It is disappointing that McMaster's book does not live up to its potential in providing the level of insight into America's current national security challenges as his previous book shows he is capable of. McMaster's introduction starts off with several fundamental flaws. First, he has largely adopted the conventional wisdom of a group of centrist, security-oriented commentators and officials regarding national security threats. For example, McMaster repeats the conventional wisdom that the Obama Administration should have attacked Syria in 2013 in response to Assad's use of chemical weapons in suggesting that the US had stepped back from doing enough to assert its national interests abroad. Like other writers, McMaster ignores that the US public, the international community, and Congress all did not support the strikes and that the US was ultimately successful at eliminating the vast majority of Assad's chemical weapons. The notion that the US should only care about civilians who are killed by chemical weapons, and not respond when they are shot, bombed, burned, tortured, etc, has always been absurd and McMaster fails to take the opportunity to examine why the political climate in the US failed to lend Obama the backing to engage in acts of war in Syria. This shortsightedness and repetition of conventional wisdom is a common theme throughout McMaster's book.
McMaster's criticism of Obama, echoing the conventional wisdom of others, also falls short on the withdrawal from Iraq and the Iran nuclear deal. Obama ended the combat mission in 2010 and withdrew all US forces in 2011 in accordance with the Bush Administration's withdrawal plan, not in accordance with Obama's stated campaign pledge, and Obama ran into the same problems that Bush had. These included a lack of domestic support in the US, with Bush officials still in denial about their ineptitude in starting and waging the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in Iraq, which refused to support a Status of Forces Agreement that would give American soldiers immunity from local law for official actions that resulted in the death of Iraqis and destruction of Iraqi property. That Iraq would adopt this stance is unsurprising given the events at Abu Ghraib and high-profile issues with military contractors, like Blackwater. How could Obama have convinced Iraq to concede on the SOFA issue? McMaster does not say, much less mention this fundamental problem. Also, in a problem that occurs throughout the book, McMaster fails to reconcile the degree to which the US should remain committed to international problems when our partners, the Iraqis, remain uncommitted to fixing issues related to sectarianism, for example. On the Iran Nuclear Deal, McMaster does not consider what the alternative to a flawed deal would have been. Should the US have made sent credible signals of a commitment to military action, risking civilian casualties and reaffirming false views of American militarism? McMaster also fails to consider Iran's point of view, a major shortfall in a book recommending strategic empathy, and the country's desire to remain sovereign, if authoritarian, in the face of a US committed to overthrowing world leaders, like Qaddafi, and facing an Israel and US publicly committed to attacking Iran's nuclear capabilities.
This incident, and many other parts of McMaster's book, betray a failure to understand how domestic politics influences international relations. It should not be controversial that a US president did not commit acts of war, risking civilian casualties and greater involvement, without the support of the public, Congress, or allies. McMaster also selectively ignores how domestic politics regarding trade and finance complicate the US's ability to respond to Chinese human rights abuses and assertiveness and how Russia's economic weakness and distance from the US make complicate broad-based and more assertive actions against Putin.
A second fundamental flaw of McMaster's book is that he decides not to directly criticize the failures of action and inaction of the Trump Administration. McMaster rightly calls out Russia's election interference and points out that Trump Administration responded to Russian actions with meaningful measures, but does not as carefully examine Trump's own attitudes towards Russia and how those views negatively affected US national security policy. McMaster ultimately chooses to ignore the views of Trump and instead pretends that the actions damaging to US national security did not happen by attributing the hard work of level-headed bureaucrats and political appointees, including McMaster, to control Trump's worst impulses.
The most insightful parts are those about Iraq and, to a less degree, Afghanistan, where McMaster spent substantial amounts of time. A more conventional memoir would have focused on McMaster's own career before eventually describing how the hard-won lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan influenced his thinking on China, Russia, and other issues when he oversaw them on the National Security Council.
Lastly, the paradoxes of this book cannot go unexamined. McMaster criticizes the Obama Administration for not being strong enough on national security and alludes to the idea that Obama was more interested in apologizing for America's past mistakes, but his core premise is that the US needs to shift from strategic narcissism to strategic empathy. He suggests the US needs to credibly reassure allies, but fails to critically examine the Trump Administration's withdrawal from TPP, Paris, and the Iran Nuclear Deal, agreements supported by every country in the region, every country on the planet, and every major ally, respectively. McMaster also fails to critically examine Trump's disparagement of NATO, Korea, and Japan and Trump's fondness for dictators like Putin. Notably, McMaster wears his historian hat proudly in examining the past and context of US foreign policy throughout the world, but he fails as an academic in providing evidence in the form of contemporary speeches, documents, or even memoirs to back up his view of US strategic narcissism from the 90s to very recently. Past presidential administrations were surely optimistic following the Cold War, but McMaster's is a very bold claim that Administration after Administration put optimism over reality. In one weird segment, McMaster describes how the US withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Deal unsurprisingly led to Iran increasing its military activity in the region while suggesting that the US should be prepared to enact even tougher sanctions and threaten military action. In doing so, McMaster describes his own self-fulfilling prophecy, begging the question as to why he did not pursue a different policy in the first place.
McMaster also fails to appreciate the difficulty of making and implementing successful foreign policy, and how to judge success. George W. Bush hired some of the most experienced policy-makers in Republican circles, yet got the US bogged down in two unsuccessful wars. It is also worthwhile to point out that Bush's tough stance on North Korea did not deter Kim from detonating a nuclear device in 2006 or from successive rounds of escalation. While Obama may not have had policies that worked perfectly, a politician like Obama appreciates the fact that the problems that the National Security Council is asked to deal with are the ones that could not be solved at lower levels in the bureaucracy or by assistant and deputy assistant secretaries in the political hierarchy. The problems of national security involve investments and probability in an attempt to solve challenging dilemmas. The US could make a heavy investment in missile defense and military deployments to deter Iran and North Korea, but would be spending money to prevent wars that may never have happened anyway while giving up the cost to buy down risk in other conflicts or invest in domestic political priorities. Additionally, military deployments, and other complementary policies, do not ensure that Iran or North Korea will not continue provocative actions, but merely attempt to deter such actions while being postured to defend against them. At the same time, the classic security dilemma (military spending on one side increases military spending on the other side, and offensive capabilities are often indistinguishable from defensive ones), teaches us that states like Iran and North Korea may increase their desire for nuclear weapons or advanced military equipment. Indeed, North Korea made its biggest gains towards nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles after being labeled part of Bush's "Axis of Evil." Iran bought Russia's S-300 missile defense system following threats from the US and Israel to bomb Iranian facilities. The US may see the purchase of the S-300 as a provocative act meant to provide cover for an illicit nuclear program, but ignoring that the purchase would have made sense to Iran in the face of direct threats from foreign countries to bomb its sovereign territory is shortsighted.
Ultimately McMaster trades one form of strategic narcissism for another while ignoring his own advice to pursue a national strategy backed by fundamental American values and strategic empathy. McMaster assumes that US allies can be forced to adhere to American national interests, that the US government can pursue tough and militaristic foreign policies without domestic and foreign political audience costs, and, most importantly, that a strategy of sanctions and military threat will work, rather than reinforce adversary's resolve to protect their interests by pursuing nuclear weapons or engaging in provocative action. It is tragic that McMaster chose to write a flawed book rather than reflect on his deep experience and let his lessons arise from his own interactions with history.