The Changing of the Guard: the British Army since 9/11

by Simon Akam

A revelatory, explosive new analysis of the military today.

Over the first two decades of the twenty-first century, Britain has changed enormously. During this time, the British Army fought two campaigns, in Iraq and Afghanistan, at considerable financial and human cost. Yet neither war achieved its objectives. This book questions why, and provides challenging but necessary answers.

Composed of assiduous documentary research, field reportage, and hundreds of interviews with many soldiers and officers who served, as well as the politicians who directed them, the allies who accompanied them, and the family members who loved and — on occasion — lost them, it is a strikingly rich, nuanced portrait of one of our pivotal national institutions in a time of great stress.

Award-winning journalist Simon Akam, who spent a year in the army when he was 18, returned a decade later to see how the institution had changed. His book examines the relevance of the armed forces today — their social, economic, political, and cultural role. This is as much a book about Britain, and about the politics of failure, as it is about the military.

Genres: Military History, History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Politics, War, 21st Century

704 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2021

About the author

Simon Akam held a Gap Year Commission in the British Army before reading English Literature at Oxford University. He later won a Fulbright scholarship to study at Columbia Journalism School. After graduation from Columbia Simon worked at The New York Times and subsequently spent several years in West Africa as a freelance correspondent for Reuters and the Economist.

Reviews

[Anthony Lesurf · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Changing of the Guard is an engaging, well-written, researched, and presented read. While I don't agree with everything in the book, it is thought-provoking and even-handed and I agree with its central thesis that after four and a half decades of the Cold War, the British military, its leadership, in particular, was complacent and inflexible. When our military deployed in the post 9/11 wars there were successes but there were also mistakes, failures, infighting, and in extreme cases rule-breaking. Throughout the organisation struggled to identify, adapt, and to overcome the new challenges. Despite this, hard lessons were learned, albeit slowly, and in general, the military came out the other end the better for it.
The book in particular highlights pre-9/11 British ‘hubris’ in being ‘the best little Army in the World’: a fair observation as this was the firm belief right through the cold war and probably before it. As a young Infantry soldier in the 1980s, I was always told that despite our limited numbers, terrible kit, and stifling class system we were without equal the toughest and most professional army. In fact, the resource and equipment limitations were seen as proof that the Americans had ‘all the gear but no idea’ while we relied on our pluck and initiative. Plus, we had centuries of tradition behind us as well as successful counter-insurgency campaigns in places like Malaya and Northern Ireland. The Americans probably even agreed with us, even if they did not like it. I remember an urban legend about US forces in Germany, or it might have been US Marines going ashore in Hong Kong, being issued with cards warning them of the dangers of drinking, fighting, or gambling with British soldiers: all of which they would lose at, they were told.
Then came 9/11 and British participation in Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent nation-building in both places, for which they were neither prepared nor equipped. Stretched too thin, ‘heart and minds’ went out of the window (considered the winning strategy in the Malayan emergency) in order to concentrate on war-fighting—there are a couple of interesting chapters here on the awards system and its potential to encourage bad behaviour, the impact of the slew of memoirs and YouTube trophy videos that came out of the two campaigns and the related enigma that is ‘ally’ (looking the part and doing cool stuff).
In the end, the military was let down at both a political and a strategic level—and by decisions the Americans’ made, especially in Iraq. The application of a ‘Hearts and Minds’ strategy was considered the winning element of the Malayan Emergency campaign and this wasn’t in my opinion possible. I would argue that it was actually the ‘hearts and minds’ strategy coupled with significant force protection that won the day—one without the other cannot work. The number of Commonwealth troops deployed to head of population during the in Malayan Emergency was roughly 1:150, with a similar number of police plus a huge home guard force (1:25). In Iraq (Basra and Maysan) that number was around 1:300 and in Afghanistan (Helmand) about 1:150—but neither Iraq nor Afghanistan had existing military or police forces that were trained or trustworthy enough to be considered an asset (in those early days). Ultimately, the British military had neither the troops for nation-building or for force protection and the situations in both theatres quickly spiralled out of control: ‘quantity has a quality all of its own.'
In all fairness though, the Americans fared little better overall in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite their massive resources. Although embarrassingly, they ended up having to bail us out in both Basra and Helmand—and in the process, no doubt got their revenge for all those years of being told they were inferior.
Criticism regarding excessive use of violence is mixed. Troops are cited as having been too aggressive, The PWRR in Maysan in 2004 and 3 Para in Helmand in 2006 for example. But troops are also cited as not being aggressive enough in Basra city in 2006 before the ‘accommodation’: highlighted by the fact that most of the award citations during this period were for saving comrades rather than taking the fight to the enemy. Likewise, in Helmand in 2011 the main military effort became casualty reduction and enemy suppression rather than assault. Much of this was, I suspect, tactically reactive and relates back to my earlier argument about having insufficient resources for force protection given the circumstances—also the end of the Iraq campaign was in sight by this time.
I’m often reminded that it’s human nature to criticise subsequent generations as not being as tough or as good as those that went before. The old sweats when I joined up berated us and we berated those that followed us. By the time I left the Army, it was that period between the cold war and 9/11: the end of history. 9/11 changed all that and although I would spend over a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, that was as a contractor, not as a serving soldier, they belonged to a younger generation. And from where I was standing, observing, I was proud of the professionalism, bravery, toughness, and flexibility of those boys and girls. But those conflicts are over now and the next generations are having to adapt to a new military once again: and the cycle goes on.
I firmly stand by the conviction that pound for pound the British soldier is still the best, and the British Army is still ‘the best little (emphasis) army in the world’. That said, the US military also impressed me no end: the best enormous army in the world. Respect.

[Barry Sierer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Akam’s book not only covers relevant battles, and various deployments, but also the less exiting (yet still relevant) processes of the British army such as vehicle procurement, public relations (how the army tells its story through books and videos), and accountability in terms of war crimes and battlefield failures,

“Changing of the Guard” has been labeled as a fierce expose of incompetence in the British Army but I believe it’s more nuanced than that. Akam understands that and he has a fairly inciteful grasp of the British Army’s deficits in the modern age but also the difficulties of running such an organization.

[Scribe Publications]

Akam’s beautifully written, from the inside out, account of the British Army’s reluctance to engage with the realities of recent small wars, in Afghanistan in particular, is a must-read for every serious student of modern military history. At one level, it explains how and why we managed to turn victory over Al Qaeda in Afghanistan into defeat at the hands of the Taliban. But this book is about much more than the army in Afghanistan — it is a parable about failure, the failure of a revered institution, with a proud history and an uncritical public, to come to terms with a changed and changing world.
Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, Former British Ambassador to Afghanistan

Simon Akam delivers a devastating indictment of Britain’s military chiefs for overseeing the shocking decline of the nation’s armed forces.
Tom Bower, Biographer

Simon Akam has written a perceptive, challenging and passionate book that looks at modern soldiering. In doing so, Akam provides an invaluable look at how the British Army works — and how the changing world in the 21st century is asking new and complex questions for soldiers and military strategy alike.
Peter Frankopan, Author of The Silk Roads

This brave, absorbing and prodigiously well-researched tour de force renders every previous account of the British Army in its disastrous recent campaigns obsolete. Akam makes an unanswerable case that we are no longer very good at fighting wars, building his arguments with panache and good sense. In doing so he has done his country, and the army, a great service — although the Generals may not see it quite that way just yet. Put away the self-serving autobiographies and the obsequious histories of in-house academics; this is the definitive account of the British Army in its 21st Century misadventures.
Frank Ledwidge, Author of Losing Small Wars

[An] excellent and valuable book.
Jason Burke, The Guardian

Akam is an angry young man and the book is better for it.
The Times

A passionate book.
The Sunday Times

It’s compellingly written – I got through all 500-plus pages in two sittings – and it is certainly worth the effort.
Mail on Sunday

This detailed, academic book argues flawed leadership led to military disaster in Iraq and Afghanistan … Akam just manages to prevent his detailed account from becoming too crowded in military jargon, with some illuminating tales from barracks, brothel and battlefield.
Anthony Loyd, New Statesman

Impassioned … It is a valuable addition to analysing the past, present and future of a venerated institution.
Kim Sengupta

A scathing account of the British army in the years after 9/11.
Shashank Joshi, Spectator Australia

Akam makes many important points and reports in depth on officers’ recollections of specific episodes.
Prospect

The Changing of the Guard is a major book that provides the first serious analysis of the effectiveness of the modern British Army … With a particular focus on the failure of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he gives a brunt assessment of the Army as an institution and its role in society. There is lots of interesting material here and some relevant lessons for Australia.
Jeff Popple, Canberra Weekly

It is a review of the British Army … It does not tell a ‘pretty’ story — rather, it is a ‘warts and all’ tale … Simon Akman has written a fine book on how and why the British Army has changed, between
2001 and 2020. For those who have seen military service, it will provide a broad picture of the conditions some soldiers have faced in the early 21st Century. For those who have not, it shows clearly the true face of war, as it is fought in this day and age, and may, possibly, be fought in the near future and within current social value sets.
Rob Ellis, RUSI VIC Library

[Scribe Publications]

Akam’s beautifully written, from the inside out, account of the British Army’s reluctance to engage with the realities of recent small wars, in Afghanistan in particular, is a must-read for every serious student of modern military history. At one level, it explains how and why we managed to turn victory over Al Qaeda in Afghanistan into defeat at the hands of the Taliban. But this book is about much more than the army in Afghanistan — it is a parable about failure, the failure of a revered institution, with a proud history and an uncritical public, to come to terms with a changed and changing world.
Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, Former British Ambassador to Afghanistan

Simon Akam delivers a devastating indictment of Britain’s military chiefs for overseeing the shocking decline of the nation’s armed forces.
Tom Bower, Biographer

Simon Akam has written a perceptive, challenging and passionate book that looks at modern soldiering. In doing so, Akam provides an invaluable look at how the British Army works — and how the changing world in the 21st century is asking new and complex questions for soldiers and military strategy alike.
Peter Frankopan, Author of The Silk Roads

This brave, absorbing and prodigiously well-researched tour de force renders every previous account of the British Army in its disastrous recent campaigns obsolete. Akam makes an unanswerable case that we are no longer very good at fighting wars, building his arguments with panache and good sense. In doing so he has done his country, and the army, a great service — although the Generals may not see it quite that way just yet. Put away the self-serving autobiographies and the obsequious histories of in-house academics; this is the definitive account of the British Army in its 21st Century misadventures.
Frank Ledwidge, Author of Losing Small Wars

[An] excellent and valuable book.
Jason Burke, The Guardian

Akam is an angry young man and the book is better for it.
The Times

A passionate book.
The Sunday Times

It’s compellingly written – I got through all 500-plus pages in two sittings – and it is certainly worth the effort.
Mail on Sunday

This detailed, academic book argues flawed leadership led to military disaster in Iraq and Afghanistan … Akam just manages to prevent his detailed account from becoming too crowded in military jargon, with some illuminating tales from barracks, brothel and battlefield.
Anthony Loyd, New Statesman

Impassioned … It is a valuable addition to analysing the past, present and future of a venerated institution.
Kim Sengupta

A scathing account of the British army in the years after 9/11.
Shashank Joshi, Spectator Australia

Akam makes many important points and reports in depth on officers’ recollections of specific episodes.
Prospect

The Changing of the Guard is a major book that provides the first serious analysis of the effectiveness of the modern British Army … With a particular focus on the failure of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he gives a brunt assessment of the Army as an institution and its role in society. There is lots of interesting material here and some relevant lessons for Australia.
Jeff Popple, Canberra Weekly

It is a review of the British Army … It does not tell a ‘pretty’ story — rather, it is a ‘warts and all’ tale … Simon Akman has written a fine book on how and why the British Army has changed, between
2001 and 2020. For those who have seen military service, it will provide a broad picture of the conditions some soldiers have faced in the early 21st Century. For those who have not, it shows clearly the true face of war, as it is fought in this day and age, and may, possibly, be fought in the near future and within current social value sets.
Rob Ellis, RUSI VIC Library

[A] valuable and salutary read.
Foreign Affairs

The Changing of the Guard has contributed to the ongoing debate over how the British Army might change further as it enters a post-pandemic world where security challenges demand considerable flexibility of mind… Anything that provokes such self-awareness is good for institutions.
War on the Rock

[Adrian Hon · Rating 4 out of 5]

An extraordinarily well-researched book investigating the deep-seated failures of the British Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, from the ground all the way up to the most senior officers. Akam has an impressive grasp of the military and despite his obvious views, goes out of his way to be fair to all perspectives.

Given the utter failure of the war in Afghanistan, one might assume the British public would have realised the limitations and problems of the army, and Akam's book would not be necessary. However, the continued calls from both the left and right wing that we should "go back in" suggests that people still incorrectly think the British Army can do... anything meaningful at all in terms of nation-building. So this really is an essential read and, at the very least, demonstrates why the US could not give a single shit what the UK thinks with regards to any military endeavour whatsoever.

Unfortunately, there are a few stylistic issues with this book that I suspect will limit its reach. Akam's insistence on proving his military bona fides is understandable, but becomes utterly exhausting to general audiences after you've read the 500th acronym. His use of the present tense throughout is propulsive, but also wearying after a while – especially when combined with his elongated garden path sentences (and chapters, really). I didn't quite get his obsession with the orientation of buildings relative to each other, either.

More seriously, Akam pulls his punches in terms of the most senior military staff. Yes, he thinks they should have been fired or made to resign – but he never quite spells out why, unlike the highly detailed treatment he gives to more junior figures. Maybe I skipped over it, but I would have appreciated a really detailed reckoning for people like Jock Stirrup.

Finally, the highly personal introduction and conclusion felt like it came from a different book. It wasn't bad per se, but it seemed strange when put alongside the more dispassionate bulk of the book. His ending bit about his school teacher, who he pronounces to be a "good man", is oddly deflating – hasn't the entire book taught us that this is not about whether men are good or not? Even if you disagree, it's a strange moment to introduce the idea.

Despite my nitpicks – and they really are nitpicks – this is an impressive book.

[Walter Stevens · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well researched book on the forces for change on the British Army post Irag and Afghanistan, the the manner in which the Army is adapting. I really enjoyed the author's style, and how he interjected his personal story into what could have been quite a dry treatise. I didnt feel it was altogether successful though, perhaps due to the sheer amount of material he covers. So it left me with some unanswered questions. I recommend it though.

[Ross Mallett · Rating 3 out of 5]

I picked this book up on a whim. It is by a former British Army officer turned journalist. I don't usually like books by journalists, and the sheer bulk of this one is likely to put off those who do. In trying to cover the whole of two different wars over two decades, the book unavoidably falls well short. Nor is it quite certain what the author is trying to accomplish. However, given the lack of introspection and aversion to public critique (which delayed publication of the book), this sort of work is likely to be all we will have for some time to come.
British Soldiers on patrol in Helmand Province, Afghanistan

In the main, the book is about the British Army's culture, and the slow rate of change. Unfortunately, this theme is not as well-developed as it could have been. There's also some questionable claims. The dust jacket claims that Britain has changed immensely over the first two decades of the 21st century. I visited the kingdom four times, in 1995, 1998, 2007 and 2012 and I can't say I noticed the great changes referred to.

There's a claim that the British Army is undergoing reform. How widespread that it and how far-reaching is hard to say; the book talks about the amalgamation of regiments and the ever-shrinking size of the British Army, but it's far from certain how far-reaching even that is in practice. The book recounts unselfconsciously how this has occurred before with little impact. The same could be said about two world wars, so the immediate prospect is not bright.

There's also the repeated claim that Iraq was Britain's greatest defeat since the Fall of Singapore. I think this shows poor memory; what about the Fall of Tobruk in 1942, the ignominious departures from Palestine in 1948 and Aden in 1967 and the Suez Crisis of 1956? Yet the book also has a good point: the British Army is a conservative organisation, slow to change and adapt. This is amply demonstrated. There are many parts of the book that could have just as well referred to 1914 or 1939. It begs the question though of how different that makes it from British society at large. There's a running tone deafness about how Britain is perceived outside the UK.

The British Army here commits that bafflingly common twenty-first-century failing: it despises, and exudes superiority towards, an exterior entity, then feels genuine surprise when that mean-spiritedness does not generate admiration and fellow feeling in return. (p. 259)

This goes well beyond the relationship with the United States, and well beyond the British Army. But if a major objective of the exercise is to bolster the alliance with the United States, then it is highly counter-productive. It is true that the British Army played only a minor part in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is too easy to blame the Americans. For the rest of the coalition, it was also a war of choice, and the politicians have to accept responsibility for the ill-fated venture. That doesn't get the British Army off the hook: there were too many failures for that. The point is repeatedly made that a soldier who lost a rifle faced a greater penalty than a general who lost a war.

There are many points made that other armies should take notice of and learn from. Just in Time logistics is one. (Our article on the subject is called Lean manufacturing, which covers it fairly well, but completely lacks awareness of the process outside the manufacturing context. As COVID has demonstrated, the idea that you can buy whatever is necessary in a crisis doesn't work too well in a real crisis.) There's also the common problem of constructing and equipping an army to fight high impact operations and then using it for low impact ones.

This book is an interesting, but unsatisfying read. A more focused approach would have worked much better.

[John Irvine · Rating 4 out of 5]

Balanced But Unfair?

From the generation that never went to war but who practised to and trained others to go, I reacted fairly negatively to the early chapters of this book. As the book progressed through the various phases of Iraq and Afghan the early chapters made more sense. They document the culture and therefore, in part, the causes of the army’s failure and embarrassment in Iraq.

The arguments are well-reasoned and documented - the footnotes contain much interesting detail and well worth following along enough to make the reader form their own opinion.

I do think the focus on a number of individuals in the book - in an attempt to hold them publicly accountable for some of the army’s (and navy’s) failings are unfair. These people are a product of the system which reflects broader british culture. It isn’t just in the army where the way to success is to avoid being responsible for a cock up this leading to risk avoidance - but also in broader british society and in business. It isn’t only in the army where the most senior people are rewarded for failure - we see this all the time in the highest echelons of british corporations (for example, the large bonuses paid to bankers, the moves of failing Chairmen and CEOs between companies, promotions of under-performing managers and directors). The same in politics. And so on.

Whilst the author himself does acknowledge he may have solicited interviews under slightly false pretences - as who would have agreed to such interviews had they known the book would have taken this form - this reinforces my opinion that some individuals have been treated unfairly.

But I guess the end justifies the means?

[Arthur · Rating 5 out of 5]

Although I did not always found the book so easy to read (due to British/army expressions, terms, and acronyms), it provides an excellent insight into British army culture and its role in the failure of the Afghanistan and Iraq missions. It is interesting to see how this army ignores accountability at the higher levels and (over)emphasises it at the more junior levels, for example. The nature of the Afghanistan conflict did not really seem to be understood (more inter-tribal than government vs insurgents) and gung-ho action as instilled in elite troops only made matters worse. At the heart of the matter is whether the army can really learn. And while there are certainly learnings that have been adopted, it remains somewhat an open question whether the institution is sufficiently adaptable. The lack of accountability at the higher levels and the culture of (media) suppression do not make one optimistic. In addition, the author observes how the army is not really a single monolithic institution, but more a collection of competing factions.

[Okimura1170 · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an amazing book . I loved it because whilst I had read other books on the topic, it was either of a main character eg McCrystal’s biography or of the USA or Australian contributions, and if British….more orientated towards a single tour rather than the whole decades long episode.
This book encompasses the whole British effort from invasion, occupation and withdrawal. It uses these decades years to put into context the changes made in the British Army , and in his opinion still needs to be made. There is both campaign writing as well as the aftermath of legal affairs. Simon brought to life the changes in the time honoured (sacred?) regimental system in those years.
For a 700+ pg book with 500+ pages of actual prose…this is so well written keeping the reader engrossed throughout
I heard about the book from an article here https://unherd.com/2022/10/the-britis...
5 stars

[Hj Reichen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Extraordinarily well documented and well written. The author travels through twenty years of the British armed forces wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, moreover he highlights the challenges facing European western armies. The failures are used to show some of the systematic problems: lack of accountability of senior leadership, internal incentives, motivation to serve, rotation duration, law in armed conflicts, training in peacetime, lack of strategy and mostly culture. Mâles you think.

[Colin Maclennan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Switches back and fore. Hard to follow at times. Too many acronyms. There is no index of acronyms and they don't appear in the general index.

Paints an unflattering picture of the strategic direction of the Army.

[Johnny · Rating 4 out of 5]

fascinating the way big organisations lumber around and are resistant to change. Even more fascinating when it’s something so entrenched in tradition and class like the army. Iraq and Afghanistan tho, bloody hell

[Barbara Wells · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good, interesting and engaging throughout.

Good read for any military history buffs.
Doesn’t reflect too well on UK armed forces leadership.
Possibly unfair in places.

[Matthew Harris · Rating 2 out of 5]

Chap has an axe to grind

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read, challenging, insightful