Excommunication
• Likens his censure by International Psycho-analytical Association to Spinoza’s excommunication 1656. Why is the psychoanalytic community so like a religious practice?
• This is no longer a question of pudendum ( fundamentum). It is a question of knowing what may, what must, be expected of psycho-analysis, and the extent to which it may prove a hindrance, or even a failure. I ask the question—what are the fundamentals, in the broad sense of the term, of psychoanalysis? Which amounts to saying—what grounds it as praxis?
• Another question: is psychoanalysis a science? What specifies a science is having an object. There is certainly a corridor of communication between psychoanalysis and the religious register. But what of science. Science need not have a single trunk but, like Genesis, might have two.
o Science is not about experience, because this applies too well to mystical experience. Science pre-exists in the experience it is applied to.
• What is the analyst’s desire? This is not asked of scientists. But here, his desire cannot be left outside the question.
• Is science merely formula-making?
• The maintenance of Freud's concepts at the centre of all theoretical discussion in that dull, tedious, forbidding chain—which is read by no-body but psycho-analysts—known as the psycho-analytic literature, does not alter the fact that analysts in general have not yet caught up with these concepts, that in this literature most of the concepts are distorted, debased, fragmented, and that those that are too difficult are quite simply ignored
• Analysis is not a matter of discovering in a particular case the differential feature of the theory, and in doing so believe that one is explaining why your daughter is silent. Analysis consists precisely in getting her to speak.
• The fact that, in order to cure the hysteric of al her symptoms, the best way is to satisfy her hysteric’s desire—which is for her to posit her desire in relation to us as an unsatisfied desire ——leaves entirely to one side the specific question of why she can sustain her desire only as an unsatisfied desire. So hysteria places us, I would say, on the track of some kind of original sin in analysis. There has to be one. The truth is perhaps simply one thing, namely, the desire of Freud himself, the fact that something, in Freud, was never analysed.
The Unconscious and Repetition: The Freudian Unconscious and Ours
• The first two of the four Freudian major concepts: unconscious and repetition (others are transference and drive)
• Unconscious
o Structured like a language
o Levi-Strauss tells us that something precedes any experience. Before strictly human relations are established, certain relations have already been determined. Nature provides signifiers, and these signifiers organize human relations.
o Kant talked of a gap that the function of a cause has presented to conceptual apprehension. Cause is a concept that is unanalysable, and so there remains essentially in the function of a cause a certain gap
o Cause is not a law (like law of action or reaction)—it lacks a single principle. Cause has something anti-conceptual, indefinite.
o Freudian unconscious is where, between cause and that which is affects, there is always something wrong.
o Unconscious does not determine neurosis—that would be too easy. Unconscious merely shows us the gap through which neurosis recreates a harmony with ta real—a real that may well not be determined. In the gap, neurosis becomes something else (illness, scar).
o Unconscious is manifested to us as something that holds itself in suspense in the area of the unborn.
o In actual fact, this dimension of the unconscious that I am evoking had been forgotten, as Freud had quite clearly foreseen. The unconscious had closed itself up against his message thanks to bad psychoanalysts. “I never re-open it without great care”
o In the unconscious, per Freud, there is nothing homologous with what occurs at the level of the subject.
o Impediment, failure, split. Dream, parapraxis, wit. In a spoken or written sentence something stumbles. Freud is attracted by these phenomena, and it is there that he seeks the unconscious. What is produced in the gap—the discovery—is Freud’s first encounter with the unconscious. This discovery is always incomplete. The unconscious is the analyst’s Eurydice: always has a dimension of loss.
o Unconscious is not a non-concept (not non-conscious) but a concept of lack.
o We must feed the shades that emerge from the gap with blood
• Of the Subject of Certainty
o Gap of unconscious is pre-ontological. The only ontic thing about it is the split through which something, for a moment, slips into light of day.
o The status of the unconscious, so fragile on the ontic plane, is ethical (Freud: whatever it is, I must go there)
o None of this is about truth. It is about certainty.
The father dreams of his son, who says he is burning. The son is actually burning, dead, in the next room. This is not about the world of the beyond. This is about the Name-of-the-father, which sustains the structure of desire with the structure of the law. Hamlet.
o Doubt is the sign of certainty; it is precisely the sign that there is something to preserve. It is a sign of resistance.
o This is not a Cartesian think-am kind of thing, wherein the thinking lurches the I am into the real. For Freud, the subject of the unconscious thinks before it attains certainty.
o The correlative of the subject is not the deceiving Other but the deceived Other. Subjects fear misleading analysts.
o Freud was mislead, deceived, only inasmuch as he failed to see the objects of desire (for Dora, for lesbians: to sustain or procure the desire of the father). Man’s desire is the desire of the Other.
• On the Network of Signifiers
o Unconscious pulsative function: its need to disappear
o The conjectural science of the subject
Unconscious is constituted essentially bu that which Is refused
o Colophon of doubt: (colophon as small hand printed in margin). Here it indicates that Freud places his certainty only in the constellation of the signifiers as they result from the recounting, the commentary, the association, even if they are later retracted
o Wo es war, soll Ich warden: where it was, so shall I be. The subject is placed here by Freud, in dreams. The I is the complete, total locus of the network of signifiers, that is to say, the subject.
o The subject is there to rediscover where it was—the real. We do this by mapping the network.
o Opposite Freud’s certainty, there is the subject, who, as I said just now, has been waiting there since Descartes.
o Recollection, in analysis, is not Platonic reminiscence, not a return of a form, an imprint, coming to us from beyond. IT is something that comes to us from the structural necessities, something humble, born at the level of the structure of the signifier, of the languages spoken in a stuttering, stumbling way
o Wiederkehr = return. Field of unconscious is based on it. And Freud is certain of his field because of it, because of his self-analysis that leads him to return, because of the law of his own desire.
o Wiederholen =repeating. This is not reproduction for catharsis. It is not self-evident. It is a hauling of the subject
• Tuché and Automation
o Tuché, borrowed from Aristotle, who uses it in search of his cause. We translate it as the encounter with the real.
o The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the insistence of signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure principle.
o Repetition is not the return of signs, not an acted-out remembering. It is veiled in analysis bc of the identification of repetition with transference
o Freud says, though, nothing can be apprehended in effigie, in absentia—but is not transference given to us as effigy, in relation to absence?
o The tuche encounter appears first in the unassimilable, the trauma. The primary process (the unconscious) must be apprehended in its experience of rupture
o The encounter, though, is forever missed
o The place of the real: it stretches from the trauma to the phantasy—in so far as the phantasy is never anything more than the screen that conceals something quite primary, some- thing determinant in the function of repetition
• The Split Between the Eye and the Gaze
o Repetition must be grounded, again, in split that occurs in the subject in relation to the encounter/tuche.
o The eye and the gaze—this is for us the split in which the drive is manifested at the level of the scopic field.
Gaze: relation to things, ordered in figures of representations, with something always eluding
The spectacle of the world, in this sense, appears to us as all-seeing.
In the waking state, there is an elision of the gaze, and an elision of the fact that not only does it look, it also shows. In dreams, it shows.
• Anamorphosis
o Phenomenological reduction: The mode of my presence in the world is the subject in so far as by reducing itself solely to this certainty of being a subject, it becomes active annihilation.
o Psychoanalysis recenters the subject as speaking in the very lacunae of that in which, at first sight, it presents itself as speaking. The interest the subject takes in his own split is bound up with that which determines it—namely, a privileged object, which has emerged from some primal separation, some self-mutilation induced by the very approach of the real. Objet a.
o In the scopic relation, the object on which depends the phantasy from which the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation is the gaze.
o From the moment that this gaze appears, the subject tries to adapt himself to it. The gaze is unapprehensible. Through it, subject recognizes his dependence in the register of desire. It is a privileged mode of accessing this register.
o The gaze: the locus of the relation between me (annihilating subject) and that which surrounds me. But the gaze scotomizes the subject. The gaze I encounter is not a seen gaze but a gaze imagined by me in the field of the Other
• The Line and Light
• What is a Picture?
The Transference and the Drive
• Presence of the Analyst
o Transference generally defined as affect, either positive (love) or negative (ambivalence). But Lacan says positive transference is soft spot for analysand, negative is when you have to keep your eye on him.
o Unable to separate the unconscious from the presence of the analyst. That presence is itself a manifestation of the unconscious
o Again the unconscious is not an archaic function, a primal thing, a metaphysical thing. It is the sum of the effects of speech on a subject, at the level at which the subject constitutes himself out of the effects of the signifier. Psychoanalysis, in turn, rests on the recall of the field and function of speech and language
o DEF: Freud slides transference into repetition: what cannot be remembered is repeated in behavior. This behavior, in order to reveal what it repeats, is handed over to the analys’ts reconstruction. The subject transfers powers to the grand Autre (Other), the locus of speech and the locus of truth. he Other, latent or not, is, even beforehand, present in the subjective revelation, It is already there, when something has begun to yield itself from the unconscious. The analyst's interpretation merely reflects the fact that the unconscious, if it is what I say it is, namely, a play of the signifier, has already in its formations —dreams, slips of tongue or pen, witticisms or symptoms—proceeded by interpretation. The Other, the capital Other, is already there in every opening, however fleeting it may be, of the unconscious. Yet the transference is the means by which the communication of the unconscious is interrupted, by which the unconscious closes up again. This moment of closure is when analysis may begin in full force. The unconscious is not beyond the closure, but outside of it.
• Analysis and Truth or the Close of the Unconscious
o The problematic posture of: there are two reasons for transference 1. The analyst’s view is correct and considered reality and 2. The patient’s view is incorrect, and is considered ‘transference.’
o The difference between statement, the signifier (you can say “I am lying,” and enunciation (the analyst can say “you are deceiving me”)
o Statements map the subject towards reality. Enunciations map the subject towards signifiers I think?
o The subject sees himself in the space of the Other (the unconscious is a hoop net and it matters what we let in (that is, the objet a))
o Transference is the enaction of the reality of the unconscious.
• Sexuality in the Defiles of the Signifier
o Unconscious, again, is constituted by the effects of speech on the subject; it is the dimension in which the subject is determined in the development of the effects of speech, and consequently it is structured like a language
o The signifier came into the world (that is, man learnt to think) through sexual reality. There is an affinity between the enigmas of sexuality and the play of the signifier
o So do we regard the unconscious as a remanence of that archaic junction between thought and sexual reality? Analysis must reveal the pulsation of unconscious, how it links to sexual reality. The nodal point that analysis reaches between these two is DESIRE
Desire DEF is situated in depdendence on demand—which, by being articulated in signifiers, leaves a metonymic remainder that runs under it, an element that is not indeterminate, which is a condition both, absolute and unapprehensible, an element necessarily lacking, unsatisfied, impossible, misconstrued, an element that is called desire.
The function of desires is a last residuum of the effect of the signifier in the subject.
o In terms of transference: we see there established the weight of sexual reality.
o The whole theory of the transference may just be a defence of the analyst, whose own desire is unruly here
• The Deconstruction of the Drive
o Drive (Trieb): not just essentially organix, not some storing away of inertia. Not a thrust. Drive is a fundamental concept. It’s not a myth. Something closer to a fiction. Something like a model.
o Freud: drive is a constant force. On one end is a thrust, on the other, a satisfaction. The emphasis is always on satisfaction: what is meant by it?
o Satisfaction is in the category of the impossible. By snatching at its object, the drive learns in a sense that this is precisely not the way it will be satisfied.
o Drives can be satisfied but cannot get satisfaction (the aim not met)
o The object of the drive is of no importance. It is a matter of total indifference.
E.g. oral drive: not about food but the pleasure of the mouth, of being stuffed. Of the breast. The breast would be the object a cause of desire. The drive moves around the object/ the drive tricks the object: la pulsion en fait le tour.
o Why are our drives centered on erogenous zones—breast, anal, lips and teeth. The drive is precisely that montage by which sexuality participates in the psychical life, in a way that must conform to the gap-like structure that is the structure of the unconscious.
• The Partial Drive and its Circuit
o Drives are partial drives.
o The primal repressed is a signifier, symptoms are built onto it by a scaffolding of signifiers. Between these and the interpretation is sexuality. Sexuality, in the form of partial drives. And so the legibility of sex in interpretation of unconscious mechanisms is always retroactive.
o Drives merely represent, partially represent, the curve of fulfillment of sexuality in the living being.
o Drives can be satisfied but cannot get satisfaction (the aim not met)
o There can be no satisfaction: there is an objet a, the lost object. Not the origin of the drive
o Drive circuits can be interrupted (and drives can change in looks, an oral drive becoming an anal drive for example) by the intervention, the demand of the Other.
• From Love to the Libido
o Libido is an organ. Subject is divided by effects of language. So that the subject realizes himself more in the Other, but he is already pursuing there mor than half himself. He will simply find his desire ever more divided, pulverized, in the circumscribable metonymy of speech. That is why he must get out, get himself out, and in the getting-himself-out, in the end, he will know that the real Other has, just as much as himself, to get himself out, to pull himself free. SUMMARY SO FAR
o Partial drives are not love. Drives necessitate us in the sexual order. They come from the heart. Love come from the belly, the world of yum-yum.
o To conceive of love, we need a different structure: one with three levels. The real, the economic, the biological.
The difference between drive and love: I suggest that there is a radical distinction between loving oneself through the other—which, in the narcissistic field of the object, allows no transcendence to the object included—and the circularity of the drive, in which the heterogeneity of the movement out and back shows a gap in its interval.
o Objet a’s emerge from libido (lamella)
o Real-ich, the ego, the subject, begins in the locus of the Other. The first signifier emerges there. Signifier DEF: that which represents a subject for another signifier.
o Libido represents the relation between living subject and that which he loses by having to pass, for his reproduction, through the sexual cycle. This explains why each drive has affinity for death
o The subject is an emergence which, just before, as subject, was nothing, but which, having scarcely appeared, solidifies into a signifier.
o Sexual relation is handed over to the hazards of the field of the Other
o SUMMARY: the other is the locus in which a chain of signifiers makes present the subject and it is on this side, the side of the living being, called to subjectivity, that the drive is manifested.
o No drive represents the totality of sexual tendency
The Field of the Other and Back to the Transference
• The Subject and the Other: Alienation; Aphanisis (16-17)
o In his psyche, the subject situates only equivalents of the function of reproduction—activity and passivity. And so performances of gender/sex are abandoned to the drama/scenario in the field of the Other (the Oedipus complex). Subject learns from scratch from the Other what he has to do, as man or woman. Essentially, sexuality is represented in the psyche by a relation of the subject that is deduced from something other than sexuality itself. Sexuality is lack. Two types of lack here though 1. My subject depends on the Other and 2. Real, earlier lack: I have lost something in reproducing myself through t