What do you think?
The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
What are the materials of conscious perceptual experience? What is going on when we are consciously aware of a visual scene, or hear sounds, or otherwise enjoy sensory experience? In this book David Papineau exposes the flaws in contemporary answers to this central philosophical question and defends a new alternative.
Contemporary theories of perceptual experience all hold that conscious experiences reach out into the world beyond the mind. According to naïve realism, experiences literally incorporate perceived facts, while representationalism holds that experiences contain ordinary properties of the kind possessed by physical objects. These ideas might seem attractive at first sight, however Papineau shows that they do not stand up to examination. Instead, he argues for a purely qualitative account of sensory experience. Conscious sensory experiences are intrinsic states with no essential connection to external circumstances or represented properties. This might run counter to initial intuition, yet Papineau develops this qualitative theory in detail and illustrates how it can accommodate the rich structure of sensory experience.
Papineau's qualitative account has respectable antecedents in the history of philosophy. By placing the qualitative theory on a firm footing, he shows that those curious about experience need not be restricted to the options in contemporary philosophical discourse.
Contemporary theories of perceptual experience all hold that conscious experiences reach out into the world beyond the mind. According to naïve realism, experiences literally incorporate perceived facts, while representationalism holds that experiences contain ordinary properties of the kind possessed by physical objects. These ideas might seem attractive at first sight, however Papineau shows that they do not stand up to examination. Instead, he argues for a purely qualitative account of sensory experience. Conscious sensory experiences are intrinsic states with no essential connection to external circumstances or represented properties. This might run counter to initial intuition, yet Papineau develops this qualitative theory in detail and illustrates how it can accommodate the rich structure of sensory experience.
Papineau's qualitative account has respectable antecedents in the history of philosophy. By placing the qualitative theory on a firm footing, he shows that those curious about experience need not be restricted to the options in contemporary philosophical discourse.
- GenresPhilosophy
176 pages, Hardcover
Published May 18, 2021
About the author
David Papineau
31 books27 followersDavid Papineau ( born 1947) is a British academic philosopher, born in Como, Italy.[1] He works as Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College London and the City University of New York Graduate Center having previously taught for several years at Cambridge University where he was a fellow of Robinson College.
Papineau was born in Italy and grew up in Trinidad, England and South Africa.[citation needed] He received a BSc in mathematics from the University of Natal and a BA and PhD in philosophy from the University of Cambridge under the supervision of Ian Hacking.
He has worked in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophies of science, mind, and mathematics. His overall stance is naturalist and realist. He is one of the originators of the teleosemantic theory of mental representation, a solution to the problem of intentionality which derives the intentional content of our beliefs from their biological purpose. He is also a defender of the a posteriori physicalist solution to the mind-body problem
Papineau was elected President of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science for 1993–5, of the Mind Association for 2009–10 and of the Aristotelian Society for 2013-4
His latest book Knowing the Score (2017) is written for a general readership, and looks at a number of ways in which sporting issues cast light on long-standing philosophical problems.
Papineau lives in London with his wife, Rose Wild
Papineau was born in Italy and grew up in Trinidad, England and South Africa.[citation needed] He received a BSc in mathematics from the University of Natal and a BA and PhD in philosophy from the University of Cambridge under the supervision of Ian Hacking.
He has worked in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophies of science, mind, and mathematics. His overall stance is naturalist and realist. He is one of the originators of the teleosemantic theory of mental representation, a solution to the problem of intentionality which derives the intentional content of our beliefs from their biological purpose. He is also a defender of the a posteriori physicalist solution to the mind-body problem
Papineau was elected President of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science for 1993–5, of the Mind Association for 2009–10 and of the Aristotelian Society for 2013-4
His latest book Knowing the Score (2017) is written for a general readership, and looks at a number of ways in which sporting issues cast light on long-standing philosophical problems.
Papineau lives in London with his wife, Rose Wild
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 29, 2023
It was the primary text of my Philosophy of Mind & Psychology course last Spring.
Would I have read this book of philosophy otherwise?
I did read it full I think, although there maybe some pages I have not read with the fullest attention. (quite a few, certainly, without the attention it requires). It seems possible I may have skipped a few pages too or leafed over too quickly (essentially, meaning, skipped).
This is certainly unfortunate and sad.
However, those will not do anything to blight my understanding of the whole, as it stands today, which is far, far from perfect (or even perhaps adequate), but there is an understanding now. And it is the product of some hard work. And help from a few, at least one, peer (Argon). And talking to the professor helped too, I think. His written comments or feedback certainly did.
I should make it very clear that Papineau has a remarkably clear style of writing. This is much appreciated, of course. It's just the contents or the topic itself is difficult. Extremely so to the novice.
Anyway, my paper, which turned out, much, much, better than expected, focused on a small, narrow but important, but not central, structure of his thoughts (awareness. it was supposed to be about introspection at first. but had to narrow down even further to awareness. or awareness(es), to be more precise, ironically). I thought there may have been an inconsistency there. But his writing, as noted above, is clear enough - although it was certainly problematic here. Andrew's final comment, however, suggested that - there may not be any inconsistencies there, but he (meaning Papineau) needed to be much more careful in his use of language, as my attacks, at least (or maybe at most, haha) demonstrate.
Now, my amateur views of the whole thing: I liked and actually found a large part of the positive thesis (the qualitative view) attractive ( I do not want to use the word, convincing, - I certainly do not have the expertise to hold an opinion). It's easy to see the weaknesses of sense datum theories. Slightly harder for naive realism, or adverbialism (and Papineau, in turns out on the end, builds his thesis based on adverbialism), and it is supposed to be the hardest for representationalism. But Papineau's discussions, in quite a few places, let's take the one concerning transparency, the issues regarding shifting the focus to the intrinsic properties of experience from (what was it), and I forget the one about -- (I can try to locate it later), made a lot of sense. Andrew, is of course dead bent on representationalism, and I suppose there are good (physicalist?) reasons for it. But I need to understand it far better before I can stake my view. It was a struggle, building the understanding I have of representationalism now, as I understood almost NOTHING for a very long time. Even a long way into this very book as well. Thanks to Argon and a bit of perseverance, the first mountain, let's say, Fujiama if not Kaekradong (no that would be too much too little) was summitted. And it's not wrong to be proud of it. But of course, the whole of the Himalayan peaks remain.
Would I have read this book of philosophy otherwise?
I did read it full I think, although there maybe some pages I have not read with the fullest attention. (quite a few, certainly, without the attention it requires). It seems possible I may have skipped a few pages too or leafed over too quickly (essentially, meaning, skipped).
This is certainly unfortunate and sad.
However, those will not do anything to blight my understanding of the whole, as it stands today, which is far, far from perfect (or even perhaps adequate), but there is an understanding now. And it is the product of some hard work. And help from a few, at least one, peer (Argon). And talking to the professor helped too, I think. His written comments or feedback certainly did.
I should make it very clear that Papineau has a remarkably clear style of writing. This is much appreciated, of course. It's just the contents or the topic itself is difficult. Extremely so to the novice.
Anyway, my paper, which turned out, much, much, better than expected, focused on a small, narrow but important, but not central, structure of his thoughts (awareness. it was supposed to be about introspection at first. but had to narrow down even further to awareness. or awareness(es), to be more precise, ironically). I thought there may have been an inconsistency there. But his writing, as noted above, is clear enough - although it was certainly problematic here. Andrew's final comment, however, suggested that - there may not be any inconsistencies there, but he (meaning Papineau) needed to be much more careful in his use of language, as my attacks, at least (or maybe at most, haha) demonstrate.
Now, my amateur views of the whole thing: I liked and actually found a large part of the positive thesis (the qualitative view) attractive ( I do not want to use the word, convincing, - I certainly do not have the expertise to hold an opinion). It's easy to see the weaknesses of sense datum theories. Slightly harder for naive realism, or adverbialism (and Papineau, in turns out on the end, builds his thesis based on adverbialism), and it is supposed to be the hardest for representationalism. But Papineau's discussions, in quite a few places, let's take the one concerning transparency, the issues regarding shifting the focus to the intrinsic properties of experience from (what was it), and I forget the one about -- (I can try to locate it later), made a lot of sense. Andrew, is of course dead bent on representationalism, and I suppose there are good (physicalist?) reasons for it. But I need to understand it far better before I can stake my view. It was a struggle, building the understanding I have of representationalism now, as I understood almost NOTHING for a very long time. Even a long way into this very book as well. Thanks to Argon and a bit of perseverance, the first mountain, let's say, Fujiama if not Kaekradong (no that would be too much too little) was summitted. And it's not wrong to be proud of it. But of course, the whole of the Himalayan peaks remain.
October 10, 2021
I felt that the negative aspect of this book, especially against representationalism, was more informative that its positive thesis.
September 6, 2021
"The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience" by David Papineau is a captivating exploration of the profound questions surrounding our sensory perception of the world. Papineau's expertise shines through as he navigates complex philosophical terrain with remarkable clarity. He seamlessly combines rigorous analysis with engaging examples to make abstract concepts accessible. Whether you're a seasoned philosopher or a curious newcomer, this book offers fresh insights into the nature of consciousness, representation, and reality. While some sections may challenge readers with their depth, Papineau's compelling arguments and thought-provoking ideas make it a rewarding read for those interested in the philosophical underpinnings of sensory experience.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews