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Moral Luck
A new volume of philosophical essays by Bernard Williams. The book is a successor to Problems of the Self, but whereas that volume dealt mainly with questions of personal identity, Moral Luck centres on questions of moral philosophy and the theory of rational action. That whole area has of course been strikingly reinvigorated over the last deacde, and philosophers have both broadened and deepened their concerns in a way that now makes much earlier moral and political philosophy look sterile and trivial. Moral Luck contains a number of essays that have contributed influentially to this development. Among the recurring themes are the moral and philosophical limitations of utilitarianism, the notion of integrity, relativism, and problems of moral conflict and rational choice. The work presented here is marked by a high degree of imagination and acuity, and also conveys a strong sense of psychological reality. The volume will be a stimulating source of ideas and arguments for all philosophers and a wide range of other readers.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
188 pages, Paperback
First published December 3, 1981
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715 people want to read
About the author
Bernard Williams
103 books145 followersSir Bernard Arthur Owen Williams was an English moral philosopher. His publications include Problems of the Self (1973), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), Shame and Necessity (1993), and Truth and Truthfulness (2002). He was knighted in 1999.
As Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and Deutsch Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, Williams became known for his efforts to reorient the study of moral philosophy to psychology, history, and in particular to the Greeks. Described by Colin McGinn as an "analytical philosopher with the soul of a general humanist," he was sceptical about attempts to create a foundation for moral philosophy. Martha Nussbaum wrote that he demanded of philosophy that it "come to terms with, and contain, the difficulty and complexity of human life."
Williams was a strong supporter of women in academia; according to Nussbaum, he was "as close to being a feminist as a powerful man of his generation could be." He was also famously sharp in conversation. Gilbert Ryle, one of Williams's mentors at Oxford, said that he "understands what you're going to say better than you understand it yourself, and sees all the possible objections to it, and all the possible answers to all the possible objections, before you've got to the end of your own sentence."
As Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and Deutsch Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, Williams became known for his efforts to reorient the study of moral philosophy to psychology, history, and in particular to the Greeks. Described by Colin McGinn as an "analytical philosopher with the soul of a general humanist," he was sceptical about attempts to create a foundation for moral philosophy. Martha Nussbaum wrote that he demanded of philosophy that it "come to terms with, and contain, the difficulty and complexity of human life."
Williams was a strong supporter of women in academia; according to Nussbaum, he was "as close to being a feminist as a powerful man of his generation could be." He was also famously sharp in conversation. Gilbert Ryle, one of Williams's mentors at Oxford, said that he "understands what you're going to say better than you understand it yourself, and sees all the possible objections to it, and all the possible answers to all the possible objections, before you've got to the end of your own sentence."
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Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews
December 22, 2019
3.5 stars
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July 14, 2025A colossal mind, no amount of praise captures it. That being said, I need a sherpa to guide me through what happens in the second half of these papers. It seems like he is just picking and choosing problems (I know that this is a collection of papers and not a whole united project) but it is surprising how they all seem to come together in the end. Feels very Wittgensteinian, but I am going to need some help to really get all the meat of this bone
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October 16, 2017Thoughtful papers on "why we go on at all," and related topics.
abandoned
January 29, 2022Title looked interesting, it’s a subject I’m fascinated with. But the writing is a little too complex for me, not totally incomprehensible, but I think I’d have to really -study- it to comprehend it, rereading sentences many times, with frequent references to a dictionary and the SEP. And I’m just too lazy for that.
June 11, 2025
bit too sensitive and subtle for my taste
March 4, 2026
The stance that moral value to a certain extent depends on luck seems to be counterintuitive. In the more prominent accounts of morality chance plays no role at all. Kant, for instance, argues that a moral act must happen out of good will. His decision to base moral theory on intention relies, on the one hand, on the fact that all other values such as kindness and cleverness can be used as a mean for evil purposes, whereas the good will is the only thing which is good only in itself. Another reason may be (idk if it really is (haven’t read Kant for a while)) that a moral theory based on affections, for instance, would divide people into those more and those less capable of morality. It is due to nature that there are some more affectionate than others. The will as a construct every individual has control of provides everyone with the opportunity to obey moral laws, so to speak.
Williams argues that this conception of morality is false. The same way every other course of happening is afflicted by chance, the moral value of an act depends on its outcome which is not independent of the luck of the agent, in that regard. Thus, we may not always have the opportunity which only depends upon ourselves to act morally. Williams illustrates this with three examples. He strongly focuses on the feeling agents experienced in terms of moral assessment of themselves. Even though Williams probably had his reasons for picking these examples I personally don’t find them well chosen. There certainly are examples where it becomes clearer how moral judgement concerning the outcome differs in various scenarios. His examples two out of three times surround people who take decisions firstly in terms of their life and despite their affection for others it may be doubted to what extent moral measures can be applied. I think this strongly suggests that Williams is rather concerned with the notion of justification and unjustification towards oneself and how it differs with success or failure.
Imagine a painter who decides to leave because he thinks this is the only way he can focus on his art. (regarding the notion above: it probably depends what family members this family contains. If the painter has children, one may argue that it would be morally bad either way, since by the act of getting children he took on a degree of responsibility. However, if this is not the case, I don’t see how one could say that it would be morally bad to do so. One may say that this is a drastic decision or you may blame him if you don’t find yourself in an objective position. This may be arguable but I think the important point is that this is not such a clear case as killing someone, for instance). There are two different scenarios how the life of the painter may evolve. Either he becomes a successful painter, or he fails to do so. If the first scenario becomes true he may see himself justified in his decision to do so. For the latter scenario it depends, whether he fails due to extrinsic or intrinsic factors. Failing due to his incapability for art he will see himself unjustified in his decision. However, if he becomes blind through some accident he will never know, if he had the capability to become an artist without these obstacles. While he won’t see himself justified, he won’t see himself unjustified. Consequently, the assessment of oneself in certain situations depends on the success or failure of an act.
Searching for examples which illustrate moral luck in a comprehensive way one might take a look at Nagel’s paper on that topic. I personally find his examples better picked, since they are shorter and clearer. As mentioned above, one may argue however, that their ambition was slightly different.
If moral luck exists, and I think it is quite plausible to assume that it does, this raises a lot of question concerning the moral responsibility and the constraints of moral luck. How one is, for instance, depends on the experiences one has made and one the set of genes one possesses. Both factors are connected to chance. While it is not plausible to include them into moral luck, it is difficult to make a distinction between moral luck and other types of luck.
Williams argues that this conception of morality is false. The same way every other course of happening is afflicted by chance, the moral value of an act depends on its outcome which is not independent of the luck of the agent, in that regard. Thus, we may not always have the opportunity which only depends upon ourselves to act morally. Williams illustrates this with three examples. He strongly focuses on the feeling agents experienced in terms of moral assessment of themselves. Even though Williams probably had his reasons for picking these examples I personally don’t find them well chosen. There certainly are examples where it becomes clearer how moral judgement concerning the outcome differs in various scenarios. His examples two out of three times surround people who take decisions firstly in terms of their life and despite their affection for others it may be doubted to what extent moral measures can be applied. I think this strongly suggests that Williams is rather concerned with the notion of justification and unjustification towards oneself and how it differs with success or failure.
Imagine a painter who decides to leave because he thinks this is the only way he can focus on his art. (regarding the notion above: it probably depends what family members this family contains. If the painter has children, one may argue that it would be morally bad either way, since by the act of getting children he took on a degree of responsibility. However, if this is not the case, I don’t see how one could say that it would be morally bad to do so. One may say that this is a drastic decision or you may blame him if you don’t find yourself in an objective position. This may be arguable but I think the important point is that this is not such a clear case as killing someone, for instance). There are two different scenarios how the life of the painter may evolve. Either he becomes a successful painter, or he fails to do so. If the first scenario becomes true he may see himself justified in his decision to do so. For the latter scenario it depends, whether he fails due to extrinsic or intrinsic factors. Failing due to his incapability for art he will see himself unjustified in his decision. However, if he becomes blind through some accident he will never know, if he had the capability to become an artist without these obstacles. While he won’t see himself justified, he won’t see himself unjustified. Consequently, the assessment of oneself in certain situations depends on the success or failure of an act.
Searching for examples which illustrate moral luck in a comprehensive way one might take a look at Nagel’s paper on that topic. I personally find his examples better picked, since they are shorter and clearer. As mentioned above, one may argue however, that their ambition was slightly different.
If moral luck exists, and I think it is quite plausible to assume that it does, this raises a lot of question concerning the moral responsibility and the constraints of moral luck. How one is, for instance, depends on the experiences one has made and one the set of genes one possesses. Both factors are connected to chance. While it is not plausible to include them into moral luck, it is difficult to make a distinction between moral luck and other types of luck.
August 26, 2021
I am not qualified to really review this classic of moral philosophy by Bernard William's since moral philosophy is not my area. It would suffice if I just say what I find interesting in this work.
The most celebrated of this collection of essays is of course Williams's original essay on moral luck which suggests a person's deliberations in life is connected to both intrinsic and extrinsic luck.
This collection of essays contains not only the celebrated moral luck essay but also some other essays of original and fascinating topics. In "Persons, Character, and Morality", Williams discusses the conflict that the selfless abstraction demand of Kantianism impartiality, and, also of Utilitarianism's maximal utility have with a person's character that features individual's life projects and concerns that he finds worth living. This conflict between morality and personal character bears on the discussion of moral luck which suggests an agent's introspection and deliberation in life project is not always based on moral considerations alone .
There are also essays on pratical necessity and a person's character. "Practical necessity" and "Ought and Moral Obligation" discuss deliberation based on practical necessity which reveals one's own powers and incapacities in the circumstances and external limits available to oneself. Again, luck seems to factor in even if unrelated to moral necessity.
In "Conflict of Values", Williams discusses Isaiah Berlin's idea of a plurality of values with values not irreducible to each other. The resolution of a conflict of values brings to attention of the commensurability of values and utility as a possible currency to assess all values. But there is no reason one has to accept utility as an arbiter of value conflict if one does not think appealing to another value is a proper way to resolve value conflict. Further there may not be a universal currency for the arbitration of conflict. Williams think it is also a mistake to think value conflict can be resolve by constructing an ethical theory using some rational calculus systematising moral beliefs as if value conflict is a logical affliction. William's and Berlin's reasoning are quite correct. If each value is different, there just can't be an universal currency or calculus to compute how to resolve value conflict by weighing one against the other. This means value conflict can't be resolved by moral reasoning. Answers are to be sought outside of moral calculus.
"Politics and Moral Character" is an essay on integrity. What kind of character or level of integrity one wants in a politician? A politician may find himself having to do unpalatable acts in political activities such as special pleading, misleading statements, breaking promises, temporary coalition with unrespectable political party, perhaps even for preventing worthy political projects from not being actualised. The unpalatable acts may not be necessarily morally abhorrent but at least not tasteful. Williams thinks you want a politician who would be reluctant to do such acts when it is necessary in order to expect him to have much chance of not doing them when unnecessary. Certainly a very insightful observation.
The most celebrated of this collection of essays is of course Williams's original essay on moral luck which suggests a person's deliberations in life is connected to both intrinsic and extrinsic luck.
This collection of essays contains not only the celebrated moral luck essay but also some other essays of original and fascinating topics. In "Persons, Character, and Morality", Williams discusses the conflict that the selfless abstraction demand of Kantianism impartiality, and, also of Utilitarianism's maximal utility have with a person's character that features individual's life projects and concerns that he finds worth living. This conflict between morality and personal character bears on the discussion of moral luck which suggests an agent's introspection and deliberation in life project is not always based on moral considerations alone .
