We Shall Be Masters: Russian Pivots to East Asia from Peter the Great to Putin

by Chris Miller

An illuminating account of Russia’s attempts―and failures―to achieve great power status in Asia.

Since Peter the Great, Russian leaders have been lured by opportunity to the East. Under the tsars, Russians colonized Alaska, California, and Hawaii. The Trans-Siberian Railway linked Moscow to Vladivostok. And Stalin looked to Asia as a sphere of influence, hospitable to the spread of Soviet Communism. In Asia and the Pacific lay territory, markets, security, and glory.

But all these expansionist dreams amounted to little. In We Shall Be Masters , Chris Miller explores why, arguing that Russia’s ambitions have repeatedly outstripped its capacity. With the core of the nation concentrated thousands of miles away in the European borderlands, Russia’s would-be pioneers have always struggled to project power into Asia and to maintain public and elite interest in their far-flung pursuits. Even when the wider population professed faith in Asia’s promise, few Russians were willing to pay the steep price. Among leaders, too, dreams of empire have always been tempered by fears of cost. Most of Russia’s pivots to Asia have therefore been halfhearted and fleeting.

Today the Kremlin talks up the importance of “strategic partnership” with Xi Jinping’s China, and Vladimir Putin’s government is at pains to emphasize Russian activities across Eurasia. But while distance is covered with relative ease in the age of air travel and digital communication, the East remains far off in the ways that matter most. Miller finds that Russia’s Asian dreams are still restrained by the country’s firm rooting in Europe.

Genres: History, Russia, Politics, Nonfiction, China, Asia

384 pages, Hardcover

First published June 8, 2021

About the author

Chris Miller teaches International History at Fletcher School at Tufts University. He is also Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and Eurasia Research Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. (Source: Amazon.com)

Reviews

[Jackson Cho · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is an extremely easy to read big picture explanation of the history of Russia's relationship with East Asia. The book's thesis is that Russia periodically has grand plans for pivots to the East frequently as an economic frontier to open and later as an escape route for its European problems. There also remains a more romantic notion that as a nation spanning contiguously over two continents, it is destined to be as much a part of Asian affairs as it is European. Despite these notions, these pivots are both sporadic and rarely as rewarding as anticipated. The disappointments of these pivots create a backlash always return Russia back to a European focus despite constant talk of Russia being a Eurasian or Asian power. While it was written before the invasion of Ukraine, it does talk about Putin's Asian pivots and the problems that will inevitably be associated with it.

The main one seems to be an unfortunate trade deficit that is forming. Besides oil and natural resources, China doesn't really buy much else from Russia and they certainly aren't investing in Russia's Far East. At the end of the day, investors do not see Russia as a good investment opportunity, people don't want to move in these sparsely populated regions, and the Far East even today remain closer to the "military camp" described by early settlers. Yet it seems more then ever that Russia is being cut off from the West and will need to pivot to the East. With unprecedented levels of sanctions and animosity from its traditional playground, Russia may find that it's latest Asian pivot will determine whether it will survive as a major force in the 21st century. The thesis of We Shall Be Masters would suggest that if Russia succeeds at this, it would be a first in its long and storied history with the East.

While at times, I desired more details on individual incidents, the book does not dwell too long on small matters over the broader understanding the topic of how Russia engaged with the East. I highly recommend We Shall Be Masters for those wanting to learn more about this fascinating subject.

[Reed Hasson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great read and introduction on the cyclical nature of Russias interest in Asia. Told through the lives of a dozen russian diplomats and leaders, provides a not dry insight into the relations and mistakes that Russia continues to make. Definitely missing some key analysis such as the Vietnam war or expansions of the central Asian republics but a great history of the Asian side of a Eurasian Russia that also provides a lens into how russians viewed Asian history as they were bystanders or active participants

[Dylan Jones · Rating 3 out of 5]

Came across this in the library looking for another book, and Chris Miller been popping up lately so I thought I'd check this out.

Emphasis in the title is really the plural "pivots" because, as Miller demonstrates, Russia decides to call itself an Eastern Power and shift its money / army / geopolitical attention towards northeast Asia almost cyclically over 300 years. Having come across Baranov and Russia's Alaska Company in a few other books, I found this read relatively boring. The more exotic places the Russians tried to colonize like the Yili Valley or Kashgar and even Kauai in Hawaii were fascinating, but ultimately futile and repetitive. Miller wants to emphasize the folly in territorial land grabs by the Russian/Soviet empires, and it does become a bit grating to read.

The obnoxiously unanswered question in all of Russian expansion is why? Why, when you have established nearly useless ports in Vladivostok and the Sea of Okhostk, do you need Manchuria? Or Korea? The delusional ambitions of Przhevalsky, Nicholas II, Stalin, Brezhnev, and probably Putin are consistently based on the equation land = security. Clearly not, and it is refreshing that more flexible statesmen like Nevelskoy, Witte, Kruschev, and Gorbachev see the value in the far east as coming from trade and positive relations, specifically against encirclement by the Americans. Russian militarization of the border with China consistently drains its economy, leads to zero economic development, and more often than not poisons relations with Japan, China, Korea, and other potential Asian allies. The invasion of Afghanistan stands out as a uniquely disastrous own-goal that probably ensured the Soviets were never going to get bailed out by Asia when the economy collapsed a decade later.

Overall this felt like a slog, mainly due to the rapid pacing. Content is very good and I liked the second half more, but I'm increasingly wary of books that pick a good theme and somewhat nerf it by analyzing it over too large a span of time. Couldn't get a good rhythm.

[Mark Kagan]

h/t Boris