What do you think?
Rate this book
1931: Debt, Crisis, and the Rise of Hitler
Germany's financial collapse in the summer of 1931 was one of the biggest economic catastrophes of modern history. It led to a global panic, brought down the international monetary system, and turned a worldwide recession into a prolonged depression. The crisis also contributed decisively to the rise of Hitler. Within little more than a year of its onset, the Nazis were Germany's largest political party at both the regional and national level, paving the way for Hitler's eventual seizure of power in January 1933.
The origins of the collapse lay in Germany's large pile of foreign debt denominated in gold-backed currencies, which condemned the German government to cut spending, raise taxes, and lower wages in the middle of a worldwide recession. As political resistance to this policy of austerity grew, the German government began to question its debt obligations, prompting foreign investors to panic and sell their German assets. The resulting currency crisis led to the failure of the already weakened banking system and a partial sovereign default.
Hitler managed to profit from the crisis because he had been the most vocal critic of the reparation regime responsible for the lion's share of German debts. As the financial system collapsed, his relentless attacks against foreign creditors and the alleged complicity of the German government resonated more than ever with the electorate. The ruling parties that were responsible for the situation lost their credibility and became defenceless in the face of his onslaught against an establishment allegedly selling the country out to her foreign creditors. Meanwhile, these creditors hesitated too long to take the wind out of Hitler's sails by offering debt relief. In this way, a financial crisis soon developed into a political catastrophe for both Europe and the world.
The origins of the collapse lay in Germany's large pile of foreign debt denominated in gold-backed currencies, which condemned the German government to cut spending, raise taxes, and lower wages in the middle of a worldwide recession. As political resistance to this policy of austerity grew, the German government began to question its debt obligations, prompting foreign investors to panic and sell their German assets. The resulting currency crisis led to the failure of the already weakened banking system and a partial sovereign default.
Hitler managed to profit from the crisis because he had been the most vocal critic of the reparation regime responsible for the lion's share of German debts. As the financial system collapsed, his relentless attacks against foreign creditors and the alleged complicity of the German government resonated more than ever with the electorate. The ruling parties that were responsible for the situation lost their credibility and became defenceless in the face of his onslaught against an establishment allegedly selling the country out to her foreign creditors. Meanwhile, these creditors hesitated too long to take the wind out of Hitler's sails by offering debt relief. In this way, a financial crisis soon developed into a political catastrophe for both Europe and the world.
272 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2019
92 people are currently reading
692 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 29 of 29 reviews
September 16, 2019
This book is a confused and slightly bewildering look at the collapse of the European monetary order at the beginning of the Great Depression, but it has an important story to tell.
The book begins in January 1930, when triumphant ministers from across Europe celebrated the conclusion of the “Second Hague Conference.” After the passing of the German famed Foreign Minister Gustav Streseman, the son of a Berlin pub-owner who became a capitalist mogul, the new German foreign minister, Julius Curtis, somehow managed to come to agreement with Aristide Briand, Streseman’s long-term French counterpart, and rewrite a new German reparations agreement into law. It extended German repayments until 1988 (!), and mandated that 600 million marks of them every year would be mandatory. In return, the French and other allied countries agreed to withdraw from the Rhine and give up control of the Reichsbank and the Reichsbahn. Two months later, the German Reichstag passed the agreement by overwhelming margins. It seemed as if the perils and international tensions resulting from the First World War had finally passed.
Yet it all went wrong so quickly. Within weeks of passing the new Hague plan, German Social Democratic Chancellor Herman Muller found his coalition incapable of protecting the new social insurance and unemployment fund of 1927, since he refused to raise taxes or cut benefits. This gave the arch-conservative President Paul von Hindenburg a chance to place Heinrich Bruning, leader of the Catholic Central Party, who the arch-Protestant Hindenberg thought acted like a “Protestant Catholic," as the new chancellor. Within months Hindenburg and Bruning successfully used the “Article 48” of the Constitution to disband parliament and implement emergency austerity. The disruptive move and subsequent election allowed the Nazis to move from 2.6% of the vote in the last, 1928, election to 18.3% in this September election, and for the Communists to rise to 13% as well. Still, within months Bruning had to negotiate another German loan from the French, and the American bank Lee, Higginson, and he had to agree to even more austerity, increased social insurance taxes, reduced civil servant salaries and so on. In December, he got it through with another Article 48 move, but the right and the left were raging ever stronger. In March 1931, Bruning broached a customs union with Austria, verboten under the Versailles Treaty, and mentioned he would try to renegotiate reparations payments, which he thought was necessary for yet another round of austerity.
Brunings plans all fell apart in June 1931, when Austria’s Credit-Anstalt bank faced collapse, and then the German Nordwolle textile firm and its associated Danat Bank came under pressure. The French, British and American central banks had to extend credit to the Reichsbank to keep it on gold, and US President Herbert Hoover, understanding the intensity of the crisis, proposed a total moratorium on reparations. Such efforts were not enough. In July the Danat and then Dresdner banks closed, and Bruning was forced to break off international debt payments entirely. A global financial crisis followed, one which, importantly, encouraged the rise of the Nazis and Adolf Hitler.
The story in this book, however, is almost impossible to disentangle. Chronologies move backwards and forwards without explanation, characters are introduced and disappear, and important events fly by without comment. It’s hard to separate the wheat from the chaff, but the author does at least show how much this financial crisis mattered, to Germany and the rest of the world.
The book begins in January 1930, when triumphant ministers from across Europe celebrated the conclusion of the “Second Hague Conference.” After the passing of the German famed Foreign Minister Gustav Streseman, the son of a Berlin pub-owner who became a capitalist mogul, the new German foreign minister, Julius Curtis, somehow managed to come to agreement with Aristide Briand, Streseman’s long-term French counterpart, and rewrite a new German reparations agreement into law. It extended German repayments until 1988 (!), and mandated that 600 million marks of them every year would be mandatory. In return, the French and other allied countries agreed to withdraw from the Rhine and give up control of the Reichsbank and the Reichsbahn. Two months later, the German Reichstag passed the agreement by overwhelming margins. It seemed as if the perils and international tensions resulting from the First World War had finally passed.
Yet it all went wrong so quickly. Within weeks of passing the new Hague plan, German Social Democratic Chancellor Herman Muller found his coalition incapable of protecting the new social insurance and unemployment fund of 1927, since he refused to raise taxes or cut benefits. This gave the arch-conservative President Paul von Hindenburg a chance to place Heinrich Bruning, leader of the Catholic Central Party, who the arch-Protestant Hindenberg thought acted like a “Protestant Catholic," as the new chancellor. Within months Hindenburg and Bruning successfully used the “Article 48” of the Constitution to disband parliament and implement emergency austerity. The disruptive move and subsequent election allowed the Nazis to move from 2.6% of the vote in the last, 1928, election to 18.3% in this September election, and for the Communists to rise to 13% as well. Still, within months Bruning had to negotiate another German loan from the French, and the American bank Lee, Higginson, and he had to agree to even more austerity, increased social insurance taxes, reduced civil servant salaries and so on. In December, he got it through with another Article 48 move, but the right and the left were raging ever stronger. In March 1931, Bruning broached a customs union with Austria, verboten under the Versailles Treaty, and mentioned he would try to renegotiate reparations payments, which he thought was necessary for yet another round of austerity.
Brunings plans all fell apart in June 1931, when Austria’s Credit-Anstalt bank faced collapse, and then the German Nordwolle textile firm and its associated Danat Bank came under pressure. The French, British and American central banks had to extend credit to the Reichsbank to keep it on gold, and US President Herbert Hoover, understanding the intensity of the crisis, proposed a total moratorium on reparations. Such efforts were not enough. In July the Danat and then Dresdner banks closed, and Bruning was forced to break off international debt payments entirely. A global financial crisis followed, one which, importantly, encouraged the rise of the Nazis and Adolf Hitler.
The story in this book, however, is almost impossible to disentangle. Chronologies move backwards and forwards without explanation, characters are introduced and disappear, and important events fly by without comment. It’s hard to separate the wheat from the chaff, but the author does at least show how much this financial crisis mattered, to Germany and the rest of the world.
September 28, 2019
Tobias Straumann's '1931: Debt, Crisis, and the Rise of Hitler' is a fascinating and highly accessible account of the role that unsustainable debt, crushing austerity, and political deadlock, played in both the discrediting of the establishment parties of the right and left - who had hitched their proverbial wagons to that austerity - and of the rise of Hitler and the Nazi party which filled the political void that they vacated. We like to think that we're behind such dark periods in history, but if the EU sovereign debt crisis taught us anything, its that the European establishment political and financial elites of our day still haven't learned the lessons that led to the downfall of the liberal German republic. Reading this book I couldn't help but remember the famous aphorism that while "history doesn't repeat itself, it often rhymes."
February 29, 2020
Very good description of the financial crisis of 1931, describing all the elements that contributed to it. As with other books on the two World Wars, one gets a sense of inevitability that is quite depressing. Important reading, especially when we try to recover from the 2008 crisis, while waiting for the next one.
November 26, 2023
This is a very interesting book that explains the 1931 Sovereign Debt Crisis of Germany. Tobias Staumann argues that while the crash of 1929 led to a global recession, it was the 1931 sovereign debt crisis that transformed a global recession into a global depression.
After WWI, global balance sheets were nested and chain linked to one another. US was the largest creditor nation and Germany was the largest debtor nation. UK and France had to pay war loans to the US, and they in turn, to a large extent, relied on German war reparations. So the weakest link in this global debt chain was Germany and within Germany the weakest link was its banking sector.
Germany essentially had a long term liability of war reparations but war and hyperinflation had destroyed its capital base. So to rebuild the economy, to pay for reparations, and to fund unemployment benefits and social security programs it had to borrow. Most of this borrowing came from foreign short-term loans and deposits which were ‘hot money’ ie chasing higher yields (official rate in Germany was 2x that of UK and US) and which had to be rolled over every few weeks and months.
So Germany was structurally fragile to both a currency crisis and a banking crisis. At the first sign of trouble, foreign investors will start pulling money out of Germany. They would sell short term paper and/or convert their RM deposits into $ or gold, which would eventually push the German central bank to suspend gold convertability to halt the decline in their reserves. Moreover, since the deposits weren’t sticky, German banks would be forced to call their loans to meet their survival constraint.
Till 1930 such a crisis hadn’t come to pass for one important reason: these short-term foreign loans in practice were considered senior to war reparations in the capital structure. Germany if faced with a recession could delay making war reparations. So whenever Germany found itself in trouble it could raise rates to attract more deposits.
But all this changed after the 1930 Young Agreement. Germany now had to pay an unconditional annuity of RM650 million no matter what. Operationally this changed the seniority in the capital structure. Foreign loans now became junior to war reparations and annuity.
As it turns out this had some far reaching implications:
1. Germany could now no longer rely on foreign loans to fund reparations as investors priced in higher probability of default. So funding risk increased.
2. Germany now has to fund both war reparations and debt through a budget surplus (so that they have the money) and a trade surplus (so that they have forex/gold to pay). By 1929 Debt to GDP was 80%+ and the economy was contracting. Operationally this meant instead of adopting a counter cyclical policy of increased government spends and lower taxes, Germany has to adopt a pro-cyclical policy of lower wages, higher taxes, and reduced spending. And as the economy contracted Germany had to adopt multiple rounds of such austerity measures, which were deeply unpopular with the population.
3. This put the German government in a dilemma: if they renegade on repatriations it would lead to capital flight leading to a banking and currency crisis. If they continued to pay repatriation they would be forced to impose harsher austerity measures, which was politically unsustainable. Hitler and Nazi party had emerged as the second largest party to the surprise of many in 1930 and one of their election planks was to end reparations. More austerity would be mean political defeat for government and Nazi eventually forming the government.
Given the above the book answers the following questions through a political - economic - foreign policy lens :
1. Why wasn’t Germany able to get additional bridge loans or credit lines from UK, US or France when these powers realized that a crisis is brewing?
2. Why weren’t the original reparations ever renegotiated ? And why didn’t the US come out earlier to announce a debt moratorium on WW1 loans and reparations?
3. What were the catalysts in the summer of 1931 which converted a regional funding crisis to a global liquidity crisis?
One thread I will pursue further is a financier named Felix Somary. He was among the very few people who was able to connect the dots of the impending global depression, repeatedly warned governments and central bankers. He also moved his client money out of the markets before the above events took place. In 1927 when Keynes disagreed with him on the prospects of crisis, Keynes asked Somary where does he foresee a crisis coming from. Somary replied “from the gap between appearance and reality” and from “fundamental global imbalances that were about to unwind in a chaotic way”
Highly recommended.
After WWI, global balance sheets were nested and chain linked to one another. US was the largest creditor nation and Germany was the largest debtor nation. UK and France had to pay war loans to the US, and they in turn, to a large extent, relied on German war reparations. So the weakest link in this global debt chain was Germany and within Germany the weakest link was its banking sector.
Germany essentially had a long term liability of war reparations but war and hyperinflation had destroyed its capital base. So to rebuild the economy, to pay for reparations, and to fund unemployment benefits and social security programs it had to borrow. Most of this borrowing came from foreign short-term loans and deposits which were ‘hot money’ ie chasing higher yields (official rate in Germany was 2x that of UK and US) and which had to be rolled over every few weeks and months.
So Germany was structurally fragile to both a currency crisis and a banking crisis. At the first sign of trouble, foreign investors will start pulling money out of Germany. They would sell short term paper and/or convert their RM deposits into $ or gold, which would eventually push the German central bank to suspend gold convertability to halt the decline in their reserves. Moreover, since the deposits weren’t sticky, German banks would be forced to call their loans to meet their survival constraint.
Till 1930 such a crisis hadn’t come to pass for one important reason: these short-term foreign loans in practice were considered senior to war reparations in the capital structure. Germany if faced with a recession could delay making war reparations. So whenever Germany found itself in trouble it could raise rates to attract more deposits.
But all this changed after the 1930 Young Agreement. Germany now had to pay an unconditional annuity of RM650 million no matter what. Operationally this changed the seniority in the capital structure. Foreign loans now became junior to war reparations and annuity.
As it turns out this had some far reaching implications:
1. Germany could now no longer rely on foreign loans to fund reparations as investors priced in higher probability of default. So funding risk increased.
2. Germany now has to fund both war reparations and debt through a budget surplus (so that they have the money) and a trade surplus (so that they have forex/gold to pay). By 1929 Debt to GDP was 80%+ and the economy was contracting. Operationally this meant instead of adopting a counter cyclical policy of increased government spends and lower taxes, Germany has to adopt a pro-cyclical policy of lower wages, higher taxes, and reduced spending. And as the economy contracted Germany had to adopt multiple rounds of such austerity measures, which were deeply unpopular with the population.
3. This put the German government in a dilemma: if they renegade on repatriations it would lead to capital flight leading to a banking and currency crisis. If they continued to pay repatriation they would be forced to impose harsher austerity measures, which was politically unsustainable. Hitler and Nazi party had emerged as the second largest party to the surprise of many in 1930 and one of their election planks was to end reparations. More austerity would be mean political defeat for government and Nazi eventually forming the government.
Given the above the book answers the following questions through a political - economic - foreign policy lens :
1. Why wasn’t Germany able to get additional bridge loans or credit lines from UK, US or France when these powers realized that a crisis is brewing?
2. Why weren’t the original reparations ever renegotiated ? And why didn’t the US come out earlier to announce a debt moratorium on WW1 loans and reparations?
3. What were the catalysts in the summer of 1931 which converted a regional funding crisis to a global liquidity crisis?
One thread I will pursue further is a financier named Felix Somary. He was among the very few people who was able to connect the dots of the impending global depression, repeatedly warned governments and central bankers. He also moved his client money out of the markets before the above events took place. In 1927 when Keynes disagreed with him on the prospects of crisis, Keynes asked Somary where does he foresee a crisis coming from. Somary replied “from the gap between appearance and reality” and from “fundamental global imbalances that were about to unwind in a chaotic way”
Highly recommended.
May 27, 2020
“It is not sufficient to have good intentions and appeal to the spirit of cooperation. Nor is it wise to agree on global rules that are not enforceable and then hail them as breakthroughs just because diplomats and politicians are reluctant to return empty-handed after several rounds of contentious and exhausting negotiations. “
These are the closing lines of the book I am about to discuss here and in my opinion it almost perfectly sums up the whole book in two sentences. This book, as the title so correctly mentions, is about what actually happened before the economic crisis of Germany in 1931, a crisis that not only hit germany, it reverberated across the world. This crisis would eventually give Hitler the push that he needed to go on to become the authoritarian leader that he was.
The crisis that hit Germany immediately after the first world war, revolved mainly around the huge amount of war reparations that it had to pay to the allied nations under the treaty of Versailles. The government in Germany initially suffered from a lack of good leadership. Eventually though the government did put its act together, it still struggled to get enough money together to properly pay the reparations under the Weimar government. Germany had been struggling since the early 1920s but it all came to a head as 1930 and 1931 approached.
The book shows the struggle of the German leadership trying to put austerity measures, collecting huge amounts of taxes from the already struggling German people and at the same time making blunders along the way, especially as far as keeping up friendly and meaningful diplomatic relations is concerned. The book tries to show what the German government did during the last days of the crisis as the stock market fell, as they struggled to pay the employees, as the banks slowly started closing and failing. It also showed the response of the other government in relation to the German crisis, namely Britain, France and the United States.
The main point that the book tries to highlight is that the actions of individuals have the power to change the road that nations eventually take. It also tries to highlight the diplomatic failures, failures that can only be seen with the wise eye of hindsight. The people participating at the moment, however, somehow fail to see the obvious problems in their actions and convictions.
The problem, however, of this book, for me, was that while it showed the sequence of events during the one and a half year or so of history it showcases, it did not provide enough analysis of the events which went against what I thought the book would cover when I picked it up. I appreciated the book’s fluid description of the events that preceded one of the biggest financial crises in the world but as I mentioned before the analysis part kind of threw me off. Also, the book fails to show in detail the rise of Hitler lightly brushing past it. To be honest, I am willing to read a more detailed version of the book. Maybe I should look for one by another author. The book gets a mere 3 out 5 stars from me and I would recommend it to anyone who would just like to get lite details about the crisis and not much into heavy reading.
These are the closing lines of the book I am about to discuss here and in my opinion it almost perfectly sums up the whole book in two sentences. This book, as the title so correctly mentions, is about what actually happened before the economic crisis of Germany in 1931, a crisis that not only hit germany, it reverberated across the world. This crisis would eventually give Hitler the push that he needed to go on to become the authoritarian leader that he was.
The crisis that hit Germany immediately after the first world war, revolved mainly around the huge amount of war reparations that it had to pay to the allied nations under the treaty of Versailles. The government in Germany initially suffered from a lack of good leadership. Eventually though the government did put its act together, it still struggled to get enough money together to properly pay the reparations under the Weimar government. Germany had been struggling since the early 1920s but it all came to a head as 1930 and 1931 approached.
The book shows the struggle of the German leadership trying to put austerity measures, collecting huge amounts of taxes from the already struggling German people and at the same time making blunders along the way, especially as far as keeping up friendly and meaningful diplomatic relations is concerned. The book tries to show what the German government did during the last days of the crisis as the stock market fell, as they struggled to pay the employees, as the banks slowly started closing and failing. It also showed the response of the other government in relation to the German crisis, namely Britain, France and the United States.
The main point that the book tries to highlight is that the actions of individuals have the power to change the road that nations eventually take. It also tries to highlight the diplomatic failures, failures that can only be seen with the wise eye of hindsight. The people participating at the moment, however, somehow fail to see the obvious problems in their actions and convictions.
The problem, however, of this book, for me, was that while it showed the sequence of events during the one and a half year or so of history it showcases, it did not provide enough analysis of the events which went against what I thought the book would cover when I picked it up. I appreciated the book’s fluid description of the events that preceded one of the biggest financial crises in the world but as I mentioned before the analysis part kind of threw me off. Also, the book fails to show in detail the rise of Hitler lightly brushing past it. To be honest, I am willing to read a more detailed version of the book. Maybe I should look for one by another author. The book gets a mere 3 out 5 stars from me and I would recommend it to anyone who would just like to get lite details about the crisis and not much into heavy reading.
February 15, 2020
Astonishing!
I just tell you that a book that mention Felix Somary is a book that it s a must read.
I just tell you that a book that mention Felix Somary is a book that it s a must read.
August 21, 2020
This book was a scholarly work on the issues surrounding the debt crises in Germany prior to WWII which lead directly to the rise of Adolf Hitler. It covered a lot of information that was valuable for the background to become clear. I found it somewhat difficult to read, due to the scholastic nature and the fact that the names of people and institutions were reported in German, for the most part. It did provide a lot of good background information as a cautionary tale for governments becoming over leveraged. Governments are meant to serve the people and they cannot adequately manage that task when they are too worried about their own insolvency.
December 14, 2019
I had always bucketed German economic malaise/distress that lead into the war fervor with hyperinflation (34). Straumann masterfully paints the slow burn into banking crises of 1931. Eye-opening, with flashes of the recent European crises. Very much worth a read for any lover of economic /business history, or has an interest in the political machinations of trade/finance based power politics.
September 18, 2025
(Read in January 2025) I won't lie and say this is an exciting read, nor will I claim to have academic mastery of either World War.
This book is a look at how Germany went from losing the Great War in 1919 to Adolf Hitler's appointment as Chancellor only 14 years later in 1933. This all boils down to the Allies setting exorbitant reparations for the German government to pay, which of course would come from taxes on the common people. In trying to satisfy these monetary demands, the German govt had to borrow from predatory lenders and sponsor austerity programs to suck out every last drop of cash from the German people, and there were multiple whole gamuts of recession, depression, and inflation periods.
This is not to say that the Allies are to blame for the rise of Hitler, but that conditions prevailed that saw the German people poor and suffering and willing to submit to an enthusiastic ideologue promising to restore proud Germany to its former might (with a little bit of genocide mixed in).
Interesting on a macro level but not a book that I had need of reading. Three tumultuous stars.
This book is a look at how Germany went from losing the Great War in 1919 to Adolf Hitler's appointment as Chancellor only 14 years later in 1933. This all boils down to the Allies setting exorbitant reparations for the German government to pay, which of course would come from taxes on the common people. In trying to satisfy these monetary demands, the German govt had to borrow from predatory lenders and sponsor austerity programs to suck out every last drop of cash from the German people, and there were multiple whole gamuts of recession, depression, and inflation periods.
This is not to say that the Allies are to blame for the rise of Hitler, but that conditions prevailed that saw the German people poor and suffering and willing to submit to an enthusiastic ideologue promising to restore proud Germany to its former might (with a little bit of genocide mixed in).
Interesting on a macro level but not a book that I had need of reading. Three tumultuous stars.
December 29, 2024
Typical anti-German propaganda. While it covers the bankers use of hyperinflation to cripple Germany, no real acknowledgement of Hitler's public works program and labor-based economy is ever mentioned. The author opines that Hitler's policy was one of "antisemitism". An oddly honest response to an economic plan that is based on production and forbids vice, usury, and speculation.
October 16, 2021
Outstanding book, short but incredibly concise and packed with lots of incredible insights on the global descent into chaos following an incredibly tumultuous decade and a half punctuated by Weimar hyperinflation, 1929 crash, and the incredible tug of war between German creditor nations/recipients of reparation payments and the moderate political forces within the Weimar Republic that tried to reconcile the irreconcilable - namely, the interest of her creditors/former WWI belligerents and the interest of ordinary German working men and women who had suffered immensely throughout the WWI and the larger part of the ensuing decade. The story of how the financial and global liquidity crisis of 1931 shattered the post-WWI global order is an unjustifiably overlooked historical episode in the context of the radicalisation of Weimar politics that eventually lead to the rise of Hitler and his ascent to the German chancellery in 1933. Straumann masterfully tells this story and frames the issues and dilemmas faced by politicians and policymakers of leading global powers of the time during those fateful few years. The main focus is on the leaders of the Weimar Republic of centrist orientation finding themselves between the Scylla and Charybdis of unplayable/unenforceable reparation payments imposed on them by the victors of WWI and domestic political economic constraints and pressures that grew intolerable after the maddening plight of German population throughout the 1920s. I wholeheartedly recommend this book to anyone interested in politics of debt, international relations, domestic policy constraints and how they are all entwined. To take our just one quote from the book: “the German financial crisis of 1931…is a timeless reminder of the dangers of ignoring the dynamics of domestic politics when setting up international institutions and concluding international agreements…only when domestic electorates are ready to accept a loss of sovereignty for the benefit of cross-border cooperation can international institutions and agreements have a change of working efficiently and standing the test of time”. As we know the German electorate of the time got too radicalised and imposed insurmountable domestic policy constraints on moderate political forces in the country that were seeking political alignment and cooperation with former foes.
December 21, 2019
A thoughtful examination of the German Debt Crisis of 1931
Most people know a little about the hyper-inflation that led to the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler. This book provides an in depth look at the debt issues that propelled the crisis. He does a fine job of explaining the difficulties that theGerman statesmen and economists faced. The book provides food for thought about the current economic situation.
Most people know a little about the hyper-inflation that led to the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler. This book provides an in depth look at the debt issues that propelled the crisis. He does a fine job of explaining the difficulties that theGerman statesmen and economists faced. The book provides food for thought about the current economic situation.
January 27, 2025
This is a relatively clear book about the follow-up in Germany to the Young Plan which facilitated Hitler’s rise. It argues for scrutiny towards the terms of international settlements because they set the structure under which policymakers can or not make the policy of their choice. The demand for reparations undermined the ability of Brüning and others to set the Weimar government on the right path.
I appreciate books like these because they are not nakedly economic determinist, but nonetheless alive to the way the economic relates to and conditions the political. With that said, this is not that exciting to read. Had I not been assigned to read it for a class, it is unlikely I would have made it through.
I appreciate books like these because they are not nakedly economic determinist, but nonetheless alive to the way the economic relates to and conditions the political. With that said, this is not that exciting to read. Had I not been assigned to read it for a class, it is unlikely I would have made it through.
May 19, 2023
Interesting book and provides an eloquent narrative of a turbulent time.
As an economic history, I find it rather limited. The counterfactual, namely that the 1939 Great Stock Market Crash was more influential, is barely elaborated on. I’d prefer a more in-depth look at economic indicators for potential signs of causality.
The book’s premise is one that can never be completely proven, but I felt the argument could easily have been built on.
A generous four stars, although I concede that the book was rather easy to read!
As an economic history, I find it rather limited. The counterfactual, namely that the 1939 Great Stock Market Crash was more influential, is barely elaborated on. I’d prefer a more in-depth look at economic indicators for potential signs of causality.
The book’s premise is one that can never be completely proven, but I felt the argument could easily have been built on.
A generous four stars, although I concede that the book was rather easy to read!
November 25, 2025
Minutiae
This book was recommended by one of the finance channels I watch. While somewhat interesting from a nuts-and-bolts perspective, the elites of Europe clearly learned nothing from the First World War. The American elites can "maybe" be forgiven for being clueless; the Europeans cannot. Hitler and Goebbels were only second-rate opportunists, but the vapidity of the bankers and governments gave them their chance. There was no dearth of social science at the time either. Hard choices were available, but cowardice and cluelessness ruled the day.
This book was recommended by one of the finance channels I watch. While somewhat interesting from a nuts-and-bolts perspective, the elites of Europe clearly learned nothing from the First World War. The American elites can "maybe" be forgiven for being clueless; the Europeans cannot. Hitler and Goebbels were only second-rate opportunists, but the vapidity of the bankers and governments gave them their chance. There was no dearth of social science at the time either. Hard choices were available, but cowardice and cluelessness ruled the day.
May 26, 2025
Straumann details the financial, political, and social crisis that severely weakened Weimar Germany and brought the previously obscure Hitler to public prominence. There were certainly steps both the German government and the international community could have taken to alleviate the crisis earlier but few if any world leaders understood the seriousness of the situation and tended to overemphasize minor signs of recovery and stability while prioritizing their own national interests.
January 4, 2024
Great journey across the time that spans from Versailles Treaty and the vexatious conditions imposed upon Germany, the struggle of the debt-laden Weimar Republic to juggle between debt servicing and maintenance of decent standard of living at home, and the austerity measures needed to pay back the war reparations which brought about the rise of Hitler.
November 15, 2024
Cursory overview of German economic crisis
The book provides a high level overview re: the economic conditions in Germany in the early 1930s. But much of the text focuses on political events (e.g., negotiations between German leaders and other countries) with less focus on the underlying economic conditions. I was looking for more details on the economic history.
The book provides a high level overview re: the economic conditions in Germany in the early 1930s. But much of the text focuses on political events (e.g., negotiations between German leaders and other countries) with less focus on the underlying economic conditions. I was looking for more details on the economic history.
March 24, 2020
While I found this book both illuminating and persuasive, I cannot help but feel that the play-by-play style that the author relies on does more to complicate things than it clears up. The minute details of the financial discussions tend to run together, at a certain point.
August 16, 2020
This was a very interesting look at the crisis that led to the rise of Hitler. I enjoyed the in depth look at the mismanagement of the the aftermath of the treaty of Versailles, and how that led to the economic collapse of Germany.
May 3, 2021
A bit dull / slow in parts, but a very thorough account of the economic and political issues (and their linkages) that plagued the final years of the Weimar Republic. Politicians of the 21st century should pay heed to their mistakes lest they cause history to rhyme yet again.
June 17, 2024
A very well written, easy to understand account of the events of 1931 against the background of the German war reparations crisis, the Great Depression and the rise of the Nazis. Suitable for readers who already have a general knowledge of the period and would like to go into more detail.
January 2, 2026
I am not sure why our society never tells us how Germany got to the economic situation in where a small political faction out voted large democratic parties.
If you don't know yourself, honestly, the book peeks into that blackbox that allowed such a thing.
If you don't know yourself, honestly, the book peeks into that blackbox that allowed such a thing.
December 27, 2020
As one who is mostly interested in the church response and lack of response to nazism it was very interesting to follow the economics behind much of the crisis.
October 4, 2021
Not bad and not actually boring. Describes the lead up to when Hitler became chancellor in the context of the debt that Germany owed the allies after WW1.
January 6, 2022
Great piece of history.
May 4, 2023
Fascinating and detailed
March 2, 2024
Very interesting especially in these times
May 7, 2025
A tough (I'm woefully ignorant about economics) but worthwhile read.
Displaying 1 - 29 of 29 reviews