There have been enough books on Kargil to start a small library. From the pens of those comprising the brass of the Indian Army at the time of the war (Gen VP Malik [then COAS] and Lt Gen [then Maj Gen] Mohinder Puri [then GOC 8 Mtn Div] to name a couple) to journalistic accounts to academic studies to human-interest stories and biographies of the heroes who recaptured the heights in Ladakh, virtually all bases seem to covered. Only they aren’t. And certainly not from a military perspective. The biggest chink in the accounts by those who have donned the uniform has been that they have viewed matters from a very elevated platform, which is not to say they don’t know what they’re talking about, but the accounts that are needed to create a clearer picture of the war are those of battalion commanders. COs, as they are more commonly and correctly known, command battalions/regiments which are actually tasked with taking the attack to the enemy. They are the authority to which the men actually on the battlefield – officers, JCOs and Other Ranks alike – are answerable, and for whom they, in turn, are directly responsible (this does not, in any way, imply that COs are not actively involved in attacks – they are).
Yet it’s a challenge to find accounts by these officers. A couple are still serving but most are retired. Of course, the war brings with it tremendous trauma, so it’s understandable that recollecting the grim reality of those three months (it wasn’t until the capture of Tololing in June ’99 that the tide turned in India’s favour) is asking a lot, but from both a military and a more academic perspective, the thoughts of the COs would be a goldmine.
Volunteering some information and partially filling the gap is Brig Umesh Singh Bawa, VrC, SM’s Mashkoh: Kargil As I Saw It. Brig Bawa commanded 17 Jat, which was tasked with capturing Pt 4540 and the Pimple Complex in the Mushkoh Valley.
The account is tremendously informative for the amount of material it divulges, going into the overnight move of units deployed in a counter-insurgency/counter-terrorist role in the Kashmir Valley to Ladakh to tackle the “8-10 Mujahideen” who had occupied the heights overlooking NH 1D. Brig Bawa delves into matters of supply, of operational intelligence, and of brass negligence, as well as the heroics of his officers and men, as many as thirty-six of whom were killed in action.
Mashkoh is an angry account. Much of that anger is directed at those responsible for the intrusion by the Pakistan Army into Ladakh (essentially the chain of command from Northern Command downwards to the Brigade Headquarters), and some at the civil administration, whose handling of the aftermath of the war left a sour taste in the mouth. What shines through the account is Brig Bawa’s affection for his men and his insistence on procedure being followed to the T to reduce casualties and ensure success. He lambasts the brass for their handling of the war (Zoos were coming up as the enemy was occupying Indian territory), while also shining a light on the mismanagement and dirty-doings over awards post-Kargil.
Within the part of society that makes up the Armed Forces, not much about the book will be a surprise. It is, however, rare to read accounts which put their points across without any hesitation or cushioning. For those on the outside, it shines a light on the difficulties an Army caught off-guard faced in some of the world’s toughest fighting conditions, a large number of which were of their own making.
What distracts from Mashkoh is the writing – it is unengaging, bland, and often feels impersonal. The voice of the narrative feels contrived, impersonal even. That the stories in the book are incredible, the manner in which they are described leaves a lot to be desired. Facts are repeated a number of times, often in the exact same sentence structure. The book is also riddled with far too many grammatical and spelling errors for them to be ignored. While obviously not the responsibility of the writer, it takes a lot away from the book as a whole.
The book is a mixed bag, but much of its value lies in the frankness with which Brig Bawa deals with matters, operational and administrative. That alone makes it compelling, as does the bravery of 17 Jat, like the many other battalions that fought in the war.