The United States military is the most humane army in history, and it is not a good thing. These are two pretty controversial points, yet Samuel Moyn makes a convincing case for both of them, and it will upend the way you think about war and peace.
Today we live in a country where lawyers have to approve airstrikes, and where generals pride themselves on following international human rights law. Yet this humanitarianism has not prevented the emergence of endless bloodshed. On the contrary, the entire world has become an American battlefield, as drones and special forces hunt down the United States's enemies without limits. Moyn argues that the first helped cause the second — that the rise of "humane, light-footprint" war has helped hide its costs from the public.
The book is pretty dense. Moyn gets into the weeds of intellectual debates, and profiles the individual scholars and lawyers who helped shape global debates on brutality and humanity. That said, it's not a specialist book, and is about as accessible a book on such a complicated topic can get. And the sources he cites are really varied, from excerpts from a Leo Tolstoy novel to an activist who disrupted an Obama speech.
Moyn begins his explanation in the 19th century, when two European movements began in reaction to the brutality of modern warfare. The humanitarians, like the early Red Cross, wanted to established new rules for armies that protected civilians and prisoners. The anti-war activists, meanwhile, wanted to abolish war entirely. And surprisingly, the two movements were often at odds with each other. While the humanitarians accused the anti-war side of being unrealistic ideologues, the anti-war activists argued that humanitarians were only putting a pretty face on an evil institution.
Of course, neither side got what it wanted at first. War became more brutal *and* more widespread, reaching its bloody apex in World War II. Finally, states began to acknowledge the concept of crimes against humanity, and the idea that aggression itself was a crime. Yet brutality and war continued. European powers attempted to hold onto their colonies Africa and Southeast Asia through extreme force, which bled into equally-brutal proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union in places like Korea and Vietnam.
Things began to change in the 1970s, as countries around the world signed human rights laws like the new Geneva Conventions. In the First World, the public was disgusted by the various war crimes that came to light during the Vietnam War. In the Second World — the Communist bloc — governments wanted to take the moral high ground from the First World. And in the Third World, newly-independent states wanted to prevent the kinds of horrific violence that Europe had unleashed on their people during colonial wars.
But as the United States accepted limits on *how* it could fight wars, it shed all limits on *when* and *where* it could fight them. After the fall of Communism, the USA was left as the world's sole military superpower. It used this power frequently, and sometimes even justified its wars *through* defending human rights law. And in many ways,
All of these processes came to a head during the Bush and Obama administrations. In response to 9/11, George W. Bush unleashed global military interventions and tried to shed some of the laws of war. But the backlash to war crimes — particularly the crime of torture — from U.S. lawyers and the general public was intense. Barack Obama then came to office promising to undo the worst excesses of the War on Terror. But he continued the war itself, with the same expansive legal justifications, and public debate over *why* America should be fighting in the Middle East died down.
Finally came Donald Trump, who brought more fundamental questions back to public consciousness. First, by railing against "endless wars," Trump helped break the elite consensus around continuing the War on Terror. Second, by nearly starting a full-on war with Iran, he reopened questions over what authorities the President should have over war and peace. After all, a conflict against a regional power is not the same as plinking terrorists in no-man's-land.
Moyn then ends by arguing that the evil of war is not necessarily the violence, but the domination. He speculates that, in the age of robots and AI, it will possible for militaries to take over vast territories with no civilian casualties. And this outcome, Moyn argues, could lead to a kind of global slavery. I understand his point, but it felt a bit like it had come out of nowhere. Going back, I can see how Moyn came to this conclusion, although I wish he had been more explicit in pointing to it.
Overall, I recommend the book if you want to have your ways of thinking about war and peace turned upside-down.