Cosa hanno in comune la Cina di Xi Jinping e la Russia di Vladimir Putin? Cosa sono gli Stati-civiltà? E perché la cosa dovrebbe preoccuparci? La seconda metà del XX secolo e il primo decennio del XXI secolo sono stati caratterizzati dall’affermazione dello Stato-nazione come forma di organizzazione politica per eccellenza e, a partire dalla caduta dell’URSS, dall’egemonia incontestata dell’Occidente sul mondo intero. Secondo la tesi resa celebre da Francis Fukuyama e da altri pensatori liberali, la fine della guerra fredda e il definitivo trionfo della democrazia liberale avevano aperto una fase finale di conclusione della storia in quanto tale e creato le condizioni per la costruzione di un “nuovo secolo americano” o quantomeno occidentale. Oggi, a trent’anni di distanza, quella tesi appare straordinariamente ingenua. Non solo l’ordine mondiale liberale è minacciato dall’ascesa di nuove superpotenze regionali o globali (o aspiranti tali) – come la Cina, la Russia e l’India, che rigettano più o meno esplicitamente l’universalismo occidentale, sia in campo economico-politico che in campo culturale e morale –, ma i valori liberali sono in crisi anche nello stesso Occidente, come testimonia la crescita di fenomeni populisti e neo-autoritari su entrambe le sponde dell’Atlantico. La vera particolarità della nostra epoca, però, secondo il filosofo politico Christopher Coker, è anche quella che ha ricevuto meno attenzioni: l’ascesa di una nuova entità politica intenzionata a sfidare il primato dello Stato-nazione e destinata a cambiare profondamente il mondo per come l’abbiamo conosciuto finora. Stiamo parlando dello “Stato-civiltà”: paesi, cioè, che non si caratterizzano solo per una certa omogeneità culturale o etnica, ma che si considerano delle vere e proprie civiltà a sé stanti, profondamente diverse dalla civiltà occidentale, che viene vista come una minaccia se non come un nemico vero e proprio. Coker si concentra in particolare sui due paesi che più di chiunque altro rivendicano questo titolo: la Cina di Xi Jinping e la Russia di Vladimir Putin. Due realtà che ormai non possiamo più ignorare: perché se è vero che Samuel Huntington aveva torto a sostenere che le civiltà sono necessariamente destinate a scontrarsi, è altrettanto vero che gli Stati-civiltà hanno alte probabilità di farlo.
«Questo libro mette brillantemente a fuoco uno dei temi più urgenti dei nostri giorni: qual è il futuro della civiltà (o meglio delle civiltà) nel mondo di oggi e di domani?». Nick Rengger, St Andrews University
There may have been an interesting book somewhere in here, but instead what has been published is closer to a gigantic stream-of-conscious ramble by an educated scholar of international relations and history. I read the whole thing but regrettably don't think I pulled even a single memorable thought from it. My edition also had several typos which is always a sure sign of a slapdash edit. A breezily written, sometimes charming, but ultimately disappointing work.
This is one of those books that ought to command our attention. It contains the seeds that are necessary to understand China's foreign policy and Russia's use of hybrid warfare. Underlying that, it begs the question: if the Westphalian system is failing, what may replace it? This is one of the larger questions of our times.
The western liberal democracies certainly feel as if they are in retreat, or at least in need of renewal. Whether this can be ascribed to terminal decline or just simply a process of updating remains to be seen. However, the populist surge, the rise of myopic nationalism, and the development of siege economies all point towards a very different world in the years to come. I am not entirely convinced by the argument of civilisational decline, and neither is the author. And yet if we are in a period of terminal decline, what other options are there?
The author argues that the China of Xi Jinping aspires to become a civilisational state. I think that he has a case. Much of Chinese policy can seem opaque when viewed through a Westphalian lens. Yet when through a Chinese lens, it makes perfect sense. For example, take the case of the BRI. This baffles many western strategists because it makes no sense in transactional terms. However, in terms of tributary diplomacy, it fits into a pattern of Chinese foreign policy that goes back for centuries. The concept of the civilisational state helps us to understand contemporary, and future, policy.
Another aspirant to become a civilisational state is the Russia of President Putin. The author is a bit sceptical of this claim. The desire of Russia, it is stated, is to establish a Eurasian civilisation, which Russia at it's head. There is more than a grain of truth to this view. The exercise of power by contemporary Russia contradicts the claim. The use of raw power to achieve national and factional objectives undermines the claim to be acting on behalf of a civilisation. Yet the core view helps us to understand why Russia feels itself the guardian of the Slavic civilisation, and why it feels compelled to act in it's near neighbourhood.
The book considers two other interesting contenders to be seen as civilisational states - India and ISIS. The claim by India to be a civilisational state is undermined by the absence of and Indian civilisation. There is an Indian culture, but that culture has such diverse origins from within the sub-continent that it is too much of a stretch to call it an Indian civilisation. The claim by ISIS to represent an Islamic civilisation is again undermined by the sheer diversity of experience and belief within that putative civilisation. It does beg the question of whether a religion could represent a civilisation, but it would be outside the scope of the book to give that question too deep a consideration.
The book is reasonably well written for an academic text. The arguments are presented clearly and are easy to follow. I was impressed by the scholarship of the author, who seems to have rasped his subject very well. This is definitely a specialist book, and one I can recommend to those who have an interest in this area.
Breezy, silly, erudite, even moralistic - more a of long essay than a serious argument. Suffused with the best of English irony, and full of wisdom, nostalgia and laments of a once-great power.
How substantive is the argument? Am not convinced of it, or rather his version of it. Even though I think the fundamental argument has merit. Partly why I find it unconvincing is that I’m not sure that Coker is wholly convinced by it either. Better to treat it more as a series of interesting observations than a serious argument, that has to be found somewhere else.
Starts out with so much promise, has a few interesting points, and then blows it on failing to actually deep dive into what a civlizational state is or is not all while gradually declining into a glorified op-ed piece about things that are clearly not meeting any sane definition of the topic matter.
A writer who sees fit to mention India and ISIS in the same sentence is another added statistic to the voluminous human excreta of the white supremacist / racist manner who probably , had his a fit of vicarious chauvinism brought on by a rehash of another police killing in the US. The supercilious manner in which this bigot shrugs off Chinese and Russian ,very legitimate claims to power and belittles their technology is sadly another vindicant of the rise of the rejuvenated KKK
A very interesting, big picture look at how some 21st-century states have been recasting themselves in civilizational terms, as opposed to ethnicities or nations. China, Russia, and ISIS loom large for Coker. India under Modi also appears. Europe comes in as a divided entity without much coherence despite people speaking of a European civilization.
I enjoyed Coker's wide ranging investigation, racing across multiple nations, time periods, events, and theories.
Coker provides his readers with a good historical account of the last two centuries and is a fun author to read. However, speaking from a theoretical viewpoint, I don't get the fuss about "civilizational states." To me, they appear to be standard nationalist states with primordialist tendencies - thus, nothing new? I don't think this perspective has anything new to offer for contemporary political analysis.