The Paranoid Style in American Diplomacy: Oil and Arab Nationalism in Iraq

by Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt

A new history of Middle East oil and the deep roots of American violence in Iraq. Iraq has been the site of some of the United States' longest and most sustained military campaigns since the Vietnam War. Yet the origins of US involvement in the country remain deeply obscured—cloaked behind platitudes about advancing democracy or vague notions of American national interests. With this book, Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt exposes the origins and deep history of US intervention in Iraq. The Paranoid Style in American Diplomacy weaves together histories of Arab nationalists, US diplomats, and Western oil execs to tell the parallel stories of the Iraq Petroleum Company and the resilience of Iraqi society. Drawing on new evidence—the private records of the IPC, interviews with key figures in Arab oil politics, and recently declassified US government documents—Wolfe-Hunnicutt covers the arc of the twentieth century, from the pre-WWI origins of the IPC consortium and decline of British Empire, to the beginnings of covert US action in the region, and ultimately the nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry and perils of postcolonial politics. American policy makers of the Cold War era inherited the imperial anxieties of their British forebears and inflated concerns about access to and potential scarcity of oil, giving rise to a "paranoid style" in US foreign policy. Wolfe-Hunnicutt deconstructs these policy practices to reveal how they fueled decades of American interventions in the region and shines a light on those places that America's covert empire builders might prefer we not look.

Genres: History, Politics, Middle East, Nonfiction

336 pages, Hardcover

Published June 1, 2021

Reviews

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 4 out of 5]

Happy to be the first to review this on Goodreads. This is a good book that filled in a big gap in my understanding of Iraqi history and U.S.-Iraq relations, although I do have a few criticisms. This book is about U.S.-Iraqi relations and Iraqi politics with a specific focus on the role of oil in both of these histories. BWH shows how from the 40s to the 70s oil in Iraq, as in much of the Middle East, was "decolonized" in the sense that control shifted from large multinational corporate holdings like the Iraqi Petroleum Company gradually toward nationalization. The United States interpreted this process, and most of Iraqi and regional politics, through a pretty rigid Cold War lens, although BWH does a great job showing different viewpoints on Iraq within the USFP and oil establishments. For example, the US kind of flipped out when the monarchy was toppled by Qassem and backed a variety of challengers to him, including the Baath. The US then flip-flopped on Iraq for a while after the brief Baathist seizure of power in 1963, ultimately settling on a hostile policy when the Bakr regime seized power in 1968. Here, impulsive U.S. meddling backfired again; the early Baathist regime was brutal yet successful in modernizing, and it sought a tentative alliance with the USSR. The US, however, seeing mainly through the COld War lens, supported a Kurdish insurgency fueled by the Shah and Israel which only solidified the Iraq-Soviet alliance. Overall, BWH makes a good case that US interference in IRaqi politics served neither the good of that nation nor the goals of USFP.

THis book is also very helpful for understanding the complexities of global oil politics. Overall, BWH scrutinizes whether it makes strategic sense for the US to base its ME policy on the "free flow of oil" from the region. What has this really meant in historical terms? Iraq and other nationalizers of oil did not want external control from everyone, and they did not want to cut off oil (although they did raise and lower it for political reasons, as in 1973) as this would be economically counterproductive. What the US seemed to want to prevent A. Soviet control of these resources or B. Soviet alliances with the oil states that might lead to oil being used as a weapon. Either of these scenarios would be more of a problem for our allies than the US itself, but how realistic were these situations? ARab goals vis a vis oil were to sell oil and maintain "oil sovereignty," or nationalist control of their own resources. Most tilts toward the Soviets were selective and tactical, and again the US underestimated

I think this is what BWH means by the "paranoid style," but it isn't that clear. I really wish he had more clearly defined this point, as I found it intriguing but vague. A related problem is that while BWH has a strong critique of USFP, he tends to oversimplify and pathologize the actions/perspectives of top U.S. foreign policy-makers. Yes, U.S. leaders, like any policymakers, aren't fully rational, but the portrait that emerges here often glosses over complex motivations. Take his treatment of LBJ, for instance. BWH attributes LBJ's staunch support for Israel, which definitely conflicted with the priority of maintaining friendly relations with Arab oil producers, to his millenarian commitment to Jewish control of the land of Israel. He doesn't present a whole lot of evidence for this besides a quote from an LBJ advisor, and there isn't much evidence I've seen that LBJ was terribly devout or that his religion affected his FP a lot. In short, BWH presents US support for Israel in the 60s and 70s as totally irrational/ideological. It would have been more complete to present the full range of forces that drove the US shift to an alliance with Israel: the Cold War, Holocaust consciousness, Jewish voters in the US, and greater cultural affinities with the Jewish state. At the end of the book, BWH gives away some of his political motives, and it seems that in some cases those commitments influenced the argument in ways that didn't strengthen it.

This book is very useful for understanding the deep historical relationship of the US and Iraq, the turmoil of Iraqi politics, and the larger phenomena of oil nationalism and decolonization. Definitely recommended for scholars in these areas.

[Frances · Rating 5 out of 5]

Tbh haven’t read enough Iraqi history but feels like it gives a good overview of oil policy especially in the 1950s through 60s. Lots of names and events that will hopefully stick better when I’ve read more Iraqi history

[Toby Crime · Rating 5 out of 5]

With so many coups and insurgent movements, this book in never Dulles, though needs concentration so perhaps not one to read in the Baath.

[Maryam · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a fascinating talent for storytelling... This book was such a fun read despite the extremely daunting topic discussed. The author dives into the deep psyche of the different actors in the region and their interactions with Big Oil. My only complaint is that even though this book might seem like an easy read (fast paced, minimum academic jargon), you should write things down because the dates and the times will become too much to keep up with. Can't wait to re-read this in the future