Ordinary Language: Essays in Philosophical Method

by Vere C. Chappell (Editor & Introduction), Norman Malcolm (Contributor), Gilbert Ryle (Contributor)

Ordinary-language philosophy was an attempt to overcome the self-imposed irrelevance of most of the traditional schools of philosophy in the early 20th century. In its many years of stimulating give-and-take among partisans, it exerted an immense influence on philosophical thought and helped to clarify many philosophical issues. There is no doubt of its permanent contribution to the progress of philosophy.

To help students gain a deeper understanding of the different aspects of this philosophy, editor V.C. Chappell has brought together five seminal articles by five illustrious modern philosophers in this collection.

Norman Malcolm's 'Moore and Ordinary Language' is a clear, plausible defense of the Wittgensteinian view of ordinary-language philosophy.

Then Gilbert Ryle in 'Ordinary Language' and J.L. Austin in 'A Plea For Excuses' compellingly state the case for the Oxford group of ordinary-language philosophers.

Finally, Benson Mates criticizes ordinary-language philosophy in 'On the Verification of Statements about Ordinary Language', and Stanley Cavell answers Mates in 'Must We Mean What We Say?', probably the most detailed explanation and defense of the procedures of the ordinary-language philosophers that has ever been written.

Genres: Philosophy

115 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1964

About the author

Vere Claiborne Chappell, Ph.D. (Philosophy, Yale University, 1958; M.A., Yale, 1953; B.A., Yale, 1952), was Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at University of Massachusetts Amherst.

Not to be confused with his son Vere Chappell

Reviews

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

SEVERAL IMPORTANT ESSAYS OF THIS BRANCH OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY

This 1964 book contains five key essays relating to the once-prevalent "Ordinary Language" branch of philosophy; authors included are Norman Malcolm, Gilbert Ryle, J.L. Austin, Benson Mates, and Stanley Cavell.

Malcolm states in his essay, "In the case of all expressions the meanings of which must be SHOWN and cannot be explained... it follows, from the fact that they are ordinary expressions in the language, that there have been MANY situations of the kind which they describe; otherwise so many people could not have learned the correct use of those expressions. Whenever a philosophical paradox asserts, therefore, with regard to such an expression, that always when that expression is used the use of it produces a false statement, then to prove that the expression is an ORDINARY expression is completely to refute the paradox." (Pg. 18)

Ryle concludes, "Well, then, has philosophy something to do with the use of expressions or hasn't it? To ask this is simply to ask whether conceptual discussions, i.e., discussions about the concept of, say, voluntariness, infinitesimals, number or cause, come under the heading of philosophical discussions. Of course they do. They always have done, and they have not stopped doing so now." (Pg. 39)

Cavell observes, "Giving directions for using a word is not more prodigious and unending a task than giving directions for anything else. The context in which I make a martini with vodka is no less complex than the context in which I make a statement with 'voluntary.' Say, if you like, that these actions take place in infinitely complex contexts; but then remember that you can be given directions for doing either." (Pg. 89) Cavell also asks, "How could I be led into a paradox if I could mean what I wished by my words? Because I must be consistent? But how could I be inconsistent if words would mean what I wanted them to mean?" (Pg. 109)

Ordinary Language philosophy is far from the "mainstream" today; but this book is an excellent introduction to the kinds of things that such philosophers were discussing.