as the good guys of WW II
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews