Wild Animal Ethics: The Moral and Political Problem of Wild Animal Suffering

by Kyle Johannsen

Though many ethicists have the intuition that we should leave nature alone, Kyle Johannsen argues that we have a duty to research safe ways of providing large-scale assistance to wild animals. Using concepts from moral and political philosophy to analyze the issue of wild animal suffering (WAS), Johannsen explores how a collective, institutional obligation to assist wild animals should be understood. He claims that with enough research, genetic editing may one day give us the power to safely intervene without perpetually interfering with wild animals’ liberties.

Questions addressed

In what way is nature valuable and is intervention compatible with that value? Is intervention a requirement of justice? What are the implications of WAS for animal rights advocacy? What types of intervention are promising? Expertly moving the debate about human relations with wild animals beyond its traditional confines, Wild Animal Ethics is essential reading for students and scholars of political philosophy and political theory studying animal ethics, environmental ethics, and environmental philosophy.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

112 pages, Kindle Edition

First published October 29, 2020

Reviews

[Daniel Hageman · Rating 5 out of 5]

In a world where wild animal suffering pervades our planet at the scale that it does, and where its ethical importance is as neglected as it is by even the large majority of those who consider themselves ethically-minded, it's difficult not to want to give this book a 5-star review before even reading it. Johannsen's coverage of the relevant material, in a short and digestible format with relevant references provided, makes this book an excellent reference point for anyone interested in, or new to, the topic of wild animal welfare and the ethical problem that we must currently confront. That said, at $41/book it makes it a bit more difficult to pass along than one might like :)

From making the ethical case to focus on improving wild animal welfare, to addressing the most common objections, to the all-important considerations of various interventions and their degrees of promise they might have, this book succeeds in capturing the majority of major topics that one could ask for on the subject.

All this said, I think it behooves one to highlight points of disagreement, which for me came largely in section 6.2 'An Obligation to Contribute'. It should be noted, though, that Johannsen makes an overall robust case for our obligations to contribute in a collective and individual manner, and likely in a manner that would be considered more palatable to a large majority of readers (though I'm actually unsure on this, given it will unfortunately have a fairly niche audience with strong consequentialist proclivities, at least early on).

In section 6.2, Johanssen notes disagreement with Peter Singer's argument for the claim that we have a moral obligation to pursue beneficence-related causes, and specifically Singer's contention that we should prevent moral shortcomings up until the point at which one would need to sacrifice *something of comparable moral significance*. In this, Johannsen accuses Singer of 'presuming utilitarianism'. I think that this is fair, and almost certainly true, but falls short as any sort of hard-hitting critique. Utilitarianism is a normative framework that has been robustly defended by Singer and others for centuries (perhaps *much* longer if one wants to credit early forms of Mohism). Johannsen seems to contend, more or less, that if we instead presume some other normative framework (i.e. pluralism), then Singer's claim for such a strong obligation does not follow.

Well, of course merely presuming a new framework would affect what follows from the premises that Singer has laid out, but Johannsen spends little time defending such a normative framework (a few related references and quotes about the implausibility of a demanding framework), for which Singer could equally say that Johannsen's weaker form of obligation merely presumes that pluralism is true, alongside perhaps some form of threshold deontology (which Johannsen seems sympathetic towards). Fwiw, pluralism (and threshold deontology) seems much more difficult to coherently defend, especially when it comes to identifying values that don't implicitly rely on the utility such values generate, as well as identifying non-arbitrary tradeoff heuristics for when there are conflicts amongst the values one could attain. Because of this, one cannot fault Johannsen for not spending too much time defending such a framework here. However, it leaves his critique on Singer's framework to be found..wanting.

**As a side note, I think that Singer's shallow pond analogy, and his contended notion that we should sacrifice to the point of 'comparable moral value', is often only considered at a very surface level, which some examples in this book seemingly illustrate to be a case in point. Johannsen provides an example of a person who would reinvigorate his or her own personal illness by saving a drowning child, and therefore have to spend the next year of his or her life in a hospital bed if they were to complete such an act. Johannsen implies that because a year in a hospital bed is not as bad as a lost life, such a sacrifice would be necessitated by Singer's framework. However, when one properly considers the amount of potential moral value that is lost by one having to commit to the next year in a hospital bed, as opposed to counterfactually e.g. earning money via a modest wage to then donate and save a much greater number of lives, it becomes far from clear that one really should make such an alleged 'comparable sacrifice'. This sort of surface-level consideration of such situations is often referred to as 'naive utilitarianism', where insufficient consideration is given to the relevant proximate consequences and flow-through effects that would need to be considered before taking any given (in)action.

Johannsen's framework, and resulting degree of obligation that he concludes, leaves fairly open the notion of what one considers a 'significant sacrifice', whereas Singer's has a principled demarcation, given that a 'comparable sacrifice' is one that in principle is nearly as morally valuable as the disvaluable situation that one is preventing/mitigating. Johannsen makes comments here that appeal to 'common sense morality', a moral framework that has been effectively criticized from the likes of Sidgwick and Parfit, amongst others. It's also an odd appeal in a book that is making the case (albeit rightfully so) for a cause area that falls fairly far adrift the ethical Overton window when it comes to public 'common sense'. In a similar manner, I disagree with his common sense appeal regarding the notion that negative duties outweigh positive duties (no doubt because I am convinced of consequentialism, I know). So much of common sense morality understandably stems from 'what's popular' or 'immediate gut intuitions', which are often more likely explained (explained away) via a proper understanding of evolutionary and social psychology.

Perhaps somewhat to my dismay, while I disagree with this brief attempt to undermine Singer's utilitarian framework, this sort of pluralistic case will likely go over better with the general public, who share a lot of the fundamental values that Johannsen himself likely holds. For that reason, I'm hopeful this book will draw serious attention from such a crowd :)

All of this said, these criticisms are not meant to be scathing in any sense, but perhaps I'm sharing because it will make me seem less biased when I recommend this book to anyone and everyone who would consider learning about this topic. I think that it's difficult to overemphasize the importance of this work and what a joy it was to read. I highly recommend it for those who are even slightly interested, or curious to the idea. The arguments on the whole are very compelling, and ethically demand our attention whether we realize it or not.

[Hemen Kalita · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well written and necessary book on one of the most ignored and often unacknowledged moral topics. The author explains why wild animal suffering matters and how we can intervene to alleviate the suffering. The idea that humans need to be involved in nature seems repulsive to most of us. But we have been doing it since ages when it is beneficial to humans. This time it is only different because the intervention will be for the animals themselves.

[Dayton Martindale · Rating 3 out of 5]

A concise and reasonably clear (though not convincing) case that 1) most wild animals fail to flourish and 2) that we should thus research ways to use CRISPR to modify their reproductive and dietary habits to improve their lives. I found myself wishing it was either shorter or longer—some parts felt repetitive but certain key arguments were established rather hastily. Basically, I remain unconvinced both that lives in the wild are as awful as he suggests, and that CRISPR represents a realistic and safe way to improve said lives. That said, there is certainly suffering in the wild and I too am troubled by it. I appreciate people going through the work to lay out how we might respond to this suffering, even if it largely serves to convince me they are wrong to advocate such responses.

[Heather Browning · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a great overview of the current issues in wild animal ethics. Johannsen describes the problem of wild animal suffering and makes a convincing case for why we have duties to intervene and assist where we can; though I am probably more sceptical then he is about the feasibility of his preferred method of large-scale gene drives.

[Sean Richardson · Rating 4 out of 5]

A few chapters in, I think it's safe to say that this is a great contribution to the animal ethics literature. This (short) book consolidates a great deal of thought on the problem of wild animal suffering. [To be updated...]

[Joachim · Rating 3 out of 5]

Although I broadly agree with the conclusion that Wild Animal Suffering is a cause that deserves more attention and wide-spread support than it now receives, I'm quite unpersuaded by the ethical framework espoused by Johannsen. I don't see how we can uphold moral status of non-human animals on the one hand, and at the same time fail to support interventions that could interfere with humans' autonomy to pursue their own self-interest. Why should the protection of autonomy of non-human animals be any less urgent, given what the life of a typical wild animal looks like.

The author's attitude to negative and positive duties is, from my point of view, also misguided, because ethics is hardly about the benefactor, but about the beneficiary. In other words, the effect that something has upon a subject (e.g. a non-human animal) is what matters, not whether it was caused by humans or by other means. Because it's of little consolation to wild animals that their miserable lives are not mainly the product of human action, there's a robust case for intervening in nature, irrespective of positive and negative duties. This view is decently presented and argued for in Johannsen's book, my remarks notwithstanding.

[Andy Masley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Oh no.