Deception in War

by Jon Latimer

January 16, 1991. Operation Desert Storm's coalition forces are arrayed along the Saudi border with Kuwait, on the other side of which lurks the bulk of Saddam Hussein's army. While the battle for air supremacy is being waged in the skies, the coalition forces pull off a stunning, and ultimately decisive, deception. Later dubbed the "Hail Mary Pass," it consists of the abrupt relocation of the coalition ground forces hundreds of miles to the West. Meanwhile, as inflatable decoys, deceptive radio transmissions, and psyops leaflets all lead them to believe, the Iraqis are expecting an amphibious assault from the Persian Gulf, hundreds of miles from where it is actually occurring. The world's fourth largest army is preparing to engage a horde of phantoms. The coalition forces are able to march deep into Iraq with little opposition. Within one hundred days, Kuwait City is liberated and a decisive victory by the coalition forces is won.

Deception on the battlefield is surely as old as warfare itself. The examples stretch from the very beginnings of recorded military history—Pharaoh Ramses II's campaign against the Hittites in 1294 B.C.—to modern times, when technology has placed a stunning array of devices into the arsenals of military commanders. Military historians often underestimate the importance of deception in warfare. This book is the first to fully describe its value. Jon Latimer shows how simple some tricks have been, but also how technology has increased the range and subtlety of what is possible—bogus radio traffic, virtual images, even false smells. He draws examples from land, sea, and air to show how great commanders have always had, as WinstonChurchill put it, that indispensable "element of legerdemain, an original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten."

Author Biography: Jon Latimer served for sixteen years as an officer in the Royal Welch Fusiliers, as Platoon Commander, Assault Troop Leader and Battalion Intelligence Officer. He has published widely in military journals, and is also the author of Operation Compass 1940 and, with Jim Laurier, of CAM080 Tobruk 1941.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, Military History, Nonfiction, Espionage

412 pages, Kindle Edition

First published November 12, 2001

About the author

Educated at Christleton County High School in Chester, Jon Latimer studied for a geography degree at University College, Swansea but switched course to graduate in oceanography. He worked as an oceanographer until becoming a full-time writer in 1997.

Reviews

[James · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great discussion of a side of warfare that is sometimes overlooked in the popular media and imagination, but one that has determined the fates of empires. Highly recommended for anyone interested in military history.

[Joker]

"Im kosztowniejsze i bardziej intensywne stają się działania wojenne, tym cenniejsze są udane podstępy wojenne". Trudno nie zgodzić się z tym stwierdzeniem. Na 336 stornach poznajemy techniki podstępu używane od starożytności po dzisiejsze czasy. Na poziomie taktycznym, strategicznym, dodatkowo autor pokusił się o podział dla wojsk lądowych, marynarki wojennej oraz lotnictwa. Do minusów należy dodać chaotyczność i przeskakiwanie od tematu do tematu.

[Richard Garcia · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book on all things deception in war. If you want to know about deception strategies used in previous war, this book is what you are looking for. I used this for my dissertation on the 23rd Special Troops (Ghost Army).

[Rick · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really liked the breadth and depth covered in this book.

[Kay · Rating 3 out of 5]

Hmmm... I was probably in over my head on this one, as I struggled quite a bit. While the book is a broad analysis of the military bluff up to the present day, there's a considerable amount of material here on WWII, which was my main interest. However, the deceptions include material going all the way back to the Hittites. I haven't the background in military history or tactics necessary to really appreciate a lot of this, but at least the book made me think about how much warfare is based on concealment and misdirection. There's so much material here that I found it almost hard to take in. Then again, it's the kind of book I could come back to after further reading and probably get a lot more out of.

[Inknscroll]

This book, also, was recommended in the "Bookmarks" magazine's issues of either: (Nov/ Dec 2007) or (Jan/ Feb 2008).