There are also essays on pratical necessity and a person's character. "Practical necessity" and "Ought and Moral Obligation" discuss deliberation based on practical necessity which reveals one's own powers and incapacities in the circumstances and external limits available to oneself. Again, luck seems to factor in even if unrelated to moral necessity.
In "Conflict of Values", Williams discusses Isaiah Berlin's idea of a plurality of values with values not irreducible to each other. The resolution of a conflict of values brings to attention of the commensurability of values and utility as a possible currency to assess all values. But there is no reason one has to accept utility as an arbiter of value conflict if one does not think appealing to another value is a proper way to resolve value conflict. Further there may not be a universal currency for the arbitration of conflict. Williams think it is also a mistake to think value conflict can be resolve by constructing an ethical theory using some rational calculus systematising moral beliefs as if value conflict is a logical affliction. William's and Berlin's reasoning are quite correct. If each value is different, there just can't be an universal currency or calculus to compute how to resolve value conflict by weighing one against the other. This means value conflict can't be resolved by moral reasoning. Answers are to be sought outside of moral calculus.
"Politics and Moral Character" is an essay on integrity. What kind of character or level of integrity one wants in a politician? A politician may find himself having to do unpalatable acts in political activities such as special pleading, misleading statements, breaking promises, temporary coalition with unrespectable political party, perhaps even for preventing worthy political projects from not being actualised. The unpalatable acts may not be necessarily morally abhorrent but at least not tasteful. Williams thinks you want a politician who would be reluctant to do such acts when it is necessary in order to expect him to have much chance of not doing them when unnecessary. Certainly a very insightful observation.
August 16, 2025
I loved this collection of essays. There were only two that felt absolutely dispensable. For the rest, a host of illuminating ideas and arguments that I’ll be sitting with and writing on for a while. My favorite essays include “the truth about relativism,” “internal & external reasons,” “ought & moral obligation,” and “conflicts of values”
October 21, 2025
يقدّم برنارد ويليامز نقداً عميقاً لفكرة الأخلاق، كاشفاً أن الحظ والظروف جزء لا يتجزأ من التجربة الأخلاقية. وببرز فيه الحس التراجيدي والإنساني للأخلاق، بعيداً عن التجريد العقلي الصارم. أسلوب ويليامز يجمع بين التحليل الفلسفي والعمق الأدبي، مما يمنح الكتاب قوة فكرية فريدة. ورغم غموض النتائج نوعاً ما، فإنه يفتح أفق جديد للتفكير في المسؤولية والقدر.
August 27, 2020
Just read the titular essay on how luck operates in our assessments of why is praiseworthy or blameworthy. Fabulous.
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September 1, 2020I've been reading the essays "Persons, Character, and Morality" and "Moral Luck" on and off again for the past two and a half years, and they still contain much mystery, inspiration and wisdom.
July 16, 2008
The notorious pessimist. Mark Jenkins had us read this in his 400 lvl moral philosophy class and juxtapose it with the work of Joseph Nagel. Both philosophers are phenomenal yet disparate - they compliment each other really well for discussion.
For Williams, moral luck is, in part, a confrontation to Kant's rational categorical imperative. Much of the argument hinges around a hypothetical situation where someone accidentally, and by no fault of his own, kills a child. Kant says we should, rationally, feel no guilt... yet, Williams says: we do. Which, of course, begs the question: wtf?
He's a great writer and utterly hilarious at points. I recommend to anyone thinking about moral philsophy. I'd recommend Mr. Nagel too.
For Williams, moral luck is, in part, a confrontation to Kant's rational categorical imperative. Much of the argument hinges around a hypothetical situation where someone accidentally, and by no fault of his own, kills a child. Kant says we should, rationally, feel no guilt... yet, Williams says: we do. Which, of course, begs the question: wtf?
He's a great writer and utterly hilarious at points. I recommend to anyone thinking about moral philsophy. I'd recommend Mr. Nagel too.
February 22, 2016
A wee bit technical for my taste, but in general quite striking thoughts for modern moral philosophy.
to-keep-reference
February 23, 2016Discutido en Visión de Paralaje Pág.77
Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews