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Latecomer State Formation: Political Geography and Capacity Failure in Latin America
A major contribution to the field of comparative state formation and the scholarship on long-term political development of Latin America
“Ambitious and rich. . . . A sweeping and general theory of state formation and detailed historical reconstruction of essential events in Latin American political development. It combines structural elements with a novel emphasis on the political incentives and bargaining that shaped the map we have today.”—Hillel David Soifer, Governance
Latin American governments systematically fail to provide the key public goods for their societies to prosper. Sebastián Mazzuca argues that the secret of Latin America’s failure is that its states were “born weak,” in contrast to states in western Europe, North America, and Japan. State formation in post-Independence Latin America occurred in a period when capitalism, rather than war, was the key driver forging countries. In pursuing the short-term benefits of international trade, Latin American leaders created states with chronic weaknesses, notably patrimonial administrations and dysfunctional regional combinations. Mazzuca analyzes pathways leading to variations in country size and level of “port-led” state formation in Argentina and Brazil; “party-led” in Mexico, Colombia, and Uruguay; and “lord-led” in Central America, Venezuela, and Peru.
“Ambitious and rich. . . . A sweeping and general theory of state formation and detailed historical reconstruction of essential events in Latin American political development. It combines structural elements with a novel emphasis on the political incentives and bargaining that shaped the map we have today.”—Hillel David Soifer, Governance
Latin American governments systematically fail to provide the key public goods for their societies to prosper. Sebastián Mazzuca argues that the secret of Latin America’s failure is that its states were “born weak,” in contrast to states in western Europe, North America, and Japan. State formation in post-Independence Latin America occurred in a period when capitalism, rather than war, was the key driver forging countries. In pursuing the short-term benefits of international trade, Latin American leaders created states with chronic weaknesses, notably patrimonial administrations and dysfunctional regional combinations. Mazzuca analyzes pathways leading to variations in country size and level of “port-led” state formation in Argentina and Brazil; “party-led” in Mexico, Colombia, and Uruguay; and “lord-led” in Central America, Venezuela, and Peru.
464 pages, Hardcover
Published May 11, 2021
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
November 6, 2024
In this book, the political scientist Sebastian Mazzuca offers a narrative of the formation of continental Latin American states.
According to him, different politicians and military leaders—who were either rural warlords or city-based, largely coastal power brokers—were able to piece together or tear apart nascent republics (and a few monarchies) in an era defined largely by interstate peace externally secured by Britain and the rise of foreign finance and global markets. This process, he contends, should not be viewed teleologically with the current political map being seen as "natural", and not in need of explanation. On the contrary, he is very persuasive in showing how fluid the political situation was for several decades after Spanish and Portuguese authority had all but waned. There were several breakaway states (famously Texas, but many more), proposed confederations, and city states. What enabled the current configuration depended greatly on the willingness of areas to form cohesive economic units, military balances of power, and the capacity to bribe weaker or more peripheral warlords into at least a surface-level acceptance of rule by the capital. These bribes and patchwork arrangements are essentially blamed for the weak state capacity compared to Europe.
When it comes to the economic and fiscal aspects of state-formation, I was initially sceptical of Mazzuca's take. He stresses the way a tax base which relied on customs/tariff revenue was not conducive to the development of state capacity. He claims that accumulating customs revenue is relatively easy as it only requires effective control of the port. Compared to something like a land tax or direct taxation of income, it is true that collecting tariffs is relatively less demanding for authorities and is less likely to prompt resistance. Nevertheless, it's also true that many states relied on those exact revenues as they became more capacious—the early United States and 18th century Britain being two examples.
Where I found Mazzuca more persuasive later was his view that generating customs revenue was tightly connected to the desire to maintain internal peace to offer sufficient security for foreign investors. To produce commodities for export, Latin American countries desperately needed foreign capital to finance ports, railroads, and other relevant infrastructure. Capital was also needed for the many mines and plantations. This is indeed a substantial difference compared to the US and UK, where domestic capital and public investment had a much larger role in infrastructure provision. The need for foreign capital thus lent itself to the hardening of corrupt bargains and protection rackets struck with provincial bosses, if only to keep the peace and allow trade to flow. So instead of stressing the tariffs aspect, I think Mazzuca's argument makes more sense when seen as a holistic process meant to encourage the preservation of high international flows—of both export revenues and capital.
In the end, I thought this was a fascinating framework to examine Latin America's 19th century history. There really is something valuable in Mazzuca's theory. Yet with all this said, I wonder if he underappreciated the relevance of the 20th and 21st centuries when he claims this history endowed the region with relatively low-capacity states. After all, in more recent times urbanization and technological change have reshaped the region as well as the state. Instead of having effective control over outlying rural areas, problems of urban governance and service provision started to become much more significant. A "regional bargains" has much less to say about this.
According to him, different politicians and military leaders—who were either rural warlords or city-based, largely coastal power brokers—were able to piece together or tear apart nascent republics (and a few monarchies) in an era defined largely by interstate peace externally secured by Britain and the rise of foreign finance and global markets. This process, he contends, should not be viewed teleologically with the current political map being seen as "natural", and not in need of explanation. On the contrary, he is very persuasive in showing how fluid the political situation was for several decades after Spanish and Portuguese authority had all but waned. There were several breakaway states (famously Texas, but many more), proposed confederations, and city states. What enabled the current configuration depended greatly on the willingness of areas to form cohesive economic units, military balances of power, and the capacity to bribe weaker or more peripheral warlords into at least a surface-level acceptance of rule by the capital. These bribes and patchwork arrangements are essentially blamed for the weak state capacity compared to Europe.
When it comes to the economic and fiscal aspects of state-formation, I was initially sceptical of Mazzuca's take. He stresses the way a tax base which relied on customs/tariff revenue was not conducive to the development of state capacity. He claims that accumulating customs revenue is relatively easy as it only requires effective control of the port. Compared to something like a land tax or direct taxation of income, it is true that collecting tariffs is relatively less demanding for authorities and is less likely to prompt resistance. Nevertheless, it's also true that many states relied on those exact revenues as they became more capacious—the early United States and 18th century Britain being two examples.
Where I found Mazzuca more persuasive later was his view that generating customs revenue was tightly connected to the desire to maintain internal peace to offer sufficient security for foreign investors. To produce commodities for export, Latin American countries desperately needed foreign capital to finance ports, railroads, and other relevant infrastructure. Capital was also needed for the many mines and plantations. This is indeed a substantial difference compared to the US and UK, where domestic capital and public investment had a much larger role in infrastructure provision. The need for foreign capital thus lent itself to the hardening of corrupt bargains and protection rackets struck with provincial bosses, if only to keep the peace and allow trade to flow. So instead of stressing the tariffs aspect, I think Mazzuca's argument makes more sense when seen as a holistic process meant to encourage the preservation of high international flows—of both export revenues and capital.
In the end, I thought this was a fascinating framework to examine Latin America's 19th century history. There really is something valuable in Mazzuca's theory. Yet with all this said, I wonder if he underappreciated the relevance of the 20th and 21st centuries when he claims this history endowed the region with relatively low-capacity states. After all, in more recent times urbanization and technological change have reshaped the region as well as the state. Instead of having effective control over outlying rural areas, problems of urban governance and service provision started to become much more significant. A "regional bargains" has much less to say about this.
October 3, 2021
When you thought that the tradition of Barrington Moore, Charles Tilly and Perry Anderson was dying, this book revives it with an extra layer of analytical clarity. The author is a master in all traditions in social theory and the book is probably the best book on Latin America. It identifies deep structures with unique historical erudition and paramount analytical sharpness.
September 11, 2024
Mazzuca hace una contribución interesante a las teorías sobre la formación del estado y de sus capacidades. En un libro muy ambicioso hace un gran ejercicio de política comparada en la región distinguiendo distintos tipos ideales sobre como ocurrió la consolidación de los estados. Es una contribución importante la distinción que hace entre capacidades estatales y la formación del estado. En este sentido es un libro que quizá es "neo-weberiano".
No obstante, me parece que en el afán de crear dicha taxonomía y un modelo general, se simplifica demasiado. En el caso particular de México hay sucesos históricos que no son tomados en cuenta o interpretados de manera correcta y que por ende llevan a conclusiones que no son completamente ciertas. Mi conocimiento sobre la formación de los estados en otros países de la región no es suficiente para comentar si esta simplificación es un problema generalizado. Otro aspecto que es problemático es el uso del concepto de causalidad tal como lo entendemos en las ciencias sociales sin mostrar empíricamente dicha causalidad, es decir en momentos se hacen aseveraciones causales usando el lenguaje de las ciencias sociales pero sin acompañarlos de demostraciones de dichas causalidades (sean econométricas o de otro tipo), esto es problemático porque un lector que haga una lectura poco crítica podría pasar por ciertas cosas que son meramente conjeturas.
Creo que es un buen libro, lleno de provocaciones útiles para pensar el problema histórico de la formación de los estados en América Latina.
No obstante, me parece que en el afán de crear dicha taxonomía y un modelo general, se simplifica demasiado. En el caso particular de México hay sucesos históricos que no son tomados en cuenta o interpretados de manera correcta y que por ende llevan a conclusiones que no son completamente ciertas. Mi conocimiento sobre la formación de los estados en otros países de la región no es suficiente para comentar si esta simplificación es un problema generalizado. Otro aspecto que es problemático es el uso del concepto de causalidad tal como lo entendemos en las ciencias sociales sin mostrar empíricamente dicha causalidad, es decir en momentos se hacen aseveraciones causales usando el lenguaje de las ciencias sociales pero sin acompañarlos de demostraciones de dichas causalidades (sean econométricas o de otro tipo), esto es problemático porque un lector que haga una lectura poco crítica podría pasar por ciertas cosas que son meramente conjeturas.
Creo que es un buen libro, lleno de provocaciones útiles para pensar el problema histórico de la formación de los estados en América Latina.
July 19, 2024
If there were a Nobel Prize in Political Science, this book should make its author earn it. Genius.
March 25, 2026
Me gustó el argumento principal y la distinción entre fundación y construcción del Estado.
March 9, 2026
The counterfactual history puzzles at the center of this project are very interesting: what if / why didn't Mexico, Argentina, Brazil break up into smaller states despite secessionist impulses. As social science it's a mess: there are so many cells in the typology, it can feel like theorizing from cases. Might pull a chapter for my class.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews