You may have an inclination to do it, but there is still a moment when you can decide to do it or not. This "moment of drama" is more puzzling than it first appears. When you are inclined to do something, are you related to your inclination as rider to horse? As ruler to subject? As thinker to thoughts? Schapiro shows that these familiar pictures fail to confront the central puzzle. Inclinations are motives with respect to which we are distinctively passive. But tobe motivated is to be active—to be self-moved. How can you be passive in relation to your own activity? Schapiro puts forward an "inner animal" view, inspired by Kant, which holds that when you are merely inclined to act, the instinctive part of yourself is already active, while the rest of you isnot. At this moment, your will is at a crossroads. You can humanize your inclination, or you can dehumanize yourself. Feeling Like It provides a concise and accessible investigation of a new problem at the intersection of ethics, philosophy of action, and philosophy of mind.
one has inclinations, sometimes feel it’s alien, sometimes follow its opinion, whats important is that one always tend to follow her inclinations, rather than not. So a good theory of inclination captures three characteristics above. The Brute force view see inclinations too like something that happens, and the Practical reasoning view sees it too like something that one does. Schapiro invites us to think about the human dilemma: there are often moments when I feel like to do something, but I haven't done it yet, because I have an Inner animal, and the decision to follow or not is the decision to take the freedom