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160 pages, Paperback
Published March 10, 2022
A few quotes:
“The French mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal commented in a 1657 letter that he would have written less, had he had time to do so. I thank Oxford University Press for their patience.” (p. XXXIII)
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Dualism in philosophy of mind is the theory that the mind is distinct from the body…it is the theory that philosophy of mind cut its teeth on, and, though widely criticized, it continues to command the attention of contemporary philosophers who puzzle over thought experiments that seem to suggest the theory is true.” (p. 1).
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Our actions are analogous to the buildings and grounds of a university while the mind is analogous to the university itself, and the dualist’s ‘big mistake’ is thinking of mind and body as two things that fall under the heading ‘parts of a person’....According to the behaviourist, there is nothing behind the scenes. What you think is what you do.” (p. 21).
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“It took around 380,000 years [after the Big Bang] before the first atoms were formed…around the 9.2-billion-year mark, the solar system was formed. Life on earth is thought to have begun within a billion years after that, perhaps arising in undersea alkaline vents, and within a couple billion more years eukrayotic cells evolved with multicellular life developing in anothe billion years or so. Hundreds of millions of years later—approximately 4 million years ago—humans began to evolve along the verdant savannas of east Africa.
Where in this picture does the mind make its appearance?” (p. 33)
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“The physicalist thinks that, although our knowledge of the creation and evolution of the universe is incomplete, we know enough to know that God isn’t working behind the scenes. Everything that exists today—including human minds—came about, according to the physicalist, in virtue of the rearrangements of and interactions between the physical particles and forces that emerged after the universe’s birth…
From behaviourism to the identity theory Physicalism is a theory about the general nature of the world; it asserts that everything—from particles to people, from multi-star systems to multiplayer video games—is physical. And since the mind is seen as physicalism’s greatest nemesis, the central challenge for physicalists is to show how the mind sits comfortably in the physical world.” (p. 35).
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“Not only is there a possibility of a science of consciousness, but there is a science of consciousness; for scientists do in fact investigate subjective processes. Would you feel a bee’s wing drop onto your cheek from one centimetre away? How many hairs on the back of your hand need be touched in order for you to notice that they are being touched? These are some of the many questions about conscious experiences that science has cracked (the answers are ‘yes’, and ‘two or three’)...
Scientists also investigate the causes and effects of pain, the role of conscious attention in action, the effect of meditation on attention, and visual, auditory and olfactory perception, to name just a few of the ontologically subjective features of the world that yield to scientific investigation.” (p. 81).
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“...scientists have found that intracranial electrical stimulation of various areas in the prefrontal cortex can produce feelings of anxiety, olfactory and gustatory sensations, the urge to move and laugh, and other conscious experiences.” (p. 82)
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“Body-based theories of emotions also reap support from practices such as yoga or meditation that emphasize how calming one’s breathing is conducive to reducing anxiety.” (p. 90).
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“Embodied emotions: Some philosophers maintain that mental processes are ‘embodied’, by which they mean that the body (in the sense, generally, of torso, limbs, head, neck, but not brain) is an integral part of our mental architecture, so much so that a disembodied mind makes no sense.” (p. 96).
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“Alan Turing, the mathematician whose face is on Britain’s £50 note in recognition of, among other things, developing the first fully-fledged theory of computability and playing a key role in cracking the German secret code during the Second World War, suggests that the question of whether a computer could think is too muddled to be addressed. He argues that we should instead ask whether a computer could make us believe it is thinking.” (p. 111).
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