History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History: The Modern Era:

History of the Art of War #4

by Hans Delbrück, Walter J. Renfroe (Translator)

Two thirds of a century after it first appeared, this last volume of Delbruck's fundamental work on military history has been translated into English. The work remains essential for the history of European warfare. Choice

Genres: History, Military Fiction, Military History, War, Nonfiction, World History, Modern

487 pages, Hardcover

First published April 25, 1985

About the author

German historian who looked at military history in the context of world history.

Sat in the Reichstag, was Professor of History at the University of Berlin and was a member of the German delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference after the First World War.

Reviews

[Hades Lutifiglus · Rating 4 out of 5]

Książka bardzo ciekawa, obejmująca historię sztuki wojennej od wynalezienia prochu i wojny stuletniej do epoki napoleońskiej. Kompletnie ominięta jest w niej Polska, Turcja i Rosja - co najwyżej kilka zdań opisujących ewolucje tamtejszych sztuk wojennych bardzo ogólnie i bezrefleksyjnie. Widać natomiast skupienie autora na Francji i Niemcach(Prusach) w pierwszej kolejności oraz Włochach, Szwajcarach, Anglikach i Szwedach. Czytając to trzeba znać historię opisywanych wojen i bardzo szczegółowo okres nowożytny, a autor nie kwapi się do szerszych wyjaśnień. Widać jednocześnie, że pisał to Niemiec, który wychwala Fryderyka Wielkiego. Można odnieść wrażenie że ta książka w 60% jest właśnie o nim. Delbrück używa go do porównania z Napoleonem, wyjaśnienia strategii manewrowej, wyniszczenia i zniszczenia oraz pokazania formowania się armii stałych, a także w wielu innych okolicznościach, których pisząc to nie jestem sobie w stanie przypomnieć. Jednocześnie autor zamieszcza wiele "wrzutek" z swego rodzaju autobiografii opisującej jego spory z innymi znawcami sztuki wojennej na temat właśnie Fryderyka Wielkiego. Również kończąc książkę Delbrück zamyka ją przykładem z historii tego władcy Prus. Pomimo tego jest to praca dobra, rzetelna i godna uwagi. Skupienie na Fryderyku mimo wszystko pozwala dobrze zrozumieć różnice w różnych rodzajach strategii oraz bitw. Ewolucje sztuki pokazuje też ciekawie i na wielu przykładach.

[Volodymyr Kramskyi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Classics of military history. Highly recommended to read before anything else on the subject.

You may not agree with something. Few statements become somewhat obsolete as new evidence appears. However, the amount of work done, of events juxtaposed, of processes and trends analyzed, is just staggering! Every statement is supported by at least some arguments. Usage of sources is extensive.

But while this all sounds good, it is not the primary reason to read the book. The first and foremost value of the book for any person interested in military history (or even just history in general) is in the author's critical thinking. Prof Delbruck is always suspicious about evidence from sources, he never accepts a statement without assessing every piece of information available to him. His willingness to ask crucial questions is of principal importance. Regardless of your interests in this book or in the subject, there are plenty of ways in which this book might enrich your thinking patterns. Even if you disagree with the author on some of his ideas. Especially if you disagree.

Being a German author, Prof Delbruck inclines more to the examination of military practices on German lands but not to an extent for any major military development to be missed. Last editions contain a lot of discussion between the author and other scholars, though I personally regard those discussions as rather outdated and not necessary to read unless you are particularly interested in the early 20th-century historiography of the subject.

[Richard · Rating 4 out of 5]

Re-read this classic and it is well worth the time. Delbruck looks at the evolution of strategy and tactics over time, with particular attention to the long standing strategic debate "Battle of Annihilation" versus "War of Attrition". This volume ends with a comparison of Napoleon -- Annihilation -- and Frederick the Great -- Attrition. Delbruck's conclusion is that Napoleon was the first commander who had an army capable of battle(s) of Annihilation, so those before him needed to campaign on the attrition strategy or lose. Thus Frederick the Great did the best with what he had.

[sologdin · Rating 3 out of 5]

carries the argument of the prior volumes through the Thirty Years' War and Napoleon. Solid, &c.