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The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong: The Anti-extradition Movement
This book shows that Hong Kong’s protests from June to December 2019 originated from not only an attempt to extradite a Hong Kong man involved in a Taiwan murder case, but also China’s effort at extraditing corrupt mainlanders who laundered dirty money in the territory. The mixture of peaceful and violent protests was due to the snowballing effect of protestors-police confrontations, the imbalanced way in which police exercised their power, and protestors’ strategies. The protests triggered the national security concerns of Beijing, which mobilized the People’s Armed Police to Shenzhen as a warning rather than sending them openly to Hong Kong to avoid undermining the image of “one country, two systems.” The entire debate raised the concerns of Washington, Taiwan, and foreign governments, heightening Beijing’s sensitivity. After the bill was withdrawn, the anti-extradition movement has become anti-police and anti-mainland, constantly challenging the legitimacy of the Hong Kong government and Beijing. This is a valuable read for China watchers, political scientists and all those interested in the future of East Asia.
383 pages, Hardcover
Published January 1, 2021
19 people want to read
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June 11, 2021
4.5
A work that explains the 2019 protests in a different way. Instead of from the perspective of citizens, this work focuses more on the perspective of ruling elites. The chapters "The Legal and Political Origins of the Extradition Bill", as well as "National Security and Beijing’s Responses to the Hong Kong Crisis" are especially well written. Explaining the concerns on the extradition bill by different parties, as well as how the legal concerns snowballed to a stand-off between PRC and Hong Kong public (at least the half that are against the bill).
The authors attempt to review 15 perspectives:
1. legitimacy; 2. state violence and repression; 3. organized crime, vandalism and violence; 4. political violence; 5. democratization and violence; 6. citizenship and violence; 7. social movement and violence; 8. the art of peaceful protests; 9. the relevance of totalitarianism; 10. the psychology of public fear; 11. populism and violence; 12. political symbolism; 13. anarchism and "uncivil society"; 14. insurgency; 15. the role of the failed state.
While these perspectives are all helpful in understanding the protests, I felt like there wasn't enough explanation. Especially as a Hongkonger and one who experienced many of these events firsthand, I felt like the analysis was not deep enough to understand the protests more than what can be usually seen in web articles. (Perhaps apart from the two chapters I mentioned, but that's because common folk have no access to that info). I also felt like the authors have not enough knowledge of what happened in some events, thus leading to wrong conclusions (eg. the CUHK press con controversy). Many details were also missed out (understandable, given the length of the protests).
[Problems with 721 description on p.123] (with info from 元朗黑夜)
- District councillor of Yuen Long have been receiving messages and notices from 12:05pm, that villages (where many organized criminal groups are based) are mobilizing people for possible disturbances. The councillor has immediately alerted the district police. (p.58)
- According to reports, white-shirt triads have been gathering for 誓師 (pep rally) in the evening. From 19:07, citizens reported that over-hundred white-shirts guys with weapons are amassing, including well-known triad leaders. By 20:30, after having group dinners at 酒樓 (chinese restaurants), they gathered en masse and started threatening bypassers. Shops closed, and many citizens called the police, but the police did not take any action other than observing. (p.63)
- Police reports show that they have been receiving reports from 7pm, having sent out squads on 19:51, 20:04, 20:27, 21:08 and 21:45 to investigate. (p.50)
- The first victim was attacked by white-shirt triads by 21:55, from videos taken by bystanders. (p.77)
- A large police squad arrived at the Yuen Long station at 23:20, over an hour after the initial attack. They made no arrests as they claim that they cannot see any criminals. But instead, the police aimed pepper spray at citizens, who just endured an attack and are enraged by the police's inaction.
- There have been lots of videos and CCTV footage, accessible even on the internet, which faces of white-shirt triads who attacked citizens can be recognized. However, the police did not arrest the people in white-shirt that night, going so far as to claim "they didn't see them holding any weapons" and "they might not have participated in violence".
- The main focus of this incident is whether or not the 721 incident is a collusion between the police and gangs to demonstrate to the public that the police was necessary (or a show of force coordinated by the Liason Office of PRC to scare off protestors, according to another theory). So far there has been no evidence denouncing this claim, but a lot of evidence supporting this claim. Residents of Yuen Long have been hearing whispers of a possible attack on people with black shirts (a common attire by protestors) by July 20, while the police claimed it has stationed forces in preparation, the following incidents showed otherwise. The lack of response from the police during 7pm to 11pm on July 21, showed not the incompetence of the police force, but pre-planned inaction and intentional delay.
I also would like to question, on what basis can the authors downplay and even dismiss the suspicious activities by the police force? As the data and police reports showed otherwise. Investigative reports from journalists and scholars familiar with China's united front work and gangs in HK also proves a huge possibility of collusion between governmental institutions and organized criminal groups. On the other hand, there is not proof showing that the police have NOT colluded with gangs in the case of 721.
It directly led to the loss of all confidence in the police to perform its duty of protecting citizens, leading to the increased use of violence by protestors (and increased acceptance of using violence by pro-dem camp) to fend off attacks from the other camp, as well as taking the offensive to warn pro-government supporters not to attack.
The authors' claim that "the police do not have enough manpower" is a lame excuse for police inaction. From police reports, they claimed to have received a report at 22:40. By 22:57, around 50 快速應變部隊 (Quick Reaction Force) personnel and 2 teams (together ~30 ppl) were mobilized for backup. They left the police station at 23:07 and arrived at 23:15. (p. 128) It took 35 minutes for the police (according to their report) to gear up and arrive at the scene. Despite that the first attack started at 21:55, which after that the white-shirt attackers went to attack citizens and passengers at around 22:30 at a subway station, where the CCTVs are directly connected to the WanChai police headquarters. From news live streaming and witnesses, the police took around 45-50 minutes from the start of the big attack on Yuen Long station to arrive at the scene.
Still manpower problem? Authors?
* Also, only 45 victims were admitted to the hospitals, many more refused to go to hospitals as they do not trust the Hospital Authority.
[Role of pro-democracy legislators]
It can be easily concluded that meeting ALL the five demands are the bottom line for the "pro-democracy camp". Any "concessions" or "deals" other than that will not be recognized by the public, and the "elites" will be deemed as traitors of the people (eg. the 2010 District Council (Second) Functional Constituency deal). Under this context, pro-dem elites' role is hugely limited, as they cannot represent all the protestors, negotiation is also unacceptable by the majority of protestors.
The authors argued that "pro-democracy elites harboured some authoritarian tendencies, failing to make concessions and mobilizing the public to oppose the regime at all costs" (p.112). However, considering the history of Hong Kong's protests, public sentiment and protest culture, pro-democracy legislators are hugely limited in their actions.
Firstly, no "elites" can represent the protesters and make such negotiations. Due to the failure of the previous Umbrella Movement, protestors want a leaderless movement. Any attempt of a group of "leaders" leading the movement will be shunned. The "pro-democracy camp" during this period, includes people with very different ideologies, united by the same goal of stopping the legislation and fighting for democratization. However, they have very different visions of Hong Kong's future, as well as having other different objectives. This makes having a "leader" or a group of "elites" to negotiate impossible.
The "elites" are not representative of the whole camp. The disqualification of several legislators (and candidates), means that pro-dem conservatives and dovish politicians preside at LegCo, while pro-dem hardliners and progressives were alienated from the political center. In the meantime, pro-dem conservatives' legitimacy continues to decline, a political cost of their several concessions to the government prior to 2019.
Secondly, "pro-democracy elites" have no control over the movement. Even if there are talks between the pro-democracy elites and the government, and even if the government were willing to make concessions, there was no guarantee that the public will accept the deal and stop protesting. In a leaderless movement, every individual makes their own decisions on how to protest, and what they deem as an acceptable result. Not only is the claim that "pro-dem elites mobilize the public to fight at all costs" problematic, as it is partially untrue, these "elites" cannot force protestors to stop protesting, their words have no binding power on the actions of citizens.
For example, of the five demands, some think that they can stop protesting if the government formally withdraw the bill. (Which didn't happen until September 2019, too little too late by then). But a majority of protestors vowed that they will not stop until all five demands are met. However, even the five demands are only the most basic consensus among protestors. Some called for disbanding or even restructuring the police, many wanting to include it as the "sixth demand" by mid-August. Some even called for self-determination and independence. Different protestors have their own agenda and goal, persuading or forcing all protestors to accept a deal from the government will be impossible.
During the protests, pro-dem legislators have publicly commented that they can only be a supportive role in the protestors, acting as mediators and utilizing their power to protect and help protestors. From the very beginning, they understand that their role of mobilizing the public is completed by June 2019, after that they can only help with the administrative and logistics of organizing rallies, as well as following up with arrested protestors. The movement is too spontaneous and fast-moving for them (or for anyone) to be "leaders". Thus, the authors' claim imo is incorrect and implausible.
[Issues with how the “Youth problem” was addressed]
The authors seem to put the “Youth problem” in HK as a simple “jealousy” for mainland elites occupying high positions and thus increasing competition (p.245)
While that is arguably true for some, that is NOT the major concern among HK youth. The major concerns are high living costs and staggering growth of salary. There is low social mobility, as well as increasing political pressure.
Concerns, either political or social, were not addressed, due to the biased governmental institutions that favor the rich and powerful (namely big corporations who the government relies on for political support). Policies are not effective in dealing with social problems, and seem to aim to protect vested interests of the pro-government faction.
Governmental policies have long been updated, as the rest of the world progresses, Hong Kong seemed to be stuck in the 80s. HK still does not have an effective way to deal with the waste and pollution. Racism and sexually-related phobias are still not addressed, unequal distribution of wealth was largely ignored, and social services (eg. medical services) are inadequate in meeting public demands.
At the same time, social movements or electoral politics failed to bring any substantial change, leading to a sense of powerlessness and desperation among citizens.
This frustration from experiencing injustices and powerlessness are the main cause of an alienated generation.
[Minor problems]
- p.126: problematic entry into the very crowded New Town Plaza on July 14
- p. 247 The authors coveniently left out state-supported doxxing by the pro-government camp of protestors. State apparatus retweeted websites posting pro-dem protestors and journalists' private info. Pro-government newspapers publicly doxxed protestors. Not to mention political retribution and people being fired due to their participation in the movement.
- p. 267 according to witnesses' testimonies, there was a discussion held by CUSU on Nov 13, which most protestors reached a consensus to reopen one lane of the Tolo Highway. what the CUSU denied is the press conference by several black clad people claiming to be protestors, stating that their demand is for the government to ensure that District Council elections will be held as planned (which was neither discussed in the discussion, nor have the support of majority of protestors). The auhors' claim that the Student Union are hardliners and denying support for reopening one lane, is unfounded and incorrect. The CUSU discouraged any unnecessary destruction and vandalism of school property (inc. buildings and school buses), they could hardly be called "hardliners".
眾新聞 - 前線中大生訪問
A work that explains the 2019 protests in a different way. Instead of from the perspective of citizens, this work focuses more on the perspective of ruling elites. The chapters "The Legal and Political Origins of the Extradition Bill", as well as "National Security and Beijing’s Responses to the Hong Kong Crisis" are especially well written. Explaining the concerns on the extradition bill by different parties, as well as how the legal concerns snowballed to a stand-off between PRC and Hong Kong public (at least the half that are against the bill).
The authors attempt to review 15 perspectives:
1. legitimacy; 2. state violence and repression; 3. organized crime, vandalism and violence; 4. political violence; 5. democratization and violence; 6. citizenship and violence; 7. social movement and violence; 8. the art of peaceful protests; 9. the relevance of totalitarianism; 10. the psychology of public fear; 11. populism and violence; 12. political symbolism; 13. anarchism and "uncivil society"; 14. insurgency; 15. the role of the failed state.
While these perspectives are all helpful in understanding the protests, I felt like there wasn't enough explanation. Especially as a Hongkonger and one who experienced many of these events firsthand, I felt like the analysis was not deep enough to understand the protests more than what can be usually seen in web articles. (Perhaps apart from the two chapters I mentioned, but that's because common folk have no access to that info). I also felt like the authors have not enough knowledge of what happened in some events, thus leading to wrong conclusions (eg. the CUHK press con controversy). Many details were also missed out (understandable, given the length of the protests).
[Problems with 721 description on p.123] (with info from 元朗黑夜)
- District councillor of Yuen Long have been receiving messages and notices from 12:05pm, that villages (where many organized criminal groups are based) are mobilizing people for possible disturbances. The councillor has immediately alerted the district police. (p.58)
- According to reports, white-shirt triads have been gathering for 誓師 (pep rally) in the evening. From 19:07, citizens reported that over-hundred white-shirts guys with weapons are amassing, including well-known triad leaders. By 20:30, after having group dinners at 酒樓 (chinese restaurants), they gathered en masse and started threatening bypassers. Shops closed, and many citizens called the police, but the police did not take any action other than observing. (p.63)
- Police reports show that they have been receiving reports from 7pm, having sent out squads on 19:51, 20:04, 20:27, 21:08 and 21:45 to investigate. (p.50)
- The first victim was attacked by white-shirt triads by 21:55, from videos taken by bystanders. (p.77)
- A large police squad arrived at the Yuen Long station at 23:20, over an hour after the initial attack. They made no arrests as they claim that they cannot see any criminals. But instead, the police aimed pepper spray at citizens, who just endured an attack and are enraged by the police's inaction.
- There have been lots of videos and CCTV footage, accessible even on the internet, which faces of white-shirt triads who attacked citizens can be recognized. However, the police did not arrest the people in white-shirt that night, going so far as to claim "they didn't see them holding any weapons" and "they might not have participated in violence".
- The main focus of this incident is whether or not the 721 incident is a collusion between the police and gangs to demonstrate to the public that the police was necessary (or a show of force coordinated by the Liason Office of PRC to scare off protestors, according to another theory). So far there has been no evidence denouncing this claim, but a lot of evidence supporting this claim. Residents of Yuen Long have been hearing whispers of a possible attack on people with black shirts (a common attire by protestors) by July 20, while the police claimed it has stationed forces in preparation, the following incidents showed otherwise. The lack of response from the police during 7pm to 11pm on July 21, showed not the incompetence of the police force, but pre-planned inaction and intentional delay.
I also would like to question, on what basis can the authors downplay and even dismiss the suspicious activities by the police force? As the data and police reports showed otherwise. Investigative reports from journalists and scholars familiar with China's united front work and gangs in HK also proves a huge possibility of collusion between governmental institutions and organized criminal groups. On the other hand, there is not proof showing that the police have NOT colluded with gangs in the case of 721.
It directly led to the loss of all confidence in the police to perform its duty of protecting citizens, leading to the increased use of violence by protestors (and increased acceptance of using violence by pro-dem camp) to fend off attacks from the other camp, as well as taking the offensive to warn pro-government supporters not to attack.
The authors' claim that "the police do not have enough manpower" is a lame excuse for police inaction. From police reports, they claimed to have received a report at 22:40. By 22:57, around 50 快速應變部隊 (Quick Reaction Force) personnel and 2 teams (together ~30 ppl) were mobilized for backup. They left the police station at 23:07 and arrived at 23:15. (p. 128) It took 35 minutes for the police (according to their report) to gear up and arrive at the scene. Despite that the first attack started at 21:55, which after that the white-shirt attackers went to attack citizens and passengers at around 22:30 at a subway station, where the CCTVs are directly connected to the WanChai police headquarters. From news live streaming and witnesses, the police took around 45-50 minutes from the start of the big attack on Yuen Long station to arrive at the scene.
Still manpower problem? Authors?
* Also, only 45 victims were admitted to the hospitals, many more refused to go to hospitals as they do not trust the Hospital Authority.
[Role of pro-democracy legislators]
It can be easily concluded that meeting ALL the five demands are the bottom line for the "pro-democracy camp". Any "concessions" or "deals" other than that will not be recognized by the public, and the "elites" will be deemed as traitors of the people (eg. the 2010 District Council (Second) Functional Constituency deal). Under this context, pro-dem elites' role is hugely limited, as they cannot represent all the protestors, negotiation is also unacceptable by the majority of protestors.
The authors argued that "pro-democracy elites harboured some authoritarian tendencies, failing to make concessions and mobilizing the public to oppose the regime at all costs" (p.112). However, considering the history of Hong Kong's protests, public sentiment and protest culture, pro-democracy legislators are hugely limited in their actions.
Firstly, no "elites" can represent the protesters and make such negotiations. Due to the failure of the previous Umbrella Movement, protestors want a leaderless movement. Any attempt of a group of "leaders" leading the movement will be shunned. The "pro-democracy camp" during this period, includes people with very different ideologies, united by the same goal of stopping the legislation and fighting for democratization. However, they have very different visions of Hong Kong's future, as well as having other different objectives. This makes having a "leader" or a group of "elites" to negotiate impossible.
The "elites" are not representative of the whole camp. The disqualification of several legislators (and candidates), means that pro-dem conservatives and dovish politicians preside at LegCo, while pro-dem hardliners and progressives were alienated from the political center. In the meantime, pro-dem conservatives' legitimacy continues to decline, a political cost of their several concessions to the government prior to 2019.
Secondly, "pro-democracy elites" have no control over the movement. Even if there are talks between the pro-democracy elites and the government, and even if the government were willing to make concessions, there was no guarantee that the public will accept the deal and stop protesting. In a leaderless movement, every individual makes their own decisions on how to protest, and what they deem as an acceptable result. Not only is the claim that "pro-dem elites mobilize the public to fight at all costs" problematic, as it is partially untrue, these "elites" cannot force protestors to stop protesting, their words have no binding power on the actions of citizens.
For example, of the five demands, some think that they can stop protesting if the government formally withdraw the bill. (Which didn't happen until September 2019, too little too late by then). But a majority of protestors vowed that they will not stop until all five demands are met. However, even the five demands are only the most basic consensus among protestors. Some called for disbanding or even restructuring the police, many wanting to include it as the "sixth demand" by mid-August. Some even called for self-determination and independence. Different protestors have their own agenda and goal, persuading or forcing all protestors to accept a deal from the government will be impossible.
During the protests, pro-dem legislators have publicly commented that they can only be a supportive role in the protestors, acting as mediators and utilizing their power to protect and help protestors. From the very beginning, they understand that their role of mobilizing the public is completed by June 2019, after that they can only help with the administrative and logistics of organizing rallies, as well as following up with arrested protestors. The movement is too spontaneous and fast-moving for them (or for anyone) to be "leaders". Thus, the authors' claim imo is incorrect and implausible.
[Issues with how the “Youth problem” was addressed]
The authors seem to put the “Youth problem” in HK as a simple “jealousy” for mainland elites occupying high positions and thus increasing competition (p.245)
While that is arguably true for some, that is NOT the major concern among HK youth. The major concerns are high living costs and staggering growth of salary. There is low social mobility, as well as increasing political pressure.
Concerns, either political or social, were not addressed, due to the biased governmental institutions that favor the rich and powerful (namely big corporations who the government relies on for political support). Policies are not effective in dealing with social problems, and seem to aim to protect vested interests of the pro-government faction.
Governmental policies have long been updated, as the rest of the world progresses, Hong Kong seemed to be stuck in the 80s. HK still does not have an effective way to deal with the waste and pollution. Racism and sexually-related phobias are still not addressed, unequal distribution of wealth was largely ignored, and social services (eg. medical services) are inadequate in meeting public demands.
At the same time, social movements or electoral politics failed to bring any substantial change, leading to a sense of powerlessness and desperation among citizens.
This frustration from experiencing injustices and powerlessness are the main cause of an alienated generation.
[Minor problems]
- p.126: problematic entry into the very crowded New Town Plaza on July 14
- p. 247 The authors coveniently left out state-supported doxxing by the pro-government camp of protestors. State apparatus retweeted websites posting pro-dem protestors and journalists' private info. Pro-government newspapers publicly doxxed protestors. Not to mention political retribution and people being fired due to their participation in the movement.
- p. 267 according to witnesses' testimonies, there was a discussion held by CUSU on Nov 13, which most protestors reached a consensus to reopen one lane of the Tolo Highway. what the CUSU denied is the press conference by several black clad people claiming to be protestors, stating that their demand is for the government to ensure that District Council elections will be held as planned (which was neither discussed in the discussion, nor have the support of majority of protestors). The auhors' claim that the Student Union are hardliners and denying support for reopening one lane, is unfounded and incorrect. The CUSU discouraged any unnecessary destruction and vandalism of school property (inc. buildings and school buses), they could hardly be called "hardliners".
眾新聞 - 前線中大生訪問
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