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China's Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy
The untold story of China's rise as a global superpower, chronicled through the diplomatic shock troops that connect Beijing to the world.
China's Civilian Army charts China's transformation from an isolated and impoverished communist state to a global superpower from the perspective of those on the front China's diplomats. They give a rare perspective on the greatest geopolitical drama of the last half century.
In the early days of the People's Republic, diplomats were highly-disciplined, committed communists who feared revealing any weakness to the threatening capitalist world. Remarkably, the model that revolutionary leader Zhou Enlai established continues to this day despite the massive changes the country has undergone in recent decades.
Little is known or understood about the inner workings of the Chinese government as the country bursts onto the world stage, as the world's second largest economy and an emerging military superpower. China's Diplomats embody its battle between insecurity and self-confidence, internally and externally. To this day, Chinese diplomats work in pairs so that one can always watch the other for signs of ideological impurity. They're often dubbed China's "wolf warriors" for their combative approach to asserting Chinese interests.
Drawing for the first time on the memoirs of more than a hundred retired diplomats as well as author Peter Martin's first-hand reporting as a journalist in Beijing, this groundbreaking book blends history with current events to tease out enduring lessons about the kind of power China is set to become. It is required reading for anyone who wants to understand China's quest for global power, as seen from the inside.
China's Civilian Army charts China's transformation from an isolated and impoverished communist state to a global superpower from the perspective of those on the front China's diplomats. They give a rare perspective on the greatest geopolitical drama of the last half century.
In the early days of the People's Republic, diplomats were highly-disciplined, committed communists who feared revealing any weakness to the threatening capitalist world. Remarkably, the model that revolutionary leader Zhou Enlai established continues to this day despite the massive changes the country has undergone in recent decades.
Little is known or understood about the inner workings of the Chinese government as the country bursts onto the world stage, as the world's second largest economy and an emerging military superpower. China's Diplomats embody its battle between insecurity and self-confidence, internally and externally. To this day, Chinese diplomats work in pairs so that one can always watch the other for signs of ideological impurity. They're often dubbed China's "wolf warriors" for their combative approach to asserting Chinese interests.
Drawing for the first time on the memoirs of more than a hundred retired diplomats as well as author Peter Martin's first-hand reporting as a journalist in Beijing, this groundbreaking book blends history with current events to tease out enduring lessons about the kind of power China is set to become. It is required reading for anyone who wants to understand China's quest for global power, as seen from the inside.
320 pages, Hardcover
Published June 10, 2021
70 people are currently reading
933 people want to read
About the author
Peter Martin
1 book20 followersPeter Martin is a political reporter for Bloomberg News. He has written extensively on escalating tensions in the US-China relationship and reported from China's border with North Korea and its far-western region of Xinjiang. He holds degrees from the University of Oxford, Peking University and the London School of Economics.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 49 reviews
July 22, 2021
https://nwhyte.livejournal.com/3710438.html
Peter Martin was a colleague of mine when I started in my current workplace, but left to go back to Beijing as a reporter for Bloomberg. He's now in Washington working Bloomberg's defence beat, but has used his time in China profitably to write this excellent book on China's diplomatic service.
The first thing to say is that this book is (thank heavens) not for the China specialist. I confess I knew far less than I should about the history of the Communist Party and the People's Republic, and because the foreign ministry, the subject of this book, was very much the creation of Zhou Enlai. Peter is clear and lucid on this complex history. Chinese diplomacy was set up from scratch in 1949, all previous Chinese diplomats having been part of the old regime; the diplomats were senior Red Army officers, with no knowledge of diplomacy and often no experience of the world outside China. The isolation of the regime by other countries did not help. It seems incredible now that Taiwan was allowed to occupy China's place at the UN for more than twenty years after losing the war. Mutual suspicion between China and its international interlocutors was deep, and for good reason.
With that unpromising start, Chinese diplomacy is very different from that of other countries. Every country of course has its own style, reflecting national characteristics. But Chinese diplomats are unusual in two respects. They tend not to make friends outside their own service, and they tend to stick to their talking points rather than actually engage in a conversation. They are happy to pick fights over protocol, even when clearly in the wrong. This is of course the result of working for a bureaucracy which is internally paranoid and conscious of vulnerability to accusations of foreign influence. At one point in the 1990s, concerned citizens started sending calcium tablets to the ministry's headquarters, to help it build some backbone.
The Ministry also had the sharp end of explaining some of the more traumatic moments of recent history. It was badly affected by the Cultural Revolution, and one gets the sense that that experience still runs deep in bureaucratic China. The Tian-an-Men massacre of June 1989 was another key moment which reversed any recent international gains for China. NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 was another low point, inflicted by the West. On the other hand, there were also successes like the Beijing Olympics, and China's rapid re-positioning as an ally in the war on terror from 2001.
Taiwan continues to be a diplomatic irritant. I've once or twice been caught in the slipstream of this one myself; I organised a Brussels speaking opportunity for the then Taiwanese government spokesman in 2000, and was struck by the number of mainland Chinese who turned up to heckle him in the audience. Twelve years later, I organised a speaking opportunity for a senior government official from one of the dwindling number of states that recognise Taiwan. In his speech, he mentioned the People's Republic favourably and Taiwan not at all. Literally before he had sat down from speaking, he had been called by both sides asking if this meant a shift of policy. He grinned, having achieved exactly what he wanted - a very small country getting two bigger, richer rivals to compete for his affections.
Anyway, this book was published literally last week, and it's a great backgrounder on China as a whole and on its undiplomatic diplomats in particular. Strongly recommended.
Peter Martin was a colleague of mine when I started in my current workplace, but left to go back to Beijing as a reporter for Bloomberg. He's now in Washington working Bloomberg's defence beat, but has used his time in China profitably to write this excellent book on China's diplomatic service.
The first thing to say is that this book is (thank heavens) not for the China specialist. I confess I knew far less than I should about the history of the Communist Party and the People's Republic, and because the foreign ministry, the subject of this book, was very much the creation of Zhou Enlai. Peter is clear and lucid on this complex history. Chinese diplomacy was set up from scratch in 1949, all previous Chinese diplomats having been part of the old regime; the diplomats were senior Red Army officers, with no knowledge of diplomacy and often no experience of the world outside China. The isolation of the regime by other countries did not help. It seems incredible now that Taiwan was allowed to occupy China's place at the UN for more than twenty years after losing the war. Mutual suspicion between China and its international interlocutors was deep, and for good reason.
With that unpromising start, Chinese diplomacy is very different from that of other countries. Every country of course has its own style, reflecting national characteristics. But Chinese diplomats are unusual in two respects. They tend not to make friends outside their own service, and they tend to stick to their talking points rather than actually engage in a conversation. They are happy to pick fights over protocol, even when clearly in the wrong. This is of course the result of working for a bureaucracy which is internally paranoid and conscious of vulnerability to accusations of foreign influence. At one point in the 1990s, concerned citizens started sending calcium tablets to the ministry's headquarters, to help it build some backbone.
The Ministry also had the sharp end of explaining some of the more traumatic moments of recent history. It was badly affected by the Cultural Revolution, and one gets the sense that that experience still runs deep in bureaucratic China. The Tian-an-Men massacre of June 1989 was another key moment which reversed any recent international gains for China. NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 was another low point, inflicted by the West. On the other hand, there were also successes like the Beijing Olympics, and China's rapid re-positioning as an ally in the war on terror from 2001.
Taiwan continues to be a diplomatic irritant. I've once or twice been caught in the slipstream of this one myself; I organised a Brussels speaking opportunity for the then Taiwanese government spokesman in 2000, and was struck by the number of mainland Chinese who turned up to heckle him in the audience. Twelve years later, I organised a speaking opportunity for a senior government official from one of the dwindling number of states that recognise Taiwan. In his speech, he mentioned the People's Republic favourably and Taiwan not at all. Literally before he had sat down from speaking, he had been called by both sides asking if this meant a shift of policy. He grinned, having achieved exactly what he wanted - a very small country getting two bigger, richer rivals to compete for his affections.
Anyway, this book was published literally last week, and it's a great backgrounder on China as a whole and on its undiplomatic diplomats in particular. Strongly recommended.
September 16, 2021
A history of the diplomatic service of the People's Republic of China, starting from its humble beginnings in 1954 with the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and continue to the present era of "wolf warrior diplomacy". Where archival research was not really possible, Martin bases his study off of personal interviews and published memoirs - over a hundred of the latter.
When MOFA was first established, its first head, Zhou Enlai, said that its cadres would be "the People's Liberation Army in civilian clothing". This is still held as a founding principle of the ministry today- its diplomats for many years were regarded as disciplined and rigorous, but also isolated. One person who regularly dealt with Chinese delegations said that he had could make no friends among them.
That said, the ministry seems to have recurring tricks in this account - overawing flattery, telling the other party they will need to take the initiative, and (no doubt rehearsed) outbursts of anger. At times its diplomats can be overbearing, or even imperious - while they appear practiced at stating Chinese demands, their recent assertiveness has at times scuppered what might have been easy successes - the author gives an example of a delegation barging into an office in Papua New Guinea demanding last minute changes to a communique.
Finally, the ministry appears pressured by domestic interests as much as it is by its foreign counterparts. The early chapters of the book describe Mao's meddling and his later distrust for other communist officials, and the pressures on the foreign ministry during the Cultural Revolution. During periods of internal purges, those targets with perceived excessive foreign ties are under suspicion, and so that is what happened to the ministry. That said, excessive nationalism and "wolf warrior diplomacy", as it is often cold, has its own causes and drawbacks. On the one hand, there is domestic pressure to appear sufficiently assertive and nationalist, and on the other, it hinders situations where cooperation is necessary.
A useful study - much has changed since 1954, but a lot remains the same.
When MOFA was first established, its first head, Zhou Enlai, said that its cadres would be "the People's Liberation Army in civilian clothing". This is still held as a founding principle of the ministry today- its diplomats for many years were regarded as disciplined and rigorous, but also isolated. One person who regularly dealt with Chinese delegations said that he had could make no friends among them.
That said, the ministry seems to have recurring tricks in this account - overawing flattery, telling the other party they will need to take the initiative, and (no doubt rehearsed) outbursts of anger. At times its diplomats can be overbearing, or even imperious - while they appear practiced at stating Chinese demands, their recent assertiveness has at times scuppered what might have been easy successes - the author gives an example of a delegation barging into an office in Papua New Guinea demanding last minute changes to a communique.
Finally, the ministry appears pressured by domestic interests as much as it is by its foreign counterparts. The early chapters of the book describe Mao's meddling and his later distrust for other communist officials, and the pressures on the foreign ministry during the Cultural Revolution. During periods of internal purges, those targets with perceived excessive foreign ties are under suspicion, and so that is what happened to the ministry. That said, excessive nationalism and "wolf warrior diplomacy", as it is often cold, has its own causes and drawbacks. On the one hand, there is domestic pressure to appear sufficiently assertive and nationalist, and on the other, it hinders situations where cooperation is necessary.
A useful study - much has changed since 1954, but a lot remains the same.
August 6, 2023
My country’s (Australia) relationship with the People’s Republic of China has been front page for several years now and all for the wrong reasons. It is hard to believe but in 2014 Xi Jinping visited Australia and addressed parliament. Now we are hardly on speaking terms. I wanted to understand the dynamics of China’s relationship with the international community.
I have a list of books and essays by people like Bill Birtles, Linda Jaivin, Geoff Raby, Peter Hartcher, Clive Hamilton and Hugh White to make my way through. I am glad I came across Peter Martin’s book. It has filled in gaps in my knowledge and given me a different perception of incidents and people in the story of China since 1949.
The central character in the early pages of the book is Zhou Enlai and the integral role he played in the development of the Chinese diplomatic corp. It was Zhou who came up with the term that is used in the title of the book.
Martin gave us some insight into Zhou’s personality, his treatment by the party and his relationship with Mao. He also discussed the concept of the “Century of Humiliation” and the impact and use of that in China’s relationship with other countries.
I found Martin’s discussion of Edgar Snow fascinating and his assertion that Mao used Snow.
Martin charts the ups and downs, the success and failures of China’s diplomacy. He explains the mindset of Chinese diplomats. The fact that they all had to travel in pairs, they could be friendly and courteous in private but take on a totally different persona when speaking as representatives of their country. Martin discusses accounts of poor, behaviour, bullying and even violence used by some Chinese diplomats.
Martin spends some time explaining ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ under the reign of Xi.
At the conclusion of the book I re-evaluated my own convictions over China. I still accept that the West should accept the notion of a century of shame and how it influences China’s behaviour on the world stage, but it does not excuse China’s sometimes aggressive style of coercive diplomacy. The Chinese need to realise that it achieves little and is the antipathy of good diplomacy. China has not won many friends and has alienated countries and their citizens where it has been applied. Australia, Canada, Norway, Germany, Sweden and France have all been subjected to this style of diplomacy. Of course Australia must realise that megaphone diplomacy often achieves little and at times achieves the opposite of intended outcomes. If we disagree with China it should be from the high moral ground.
The concluding pages deal with Xi Jinping’s dominance of the CCP, the Taiwan situation and the brittleness and fragility of the Communist Party and how it reacts so aggressively to any criticism. I believe that because of China’s stifling of participatory in Hong Kong its chances of unifying Taiwan to the mainland are as far away as ever.
We now have the American President saying that his country would come to the defence of Taiwan if attacked. This accentuates the concept of the Thucydides Trap where war with China and USA is inevitable.
Australia needs to stand up for its own interests when dealing with China, but it also needs to have a deep understanding of the Chinese world view and act accordingly. Use diplomacy to the fullest.
A most worthwhile read for those wanting an understanding of China in the twenty-first century.
I have a list of books and essays by people like Bill Birtles, Linda Jaivin, Geoff Raby, Peter Hartcher, Clive Hamilton and Hugh White to make my way through. I am glad I came across Peter Martin’s book. It has filled in gaps in my knowledge and given me a different perception of incidents and people in the story of China since 1949.
The central character in the early pages of the book is Zhou Enlai and the integral role he played in the development of the Chinese diplomatic corp. It was Zhou who came up with the term that is used in the title of the book.
Martin gave us some insight into Zhou’s personality, his treatment by the party and his relationship with Mao. He also discussed the concept of the “Century of Humiliation” and the impact and use of that in China’s relationship with other countries.
I found Martin’s discussion of Edgar Snow fascinating and his assertion that Mao used Snow.
Martin charts the ups and downs, the success and failures of China’s diplomacy. He explains the mindset of Chinese diplomats. The fact that they all had to travel in pairs, they could be friendly and courteous in private but take on a totally different persona when speaking as representatives of their country. Martin discusses accounts of poor, behaviour, bullying and even violence used by some Chinese diplomats.
Martin spends some time explaining ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ under the reign of Xi.
At the conclusion of the book I re-evaluated my own convictions over China. I still accept that the West should accept the notion of a century of shame and how it influences China’s behaviour on the world stage, but it does not excuse China’s sometimes aggressive style of coercive diplomacy. The Chinese need to realise that it achieves little and is the antipathy of good diplomacy. China has not won many friends and has alienated countries and their citizens where it has been applied. Australia, Canada, Norway, Germany, Sweden and France have all been subjected to this style of diplomacy. Of course Australia must realise that megaphone diplomacy often achieves little and at times achieves the opposite of intended outcomes. If we disagree with China it should be from the high moral ground.
The concluding pages deal with Xi Jinping’s dominance of the CCP, the Taiwan situation and the brittleness and fragility of the Communist Party and how it reacts so aggressively to any criticism. I believe that because of China’s stifling of participatory in Hong Kong its chances of unifying Taiwan to the mainland are as far away as ever.
We now have the American President saying that his country would come to the defence of Taiwan if attacked. This accentuates the concept of the Thucydides Trap where war with China and USA is inevitable.
Australia needs to stand up for its own interests when dealing with China, but it also needs to have a deep understanding of the Chinese world view and act accordingly. Use diplomacy to the fullest.
A most worthwhile read for those wanting an understanding of China in the twenty-first century.
July 15, 2021
This book, which came out recently, is a truly excellent and very accessible look at Chinese diplomacy over the past seventy years. Although clearly written for a popular audience, the book is admirably detailed and well-sourced, and the analysis benefits from the author’s significant time spent in China. The central contention of the book is that China’s diplomacy is fundamentally characterized by ideology and self-certainty, and it is simultaneously inflected with feelings of superiority and insecurity. What I particularly enjoyed about the book is its ability to trace a clear continuity between early Chinese diplomatic efforts up to the present. In particular, the continued paranoia directed toward the loyalty and reliability of the diplomatic corps emerges as a powerful and enduring feature of Chinese foreign policy. The book discusses how early diplomatic efforts emphasized ideological purity. This obsession with conformity of thought and dedication to the Party’s ideals continued through China’s opening to the world, with the book offering humorous anecdotes about how ill-equipped Chinese diplomats were for postings abroad given their cartoonish views toward capitalism and their lack of understanding regarding diplomatic etiquette. The Chinese were quick studies, though, and the book paints a nuanced picture of the increasingly sophisticated foreign policy strategies adopted by the Chinese state. And yet despite these efforts, Martin contends that Chinese diplomatic efforts have been continually hamstrung by stovepiping and nationalism. For all the success of China’s diplomats, China’s representatives abroad frequently find themselves flat footed when the PLA or other bureaucratic actors engage is provocations without deigning to inform the Foreign Ministry. These incidents can sometimes be papered over, but Martin contends that this is getting harder in part because domestic nationalism means that diplomats suffer enormous reputational costs for being “too nice” to the Americans. One of the more interesting anecdotes in the book is a discussion of a mass mailing of calcium tablets to the Foreign Ministry by angry citizens hoping the supplements would help strengthen their diplomats’ spines. But the problem is deeper. At one point Martin reflects on a conversation with a young, soon-to-be Chinese diplomat who was bright and well-spoken but still expressed uncertainty regarding the role of the US in instigating the Tiananmen Square uprising. Martin reflects on the fact that this young man, about to represent his country, doesn’t even know its true history. The ultimate effect of this deep-rooted nationalism is the wolf warrior rhetoric so prevalent in Chinese messaging today. I found the book to be consistently engaging and well-researched, though it certainly has its gaps. For example, it would have been nice to get more on the relationship between the military and diplomatic corps. And I think a more detailed look at the institutional structure of the Foreign Ministry would have been useful. But I have an academic background, and this book is written to engage a wider audience (which I fully endorse). So although the book cannot serve as a one stop guide to Chinese diplomacy, it is a terrific place to start. I highly recommend it.
January 20, 2024
The author traces China’s history of diplomatic efforts contextualized by China’s position in the world and current self-assessment of the day.
Each epoch of China’s history has seen a diplomatic approach that reflects China’s view of itself with respect to its position in the world. This self-assessment has been manifested in diplomatic approaches that have been characterized across the spectrum from “PLA in civilian clothes” to “hide and bide” to the current characterization of “wolf warrior diplomacy.”
This book also provides insight into why Chinese diplomats behave at times in ways that defy conventional logic. Their behavior often times supersedes ideology and is rooted in the pragmatic fact that what they say is sometimes not for the international audience but is to be heard by the powers within their own borders - it is an act of self-preservation.
Good read.
Each epoch of China’s history has seen a diplomatic approach that reflects China’s view of itself with respect to its position in the world. This self-assessment has been manifested in diplomatic approaches that have been characterized across the spectrum from “PLA in civilian clothes” to “hide and bide” to the current characterization of “wolf warrior diplomacy.”
This book also provides insight into why Chinese diplomats behave at times in ways that defy conventional logic. Their behavior often times supersedes ideology and is rooted in the pragmatic fact that what they say is sometimes not for the international audience but is to be heard by the powers within their own borders - it is an act of self-preservation.
Good read.
August 31, 2025
Very accessible, also for people who do not have any prior knowledge about Chinese’s diplomacy or politics, Martin helps you make sense of it all.
This book is part history of the PRC, part Zhou Enlai biography, but it’s primarily an analysis on China’s ministry of Foreign Affairs. I really enjoyed how the author interspersed the chapters with lots of personal accounts by (Chinese) diplomats. Only the last chapter, on Xi Jinping, felt less engaging.
Nevertheless an interesting read, and incredibly well researched (as far as I can tell at least).
This book is part history of the PRC, part Zhou Enlai biography, but it’s primarily an analysis on China’s ministry of Foreign Affairs. I really enjoyed how the author interspersed the chapters with lots of personal accounts by (Chinese) diplomats. Only the last chapter, on Xi Jinping, felt less engaging.
Nevertheless an interesting read, and incredibly well researched (as far as I can tell at least).
January 24, 2025
Apologies for the unstructured stream of thought that you’re about to read. Hope you get something useful out of it
It is important to really focus on the title of the book before you start reading it. The title of this book is ‘china’s civilian army: Making of the wolf warrior diplomacy’. Making of. Here I was, starting to read all excited thinking I’ll get a breakdown to the current belligerent attitude of diplomacy which the ccp mouthpieces have been prone to. You do get that; sort of.
But the actual phenomenon of ultranationalistic wolf warrior diplomacy, which found fertile ground after Emperor Xi took to the throne, is mentioned tangentially. It’s not the focus. Rather, through several well researched, clearly written, and engaging chapters, we’re given a brief rundown, as to how the international diplomacy of a communist regime like the ccp, and by extension china, has shaped from its inception in 1949.
From the proto version of the diplomatic corps (or more accurately the espionage and honey trapping corps) back during the era of warlords vying for powers, and the subsequent Japanese Invasion, and the newly independent communist china, the diplomatic corps of the country had a rough start. Initially staffed by former military personnel and the rare foreign educated party member, there was a clear dearth in terms of resources as well as expertise on how to interact with nations outside their borders.
During this period, their largest partner in crime, in all aspects of governance was the erstwhile soviet union. As well as your odd communist regime from around the globe. But these limited capabilities suited the chinese perfectly. As, the first two decades or so following the ‘glorious revolution’, was spent getting the economy and society back on track; with communist characteristics. And of course, waging war on neighbours such as Tibet & India.
Interesting point to note is how the approach to diplomacy employed by the ministry of foreign affairs is strikingly similar to what is seen today. Which is not surprising, considering how then as now, the ccp made sure to make everything in china, an extension of their own whims and did what was best for them; not necessarily what is best for the nation or people.
In a regime built on violence, secrecy, treachery and paranoia, it is no wonder those individuals selected to interact with the ‘corrupt capitalist nations’ would’ve been under intense scrutiny. Which in turn resulted in sparse wiggle room for chinese diplomats when it came to forming meaningful working relationships with their counterparts.
When you have to only communicate based on the talking points or checklists which the party has approved, when your every move or action is being monitored and reported back to the party leadership, when one misstep or seemingly innocuous gesture might get you sent to whatever the chinese equivalent of the gulags were, most personnel from the MFA found it easier, and safer to stray not an inch from the line the glorious leaders of the party had assigned to them.
Which didn’t make their job easier, when every decade or so, as spearheaded by the genocidal blowhard Mao, the country was converting millions of its people to lifeless chunks of meat.
Be it through ill thought of, arsinine, and downright nonsensical propaganda moves like the Great leap forward, which left north of 40 million people estimated dead. Or be it the cultural revolution, Mao’s solution to consolidating his power by eliminating any and all who could oppose him, leaving ‘only’ a million or two dead. That’s not even considering the various genocidal pogroms carried out by the ccp, as recent as today with the persecution of Ethnic Uyghers and suppression of democracy in places like Hong Kong.
Whenever their leaders were indulged in their need for mass murder and suffering, the officials of the MFA were left with the unenviable task of covering up the incidents, by continuing to stonewall foreign governments, human rights organizations and journalists by being pig headed in their rote repetition of the party line.
The ccp seems to truly believe that repeating a lie enough times will make it the truth. They will continue to do so, ad infinitum and Ad nauseam.
In its infancy the nation owned by the party, acutely aware of their weak bargaining position in the international stage, chose to instead play the role of Iago, engaging in a charm offensive. Pleasing the egos, and glazing the shaft of the more stronger communist counterparts, at the same time trying to court the capitalists through the back door (pun intended).
One thing that the party has perfected over its 70+ year reign, is the art of propaganda, lying and putting on airs. To this day, if you’re a human rights activist or journalist trying to uncover the reality of the atrocities on hand, you’ll either be tricked, bribed, threatened or bamboozled by elaborate stage plays featuring real people as actors. And enough members of the secret police following you around to fill a school bus.
But communist china follows the doctrine of being amiable when weak, and being irreverent when strong. With the death of mao, policies shaped by leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, allowed the nation to grow economically. Ironically, this was by sucking at the teat of the same evil capitalist demons who the ccp often uses as scapegoats to prop up its tenuous power.
The turn of the millenia, as well as the ostentatious spectacle that was the 08 olympics, allows the ccp to showcase their vanity to the world. The subsequent power change, from President Hu Jintao, to Emperor Xi JinPing saw china discard any semblance of amiability and start behaving like the belligerent bully it always was.
Persecution of religious minorities such as christians and ethnic minorities such as the Uyghers, Brutal suppression of democracy and the people in Hong Kong, increased ruckus and diplomatic grandstanding over the Independent Nation of Taiwan, the ludicrous nine dash line which lays claims to the entirety of the sea in SouthEast Asia, bullying and threatening other nation in the SE asia using their power and influence, and of course the wide spread ultranationalism, propaganda, and subverting foreign democracies through underhanded means.
Working side by side was the new ministry of foreign affairs, same as the old ones. Who were ever ready to shout back at ten times the volume and intensity, at anyone who even attempted to say anything critical of the ccp. Your opponent can’t put forth a valid criticism, if they have to cover their ears and dodge spittle (insert big brain meme).
The current crop of diplomats, who fashion themselves to be hotshot maverick wolf warriors, who takes cues from a B-movie action star in matters of international relations, are a result of the environment created by the new emperor, who is all set to establish a Mao-esque cult of personality. He’s well on that way, having abolished the term limits to his office, in all likelihood intending to be President for life.
In this new regime, those who’re the loudest, the most fervent, and the most pig headed in defending the nation’s paper thin honor in front of foreign enemies are nurtured and rewarded. This is where you see the likes of zhao lijian, the mascot of wolf warriors worldwide (hey, alliteration). Confrontational; Provocative; Overbearing; Abrasive.
The only things their grandstanding and jingoism has achieved, is a general disdain for the ‘diplomacy with chinese characteristics’, as well as ridicule at the blatant denial of facts and inability to engage in any meaningful discourse. Also, erasing any and all goodwill and limited relations that actually competent diplomats managed to establish in the past. What is it that they say ‘Don’t interrupt your enemy when they’re busy shooting their own foot?’.
What I managed to glean is but a fraction of what the book had to offer. There are many more anecdotes and diatribes taken from pages in history, which I sadly don’t have the patience to explore.
To summarize, I went into this book, with only a cursory knowledge about the convoluted world of chinese diplomacy. And have emerged much wiser. So, I would recommend this book for an intermediate difficulty course in international relations and diplomacy.
It is important to really focus on the title of the book before you start reading it. The title of this book is ‘china’s civilian army: Making of the wolf warrior diplomacy’. Making of. Here I was, starting to read all excited thinking I’ll get a breakdown to the current belligerent attitude of diplomacy which the ccp mouthpieces have been prone to. You do get that; sort of.
But the actual phenomenon of ultranationalistic wolf warrior diplomacy, which found fertile ground after Emperor Xi took to the throne, is mentioned tangentially. It’s not the focus. Rather, through several well researched, clearly written, and engaging chapters, we’re given a brief rundown, as to how the international diplomacy of a communist regime like the ccp, and by extension china, has shaped from its inception in 1949.
From the proto version of the diplomatic corps (or more accurately the espionage and honey trapping corps) back during the era of warlords vying for powers, and the subsequent Japanese Invasion, and the newly independent communist china, the diplomatic corps of the country had a rough start. Initially staffed by former military personnel and the rare foreign educated party member, there was a clear dearth in terms of resources as well as expertise on how to interact with nations outside their borders.
During this period, their largest partner in crime, in all aspects of governance was the erstwhile soviet union. As well as your odd communist regime from around the globe. But these limited capabilities suited the chinese perfectly. As, the first two decades or so following the ‘glorious revolution’, was spent getting the economy and society back on track; with communist characteristics. And of course, waging war on neighbours such as Tibet & India.
Interesting point to note is how the approach to diplomacy employed by the ministry of foreign affairs is strikingly similar to what is seen today. Which is not surprising, considering how then as now, the ccp made sure to make everything in china, an extension of their own whims and did what was best for them; not necessarily what is best for the nation or people.
In a regime built on violence, secrecy, treachery and paranoia, it is no wonder those individuals selected to interact with the ‘corrupt capitalist nations’ would’ve been under intense scrutiny. Which in turn resulted in sparse wiggle room for chinese diplomats when it came to forming meaningful working relationships with their counterparts.
When you have to only communicate based on the talking points or checklists which the party has approved, when your every move or action is being monitored and reported back to the party leadership, when one misstep or seemingly innocuous gesture might get you sent to whatever the chinese equivalent of the gulags were, most personnel from the MFA found it easier, and safer to stray not an inch from the line the glorious leaders of the party had assigned to them.
Which didn’t make their job easier, when every decade or so, as spearheaded by the genocidal blowhard Mao, the country was converting millions of its people to lifeless chunks of meat.
Be it through ill thought of, arsinine, and downright nonsensical propaganda moves like the Great leap forward, which left north of 40 million people estimated dead. Or be it the cultural revolution, Mao’s solution to consolidating his power by eliminating any and all who could oppose him, leaving ‘only’ a million or two dead. That’s not even considering the various genocidal pogroms carried out by the ccp, as recent as today with the persecution of Ethnic Uyghers and suppression of democracy in places like Hong Kong.
Whenever their leaders were indulged in their need for mass murder and suffering, the officials of the MFA were left with the unenviable task of covering up the incidents, by continuing to stonewall foreign governments, human rights organizations and journalists by being pig headed in their rote repetition of the party line.
The ccp seems to truly believe that repeating a lie enough times will make it the truth. They will continue to do so, ad infinitum and Ad nauseam.
In its infancy the nation owned by the party, acutely aware of their weak bargaining position in the international stage, chose to instead play the role of Iago, engaging in a charm offensive. Pleasing the egos, and glazing the shaft of the more stronger communist counterparts, at the same time trying to court the capitalists through the back door (pun intended).
One thing that the party has perfected over its 70+ year reign, is the art of propaganda, lying and putting on airs. To this day, if you’re a human rights activist or journalist trying to uncover the reality of the atrocities on hand, you’ll either be tricked, bribed, threatened or bamboozled by elaborate stage plays featuring real people as actors. And enough members of the secret police following you around to fill a school bus.
But communist china follows the doctrine of being amiable when weak, and being irreverent when strong. With the death of mao, policies shaped by leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, allowed the nation to grow economically. Ironically, this was by sucking at the teat of the same evil capitalist demons who the ccp often uses as scapegoats to prop up its tenuous power.
The turn of the millenia, as well as the ostentatious spectacle that was the 08 olympics, allows the ccp to showcase their vanity to the world. The subsequent power change, from President Hu Jintao, to Emperor Xi JinPing saw china discard any semblance of amiability and start behaving like the belligerent bully it always was.
Persecution of religious minorities such as christians and ethnic minorities such as the Uyghers, Brutal suppression of democracy and the people in Hong Kong, increased ruckus and diplomatic grandstanding over the Independent Nation of Taiwan, the ludicrous nine dash line which lays claims to the entirety of the sea in SouthEast Asia, bullying and threatening other nation in the SE asia using their power and influence, and of course the wide spread ultranationalism, propaganda, and subverting foreign democracies through underhanded means.
Working side by side was the new ministry of foreign affairs, same as the old ones. Who were ever ready to shout back at ten times the volume and intensity, at anyone who even attempted to say anything critical of the ccp. Your opponent can’t put forth a valid criticism, if they have to cover their ears and dodge spittle (insert big brain meme).
The current crop of diplomats, who fashion themselves to be hotshot maverick wolf warriors, who takes cues from a B-movie action star in matters of international relations, are a result of the environment created by the new emperor, who is all set to establish a Mao-esque cult of personality. He’s well on that way, having abolished the term limits to his office, in all likelihood intending to be President for life.
In this new regime, those who’re the loudest, the most fervent, and the most pig headed in defending the nation’s paper thin honor in front of foreign enemies are nurtured and rewarded. This is where you see the likes of zhao lijian, the mascot of wolf warriors worldwide (hey, alliteration). Confrontational; Provocative; Overbearing; Abrasive.
The only things their grandstanding and jingoism has achieved, is a general disdain for the ‘diplomacy with chinese characteristics’, as well as ridicule at the blatant denial of facts and inability to engage in any meaningful discourse. Also, erasing any and all goodwill and limited relations that actually competent diplomats managed to establish in the past. What is it that they say ‘Don’t interrupt your enemy when they’re busy shooting their own foot?’.
What I managed to glean is but a fraction of what the book had to offer. There are many more anecdotes and diatribes taken from pages in history, which I sadly don’t have the patience to explore.
To summarize, I went into this book, with only a cursory knowledge about the convoluted world of chinese diplomacy. And have emerged much wiser. So, I would recommend this book for an intermediate difficulty course in international relations and diplomacy.
October 25, 2024
Why did I hate this so much.. It’s probably on me to have expected anything more than a tired western centric narrative of the insecure, recently minted pariah from the far east with mystifying morals, values and playbooks that western counterparts can’t possibly find any shared humanity with. Little attempts made to see things from perspectives of the rest of the world, who was reduced to objects of domination. At times it’s as if the exercise of some measure of imagination to assume there is (limited) rationale in China’s early inexperienced diplomatic endeavours would be like admitting they themselves are less human. Or maybe they are too afraid to admit Chinese and western nationalist projects are mirror-imaged self-righteousness, deep insecurity and flagrant disregard of personhood and dignity, just against different ideological and cultural backdrops. It takes one to know one baby..
Also please publishers of the world I beg you, if a book includes a long Chinese phrase on every other page, maybe ask someone whose pronunciation stands a chance of being understood more than 5% of the time to narrate the audiobook…
Also please publishers of the world I beg you, if a book includes a long Chinese phrase on every other page, maybe ask someone whose pronunciation stands a chance of being understood more than 5% of the time to narrate the audiobook…
April 24, 2023
As someone interested in China's rise, I have tried to understand how the country has so successfully developed over the past 30-40 years. I have found a lot of great books on China's economic rise and use of Special Economic Zones as well as the growth and strategy of its military, but I hadn't read a modern history of China's diplomatic corps that makes up the Foreign Ministry before this book.
I found it both informative and eminently readable.
Beginning with the rise of Mao and China's cultural revolution, Peter Martin's work shows how Chinese diplomats have had to deal with shifting national policies across administrations who trust the Foreign Ministry to varying degrees--but are always cautious. This distrust shapes the way Chinese diplomats engage with the world and leaves them with very little room to maneuver, defaulting to approved talking points and public displays of loyalty.
It's also worth noting how China's diplomatic corps has been modeled on the People's Liberation Army. Self proclaimed "warriors in civilian clothing," Chinese diplomats have increasingly turned to aggressive rhetoric to demonstrate allegiance and affirm their militaristic allegiance to their country. Often, they perceive "safety" in a return to nationalistic pronouncements, even when such statements jeopardize other international relationships.
Given the geopolitical tension today, I think this insightful book offers some explanation of the communications challenges that exist for countries sitting across from Chinese representatives.
I found it both informative and eminently readable.
Beginning with the rise of Mao and China's cultural revolution, Peter Martin's work shows how Chinese diplomats have had to deal with shifting national policies across administrations who trust the Foreign Ministry to varying degrees--but are always cautious. This distrust shapes the way Chinese diplomats engage with the world and leaves them with very little room to maneuver, defaulting to approved talking points and public displays of loyalty.
It's also worth noting how China's diplomatic corps has been modeled on the People's Liberation Army. Self proclaimed "warriors in civilian clothing," Chinese diplomats have increasingly turned to aggressive rhetoric to demonstrate allegiance and affirm their militaristic allegiance to their country. Often, they perceive "safety" in a return to nationalistic pronouncements, even when such statements jeopardize other international relationships.
Given the geopolitical tension today, I think this insightful book offers some explanation of the communications challenges that exist for countries sitting across from Chinese representatives.
September 29, 2024
This book was so interesting to me… it’s so cool to be able to study international relations (Major appreciation moment!!!) and read stuff like this. My thesis is gonna be so freaking cool, you guys have no idea. Ugh, I’m so excited to be starting it. Yippee!
This book was so surprisingly well written and researched. I’m shocked it doesn’t have more readers/reviews on this app. So informative and helpful for my info-gathering for thesis.
5/5, so interesting!
This book was so surprisingly well written and researched. I’m shocked it doesn’t have more readers/reviews on this app. So informative and helpful for my info-gathering for thesis.
5/5, so interesting!
December 2, 2021
This is a fascinating & readable account of the dynamics and intricacies of the Chinese diplomatic corps
August 16, 2022
Wolf of Warrior Street
This was a real interesting read on China.
It was nicely recent and contained a lot of good details.
Would recommend for readers interested in China.
4.7/5
This was a real interesting read on China.
It was nicely recent and contained a lot of good details.
Would recommend for readers interested in China.
4.7/5
August 19, 2021
4.5 stars. Quite thoughtfully written and well-researched, this book will be a great resource for anyone interested in learning more about PRC diplomacy. Both for readers with no prior background and for old China hands, there will probably be something to learn here. And at a modest 230 pages (not counting endnotes), it's quite manageable. One note of caution, however, this book is primarily a history of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) which only briefly touches on the present moment. If you're uninterested in PRC diplomacy during the Mao-era then you might find yourself slightly underwhelmed for much of it.
In terms of what's new here, there are a handful of interviews which provide some interesting colour to the whole thing, but Martin's primary contribution to knowledge is probably his extensive use of the as-of-yet-untranslated (to my knowledge) memoirs of numerous former PRC diplomats. Taken together they provide an interesting glimpse into the MFA, one that's been largely unseen by the English speaking world. I'm not sure if Martin went through them all himself or if he had help, but either way: bravo, that must have been quite a task. Also on this point, I really (REALLY) appreciated how well footnoted this book was. It really makes it easier to take seriously and to understand how Martin constructed this account.
Martin's main arguments that A) the initial conception of the MFA as being a "civilian army" (or the "PLA in civilian clothes") which practises "controlled openness" continues to impact how it behaves today, and B) that the PRC's diplomatic corps is well-suited to articulating positions but poorly placed to actually persuade or befriend anyone are all pretty convincingly argued. Martin does a good job of accounting for the recent behaviour of PRC diplomats, pretty well summed up in the last line of the book: "Chinese diplomats spend more time looking back over their shoulders than out into the world." There are heaps of wonderful anecdotes and thoughtful observations here, tied together by a competently constructed historical narrative.
There were a few moments were Martin's brief gloss-over of major events in Chinese history left me a tad unsatisfied (in particular, Martin relies on two very popular, and in my view very problematic, sources for his accounts of some key historical events so that probably biased my opinion here, but still, kudos to him for footnoting things so well), and at times I felt the main thesis of his book was slightly overstated (for instance, while systemic/historical factors might account for some general trends in behaviour in the MFA, it seems like the personality of the leader-of-the day and developments outside the MFA are probably just as essential to understanding what's going on, which I don't think the author would disagree with, but you see where I'm coming from). But these are minor quibbles. In the final analysis: a good book that I recommend.
In terms of what's new here, there are a handful of interviews which provide some interesting colour to the whole thing, but Martin's primary contribution to knowledge is probably his extensive use of the as-of-yet-untranslated (to my knowledge) memoirs of numerous former PRC diplomats. Taken together they provide an interesting glimpse into the MFA, one that's been largely unseen by the English speaking world. I'm not sure if Martin went through them all himself or if he had help, but either way: bravo, that must have been quite a task. Also on this point, I really (REALLY) appreciated how well footnoted this book was. It really makes it easier to take seriously and to understand how Martin constructed this account.
Martin's main arguments that A) the initial conception of the MFA as being a "civilian army" (or the "PLA in civilian clothes") which practises "controlled openness" continues to impact how it behaves today, and B) that the PRC's diplomatic corps is well-suited to articulating positions but poorly placed to actually persuade or befriend anyone are all pretty convincingly argued. Martin does a good job of accounting for the recent behaviour of PRC diplomats, pretty well summed up in the last line of the book: "Chinese diplomats spend more time looking back over their shoulders than out into the world." There are heaps of wonderful anecdotes and thoughtful observations here, tied together by a competently constructed historical narrative.
There were a few moments were Martin's brief gloss-over of major events in Chinese history left me a tad unsatisfied (in particular, Martin relies on two very popular, and in my view very problematic, sources for his accounts of some key historical events so that probably biased my opinion here, but still, kudos to him for footnoting things so well), and at times I felt the main thesis of his book was slightly overstated (for instance, while systemic/historical factors might account for some general trends in behaviour in the MFA, it seems like the personality of the leader-of-the day and developments outside the MFA are probably just as essential to understanding what's going on, which I don't think the author would disagree with, but you see where I'm coming from). But these are minor quibbles. In the final analysis: a good book that I recommend.
July 17, 2021
This is a history of the foreign ministry of the People's Republic of China, starting with brief biographies of the ministry's central figures like Zhou Enlai and ending nearly at present day. It covers most of the major events that the ministry dealt with both domestically and abroad. It does a good job of weaving together a cohesive narrative of more than 70 years worth of developments in the way the foreign ministry is run and the way in which China's foreign policy is shaped. There are a ton of fascinating stories and facts in this book that you won't get anywhere else (unless you can read Chinese) which are revealing of why China operates its foreign diplomacy the way it does. Peter Martin makes some errors with regard to Mao on several occasions, and if you're interested in that I highly recommend "Mao: The Unknown Story" by Jung Chang.
July 31, 2022
Diplomacy dates back to the days of European autocrats, those kings and emperors sending an emissary to do their biddings. But so many nations having entered diplomacy after the WWII lack such a legacy. While the book is a good reading of Chinese diplomacy, it casually misses out on so many diplomacies of the third world which operate on a more or less similar mechanics. And there are more than hundred of them out there.
I must admit that I was mislead with the subtitle. This book traces China's history of diplomacy and is by itself a good read, although I needed to course-correct my initial anticipation of book's content.
I must admit that I was mislead with the subtitle. This book traces China's history of diplomacy and is by itself a good read, although I needed to course-correct my initial anticipation of book's content.
July 27, 2022
Read this book for a class. Though the book has useful information and important events (for someone who does not know much, or anything, about Chinese foreign policy and diplomats), it is not that great. The author keeps bringing up how secretive Chinese diplomats are, but what kind of diplomat isn't secretive? probably a bad one I imagine. The book also seems very US sided, which I do love and hate.
As with all books, take whatever is written with a grain of salt as the book is about the author's opinion and not fact!
As with all books, take whatever is written with a grain of salt as the book is about the author's opinion and not fact!
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
November 10, 2022
I've got a decent library of CCP related offerings but they tend to focus on specific areas and eras. I found this book interesting because it gave a broad historical perspective on the CCP efforts to build a foreign service apparatus and the evolution of the strident wolf warrior diplomacy. The author assumes the reader is familiar with key turning points (the Great Leap, the Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen, etc.) and explores the impact of these events on Chinese diplomacy. This makes for a fairly focused treatment and keeps the book manageable in size.
January 28, 2022
Martin gives a detailed insight into the history of the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs under the CCP.
There is nothing groundbreaking here, but it is nonetheless interesting and worth reading for anyone looking to understand more about Chinese Diplomacy.
There is nothing groundbreaking here, but it is nonetheless interesting and worth reading for anyone looking to understand more about Chinese Diplomacy.
February 25, 2025
Why are we still quoting Frank Dikötter as a reliable source in the year 2021 (this book was published in) ...😐 Mr. Opium ban was worse than the drug. Mr. What does it matter if I added another percentage to the Great Famine’s death toll.
There’s a lot of other factual and interpretative errors in here that I Might list later. One such critique how this book states as fact that Zhou knew of the Kashmir Princess assassination attempt and let the plane go off without him and then explode when even the source the author quotes can only say ‘evidence suggests’:
Steve Tsang of Oxford University wrote in the September 1994 edition of The China Quarterly, "Evidence now suggests that Zhou knew of the plot beforehand and secretly changed his travel plans, though he did not stop a decoy delegation of lesser cadres from taking his place."
This was on Wikipedia man. Slight nitpick too but I noticed some misplaced punctuation and other mistakes in the book. I will nitpick nevertheless due to the assumed quality of this book thanks to it being sponsored and published by a High Elite University.
Are some insights here interesting? Yes. But I’m still keeping it at 2 stars because of the way books like this end up being the Single Authoritative Voice on China in the West instead of encouraging people to think critically or research more.
It’s also really funny how I knew the article the author was referencing (Chou Gags Critics At Bandung).
There’s a lot of other factual and interpretative errors in here that I Might list later. One such critique how this book states as fact that Zhou knew of the Kashmir Princess assassination attempt and let the plane go off without him and then explode when even the source the author quotes can only say ‘evidence suggests’:
Steve Tsang of Oxford University wrote in the September 1994 edition of The China Quarterly, "Evidence now suggests that Zhou knew of the plot beforehand and secretly changed his travel plans, though he did not stop a decoy delegation of lesser cadres from taking his place."
This was on Wikipedia man. Slight nitpick too but I noticed some misplaced punctuation and other mistakes in the book. I will nitpick nevertheless due to the assumed quality of this book thanks to it being sponsored and published by a High Elite University.
Are some insights here interesting? Yes. But I’m still keeping it at 2 stars because of the way books like this end up being the Single Authoritative Voice on China in the West instead of encouraging people to think critically or research more.
It’s also really funny how I knew the article the author was referencing (Chou Gags Critics At Bandung).
August 29, 2025
China's Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy by Peter Martin is one of the more insightful books I've encountered on China in a long time. Though perhaps a bit hawkish in some places, the book is, in a word, excellent. It covers the formation of the CCP's diplomatic arm under Zhou way back during the pre-unification days all the way up to the present. While the author attempts to argue for a narrative throughline to some degree of success, the most interesting part of the book, to me, was the descriptive analysis of the phases that China's diplomacy went through and the anecdotes that pepper its pages. Whether it be Zhou Enlai's unassailable legacy, the initial awkwardness of Chinese diplomats going through culinary lessons, the tension between what they could see with their own eyes and what propagandists proclaimed at home, the damaging legacy of the cultural revolution, the initial opening up, the references to the diplomatic corps as a component of China's military just in civilian clothing, their growing confidence, their overreach, and, ultimately, a prickly sense of insecurity. There's a lot to like here. If you care at all about global affairs, give this one a go.
June 25, 2023
This was a good book. It provides a very readable narrative history of China's diplomatic corps, beginning with the end of the Qing Dynasty, but chiefly focused on the period between the founding of the People's Republic and through the present. In addition to the usual attention paid to Mao and Zhou Enlai, I appreciated that there's a good amount of detail on the work and lives of slightly more ordinary diplomatic corps workers without going into minutiae. I feel like I came away with a better understanding of the incentives that Chinese politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats and foreign policy actors in China are faced with and more context to understand the language used and behaviors exhibited by Chinese actors.
August 12, 2022
Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy sounded really exciting and almost conspiratorially. This def is a very informative book although I am not too sure how reliable it truly is. You just have to take what the author claims his experience and intel is for face value. And yes, research goes a long way...but still. Seemed quite conspiratorially at some points. That's a downside of the book. Plus there is a lot of history covered here. Maybe more than necessary for people who already have a good grasp on Chinese/diplomatic history. Also the chapters are veeeery long. Therefore, I struggled picking this book up in between because you really have to commit to reading it- even for a chapter.
July 23, 2023
Well-researched and hard to put down book on China’s diplomatic efforts post CCP winning in 1949. The subject is made accessible due to straightforward writing, anecdotes and consistency in sticking to main theses behind China’s Foreign Affairs.
The book is a good complement to other subjects for China enthusiasts.
Overall, main takeaways are clear. The diplomats are guided by central policies and given little freedom, and are always playing to the audience in Beijing. While this has helped get points, it’s not clear it’s an effective long-term winning strategy. In fact, it hamstrings many of their efforts and typically is due to a strong central figure.
Highly recommend this book!
The book is a good complement to other subjects for China enthusiasts.
Overall, main takeaways are clear. The diplomats are guided by central policies and given little freedom, and are always playing to the audience in Beijing. While this has helped get points, it’s not clear it’s an effective long-term winning strategy. In fact, it hamstrings many of their efforts and typically is due to a strong central figure.
Highly recommend this book!
March 4, 2023
This is easy dive into a topic for a person who is not an expert in politics or nation to nation interactions. I appreciated that it did feel to promote a particular opinion or take a sides between the US and China while exploring Chinas rise in diplomacy.
When contrasting the differences of diplomacy between China and other nations it fascinating to consider the national pressure on topic and diplomats. These include being thick skinned and the nature of the public pressure from billions, not millions.
When contrasting the differences of diplomacy between China and other nations it fascinating to consider the national pressure on topic and diplomats. These include being thick skinned and the nature of the public pressure from billions, not millions.
June 19, 2025
“Put on a mask and shut up”, ah so settling global issues is going to be that much harder. That’s great.
This book is fantastic. It has commentary of Chinese diplomacy from Zhou Enlai under Mao to Wang Yi under Xi. It’s fascinating to see Chinas arc from the controlling mao to some diplomatic liberalization in the Deng era to control again under Xi. It’s interesting that Xi Xingping influence and thought has so thoroughly affected China’s dipolomacy. I wonder when change will come, if at all, and if repeated halts and in progress could drive this.
This book is fantastic. It has commentary of Chinese diplomacy from Zhou Enlai under Mao to Wang Yi under Xi. It’s fascinating to see Chinas arc from the controlling mao to some diplomatic liberalization in the Deng era to control again under Xi. It’s interesting that Xi Xingping influence and thought has so thoroughly affected China’s dipolomacy. I wonder when change will come, if at all, and if repeated halts and in progress could drive this.
October 4, 2021
This went a long way to helping me understand China’s odd “wolf warrior” diplomatic reputation. Many of their foreign affairs behaviours have seemed counter intuitive or even counter to the concept of diplomacy as I understand it. This book clearly outlines where foreign affairs have come from, how they have developed and how they are influenced by the Chinese communist party. This work is well annotated and current to the Trump and COVID-19 landscape.
January 15, 2023
Enjoyed the history of the diplomatic corps and it makes good points about how some weird stuff in the public eye from it (Wolf Warrior tweets etc) are really just a result of domestic incentives.
Been too long since I read it to write more in the review, but I think it didn't go as deep as I'd've wanted to make more of an impression on further points.
[accidentally did not submit this review it seems, not quite sure when I read it; purchased in Feb. 2022]
Been too long since I read it to write more in the review, but I think it didn't go as deep as I'd've wanted to make more of an impression on further points.
[accidentally did not submit this review it seems, not quite sure when I read it; purchased in Feb. 2022]
October 30, 2024
A very well written and interesting look at one portion of the CCPs machine, but the one that faces the world the most. The sources and inside information brought to light a lot of the behind the scenes scheming and decision making, but also the dissent and doubt you might not otherwise find.
Highly recommended for anyone who wants to dig beneath the public face of China.
Highly recommended for anyone who wants to dig beneath the public face of China.
October 29, 2021
Martin makes some excellent points, faithfully charting the rise and remarkable uniqueness of republican China's global engagement.
This is an excellent introductory read for those stupefied by the tone and content of current-day PRC diplomacy (though it could be longer).
This is an excellent introductory read for those stupefied by the tone and content of current-day PRC diplomacy (though it could be longer).
November 24, 2021
Well researched and written, this book sets out a fascinating history of China’s foreign service and provides important insights on the country’s contemporary diplomatic relations with the rest of the world.
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