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The Ghost of Napoleon
B. H. Liddell Hart believes that "thought working on thought is the most influential process in history. Yet, being intangible, it is less perceptible than the effects of action, and has always received far less attention than it deserves." In THE GHOST OF NAPOLEON, Liddell Hart concentrates on two of these intellections, each of which vitally affected the course of history in the last two centuries. One was responsible for the triumphs of Revolutionary France and for Napoleon's empire; the other, for that ruinous conflict called WW I. Liddell Hart is to military subjects what Peter Drucker is to business. Two of his best are THE SOVIET ARMY and GREAT CAPTAINS UNVEILED.
199 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1933
7 people are currently reading
144 people want to read
About the author
B.H. Liddell Hart
223 books301 followersBritish military authority Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart early advocated tank and air warfare.
Usually known as captain before his knighthood, this English soldier and historian led theorists.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._H._L...
Usually known as captain before his knighthood, this English soldier and historian led theorists.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._H._L...
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
April 25, 2009
One can only appreciate this book through the prism of contemporary events. Liddel-Hart was trying to shock the military establishment into an honest appraisal of the First World War failures, because he was witness to what had happened by misapplication of historical "lessons learned". He is unrepentantly critical of both Napoleon and Clauswitz to prove a point that the real lesson to be learned is that adaptability to new tactics and technologies is the key to success and that original, imaginative thought is required to apply these tools. He encourages students of war at all levels to learn not just military history, but to understand battles and war in the context of social, political, and economic events. This is a great book that aspires to inspire critical thought in everyone who reads it.
April 19, 2023
Star Ratings:
* = Didn't finish but marked it finished so I would never repeat the mistake of reading this book.
** = Regretted Reading, but I hoped it would be worth it, or I was too stubborn to stop.
*** = I didn't regret reading it.
**** = I enjoyed the read, didn't take notes, and probably won't read again, but I regret nothing.
***** = I took notes, will read them again, and probably won't stop talking about it when drinking.
Review Overview: *****
Yes, this work, and most of Hart, has aged poorly. But looking at history through a Symbolic Interpretive Perspective lens, this is a great piece of work to gain empathy for the strategic climate of the post-First World War world. Hart does a phenomenal job of providing an analogy for the rise and fall of Napoleon I and how theorists and historians can take away incorrect lessons when examining his campaigns. The discussion of Napoleon the General, the Manueverist vs. Napoleon the Emperor, the Destructionist illustrates how the methods that gained French Military renown differed from how they acted after they achieved dominance. Finally, the gladiatorial Retarius vs. Secutor example used to describe Napoleon the General vs. the Ancient Regime provides an illustrative example to understand the conflict.
Hart claims that before Napoleon I, warfare tended to resemble two shielded warriors clashing shields, leaning into each other, mass on mass, with the objective of one warrior putting more weight on one of the sides of the shield and exposing them for the decisive blow. This is juxtaposed against the Retarius, or Net Man, armed with a net and a trident who uses his net to immobilize his foe and trident to deliver the decisive blow. The difference Hart is getting at is the use of mass to immobilize the enemy vs. the use of maneuver to immobilize.
Hart's Theory of Victory is to paralyze the enemy and strike. Organized dispersion is the net that paralyzes the enemy, while decisive action is the spear that delivers the blow.
Hart takes it a step further to break down the influences on the Napoleonic system within the Retarius example. Napoleon was influenced by those who came before him, and the French Revolution provided a means to change the dogmatic approach to warfare. Hart says Napoleon didn't create the net or spear; he was just the arm.
The rest of this review is me babbling about this analogy and some impactful quotes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The net was created by Pierre-Joseph Bourcet, who advocated for organized dispersion in the mountains by having a large army march in separate columns along parallel roads, allowing them to be rapidly concentrated for attack or defense. He also devised the strategic concept of "a plan with branches" by keeping the enemy confused about his destination, so he had to split his forces to defend more than one place.
The frame that allowed the net to be wielded was the French Revolution and the intellectual challenges it provided to the current political and military establishment.
Saxe, Gribeavul, and Rear Maneuvers provided the three prongs of the trident.
Maurice de Saxe - laid down the concepts that rejected Fredrick the Great's methods and subscribed to what became the Napoleonic column with skirmishers in front.
Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval - revolutionized the French cannon by creating a new product that allowed for lighter, more uniform guns without sacrificing range, creating the core of what was later known as Napoleon's flying Artillery.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pg 85. "Move the army on the flank or rear of the enemy" - it was a fundamental error to have separated the science of subsistence from the science of war.
Pg 98. "Organized Dispersion = distraction to create or disorganize and demoralize to paralyze the enemy before the decisive blow."
Pg 110. "Bourcet + Guibert created a theory for Napoleon to apply."
Pg 126. "Clausewitz's greatest contribution was the moral component."
Pg 127. "Mass and Strength thought in physical concentration, not potential unity" - rhymes with modern writings of convergence.
Pg 140-141. "By looking at the Napoleonic system through his (Clausewitz) distorted lenses, they had failed to perceive the real purpose and value of Napoleon's wide stretched net formation as an automatic means of distraction."
Pg 144. "war is the continuation of policy became a catchphrase to pursuit warlike policy."
Pg 165. "Gustavo Adolphis, like Skipio, made his CAV a real striking force with his infantry pivot (line of contact)."
Pg 169. "Decisive importance of Adabilitity"
* = Didn't finish but marked it finished so I would never repeat the mistake of reading this book.
** = Regretted Reading, but I hoped it would be worth it, or I was too stubborn to stop.
*** = I didn't regret reading it.
**** = I enjoyed the read, didn't take notes, and probably won't read again, but I regret nothing.
***** = I took notes, will read them again, and probably won't stop talking about it when drinking.
Review Overview: *****
Yes, this work, and most of Hart, has aged poorly. But looking at history through a Symbolic Interpretive Perspective lens, this is a great piece of work to gain empathy for the strategic climate of the post-First World War world. Hart does a phenomenal job of providing an analogy for the rise and fall of Napoleon I and how theorists and historians can take away incorrect lessons when examining his campaigns. The discussion of Napoleon the General, the Manueverist vs. Napoleon the Emperor, the Destructionist illustrates how the methods that gained French Military renown differed from how they acted after they achieved dominance. Finally, the gladiatorial Retarius vs. Secutor example used to describe Napoleon the General vs. the Ancient Regime provides an illustrative example to understand the conflict.
Hart claims that before Napoleon I, warfare tended to resemble two shielded warriors clashing shields, leaning into each other, mass on mass, with the objective of one warrior putting more weight on one of the sides of the shield and exposing them for the decisive blow. This is juxtaposed against the Retarius, or Net Man, armed with a net and a trident who uses his net to immobilize his foe and trident to deliver the decisive blow. The difference Hart is getting at is the use of mass to immobilize the enemy vs. the use of maneuver to immobilize.
Hart's Theory of Victory is to paralyze the enemy and strike. Organized dispersion is the net that paralyzes the enemy, while decisive action is the spear that delivers the blow.
Hart takes it a step further to break down the influences on the Napoleonic system within the Retarius example. Napoleon was influenced by those who came before him, and the French Revolution provided a means to change the dogmatic approach to warfare. Hart says Napoleon didn't create the net or spear; he was just the arm.
The rest of this review is me babbling about this analogy and some impactful quotes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The net was created by Pierre-Joseph Bourcet, who advocated for organized dispersion in the mountains by having a large army march in separate columns along parallel roads, allowing them to be rapidly concentrated for attack or defense. He also devised the strategic concept of "a plan with branches" by keeping the enemy confused about his destination, so he had to split his forces to defend more than one place.
The frame that allowed the net to be wielded was the French Revolution and the intellectual challenges it provided to the current political and military establishment.
Saxe, Gribeavul, and Rear Maneuvers provided the three prongs of the trident.
Maurice de Saxe - laid down the concepts that rejected Fredrick the Great's methods and subscribed to what became the Napoleonic column with skirmishers in front.
Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval - revolutionized the French cannon by creating a new product that allowed for lighter, more uniform guns without sacrificing range, creating the core of what was later known as Napoleon's flying Artillery.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pg 85. "Move the army on the flank or rear of the enemy" - it was a fundamental error to have separated the science of subsistence from the science of war.
Pg 98. "Organized Dispersion = distraction to create or disorganize and demoralize to paralyze the enemy before the decisive blow."
Pg 110. "Bourcet + Guibert created a theory for Napoleon to apply."
Pg 126. "Clausewitz's greatest contribution was the moral component."
Pg 127. "Mass and Strength thought in physical concentration, not potential unity" - rhymes with modern writings of convergence.
Pg 140-141. "By looking at the Napoleonic system through his (Clausewitz) distorted lenses, they had failed to perceive the real purpose and value of Napoleon's wide stretched net formation as an automatic means of distraction."
Pg 144. "war is the continuation of policy became a catchphrase to pursuit warlike policy."
Pg 165. "Gustavo Adolphis, like Skipio, made his CAV a real striking force with his infantry pivot (line of contact)."
Pg 169. "Decisive importance of Adabilitity"
June 8, 2015
Nice to read.
March 1, 2016
Persuasive and brilliantly written, yet horribly flawed and showing its age. Probably "Patient Zero" of great tradition of bashing Clausewitz.
April 8, 2017
There is not book as this one to capture the brutality of colonisation.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews