A tease of book: tantalizing, frustrating, ends with a kiss that could be so much more.
Hugging a relatively conventional environmental history are a series of chapters that lay out and flirt with a potentially interesting series of arguments. But the book doesn't do more than touch on these.
The book opens with a prologue and introduction that take up the first fifty pages of the book--a book that is less than three hundred pages; indeed, the central narrative runs only about 175 pages more before two concluding chapters. It is these four parts, and not the six body chapters that bring the excitement.
The prologue lays out what it means to (possibly) be living in the anthropocene. That is to say, in a geological epoch that is marked most significantly by the actions of humans: by the animals we drive to extinction (and those we subsidize), by the pollen of our crops that coat the earth, and by the climate that we have decidedly altered. If ever there was a division between humans and nature--this is not clear, and Purdy hedges it: it's one of those topics I wish he had explored more--there no longer is.
For Purdy, this revolution in the understanding of nature is one of three important revolutions. The others are the collapse in the belief of a politics that is natural and an economics that follows natural laws. We now must confront that politics, economics, and nature are all our creations, and our responsibility. It's an open question whether humans will bother to pick up their responsibility. Purdy understands that his book is written at a time when there's no indication that humans are ready to do so--that there is no concept of "we." Her hopes his book might nudge the world toward burdening themselves with their responsibility.
I am more pessimistic than him, though, given all the different things humans are responsible for creating-terrorism, inequality, certain forms of disease, etc.,--that we have refused to deal with. We continue to naturalize these problems. Purdy's hope is that we stop using nature as a normative term altogether. From his lips to God's ears.
Our responsibilities begin, as Delmore Schwartz said, in our dreams--or what Purdy calls our imagination. Humans imagine certain ways of interacting with the natural world, and these imaginings our brought to fruition through laws, which create the landscapes in which we live. (There is a circuit, he says, between imagination, law, and landscape.) Consider the Midwest's division in square plots, he says, which came out of certain imagination and a certain legal regime. Not all landscapes, though, are so carefully created, and he admits that the landscape of his own youth--the Appalachia--is mostly ignored, created out of indifference.
Purdy has an admirably clear prose style, and the lawyer's predilection for categories. (He's a legal scholar.) And so he identifies four different imaginings that have shaped America--what he calls the Providential: that God was given to humankind and can be completed and made perfect through labor' the Romantic--in which certain sublime landscapes, particularly montane ones, are natural cathedrals for the spiritual development of the human self; the utilitarian--in which nature is a storehouse of goods for humans to be carefully managed by experts; and the ecological--in which nature is an intricate web that includes humans, the good and the ill both propagating through it.
In many ways, one can see these as close to Foucaltian epistemes, with one following the other--but never completely eradicating the previous, such that in the early 21st century we are the inheritors of all four, our politics about nature drawing on each of these strands. Each also has parts that are cut out--and ways in which the radical implications of the projects are stopped. The providential idea that characterized much of American action from its first discovery by Europeans into the early 19th century obviously ignored the place of Native Americans as well as the role of slaves in the economy and construction of the country.
The utilitarian view, which underwrote the conservation movement of the first half of the twentieth century ignored democracy and ceded political decisions to a cadre of experts, usually distant from the place where the actions were taken place. The Romantic vision ignored the environmental issues of everyday life--choosing to protect those places that became national parks and cites of vacations, but not the places where people lived all the time. The ecological vision, arising since the 1960s, has turned away from politics toward the market--borrowing from the conservation movement--without acknowledging that the act of pricing is political.
Inside each of these political moments were radical possibilities that were snubbed. The providential imagination could have been radical if it opened up democratic citizenship to a wider array of people and if it avoided naturalizing concepts such as property and rights. The Romantic vision turned away from the way their view could have connected humans to nature on the everyday level and instead opted for turning nature into a consumer object--someplace to visit was tourists.
The utilitarian vision promised to show that humans needed to take responsibility for the world that they created, but rather than pursuing that idea, vested the power in a few elites, who were mostly concerned over the loss of white men's privilege. Finally, the ecological vision has turned into making everything a continuous crisis, and has opted for market mechanisms over democratic ones. Indeed, Purdy sees two possible futures, a neoliberal one, that expands the already gaping global inequalities (climate change destroying the poor, while the rich are buffered) and a democratic one, in which a wider and wider array of people--and things?--involve themselves in politics to discuss the outcomes they want without naturalizing any of the answers.
This sets up a potentially interesting exploration of contemporary environmental politics--whether one buys into the anthropocene or not--but rather than follow up with a continuation of the argument, Purdy dips back into history to show the development of each of these ideas and their application via particular legal regimes. Which is ground that has been covered, a lot, over the last forty years by environmental historians. Admittedly,t hey didn't use his categories, but the story is well known by this point. But instead of building on what's come before, it feels as though Purdy is writing this book to bring legal scholars up to speed--even as he barely cites environmental historians (beyond Donald Worster and William Cronon).
I really wanted him to assume the history and move on, but it's not my book. He did tell the story with interesting enough details, but nothing here changes what environmental historians have been saying for twenty, thirty years.
Then we come to the last couple of chapters, where Purdy comes back to his argument. He is very vested in the idea that the only way to deal with the issues is politics. He cites Habermas here, but the argument reminds me more of another Marxist, Steven Vogel, whose Against Nature made many of the same arguments. And while I am uncomfortable with the conclusion, I also have to admit its wisdom.
My discomfort is really a form of narcissism. Politics sucks, I want to be above it, so I want a different way. But there really isn't another way. Politics is all we have.
And we have to be clear about our terms, which is where Purdy starts sketching in some interesting caveats to the democratic future he sees, but never develops them fully. (Oh those wasted 175 pages!) He is careful to stomp out any recourses to one thing or another being "natural" and therefore unchangeable: if nothing else, that's what the anthropocene teaches us, that we cannot use nature normatively. He is also appropriately skeptical of expertise--though he is not quite recursive enough on that, since the "debate" over climate change is also a debate over who counts as expertise.
He also pushes against the humanism inherent in his story--pointing toward recent work (Jane Bennet, e.g.) who want to broaden democracy to involve non-human actors --and wondering what our responsibilities to animals are--but these discussions are abbreviated and suggestive, not definitive. They are pointings toward essays, but not essays themselves.
They are teases.
Although I guess there are worse things to say about a book than that upon finishing you wanted more.