Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali's 2006 Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary is a fascinating 5-star read for anyone interested in the Cold War.
We all know certain highlights of Nikita S. Khrushchev's exploits. The "kitchen debate" where he chided Richard Nixon, "You don't know everything, you know!"-- The infamous "We will bury you" quote-- The boorish pounding of his shoe at the United Nations-- His bold adventurism and then embarrassing withdrawal during the Cuban Missile Crisis-- All of these--along with Hungary, Sputnik, the U-2, Gagarin, Berlin, the Tsar Bomba--are part of the legend of a man larger than life, who seemed to make the course of world events tremble at his mere bluster or whim.
Fursenko and Naftali, however, go far beyond simply retelling what we already know. Using not only American and British government documents but also their research in the Russian archives opened after the fall of the Soviet Union, and even interviews with participants from both sides of the former Iron Curtain, Fursenko and Naftali offer a wealth of information and interpretations that richly increases our understanding of the tumultuous period of superpower relations from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s.
Khrushchev himself was a figure of contradictions, and hence a leader somewhat inscrutable. He could condemn the once-glorified Josef Stalin as one who "ruined the Party," "erased all that is holy in a human being," and "bent everything to his caprices," and yet several months later order Red Army tanks and troops to kill hundreds to put down a revolt in Hungary (page 123). Khrushchev truly did want nuclear disarmament, Fursenko and Naftali show--it was not simply a "peace offensive" made to score propaganda points and then be rejected by the West--but he would have allowed inspections "on Soviet soil only after the weapons had been destroyed" (page 291)...a literally incredible amount of Western trust thus being required in the era of the hydrogen bomb. He gave moral and, eventually, financial and even materiel support to revolutionary or emerging leaders in the Third World, even when they may have been more nationalist than actually socialist, and yet he rarely could he truly count on their gratitude, let alone political support.
Khrushchev was a committed Communist, but after "reach[ing] the disquieting conclusion" in 1956 that unrest in Poland and Hungary had been caused by government "failure to provide...adequate standards of living," he pumped an "emergency investment" into the 1957 budget to raise "Soviet standards of living, especially for the industrial working class,...to forestall political trouble" (pages 141-42). If people could see Communism working, Khrushchev reasoned, then they naturally would agree with it and would feel no desire to rebel or to flee, and the rest of the world ultimately would be converted by the shining example of the oh-so wonderful Soviet bloc. In a burst of enthusiasm, in 1957 speeches he proclaimed that the Soviet Union's economy would "overtake and surpass" anything in the West, and that by 1960 they would "catch up with the United States in per capita meat production"...which meant "almost a tripling" in a mere three years (page 145).
Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States, however, showed him firsthand the true level of wealth and plenty that a nation already primitive before being gutted by the Second World War simply could not achieve anytime soon. Perhaps catching up would take fifteen or twenty years, he realized (page 245). And although the Soviet leader had every confidence in the rightness of his nation's system, he "could not risk granting American-style democracy to [the] people" until those people could be certain, too--a certainty not yet guaranteed "so long as they were ill fed, poorly sheltered, and underemployed and the citizens of the West enjoyed a higher standard of living" (page 245).
Moreover, in the meantime the Soviet Union still needed to appear big and strong and bold to the outside world. Although the Red Army was huge, Khrushchev directed the navy to build "missile ships and submarines, rather than aircraft carriers" (page 77), thereby eschewing a powerful tool for force projection, and the Bison bomber intended to rival the American B-52 turned ended up with a range too short to reach the United States (page 39). The imagined "bomber gap" feared by American journalists, the public, and Congress, then--but of course not by President Eisenhower, who knew the facts via illegal U-2 overflights but could not reveal them--could only be a source of "glee" on the Soviet side (page 40), while in November 1959 Khrushchev boasted of having "such a stock of rockets, such an amount of atomic and hydrogen weapons, that if they attack us we could wipe our potential enemies off the face of the earth" (page 248). And in Cuba... Well, although "[t]o second-tier officials" Khrushchev referred to his movement of nuclear missiles to Cuba as being for defense of the island against U.S. aggression, he explained frankly in the Presidium, "This will be an offensive policy" (page 435), intended to threaten America and make the Soviet deterrent meaningful rather than mainly hollow threat.
Such are the paradoxes of the rule of Nikita S. Khrushchev, a man who, as much as he disagreed with the capitalist system, believed that peaceful coexistence and disarmament--especially once a President could be wooed away from the supposed vested interests always ready to torpedo efforts toward peace--were preferable to an expensive arms race, and ultimately would show the superiority of Communism. But this man, whose early program of de-Stalinization freed "the vast majority of the 2.5 million prisoners of the gulag" and yet who by 1957 had begun to crack down again on possible "dissenters" (page 141), believed that nuclear bluff and bluster could make the West abandon West Berlin and make the United States accept a new Soviet nuclear base just 90 miles from Florida.
Clearly, however, this was not the case, spin his retreats as winning gambits though he might. And the removal from power of the once-swaggering Khrushchev? After all his adventures, nominally it stemmed his single-handed elimination of the highly vocational eleventh year of Soviet education to leave only ten years of classes (page 532)--just don't imagine, though, that when, as Khrushchev put it, the members of the Presidium "gathered together and splatter[ed] shit on [him]" (page 538), there was no discussion of his foreign policy, too.
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali's Khrushchev's Cold War reveals so much more detail and nuance of this short and yet larger than life leader, and the era itself, than any of the old black-and-white photos and films ever could. Without apologizing for the man's outrages or his casual quashing of personal and political freedom, the book ably and entertainingly shows us how the other side thought and felt and planned during one of the most dangerous periods of postwar history.