An informed modern plan for post-2020 American foreign policy that avoids the opposing dangers of retrenchment and overextension
“A masterful examination of past American grand strategy and foreign policies. A compelling, thoughtful, and thought-provoking proposal of a new grand strategy by one of America’s foremost writers and thinkers on U.S. defense, foreign policy, and geopolitics.” —General David Petraeus, U.S. Army (Ret.)
Russia and China are both believed to have “grand strategies”—detailed sets of national security goals backed by means, and plans, to pursue them. In the United States, policymakers have tried to articulate similar concepts but have failed to reach a widespread consensus since the Cold War ended. While the United States has been the world’s prominent superpower for over a generation, much American thinking has oscillated between the extremes of isolationist agendas versus interventionist and overly assertive ones.
Drawing on historical precedents and weighing issues such as Russia’s resurgence, China’s great rise, North Korea’s nuclear machinations, and Middle East turmoil, Michael O’Hanlon presents a well‑researched, ethically sound, and politically viable vision for American national security policy. He also proposes complementing the Pentagon’s set of “4+1” pre‑existing threats with a new “4+1”: biological, nuclear, digital, climatic, and internal dangers.
Michael Edward O'Hanlon (born 1961) is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. He began his career as a budget analyst in the defense field.
O'Hanlon's latest book offers loads of sensible policy prescriptions as well as an interesting critical reflection on American foreign policy more broadly. In his telling, Washington needs to avoid overextending itself and reprioritize its mission overseas. Unfortunately, in my view, that does not include a full rebalancing of strategic attention away from the Middle East and towards Asia (where great power competition with China will dominate the 21st century), making his vision outdated in my view. I was also somewhat flummoxed to see the word "restraint" in the title of his book, which initially drew me in. What O'Hanlon advocates in the book is essentially a preservation of the status quo with forward deployed forces overseas and the maintenance of existing American treaty alliances. In his view, restraint means not expanding on existing US alliance commitments. But that's not really restraint, nor offshore balancing (which often gets conflated with restraint). I appreciate that he's trying to reclaim the term, but I don't think the book fully accounts for just how status quo the policy recommendations advanced are. I also appreciated O'Hanlon's critique of strategies of deterrence by denial. In his telling, such an aggressive form of deterrence is overly ambitious. Washington can no longer deter China from occupying artificial islands in the South China Sea, for instance. That's why he says that deterrence by punishment is more realistic, and I agree. So perhaps there is more to his conceptualization of restraint than I at first acknowledged. Above all, I liked O'Hanlon's fiscal policy recommendations, which balanced a need for continued spending on the defense budget (which he wants to see capped but not diminished) along with guarantees for social services like healthcare, education, and research and development (R&D). That fits well with a progressive foreign policy, and I would say makes this book a welcome departure from O'Hanlon's usual rather milquetoast form of centrism. On the whole, a sound book if a bit broad and lacking depth in certain areas. In other areas, as noted with regard to the federal budget, the depth of O'Hanlon's knowledge is remarkable and marks him as a genuine jack of all trades type scholar.
This book is primarily written as a prescription for policies and an overall approach to US national security. It delves into recent government efforts in reform, diagnoses issues, and offers corroborated opinions from analytics and thought leaders on better ideas, approaches, and policies that Presidents or Congress can take to make US more secure in national security. This book does not contain war stories or much historical strategic analysis.
I respect the intellectual effort behind this book, which is filled with prescriptions, predictions, and policies that can become irrelevant over time or with a change in administration. Not an easy feat.
The author's primary doctrine argued in this work: is focused on effective modern national defense at current spending levels, as well as exercising restraint in its use. He emphasizes the need for clear war powers usage by Congress, personnel and manpower policy improvements, a streamlined acquisition process, and financial accountability. All good things and well-researched policies.
Important for me: The author's political values differ from mine, I was drawn to this book to challenge my assumptions and gain insights from a different perspective. I find it concerning that some readers only accept ideas from those who align with them politically, disregarding any concept or work that doesn't match their own leanings. This approach is intolerable to me.
That being said, I acknowledge the flawed concepts in this book. I disagree with the inclusion of climate change and other environmental issues in national defense strategy. I also don't see the relevance of general welfare and other domestic spending to grand strategy. The author's criticism of Trump is mostly valid and substantiated. Notwithstanding, he does acknowledge favorable policies advanced by the Trump administration in the realm of national security and military action.
I wonder if the author would reconsider some of the concepts in this book in light of the Biden administration's catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban's takeover, or the soft approach taken by the Obama administration towards Russia-Ukraine and the subsequent 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The latter half of the book less appealing to me due to the author's alignment with the current administration, which undermines the key defense and strategy principles advocated in the book. This detracted from its overall merit.
Overall, I greatly appreciate many of the policies and prescriptions advocated by the author, and I feel enlightened by them. However, considering the incompetence displayed by the Biden administration (greater than that of Obama or Trump), I believe this book is somewhat outdated and less relevant in certain aspects.
PS -- I do wish to read more works by this author, especially his most recent on Military History. I was drawn to him by an interview he gave on my favorite podcast: School of War.
The Art of War in an Age of Peace: US Grand Strategy and Resolute Restraint by Michael O'Hanlon is a plan for the United States in the modern era. Most of the content of this book is unobjectionable, providing sound policy advice that would appeal to Republicans and Democrats alike. His mission is to avoid over catastrophizing our relative decline, while preventing the opposite inclination to overextend our foreign policy commitments. He calls for resolute restraint, which appears to be a term to allow a half measure between retrenchment and maintaining an over commitment abroad. He argues for the United States to change some of its thinking about US Security, but overall this is a book to allow the US to adapt to the new status quo and raise questions about what type of position we should have in the world after over commitment and hawkishness failed. I would have preferred it if the book was a bit more imaginative, and a bit more willing to challenge the world as it is, but it is still a really good book with a low barrier to entry.
This book utterly collapsed after O’Hanlon’s Korea discussion. So disappointing. His resolute restraint concept is just a coined phrase for thoughtfulness before acting. There are far better books to consult in search of a US strategic positioning and approach. Keenan this is not.
Interesting analysis by writer before the pull out of Afghanistan and the Russian invasion of Ukraine so there is some stuff that is overcome by events.