Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command

Civil War America

by Kent Masterson Brown

Although he took command of the Army of the Potomac only three days before the first shots were fired at Gettysburg, Union general George G. Meade guided his forces to victory in the Civil War's most pivotal battle. Commentators often dismiss Meade when discussing the great leaders of the Civil War. But in this long-anticipated book, Kent Masterson Brown draws on an expansive archive to reappraise Meade's leadership during the Battle of Gettysburg. Using Meade's published and unpublished papers alongside diaries, letters, and memoirs of fellow officers and enlisted men, Brown highlights how Meade's rapid advance of the army to Gettysburg on July 1, his tactical control and coordination of the army in the desperate fighting on July 2, and his determination to hold his positions on July 3 insured victory.

Brown argues that supply deficiencies, brought about by the army's unexpected need to advance to Gettysburg, were crippling. In spite of that, Meade pursued Lee's retreating army rapidly, and his decision not to blindly attack Lee's formidable defenses near Williamsport on July 13 was entirely correct in spite of subsequent harsh criticism. Combining compelling narrative with incisive analysis, this finely rendered work of military history deepens our understanding of the Army of the Potomac as well as the machinations of the Gettysburg Campaign, restoring Meade to his rightful place in the Gettysburg narrative.

Genres: Civil War, History, American Civil War, Biography, Nonfiction, American History, Military Fiction

475 pages, Hardcover

First published June 7, 2021

Reviews

[Creighton · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very well done assessment of George Meade's generalship during the Gettysburg campaign, I think the author should write a full biography on him. I would say that Meade deserves so much more credit than he is given.

[Joseph · Rating 5 out of 5]

Easily, the best single volume treatment of Meade's generalship at Gettysburg. The author debunks several myths that have cropped up in Civil War historiography over the years. We get a portrait of a different general, one who had a plan from the beginning and was prepared to follow it through. My only complaint about the book was that it didn't focus much on the Lost Cause tradition following the war and its impact on history. But, overall, a very good effort.

[J.K. Brandau · Rating 5 out of 5]

Unlike monolithic battle accounts focused on bang and boom actions, Kent Masterson Brown presents an in-depth study of Meade’s generalship at Gettysburg. The gifted strategist, operational commander, and tactician that was the real George Gordon Meade finally surfaces above the considerable political and biases thrown against him after the battle and institutionalized as “history” since then. Supported by exhaustive research and gifted objectivity, Brown masterfully sets the record straight on a truly great American general.

[Jared · Rating 5 out of 5]

A phenomenal book, and one worth rereading. Through his analysis and examination of the sources, Brown has shifted my view on Meade and his generalship during the Gettysburg campaign towards a more positive and nuanced view. Especially valuable are his chapters on the events after 3 July, as well as his engagement with the work of other scholars such as Guelzo, Sears, and Coddington, who have published on the battle

Very much recommended.

[Geoff Thomas · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent book. Very underrated General. His leadership was invaluable for the union army at Gettysburg.

[Rick Davis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kent Masterson Brown has written a fantastic treatise on General George G. Meade and the challenges he faced after having command of the Army of the Potomac thrust upon him in the middle of the morning. Meade had no choice in the matter, and he had to immediately assume the heavy responsibility and burden of command. Not only did Meade not know the position of other Union Army corps, he also did not know the location of General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. On top of all that, Meade was given the responsibility of telling General Hooker that he was no longer in command.

As a student of the Gettysburg Campaign, I have often read and heard much criticism pushed on Meade over two areas: the Pipe Creek Circular and the perceived lack of aggressiveness in pursuing Lee’s army after July 4, 1863. Brown does a fantastic job addressing this issue by highlighting the training Meade and his contemporaries received at West Point. Brown also points out the influences of Dennis Hart Mahan, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, and Carl von Clausewitz on strategy and tactics during the Civil War. Training that the volunteer and politically appointed generals did not receive, and training that the politicians, including Abraham Lincoln, never had either.
Brown also details the hardships experienced by Union soldiers on their march to Gettysburg, during the fight, and the impact that had on their welfare and supply needs after the battle. Brown describes the challenges Meade faced with little intelligence on Lee’s location, logistic problems, communications problems, lack of maps for the area, etc.

This is a great read to learn more about the challenges Meade faced. There are many take-aways from this book, including fantastic leadership examples.

[Mark Harden · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brown knows his stuff, especially logistics. His Meade-centric fog of war approach is very effective: in the book Meade is properly judged only on what information he had available at the moment. Good insight into Meade's desire and preparation to fight at Pipe Creek rather than Gettysburg until Reynolds blundered into a general engagement against Meade's orders. Gettysburg needed this deep look into the logistics of the campaign; I had no idea that with limited supply routes to Gettysburg, the Union army (and horses and mules) basically starved for four days before and during the battle.

I do quibble some with Brown cutting Meade way too much slack in the pursuit. Almost impossible to pursue through mountain passes such as South Mountain? Even McCLELLAN did that, and forced those same passes, and against a Confederate Army that had not been devastated by three days of combat. And for every instance cited of the logistical difficulties Meade was facing, multiply that by three or four for Lee. And as late as July 7, Meade was afraid that Lee might sneak around him and go BACK to Gettysburg! The excuse that Meade was still under primary orders to protect Washington and Baltimore reeks of rationalization. I agree that Meade should not have attacked the defenses at Williamsport, but that begs the question: why did Meade give Lee the time to build such extensive fortifications in the first place?

I have Brown's earlier entire book on the retreat, have not read it yet but will, maybe he does a better job fleshing out the rationale for Meade not doing more. I think even the July 1863 version of Grant would have destroyed Lee before he ever made it back to the Potomac.

[Robert · Rating 5 out of 5]

George Gordon Meade took over as commander of the Army of the Potomac on June 28. Given the task of resisting Lee's advance, and in particular defending the capital, he set up a line of defence that would achieve just this. In order to ascertain Lee's position and strength, he sent a reconnaissance in force under a general he trusted. As a result of this came about the famous Battle of Gettysburg, This is a fine account of Meade's Generalship during the Gettysburg campaign, which just to put things in perspective ran from the fourth to the sixth day of Meade's having taken charge of the army. The AOTP decisively defeated Lee's army, which subsequently pulled back, thereby ending the last major Confederate invasion of Union territory. However, Meade, the victor of the Battle of Gettysburg was criticised then and subsequently for having let Lee escape.

A warning to readers who might expect a complete account of the Battle of Gettysburg. That, this book is not and does not try to be. It shows in particular what Meade's plans were before Gettysburg was brought on accidentally by Reynolds' mistakes on Jul 1, how important Meade's generalship was to the victory on the left flank on July 2, and the correctness of Meade's actions following the battle given what he knew and the state of the Army of the Potomac. My one criticism of this book is that it could have had more detailed maps, but otherwise Brown does a good job of defending Meade's achievement, and concludes that Meade's decisions saved the Army of the Potomac and defeated Lee, and there was nothing more in the circumstances that he could have done. It is particularly impressive that Brown comments extensively from the kinds of books on strategy which Meade would have read, which shed light on what he was trying to do. Likewise, he has a firm grasp of geography and the role it played in the campaign, as well as the role of provisioning in what options were open to Meade at any given stage.

[Tim Armstrong · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was fantastic! General Meade has become a sort of obscure figure form the Civil War so it was very refreshing to read this glowing assessment of Meade's generalship during the Gettysburg campaign. I enjoy most things I read about Gettysburg, but I had never read an account of Meade's actions during the battle, and to see the battle through the eyes of the Union Army's commander was very refreshing and interesting.

This book does so much to clear up the inconsistencies and untruths about Meade during Gettysburg and proves that he was done dirty by his detractors during and after the war. His reputation is finally getting it's due and this book is a major step forward.

[Keith Robison · Rating 4 out of 5]

I recently completed listening to Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command by Kent Masterson Brown

It should be noted that Brown is a lawyer by profession and a historian on the side. I think this explains a number of both positive and negative aspects of the book

On the negative side, he is sometimes repetitious – the book could use some light editing. Sometimes these are entire short paragraphs or half paragraphs. He’s also overly fond on long comma-delimited lists of items that could be said once and then a shorthand given in future nearby references.

He’s also very argumentative, and in general I think these are well done, but it is clear he has it out for some other authors, particularly Stephen Sears and Allen C Guelzo. Brown borders on being such a backer of Meade as to slide into fanboyism, though I think in general he makes a strong argument – but I haven’t read the Sears or Guelzo books (Guelzo’s The Last Invasion was a recent overdue library book)

Brown covers the Gettysburg campaign from just before Hooker was dumped and Meade took command through Lee’s escape across the Potomac

Brown goes into great detail on Meade’s logistics planning and challenges. The Army of the Potomac was handed to Meade in poor shape, with many troops lacking boots. Hooker had spread the army over a wide geographic area. And JEB Stuart had damaged two key railroads and cut a key telegraph line. Meade’s Pipe Creek Line would have been close to a railhead at Westminster Maryland, but one served by a poorly built single track railroad. When military railroad chief Herman Haupt wasn’t gossiping back-channel with General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, Haupt ran the railroad with amazing efficiency – using convoys of five trains to provide high freight depth. Haupt also arranged a Pony Express-style relay system to move messages from the end of the telegraph system to Gettysburg

Not only did Meade have around 90 thousand soldiers (plus unmentioned numbers of support personnel), there were about 30 thousand horses – about 1 for every three soldiers! – for officers, artillery, and logistics. And those logistics trains could be tens of miles long – which also complicated transport

I definitely enjoyed Brown’s focus on Meade’s logistical and communication challenges – I could really get into an entire book on these topics. For example, Meade’s troops were probably even more poorly shod than Lee’s (and the whole “going to Gettysburg due to a shoe ad is clearly bogus, as Confederate troops had been passing through Gettysburg for several days before the battle).

While some of the chapters might be a bit dry, and the narrator never injects much emotion the chapter describing the chaos of the fighting in the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield on July 2 is absolutely gripping – I simply couldn’t halt my walk before completing the chapter that night.

Brown richly uses quotes from participants – particularly Meade but also many soldiers. Though nearly entirely from Union sources – this is a book about Meade specifically and the Union side in general at Gettysburg.

Brown levels serious charges against General John Reynolds, who tends to get a light touch since he was killed on the first day. According to Brown, Reynolds was supposed to use I Corps for a reconnaissance-in-force and then drop both it and the advanced XI Corps (under O.O. Howard) to ascertain Lee’s intentions and perhaps draw him back to the well-prepared positions on the Pipe Creek Line – but NOT trigger a general battle. Fighting at Gettysburg put the Army of Potomac far from its supply and communication bases – and actually pretty far from the fighting – most of the army made amazing forced marches (often 20-30 miles through the night) to arrive on the battlefield.

Brown also has no patience for Daniel Sickles, plainly leveling a charge of subordination of orders in Sickles abandoning his position on Cemetery Ridge in favor of an unsupportable one in the Peach Orchard.

Brown makes a strong argument that Meade used his councils of war as ways to ensure consensus with the Corps commanders who would have to execute. So on July 2nd, he already has a dispatch ready for Halleck saying he would stand and fight, but didn’t send it until after the council came concurred. Conversely, he had a dispatch Ray that he would assault Lee’s strong lines on the Potomac, but lacking supper from the Corps commanders he never sent it. Many contemporaries & modern writes see this as weakness; Brown (and I) e see it as good leadership

Brown in general bats down most criticisms of Meade. He does take issue with Meade’s harsh criticism of artillery chief Henry Hunt - who asked to be relieved after it - which Meade then backed down from

Minor gripe: books like this are full of jargon that may put off non-specialists, so it helps to define some. I’ve done a small amount of reading in this field and had never come across “prolongue” before – and Brown didn’t explain it. I must not be alone! It’s a technique for using the recoil of an artillery piece to help move it, particularly in retreat

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Meade at Gettysburg is one of those books that attracted my attention as soon as I saw it. I mean, the casual reader of history doesn't remember much about George Meade. Yes, he was the victorious Union general at Gettysburg. Didn't he fail afterwards by letting Lee escape back to Virginia? I read somewhere that he was described as "a damned old goggle-eyed snapping turtle". And then, he was replaced by Ulysses Grant and disappeared from history.

But Grant didn't replace Meade. In fact, Meade was the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac throughout the remainder of the war. Grant was the commanding general of all Union forces and it was unfortunate for Meade's memory that Grant decided to do his commanding in the field with the Army of the Potomac rather than from Washington the way that Grant's predecessor, Henry Halleck, did. But I digress…

The point is that some historians may have given Meade a bum rap. And Kent Masterson Brown has taken it upon himself to argue for a rehabilitation of Meade's record. And Mr. Brown makes a compelling argument.

For example, Mr. Brown points out that command of the army was thrust upon Meade just days before the Battle of Gettysburg. Meade did not want that command, but he felt that it was his duty to accept. And so, he took command of an army that was spread out over many miles and chasing after an enemy that had moved north into Pennsylvania and he had blessed little time to pull things together. His soldiers had been marching for many long hours and they had many more long days of marching ahead. We often hear about how Confederate troops marched without shoes or provisions, but it turns out that because of the need to move quickly and the uncertainty of the enemy's intentions, the Union army was no better provisioned and many of the Union soldiers were also without adequate footwear or food.

It also turns out that Meade made several sound military moves — creating plans to meet the enemy on a well-defended line at Pipe Creek — but those plans had to be altered when General John Reynolds was killed on July 1 in Gettysburg. Meade's plan called for reconnaissance in force, but the general who replaced Reynolds failed in that mission and was drawn into a battle on unfamiliar ground not of Meade's choosing. So, in fact, it was a major miracle that Meade and his army was able to get to Gettysburg and form a strong defensive line as quickly as they did.

What about Meade's failure to capture Lee's army after Gettysburg? Well, Mr. Brown points out that the Union army was a) pretty beaten up from the battle, b) was still suffering from a lack of supplies, and c) could not discern Lee's plans until Lee had already withdrawn into a very strong fortified position. Given that, Mr. Brown argues that Meade could well have completely undone the effect of his triumph at Gettysburg with a disastrous follow-up battle on the Potomac.

Okay… I might be biased. I've always liked Meade. But I do think that Mr. Brown makes a strong case and I welcome the idea that someone would defend Meade's legacy for a change.

About the book itself…

One of the book's strengths is that it never diverts its attention away from Meade. Mr. Brown does not spend time telling us about what was happening elsewhere. We never delve into the mind of Robert E. Lee. Everything is told from Meade's point of view. What dd he know and when did he know it? It is a very effective story-telling strategy.

My only complaints about the book are somewhat minor. There are times when Mr. Brown gets us too far in the weeds. I didn't really need to know who commanded at a brigade level unless it advances the story. I also think that the maps, while good, could have been better.

But, in the end, this is a book worth reading, if only to see a capable general in a new light.

[Roger Burk · Rating 4 out of 5]

Overlook this book's faults (It includes too much tactical detail; it includes indigestible material in long narrative paragraphs that should be presented in tables or figures; most irritatingly, it frequently mentions places that are not included in the maps). It presents a wonderfully fresh look at the Battle of Gettysburg almost entirely from Meade's point of view: what he knew, what he wanted to accomplish, what he had to decide.

Meade was peremptorily appointed commander of the Army of the Potamic on 28 June 1863, when the Army was in Fredericksburg, MD, and Lee's army was rampaging through Pennsylvania 30 miles to the north. Three days later he commanded the Army in the largest battle ever fought in North America. He did not intend to fight at Gettysburg; he prepared a good defensive position about 10 miles to the south and hoped Lee would attack him there. Unsure of Lee's exact location and intentions, he sent two of his seven corps on a (doctrinally approved) reconnaissance in force towards the town. The lead corps was sharply attacked just north of it and perhaps got too closely involved, but when Meade saw the good defensive terrain there he decided to accept battle. The book covers not only his troop movements during the battle, but also the many other things an army commander has to think about: provisioning and fodder (most supplies were fairly distant, behind the originally intended line); signals (dispatch riders and a network of semaphores across the battlefield); field hospitals; usable maps of the area. After the defeated Confederates withdrew and he was sure of where they were going, he moved to intercept them when they crossed the Potomac. His exhausted Army got there just in time, but Meade wisely chose not to attack their well-entrenched position. If he had his army would have suffered just as badly as Lee's did at Gettysburg.

Meade has been criticized for not pursuing Lee with enough vigor after his victory, and for not destroying the Army of Northern Virginia and thus probably ending the Civil War. This started with Lincoln expressing his disappointment. Brown is plainly concerned to refute this criticism, and sometimes his vigorous defense of Meade seems to call his impartiality into question. However, I find the case he makes to be persuasive.

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command by Kent Masterson Brown is an in-depth examination of Union General George G. Meade’s leadership during the pivotal Battle of Gettysburg in July of 1863. Often perceived as cranky, cautious, timid, and merely lucky, Meade is re-evaluated by Brown as a competent, capable, and effective commander. The book highlights how Meade assumed command of the Army of the Potomac just days before the battle. This was an abrupt transition that left him with little time to prepare.

Brown demonstrates that Meade was under-equipped from the start, noting that Meade himself repeatedly mentioned his lack of topographical maps of Gettysburg and the surrounding region. Despite these disadvantages, the book outlines Meade’s leadership, strategic thinking, and organizational skills while also acknowledging the logistical and communication challenges he faced.

Drawing on official military reports, personal letters, and maps, Brown argues convincingly that Meade played a far more active and decisive role in the Union victory than he has traditionally been credited for.

One of the most common criticisms of Meade is his failure to aggressively pursue Lee’s army as it retreated from Pennsylvania. However, Brown offers a compelling defense in Carl von Clausewitz’s military theory: pursuing a retreating enemy across difficult terrain, especially with an exhausted and undersupplied force, would have risked everything Meade had achieved with the victory at Gettysburg. As Brown notes, “Pursuing Lee's defeated army into the mountains, like the South Mountain range, would inevitably lead to the loss of all that Meade's victory had gained” (p. 322).

Meade did, in fact, plan to pursue Lee once he confirmed the Confederate retreat, stating, “Should the enemy be retreating, I will pursue by way of Emmitsburg and Middletown, on the left flank” (p. 323).

I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the Civil War, the Battle of Gettysburg, or Union military leadership.

[Gary Klein · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book provides an excellent overview of Meade's tactical and operational victory at Gettysburg. In doing so, it attempts to restore Meade's image following later, prominent, and lingering claims that he let the Confederate Army escape destruction in 1863.

The book raises key points and questions that have been overlooked or misjudged at the time, and up to this day:

1. Meade's Army pursued Lee's and had some success destroying or capturing trailing elements, but this seems to have been overlooked for the lack of a general engagement.
2. Was Meade's Army in a state of readiness where it should have pressed a major engagement before 13JUL or was Meade correct in refitting and reorganizing to attack more methodically? [A large portion of his troops had not eaten a real meal or been able to resupply ammunition in days.]
3. Would an attack have succeeded or would the Army of the Potomac have lost such an engagement, thereby jeopardizing their previous victory?

Beyond these questions, which are raised towards the end of the book, this book details Meade's leadership and decisions throughout the Gettysburg campaign just days after assuming command of the Army of the Potomac. It details his decisions to prepare for the pending Confederate attack and actions during a couple key challenges: Reynolds' I Corps overly aggressive advance guard attack (Day 1) and Sickles' mispositioned III Corps in the wheat field (Day 2). He maneuvered forces to overcome both of these challenges, then predicted and prepared for Lee's main attack on Day 3 (Pickett's charge). In doing so, he became the first Union general to beat General Lee on the field. Unfortunately, Meade was unable to turn this tactical and operational victory into a strategic one when he was unable to destroy the Rebel Army before it retreated to Virginia, which is what Meade seems to be most remembered for.

[Bob Lundquist · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Battle of Gettysburg has been studied by thousands of publications over the years from many perspectives. General Meade took over the Army of the Potomac only two days before the battle started. He studied the situation when he took over and gathered the resources available to possibly fight the Confederates. He set up a defensive line some miles below Gettysburg. Then he sent a strong force to recon what Lee was up to. However, due to General Reynolds’ gung-ho attitude and moving farther than ordered, Meade had to respond and send the whole army to defend Reynolds’ corps before it was wiped out. The battle was fought south of Gettysburg where Meade found the proper ground to defend the army from the Confederates’ many onslaughts. The battle was hard-fought and after winning, Meade tried to keep track of what Lee was doing to possibly wipe out the Confederate army or at least chase it out of the north. Meade’s army was exhausted after Gettysburg and supplies were very hard to obtain. In addition, Meade had orders to defend the Baltimore/Washington area. Lincoln and others disparaged Meade because he could not do that and eliminate the Confederate army. So, Meade had a negative reputation fostered by his superiors and some fellow officers. This book works to dispel that reputation.

It does this very well. The writing is clear and there is some repetition to remind the reader of important points. There is a lot of detail of who did what at the division and brigade level that seems a bit tedious. It is an excellent overview of the events leading up to the battle and how Meade attempted to chase down the Confederates after the battle despite a worn-out army and lack of supplies. He cites military theorists such as Clausewitz and Jomini to support Meade’s actions. A good book to supplements anyone’s knowledge of Gettysburg and Meade.

[Brian · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's tempting to look at all the books written on Gettysburg and wonder - what new can be written and/or learned about this battle? After you read Brown's excellent Meade at Gettysburg, you'll realize there is still much to learn and explore about this battle.
Brown is approaching this battle from Meade's perspective - what were his orders? What was his information? What factors shaped his planning decision making? What was his plan for the campaign and what factors shaped and changed it?
Brown takes a nice, clear analytical approach to Meade in the Gettysburg campaign. In the process he provides clarity to a number of Gettysburg debates such as Meade's intent in sending Reynolds to Gettysburg and his plan for the Pipe Creek Line.
Brown also clearly reviews Meade's intents and actions to deal with Sickle's decision to occupy the peach orchard. He lays out clear evidence of Sickle's willful disobedience in spite of multiple efforts to get him to comply with orders. Another important review is Brown's discussion of the Council of War held at Meade's headquarters on July 2 - Brown does a great job lining up the timeline and evidence to argue that Meade had reached his decision was using this meeting to assess his forces and build consensus among his subordinates.
A final, important discussion is Brown's review of Meade's decision making in the pursuit of Lee following the battle.
An important element of Brown's book is his review of key factors that shaped the campaign and Meade's decision making - the geography and topography of the area, supply status, condition of troops, efficiency of staff, intelligence, and the Army of the Potomac's command structure.
An all around excellent book that adds much to the understanding of the battle of Gettysburg.

[Ernest Spoon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Growing up I always heard Robert E. Lee´s Army of Northern Virginia stumbled into battle at Gettysburg, PA because they were barefoot and heard there was a shoe factory there. Or some such nonsense.

George Gordon Meade is a victim of politics and history. As the pages of this book witness, Meade was undoubtedly one of the most competent and imaginative commanding generals in the Union Army.

I always attributed the Union victory at Gettysburg to the grit and determination of the lower ranks, tired at getting whipped by Lee´s forces. Without Meade´s brilliant tactical handling of Union forces on July 2, 1863 the battle would have swung in Lee´s favor. Meade fashioned a victory, on the fly, from a debacle due to the insubordination of political general Daniel Sickles, of ¨temporary insanity¨ fame.

I was astonished by facts, read in this book by me for the first time, of the want of ammunition, food and clothing of the Union forces. I guess 60 years of Daughters of The Confederacy revisionism had me convinced the Army of Northern Virginia was starving and ragged through three days at Gettysburg. Not so.

Also Lincoln's reaction to Meade's decision, make after consultation with the highest ranking generals under his command, to not attack Lee's dug in forces at Williamsport, MD, July 13, 1863-- "He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with the our other late successes, have ended the war.*"--has colored his reputation ever since.

This is a very thoroughly researched book and should server future US Civil War historian well in righting a old, old wrong.

*unsent letter dated July 14, 1863

[Alex Tyree · Rating 5 out of 5]

Finally some justice for General George Meade! Author Brown has excelled in revealing many of the things other authors have not emphasized. He gives a real, living portrait of the man and the general.

Brown alerts us to military standards in command taught at West Point (esp., Jomini and Clausewitz). I never understood the ins and outs of the “Reconnaissance in Force,” especially in relation to Meade’s operational thinking. Also, we learn of the difficulties in logistics, especially brought on by the weather and Stuart’s raids. How do fight a battle when you cannot feed your men and horses? How can you tend to the wounded when medical supplies are unavailable? Brown’s account reminds us that Army of Potomac was barely held together considering the losses, the short supplies, the beastly hot or violently raining weather, broken communications, broken railroads, and Lee.

It is fascinating to see the kind of commanding general General Meade actually was. He was everywhere, rarely eating or sleeping enough. He became the operational commander, personally ensuring the defense of all sectors of the battlefield. Previously I had perceived that Reynolds, Buford and Hancock and Chamberlain were the big heroes of Gettysburg. Brown properly show a bigger picture of the struggle of so many, especially Meade who seemed to be just where the greatest crises arose.

There is so much more to learn about Meade’s leadership before, during and after Gettysburg. I am glad to have the chance to read about unsung heroes of the largest land battle in the U.S. to that date.

[Casey · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great book, providing a detailed study of General Meade through the Battle of Gettysburg and its immediate aftermath. The author, noted Civil War historian Kent Masterson Brown, gives a nearly hour by hour account of the U.S, Army’s senior leadership from 28 June, 1863 through to the Confederate’s final retreat on 14 July. This is one of the best Civil War histories I’ve read in some time. Masterson concentrates on General Meade and the leadership of the Army of the Potomac in the uncertain pre-battle maneuvers, the hectic battle itself, and the uncertain post-battle situation. The narrative follows the reports received by Meade, the steps he took on the battlefield, and the actions of his subordinates. There is minimal description of the Confederate actions, giving a truer understanding of what Meade knew and when. Masterson closely describes the logistics and administrative actions of the U.S. Army during the campaign. The book is generally favorable to Meade, arguing his decisions were much more central to the victory than is usually accepted. The author praised Meade for his Eisenhower-like ability to control the disparate personalities of the army. A great book for understanding the fighting methods of the Civil War. Highly recommended for any military professional keen on understanding the dynamics of operational leadership.

[Chuck Leonard · Rating 5 out of 5]

I grew up less than an hour from Gettysburg and attended numerous Boy Scout Jamborees on the Battlefield there in the 1960's. The theme of the story there highlighted the Battle as Meade vs Lee but Lincoln's impatience with Meade over his pursuit of Lee after the battle, eventually took hold, clouding Meade's roll in this critical battle and became a theme in many of the accounts of the battle that I have read over the years and soon it was like he actually had never been there (per Meade's letter to his wife regarding the criticisms of his generalship after the Battle). Brown's book clearly delineates Meade's roll in the success by describing Meade's adherence to the tactics and strategies that were taught at the time to US officers at West Point. He also does an excellent job of dispelling the long-held belief of Meade's failure to aggressively pursue Lee's army. The logistics of moving armies in the 19th century were confounded by poor roads ... etc etc.

I enjoyed this book a great deal and I believe Brown has done an excellent job of restoring credit to General Meade for the Union success at Gettysburg.

[Richard F · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very detailed account of Meade's actions from his elevation to commanding general to Lee's retreat across the Potomac. The author makes his case that Meade did an outstanding job of managing all aspects of the victorious campaign - from establishing the Pipe Creek Line, to moving to Gettysburg when the situation changed, choosing to fight and superbly managing a defensive battle despite Sickle's gross insubordination and incompetence, and declining to attack a strongly entrenched and resupplied Lee at Williamsport with his fatigued and starving army. Lincoln, showed his ignorance of war and his frustration with its realities by unfairly attacking Meade, smearing his reputation for all time. Instead of celebrating a well deserved triumph in Washington, the hero of Gettysburg was instead pilloried and humiliated by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. As Hunt said years after both Lincoln and Meade were gone "the hopes and expectations of [Lincoln and others] excited by the victory at Gettysburg wear as unreasonable as the fears that had preceded it."

[Don Humphrey · Rating 5 out of 5]

Meade gets a Fair Trial

This is a very thorough and well written history of General Meade’s generalship from the time he takes over the Army of the Potomac until he follows Lee back into Virginia. Unlike some Gettysburg histories, that give greater weight to Lincoln’s opinion of the pursuit, Brown lays out a compelling case in defense of Meade’s orders and movements based on the tactical realities faced by his army. Meade’s reality was much more complicated than Lincoln, Halleck or the Committee on the Conduct of the War could appreciate from their comfortable offices in Washington. The fact that the Army of the Potomac could pursue Lee at all, with failing horses, starving and shoeless soldiers, and horrible weather, is amazing. If Meade would have thrown this tired and weakened army against the strong entrenchments of Falling Waters, all of the gains and prestige earned at Gettysburg would have evaporated.

This book was a joy to read and I am sure I will read it again and refer to it often.

[Bill Patton · Rating 4 out of 5]

Highly detailed account of the Army of the Potomac’s side at Gettysburg. Written in the “fog of war” style made popular by Douglas Southall Freeman. In other words, you don’t get the ANV’s activities, only Meade’s reactions to whatever happens.
Not for the novice CW fan, because you have to already know the CSA side of the battle.
My own feeling is that Meade has been highly undervalued because of various Meade haters and by Lincoln’s disappointment because the ANV wasn’t destroyed in battle’s aftermath.
I’ve always thought Meade was a hero, taking over as commander of the Northern forces just a day or three before the opening confrontations between the CSA and the Army of the Potomac. The author rehabilitates Meade and does it in good form. Meade has been underrated, but remember...her beat Lee! The first time a Union General bested him!

[C. Meade · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fantastic read for one of America's most overlooked heroes of the United States Army & the Army Corps of Engineers. Kent Masterson Brown provides an even-handed and studious look at Meade's career and the moments in which Meade is often disparaged. The outcome of the American Civil War may have had a vastly different outcome had Meade not made the decisions he made during and after Gettysburg. His astute counsel to Gen. U.S. Grant at the Battle of the Crater certainly saved my cousin's life; a new, "green" member of the 28th USCT (Indiana). Gen. Ambrose Burnside wanted the USCT Regiments to lead the charge at "The Crater," but Meade stepped in and ever the diplomat, advised Grant that the wholesale slaughter of these inexperienced USCT troops would be "impolitic." This is a fast and informative read that I would recommend to anyone! A MUST read!!

[Lawrence · Rating 4 out of 5]

After a few chapters in the book felt ponderous and excessively detailed but I could not put it down. It is a unique view of Gettysburg written as a defense of Meade’s conduct before, during and after the engagement. The author does this task well, however it is also a critique of decision making and provides detailed information on the enormous problems of supplying an army in the middle of battle. “Meade at Gettysburg” should be read by anyone who wants a comprehensive view of the battle. The other interesting facet of the book is the almost total concentration on the conduct of the Army of the Potomac. Lee’s army comes across as an enigma, which is the way it probably appeared to the Union commanders. After this read I would like to visit Gettysburg again.

[Mike Haynes · Rating 4 out of 5]

At first blush this would appear simply to be just another in a seemingly endless accounting of what almost everyone agrees was a watershed moment in American history. What make it stand out is, in part, the extreme attention to detail which is no doubt the result of what had to be an exhaustive amount of research. As someone who feels they are well acquainted with the Civil War, in general, and the Battle of Gettysburg in particular it was eye opening to learn about how ill equipped the Union Army of the Potomac was both ahead of and during the 3-day battle. As a final thought, anyone who feels our country needs to experience another civil war( and judging by the reactions to what happened on Jan 6, 2021 there are many) they need to read this book.

[David W. Sharp · Rating 5 out of 5]

For me this well researched and well written book did not reveal much that I did not know. However, it is presented in a way that was very pleasing to me.
Gen. Meade has long been held in high esteem by me and I am gratified to see many new books which treat his generalship with great respect.
This book relates at length his sudden thrusting into the leadership of the army, his swift adjustment to power in the army, his logistical and tactical acumen, as well as his short comings.
It is, as I mentioned, a well written book that is, at least for me, easy to read and understand.
I recommend it to anyone is may be interested in the American Civil War, the battle of Gettysburg, and the military abilities of George Gordon Meade.

[Robert Johnson · Rating 5 out of 5]

My highest recommendation for those interested in Gettysburg. It’s strictly a view from Meade’s headquarters and what he knew, suspected and acted upon. You see his frustrations and his limitations and you admire him all the more. After reading about Hooker at Chancellorsville and Grant at Cold Harbor you better appreciate Meade for his ability. Placed as its head three days before the biggest battle on North America you come to appreciate the magnitude of the job before him. He has never truly received the appreciation he deserved and hopefully future historians will use this book to take a second look at this skilled general. I paired this fine book with the fictional book, Without Warning: The Saga of Gettysburg” and came away with renewed respect for this most underrated general.

[Jake Hauser · Rating 4 out of 5]

Insightful. This book illuminates so much of the responsibility that a battle map or synopsis could never allow us to see. Aspiring officers should read this to know just how much success in battle hinges on the strength of our preparations (which make improvisation possible). We see the exhaustion that tolls the commander and the indispensable value of seeking counsel and of acting decisively. The need to invest time and attention in the mortal, history changing movements of army divisions and the petty pride subordinates from minute to minute and hour to hour.

Poor editing made for some redundant content but such is life when detailed essays are compiled into books. Well worth the speed bumps.

[Stephen · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is historical writing at its best!

Having never previously been acquainted with this book or its author, I am most grateful for having discovered it. Long interested in the Gettysburg battle, I often wondered at the rather poor impression of General Meade left by many subsequent historical tomes. Mr. Brown has produced a thoughtful, thorough and well-reasoned account, replete with extensive references and addressing every contrary contention posited by earlier historians. He has, I think, put those fallacious views finally to rest, and, in the process, burnished an unfairly tarnished reputation of a great American.