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The Aptness of Anger
22 pages, ebook
Published July 9, 2017
About the author
Amia Srinivasan
5 books529 followersAmia Srinivasan is the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at All Souls College, Oxford. Previously she was an associate professor of philosophy at St John’s College, Oxford, and before that a lecturer in philosophy at University College London.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
December 7, 2023
Rage like there is no tomorrow: a review of "The Aptness of anger"
Anger can be counterproductive, but is this reason enough to remove it from public space? In this research paper, Srinivasan asks us to consider that anger is sometimes an apt response to the state of things. Then she asks the counterproductivity critics: why should pragmatical reasons overlap the intrinsical reasons we have to be mad?
The philosopher is also unappeasable against the rhetorical strategy that often lies behind the counterproductivity argument. The critic worriedly approaches the angry person or collective and says: getting mad only makes things worse for you. In such a way, the discussion has shifted from the space of reasons for being angry to the space of consequences of being angry. In other words, the question of anger's utility eclipses the question of anger's aptness.
And why is the anger critic interested in this argumentative movement? Often, Srinivasan remarks, because he is a defensor of the status quo. Centering the debate on the aptness of anger makes us focus necessarily on the factors that cause it, and realize they aren’t perennial, but the product of contingent social reality.
The counterproductivist critic assumes that the locus of responsibility for bettering the situation is the victim’s feelings instead of the perpetrator’s action. It is pretended to conceal the fact that not getting angry is good advice only because there is a white oppressor willing to exercise violence —says the philosopher, making reference to the struggle for African Americans’ rights—.
A reflection on anger critic tradition closes this brilliant article. When the stoics spoke of anger control, they were thinking of Aquiles' rage. There was no need to speak of women, slaves, children, or weak. That's because the mere possibility of feeling heated was reserved for the free man, who then could decide whether to be a fair and rational master, leader, husband, or father or to be an emotion-dominated tyrant. By censoring anger, Srinavasan reminds us, we perpetuate the invisibilization of apt emotions felt by silenced collectives.
Anger can be counterproductive, but is this reason enough to remove it from public space? In this research paper, Srinivasan asks us to consider that anger is sometimes an apt response to the state of things. Then she asks the counterproductivity critics: why should pragmatical reasons overlap the intrinsical reasons we have to be mad?
The philosopher is also unappeasable against the rhetorical strategy that often lies behind the counterproductivity argument. The critic worriedly approaches the angry person or collective and says: getting mad only makes things worse for you. In such a way, the discussion has shifted from the space of reasons for being angry to the space of consequences of being angry. In other words, the question of anger's utility eclipses the question of anger's aptness.
And why is the anger critic interested in this argumentative movement? Often, Srinivasan remarks, because he is a defensor of the status quo. Centering the debate on the aptness of anger makes us focus necessarily on the factors that cause it, and realize they aren’t perennial, but the product of contingent social reality.
The counterproductivist critic assumes that the locus of responsibility for bettering the situation is the victim’s feelings instead of the perpetrator’s action. It is pretended to conceal the fact that not getting angry is good advice only because there is a white oppressor willing to exercise violence —says the philosopher, making reference to the struggle for African Americans’ rights—.
A reflection on anger critic tradition closes this brilliant article. When the stoics spoke of anger control, they were thinking of Aquiles' rage. There was no need to speak of women, slaves, children, or weak. That's because the mere possibility of feeling heated was reserved for the free man, who then could decide whether to be a fair and rational master, leader, husband, or father or to be an emotion-dominated tyrant. By censoring anger, Srinavasan reminds us, we perpetuate the invisibilization of apt emotions felt by silenced collectives.
April 4, 2026
Srinivasan never dissapoints
January 11, 2021
Amazing
May 23, 2022
YES!!!
June 5, 2023
brain expanding stuff
August 13, 2025
Interesting to consider in conjuntion with Aeschylus' Eumenides - the conflict that is drawn between male "rationality" and (justified?) female rage
May 19, 2026
"we condemn anger. But in so doing we neglect, as we have always neglected, those who were never allowed to be angry, the slaves and women who have the power of neither the state nor the sword."
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews