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Modern War Studies
Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars
Since 1798, when Congress authorized John Adams to employ the navy to capture armed French vessels preying on American shipping on the Atlantic coast, U.S. presidents have grappled with the crucible of war. Some have dealt with it skillfully while others have tended toward the inept. Some have wanted to exert their war powers while others have shied away from them. Some have been successful while others have not.
Never having had their authority clearly defined, the presidents, as commanders in chief, have been allowed to interpret the scope of their involvement in wartime decision making. The question of whether a president can order forces into combat against another nation has never been resolved and precedent supports both sides. "Essentially," says Raymond O'Connor, "the president can do whatever he can get away with."
Commanders in Chief , offering an enlightening look at the president's constitutional and political roles during wartime, brings together the work of prominent historians. These experts analyze the war powers of the presidency as well as the wartime leadership of six presidents—William McKinley, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon.
Two of the authors take provocative revisionist views of their subjects. Lewis Gould asserts that McKinley delivered able and talented leadership during the Spanish-American War, while Robert Ferrell sharply criticizes Wilson's leadership during World War I. On the other hand, Warren Kimball emphatically confirms the high ranking by most scholars of Roosevelt as the most gifted wartime chief executive of the twentieth century, and Clayton James substantiates Truman's feisty and pragmatic leadership in two conflicts. In Frank Vandiver's essay on Johnson and Stephen Ambrose's on Nixon, the authors emphasize the diversity of challenges the two presidents faced during the controversial Vietnam War.
Revising and updating earlier studies, including The Ultimate The President as Commander in Chief , the 1960 classic collection edited by Ernest May, this book offers a thoughtful and thought-provoking critique of the character and capabilities of America's modern commanders in chief and presents fresh insight into an issue that affects us all.
Never having had their authority clearly defined, the presidents, as commanders in chief, have been allowed to interpret the scope of their involvement in wartime decision making. The question of whether a president can order forces into combat against another nation has never been resolved and precedent supports both sides. "Essentially," says Raymond O'Connor, "the president can do whatever he can get away with."
Commanders in Chief , offering an enlightening look at the president's constitutional and political roles during wartime, brings together the work of prominent historians. These experts analyze the war powers of the presidency as well as the wartime leadership of six presidents—William McKinley, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon.
Two of the authors take provocative revisionist views of their subjects. Lewis Gould asserts that McKinley delivered able and talented leadership during the Spanish-American War, while Robert Ferrell sharply criticizes Wilson's leadership during World War I. On the other hand, Warren Kimball emphatically confirms the high ranking by most scholars of Roosevelt as the most gifted wartime chief executive of the twentieth century, and Clayton James substantiates Truman's feisty and pragmatic leadership in two conflicts. In Frank Vandiver's essay on Johnson and Stephen Ambrose's on Nixon, the authors emphasize the diversity of challenges the two presidents faced during the controversial Vietnam War.
Revising and updating earlier studies, including The Ultimate The President as Commander in Chief , the 1960 classic collection edited by Ernest May, this book offers a thoughtful and thought-provoking critique of the character and capabilities of America's modern commanders in chief and presents fresh insight into an issue that affects us all.
248 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 1993
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September 21, 2024
Commanders In Chief consists of revised papers delivered to a symposium of the Military Studies Institute of Texas A & M University in 1990. Modern wartime presidents studied are William McKinley, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.
The first chapter explores the president’s role as commander-in-chief from debates at the Constitutional Convention and in the Federalist Papers continuing through James K. Polk's management of the Mexican War and Abraham Lincoln's Civil War experience. Lesser remembered, but noted on these pages are Grover Cleveland's dispatch of troops to Samoa and Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft's initiatives in the Caribbean. Though remembered for larger conflicts, Woodrow Wilson assigned John J. Pershing to capture Pancho Villa in Mexico and FDR ordered the occupation of Iceland, convoy escort and direct combat with German submarines before American entry into World War II.
The next six chapters each deal with one president, beginning with William McKinley's management of the Spanish American War. McKinley's author, Lewis L. Gould, represents the minority of historians who regard McKinley as "a more effective and purposeful war leader than legend would have us believe." In taking on Spain, he successfully prosecuted a limited war for limited objectives. An activist leader, McKinley requited former Confederate officers into the Army and personally overruled the tentative truce negotiated by his local commander at Santiago de Cuba, Gen. Shafter, that would have allowed the Spanish army to withdraw, rather than surrender. Spain having been vanquished, McKinley continued a war against nationalist forces in the Philippines and sent troops to defend foreigners during the Boxer Rebellion in China. In summary, McKinley is characterized as "in many respects the first modern American Commander-in-chief" whose performance "was part of a larger role of executive leadership that also made him truly the first modern president."
Robert H. Ferrell posits that Woodrow Wilson was "A Misfit In Office". He expands on this proposition by examining Wilson's background of Victorian era confidence who thought war was a thing of the past and his failed personnel choices and lack of follow-up. Though successful on the battlefield "the historian cannot help but conclude that blame for the egregious errors in mobilization, economic and military should lie primarily with the commander in chief".
Warren F. Kimball's analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt as "Dr. Win-The-War" reflects on the intertwining of the military with the political and war and post-war aims. Listing decisions made by FDR: Germany first; dispatch forces to Iceland in the summer of 1941; Torch and Overlord; and the invasion of southern France place the President in the vortex of war policy. Kimball's critique of Roosevelt focuses less on the strictly military and more on the expansion of executive power in the name of winning the war.
Harry Truman's administration of the conclusion of World War II, the occupation of Japan and the Korean War provide ample material for D. Clayton James to plumb. He challenges conventional wisdom on three main Truman command decisions: the use of atomic bombs against Japan; the commitment of troops to the defense of South Korea; and the decision to remove General MacArthur from command in Korea. James raises the claims that peace could have been achieved by acceptance of the retention of the Emperor, as was eventually done, without the need for nuclear attacks or invasion of Japan. He also identifies Truman as the originator and expander of America's nuclear force, to the detriment of its conventional forces. Intervention in Korea he attributes primarily to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who originated the response while Truman was returning from Missouri. He justifies the dismissal of MacArthur on the basis of insubordination, while debunking the claims that "our Big General in the East" advocated an invasion of China or that he threatened to start World War III. Though raising many criticisms of Truman's policies, he credits him with maintaining a Western European focus when others' attention was directed toward Asia. James ends his essay with a list of other Truman related issues for subsequent scholars to fathom.
Characterizing Lyndon Johnson as "A Reluctant Hawk" Frank Vandiver explores the roads his subject followed into the jungles of Vietnam. Asserting that Johnson was rarely more effective than in the Tonkin crisis, Vandiver follows Johnson’s increasing involvement in his war with target selection, incremental escalation, negotiations and. always, concern for each American serviceman. In the end, Vandiver grades LBJ on seven criteria, concluding that he sought consensus and commanded when necessary, but always with discomfort.
The final commander is Stephen Ambrose's Richard Nixon, "A Belligerent Dove". Entering the White House after the Tet offensive, victory over North Vietnam off the table and honorable withdrawal became Nixon's policy. Of particular interest is Ambrose's dissection of the proposed Duck Hook, a massive retaliation against North Vietnam. Dismissed due to anticipated domestic resistance, it was a decision Nixon cited as the worst of his presidency. Problems continued: low morale, evidenced by massive drug use; failure of ARVN units to effectively replace withdrawn Americans; escalation of the air war, to exert diplomatic as much as military pressure and a weak ally in Saigon. In his assessment, Ambrose lists Nixon's shortcomings while acknowledging the almost impossible task he faced.
In his Epilogue, Roger Beaumont ties the thoughts of the essayists into a series of questions aimed to guide then current and future commanders in meeting their challenges.
This brief book is thoroughly footnoted. The biographies of the essayists establish their credentials. In Commanders In Chief, readers will find thoughtful explorations of the issues and actions of American war-time presidents of the first three-quarters of the twentieth century. It is helpful to study leaders, not always in isolation, but sometimes side-by-side so their strengths and weakness, wisdoms and follies can be discerned through comparison and contrast.
I received a free copy of this book without an obligation to post a review.
The first chapter explores the president’s role as commander-in-chief from debates at the Constitutional Convention and in the Federalist Papers continuing through James K. Polk's management of the Mexican War and Abraham Lincoln's Civil War experience. Lesser remembered, but noted on these pages are Grover Cleveland's dispatch of troops to Samoa and Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft's initiatives in the Caribbean. Though remembered for larger conflicts, Woodrow Wilson assigned John J. Pershing to capture Pancho Villa in Mexico and FDR ordered the occupation of Iceland, convoy escort and direct combat with German submarines before American entry into World War II.
The next six chapters each deal with one president, beginning with William McKinley's management of the Spanish American War. McKinley's author, Lewis L. Gould, represents the minority of historians who regard McKinley as "a more effective and purposeful war leader than legend would have us believe." In taking on Spain, he successfully prosecuted a limited war for limited objectives. An activist leader, McKinley requited former Confederate officers into the Army and personally overruled the tentative truce negotiated by his local commander at Santiago de Cuba, Gen. Shafter, that would have allowed the Spanish army to withdraw, rather than surrender. Spain having been vanquished, McKinley continued a war against nationalist forces in the Philippines and sent troops to defend foreigners during the Boxer Rebellion in China. In summary, McKinley is characterized as "in many respects the first modern American Commander-in-chief" whose performance "was part of a larger role of executive leadership that also made him truly the first modern president."
Robert H. Ferrell posits that Woodrow Wilson was "A Misfit In Office". He expands on this proposition by examining Wilson's background of Victorian era confidence who thought war was a thing of the past and his failed personnel choices and lack of follow-up. Though successful on the battlefield "the historian cannot help but conclude that blame for the egregious errors in mobilization, economic and military should lie primarily with the commander in chief".
Warren F. Kimball's analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt as "Dr. Win-The-War" reflects on the intertwining of the military with the political and war and post-war aims. Listing decisions made by FDR: Germany first; dispatch forces to Iceland in the summer of 1941; Torch and Overlord; and the invasion of southern France place the President in the vortex of war policy. Kimball's critique of Roosevelt focuses less on the strictly military and more on the expansion of executive power in the name of winning the war.
Harry Truman's administration of the conclusion of World War II, the occupation of Japan and the Korean War provide ample material for D. Clayton James to plumb. He challenges conventional wisdom on three main Truman command decisions: the use of atomic bombs against Japan; the commitment of troops to the defense of South Korea; and the decision to remove General MacArthur from command in Korea. James raises the claims that peace could have been achieved by acceptance of the retention of the Emperor, as was eventually done, without the need for nuclear attacks or invasion of Japan. He also identifies Truman as the originator and expander of America's nuclear force, to the detriment of its conventional forces. Intervention in Korea he attributes primarily to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who originated the response while Truman was returning from Missouri. He justifies the dismissal of MacArthur on the basis of insubordination, while debunking the claims that "our Big General in the East" advocated an invasion of China or that he threatened to start World War III. Though raising many criticisms of Truman's policies, he credits him with maintaining a Western European focus when others' attention was directed toward Asia. James ends his essay with a list of other Truman related issues for subsequent scholars to fathom.
Characterizing Lyndon Johnson as "A Reluctant Hawk" Frank Vandiver explores the roads his subject followed into the jungles of Vietnam. Asserting that Johnson was rarely more effective than in the Tonkin crisis, Vandiver follows Johnson’s increasing involvement in his war with target selection, incremental escalation, negotiations and. always, concern for each American serviceman. In the end, Vandiver grades LBJ on seven criteria, concluding that he sought consensus and commanded when necessary, but always with discomfort.
The final commander is Stephen Ambrose's Richard Nixon, "A Belligerent Dove". Entering the White House after the Tet offensive, victory over North Vietnam off the table and honorable withdrawal became Nixon's policy. Of particular interest is Ambrose's dissection of the proposed Duck Hook, a massive retaliation against North Vietnam. Dismissed due to anticipated domestic resistance, it was a decision Nixon cited as the worst of his presidency. Problems continued: low morale, evidenced by massive drug use; failure of ARVN units to effectively replace withdrawn Americans; escalation of the air war, to exert diplomatic as much as military pressure and a weak ally in Saigon. In his assessment, Ambrose lists Nixon's shortcomings while acknowledging the almost impossible task he faced.
In his Epilogue, Roger Beaumont ties the thoughts of the essayists into a series of questions aimed to guide then current and future commanders in meeting their challenges.
This brief book is thoroughly footnoted. The biographies of the essayists establish their credentials. In Commanders In Chief, readers will find thoughtful explorations of the issues and actions of American war-time presidents of the first three-quarters of the twentieth century. It is helpful to study leaders, not always in isolation, but sometimes side-by-side so their strengths and weakness, wisdoms and follies can be discerned through comparison and contrast.
I received a free copy of this book without an obligation to post a review.
Displaying 1 of 1 review