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Feeling Like It: A Theory of Inclination and Will
You may have an inclination to do it, but there is still a moment when you can decide to do it or not. This "moment of drama" is more puzzling than it first appears. When you are inclined to do something, are you related to your inclination as rider to horse? As ruler to subject? As thinker to thoughts? Schapiro shows that these familiar pictures fail to confront the central puzzle. Inclinations are motives with respect to which we are distinctively passive. But to be motivated is to be active—to be self-moved. How can you be passive in relation to your own activity? Schapiro puts forward an "inner animal" view, inspired by Kant, which holds that when you are merely inclined to act, the instinctive part of yourself is already active, while the rest of you is not. At this moment, your will is at a crossroads. You can humanize your inclination, or you can dehumanize yourself. Feeling Like It provides a concise and accessible investigation of a new problem at the intersection of ethics, philosophy of action, and philosophy of mind.
- GenresPhilosophy
208 pages, ebook
Published April 18, 2021
19 people want to read
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
May 1, 2023
This book has some interesting insights. The most interesting of which had to do with Schapiro’s approach to the subject of inclination which she calls the “Kantian Method”. This is a method that explores a phenomenon from the standpoint of a participator in an activity rather than from a removed, detached angle. For example, one could try to define and describe judgement by observing how people judge.But another way is to be someone who judges and see what is required of you from that standpoint. In that sense, you are not describing the world like a scientist but figuring out how you should go about doing such an activity. I think expanding on this method could be a book in itself and it could appeal to all kinds of interesting thinkers throughout history (e.g. the german idealists and the phenomenologists). Interesting stuff.
How this method comes to work out on Schapiro’s part is hit or miss. She clearly has an interesting view and she is trying to say something new which will serve to answer what was previously unclear in regard to inclinations. But I just find her points to be very vague and unclear sometimes. The Inner Animal View can feel too metaphorical and while she tries to address that worry, I am not sure she managed to persuade me.
She wants to remain neutral on takes in action theory (in fact, she thinks this is something good about her view) but she leaves open a whole bunch of mysteries. She seems to imply that the inner animal can act but then switches to talking about it like it simply has ‘activity’. These are not equivalent. A further explanation of how some activities can be agential in nature without outright being actions would have been beneficial. As of now, I remain puzzled.
In the section on the weakness of will, she claims acting out of weakness of will is doing something “close to acting without engaging the will” (Pg. 152, FN 13) She then follows this up by saying: “…there is a sense in which we are acting without doing anything” (pg. 152, FN 13). So, when we do something CLOSE TO ACTING ‘there is a sense’ WE ARE ACTING without doing something? Doesn’t that seem sort of contradictory? How can we do something close to acting which is in a sense acting? What is this sense? I have a sort of vague feeling of what she is trying to get at here but she never sits down and explains these tensions (and it feels like comments like this one appear a lot in the book). She uses the term “in a sense” or “there is a sense” a lot without filling in what these ‘senses’ are. Again, I feel as though I can get the gist of her point but I never feel like I get a clear picture of how it all actually works. It feels as though the book was building up to answer some of these lingering questions (as they keep piling up) and then it just ends abruptly.
I think this book is worth a read if you’re into moral psychology and Kantian perspectives in practical thought. However, be prepared to finish it with unanswered questions.
How this method comes to work out on Schapiro’s part is hit or miss. She clearly has an interesting view and she is trying to say something new which will serve to answer what was previously unclear in regard to inclinations. But I just find her points to be very vague and unclear sometimes. The Inner Animal View can feel too metaphorical and while she tries to address that worry, I am not sure she managed to persuade me.
She wants to remain neutral on takes in action theory (in fact, she thinks this is something good about her view) but she leaves open a whole bunch of mysteries. She seems to imply that the inner animal can act but then switches to talking about it like it simply has ‘activity’. These are not equivalent. A further explanation of how some activities can be agential in nature without outright being actions would have been beneficial. As of now, I remain puzzled.
In the section on the weakness of will, she claims acting out of weakness of will is doing something “close to acting without engaging the will” (Pg. 152, FN 13) She then follows this up by saying: “…there is a sense in which we are acting without doing anything” (pg. 152, FN 13). So, when we do something CLOSE TO ACTING ‘there is a sense’ WE ARE ACTING without doing something? Doesn’t that seem sort of contradictory? How can we do something close to acting which is in a sense acting? What is this sense? I have a sort of vague feeling of what she is trying to get at here but she never sits down and explains these tensions (and it feels like comments like this one appear a lot in the book). She uses the term “in a sense” or “there is a sense” a lot without filling in what these ‘senses’ are. Again, I feel as though I can get the gist of her point but I never feel like I get a clear picture of how it all actually works. It feels as though the book was building up to answer some of these lingering questions (as they keep piling up) and then it just ends abruptly.
I think this book is worth a read if you’re into moral psychology and Kantian perspectives in practical thought. However, be prepared to finish it with unanswered questions.
Displaying 1 of 1 review