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No Victor, No Vanquished: The Arab-Israeli War, 1973
"A balanced depiction, minutely detail[ing] the causes, preparation, strategies and actual battles of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War." --Booklist
- GenresNonfictionHistory
384 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1978
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
December 25, 2013
A fantastic book that recounts the events leading to the war and its immediate aftermath. The author was able to conduct extensive interviews with most of the leading generals on all sides. The book especially documents the meticulous planning on the Arab side. I was moved by his description of the courage of those Tank Hunting teams of Egyptian soldiers on the first wave of attack who climbed the sand barrier on the East side of the Suez Canal then raced, with all of their equipment, to face the Israeli tanks that came racing to the attack.
The book also deflates many of the Israeli claims that were created to plaster-over the initial shortcomings and unpreparedness of the IDF. The book also documents the tension within the Israeli High Command. It is amazing that the Israeli Army was able to perform as well as it did with General Sharon functioning 'independently' as he did!
The book also deflates many of the Israeli claims that were created to plaster-over the initial shortcomings and unpreparedness of the IDF. The book also documents the tension within the Israeli High Command. It is amazing that the Israeli Army was able to perform as well as it did with General Sharon functioning 'independently' as he did!
March 27, 2017
An excellent read, a fair and balanced opinion that shared the positives and negatives of both sides of the fighting. A great eye opener into the war.
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December 19, 2015 إدجر أوبالانس يتميز بالموضوعية والحياد الكبيرين، ولستَ مضطرا لقراءة الكتاب لتعرف ذلك، يكفيك فقط أن تلقى نظرة على العنوان.
وقد اعتمد بالانس في كتابه على زيارته لأرض المعركة، وعلى المقابلات الشخصية مع القيادات المصرية، وعلى رأسهم الفريق أول أحمد إسماعيل وزير الحربية المصري في زمان الحرب. وقد أصر الكاتب على إلقاء مزيد من الضوء على وجهة النظر المصرية، معتبرا أنه إذا كانت حرب يونيو 67 حربا إسرائيلية، فإن حرب أكتوبر 73 حرب مصرية. ويعتبر بالانس أن العبور الإسرائيلي لغرب قناة السويس فيما بات يعرف في العالم العربي بـ«ثغرة الدفرسوار» لم يكن مذهلا للدرجة التي تحاول إسرائيل إيهام العالم بها، وأن الصورة التي تحاول إسرائيل رسمها عن أنها استطاعت قلب موازين الحرب في النهاية لصالحها، بعبورها إلى إفريقيا وتطويقها الجيش الثالث المصري، وادعائها بأن الطريق للعاصمة المصرية أصبح مفتوحا أمامها، وأن القوى العظمى هي التي حالت دون استسلام الجيش الثالث المصري، وأن جنرالاتها الشباب المفعمين بالحيوية، قد تفوقوا على جنرالات مصر - لم تكن هذه الصورة على الإطلاق سليمة، وأن الإسرائيليين بتكريسهم هذه الصورة يكونون في خطر الوقوع في فخ الغطرسة والثقة الزائدة الذي وقعوا فيه بعد حرب 67. ويرى أن الوضع بعد عبور إسرائيل لإفريقيا قد بات «مخنوقا»، بما يعني أن كلتا القوتين المتحاربتين أصبحت عاجزة عن التقدم أو التأخر، وأنه لم يكن ليضع حدًا لهذا الوضع إلا مرونة الإسرائيليين في التفاوض، لأنهم على المدى البعيد لن يعودوا قادرين على الاعتماد على قوتهم العسكرية.
وقد اعتمد بالانس في كتابه على زيارته لأرض المعركة، وعلى المقابلات الشخصية مع القيادات المصرية، وعلى رأسهم الفريق أول أحمد إسماعيل وزير الحربية المصري في زمان الحرب. وقد أصر الكاتب على إلقاء مزيد من الضوء على وجهة النظر المصرية، معتبرا أنه إذا كانت حرب يونيو 67 حربا إسرائيلية، فإن حرب أكتوبر 73 حرب مصرية. ويعتبر بالانس أن العبور الإسرائيلي لغرب قناة السويس فيما بات يعرف في العالم العربي بـ«ثغرة الدفرسوار» لم يكن مذهلا للدرجة التي تحاول إسرائيل إيهام العالم بها، وأن الصورة التي تحاول إسرائيل رسمها عن أنها استطاعت قلب موازين الحرب في النهاية لصالحها، بعبورها إلى إفريقيا وتطويقها الجيش الثالث المصري، وادعائها بأن الطريق للعاصمة المصرية أصبح مفتوحا أمامها، وأن القوى العظمى هي التي حالت دون استسلام الجيش الثالث المصري، وأن جنرالاتها الشباب المفعمين بالحيوية، قد تفوقوا على جنرالات مصر - لم تكن هذه الصورة على الإطلاق سليمة، وأن الإسرائيليين بتكريسهم هذه الصورة يكونون في خطر الوقوع في فخ الغطرسة والثقة الزائدة الذي وقعوا فيه بعد حرب 67. ويرى أن الوضع بعد عبور إسرائيل لإفريقيا قد بات «مخنوقا»، بما يعني أن كلتا القوتين المتحاربتين أصبحت عاجزة عن التقدم أو التأخر، وأنه لم يكن ليضع حدًا لهذا الوضع إلا مرونة الإسرائيليين في التفاوض، لأنهم على المدى البعيد لن يعودوا قادرين على الاعتماد على قوتهم العسكرية.
December 20, 2012
An important history of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973.
December 4, 2018
Possibly the best account of the October War I’ve read. It tells the story objectively – something few accounts I’ve read are able to do. Very insightful analysis.
October 13, 2021
Strongly recommend. If you are interested in history and have watched many documentary films about the Arab conflict against Israel, then you Must read this book. The book provides the most neutral and professional version of what really happened away from the exaggeration of both sides.
September 30, 2018
Detailed capture of the events with helpful introductions and even better summary of lessons learnt
January 18, 2024
It is unfortunate that a book this extensively-researched is so poorly written.
Writing in 1978, O'Ballance says in the preface that his account of the October War is the result of interviews and visits to the battlefields, which he walked with officers who had actually taken part in the fighting. He espouses a desire to write an "accurrate, 'warts-and-all' history," and insofar as he presents Arab accounts that run counter to myths of staggering Israeli victories and Israeli accounts running counter to Arab myths of their own masterful battlefield prowess, he succeeds. O'Ballance does indeed present"both sides" of the story.
One of the central problems with his book, however, is that it's all he does. Particularly for events in the war taking place after 8 October, O'Ballance writes, "The Arabs say they destroyed 30 Israeli tanks and lost 4 at 0800 here. The Israelis say they didn't lose a single Soldier but destroyed 65 Arab tanks 500 meters east of that place, at 1130." He repeats this formula for almost every single major engagement--the Arabs say X, the Israelis say the completely-different Y--without giving the reader a shred of evidence of any kind to evaluate the wildly-differing narratives. While it is a powerful example of how battlefield reports get warped by propaganda in wartime, it is utterly unhelpful to the reader who wants to learn something about what actually happened.
O'Ballance should have included some of those both-sidesism stories, but then provided the reader evidence to discern at least which version of the story to lean towards. For example, after-action reports written at the time of the battle would be helpful evidence to weigh against an interview O'Ballance conducted with the same commander five years later. Although his in-person interviews and battlefield tours are commendable elements of a research project, this book is a stark example of how, by themselves, they do not a nonfiction history make.
Another frustrating problem is O'Ballance does not appear to understand how different sizes of military units operate. He writes "a company attacked here" and "an armored brigade attacked there" with zero detail about what those operations looked like, or acknowledgement of the fact that each operation involves an exponentially-different level of planning, staff support, and logistical support. Frequently, he just writes, "The Egyptians destroyed an Israeli armored unit here." Unit? Of what echelon? Of what composition? What was the effect of that unit being destroyed? How did that unit's higher headquarters respond? O'Ballance answers none of these questions for the vast majority of the hundreds of engagements he mentions.
Finally, the maps in this book are unconscionably awful. There are too few of them (only one-to-two per front for the entire war), they contain very little detail (almost no terrain relief, significant roads and terrain features missing), and he frequently refers in his narrative to locations which he does not depict on his maps (an immensely-frustrating and easily-avoidable editorial mistake). Also, his hand-drawn "maps" of the initial Egyptian assault and ceasefire lines, including little hand-drawn planes and anti-aircraft guns, are pathetically imprecise and unhelpful.
Overall, an extraordinarily disappointing book. O'Ballance does not deliver on the fair, "accurate" part of his promise to the reader because he provides no way to judge between completely conflicting narratives. Nor does he deliver a real "history", because he provides none of the geographic or operational information necessary to understand what the engagements he mentions actually looked like, where precisely they occurred, who was involved, and what the consequences were. At best, it can be said he does present a "warts-and-all" narrative, allowing the Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli sides to yell contradictory accusations at each other via the medium of conflicting interviews pasted indiscriminately into this book. If you're looking for an account of the war that demonstrates how drastically postwar propaganda warps even recent history, then this is for you. Otherwise, skip it.
Writing in 1978, O'Ballance says in the preface that his account of the October War is the result of interviews and visits to the battlefields, which he walked with officers who had actually taken part in the fighting. He espouses a desire to write an "accurrate, 'warts-and-all' history," and insofar as he presents Arab accounts that run counter to myths of staggering Israeli victories and Israeli accounts running counter to Arab myths of their own masterful battlefield prowess, he succeeds. O'Ballance does indeed present"both sides" of the story.
One of the central problems with his book, however, is that it's all he does. Particularly for events in the war taking place after 8 October, O'Ballance writes, "The Arabs say they destroyed 30 Israeli tanks and lost 4 at 0800 here. The Israelis say they didn't lose a single Soldier but destroyed 65 Arab tanks 500 meters east of that place, at 1130." He repeats this formula for almost every single major engagement--the Arabs say X, the Israelis say the completely-different Y--without giving the reader a shred of evidence of any kind to evaluate the wildly-differing narratives. While it is a powerful example of how battlefield reports get warped by propaganda in wartime, it is utterly unhelpful to the reader who wants to learn something about what actually happened.
O'Ballance should have included some of those both-sidesism stories, but then provided the reader evidence to discern at least which version of the story to lean towards. For example, after-action reports written at the time of the battle would be helpful evidence to weigh against an interview O'Ballance conducted with the same commander five years later. Although his in-person interviews and battlefield tours are commendable elements of a research project, this book is a stark example of how, by themselves, they do not a nonfiction history make.
Another frustrating problem is O'Ballance does not appear to understand how different sizes of military units operate. He writes "a company attacked here" and "an armored brigade attacked there" with zero detail about what those operations looked like, or acknowledgement of the fact that each operation involves an exponentially-different level of planning, staff support, and logistical support. Frequently, he just writes, "The Egyptians destroyed an Israeli armored unit here." Unit? Of what echelon? Of what composition? What was the effect of that unit being destroyed? How did that unit's higher headquarters respond? O'Ballance answers none of these questions for the vast majority of the hundreds of engagements he mentions.
Finally, the maps in this book are unconscionably awful. There are too few of them (only one-to-two per front for the entire war), they contain very little detail (almost no terrain relief, significant roads and terrain features missing), and he frequently refers in his narrative to locations which he does not depict on his maps (an immensely-frustrating and easily-avoidable editorial mistake). Also, his hand-drawn "maps" of the initial Egyptian assault and ceasefire lines, including little hand-drawn planes and anti-aircraft guns, are pathetically imprecise and unhelpful.
Overall, an extraordinarily disappointing book. O'Ballance does not deliver on the fair, "accurate" part of his promise to the reader because he provides no way to judge between completely conflicting narratives. Nor does he deliver a real "history", because he provides none of the geographic or operational information necessary to understand what the engagements he mentions actually looked like, where precisely they occurred, who was involved, and what the consequences were. At best, it can be said he does present a "warts-and-all" narrative, allowing the Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli sides to yell contradictory accusations at each other via the medium of conflicting interviews pasted indiscriminately into this book. If you're looking for an account of the war that demonstrates how drastically postwar propaganda warps even recent history, then this is for you. Otherwise, skip it.
January 11, 2016
A nice overview of the conflict from an objective author, with great insight on the political, militarily, and logistical factors. Suffers a bit from being dated, but its good to view the October War from the perspective at the time and not hindsight.
March 19, 2013
O'Ballance's data and analysis are solid and accurate, making this book a good reference or source for reports and presentations. However, you will seldom find a drier, more somnolescent style.
December 22, 2014
Must read on Yom Kippur War of 1973.
Highly recommended. Factual and the most unbiased account of the Arab Israel War of 1973.
Highly recommended. Factual and the most unbiased account of the Arab Israel War of 1973.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews