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"Холодная война" Хрущева. Тайная история противника Америки
Книга канадско-американского исследователя Тимоти Нафтали и известного российского историка академика Александра Александровича Фурсенко (1927–2008) посвящена исследованию внешней политики СССР, проводившейся Н. С. Хрущевым. На основании многочисленных источников из российских, американских и европейских архивов авторы проследили сложную динамику взаимодействия Хрущева с президентами США – Дуайтом Эйзенхауэром и Джоном Кеннеди – взаимодействия, для которого было характерно как стремление к превосходству, так одновременно и к мирному сосуществованию. За это исследование А. А. Фурсенко и Т. Нафтали в 2007 году были награждены престижной британской премией – медалью герцога Вестминстерского за военную литературу (The 2007 Duke of Westminster’s Medal for Military Literature). Монументальная монография Фурсенко и Нафтали будет интересна не только специалистам-историкам, но и всем интересующимся историей внешней политики.
734 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
November 26, 2019
Well written, this is not so much a biography of Khrushchev as it is a record of the Cold War from the perspective of his administration. As such, it took me back to events (mostly) dimly recollected from childhood such as the missile and space races, the Laotian crisis, the Berlin crises, the Cuban crises, the Lumumba assassination, the formation of the UAR and, more positively, Khrushchev's visit to middle America. Personally, probably influenced by that visit, I saw him as a somewhat avuncular figure.
As represented herein, Khrushchev comes across as a convinced Marxist-Leninist who genuinely believed that, with arms control, the Soviet Union could actually catch up with the USA as regards the standard of living. Sadly, that was not to be, arms control not going much beyond the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Soviet resources being drained in its often futile attempts to play military catch up and to curry favor with the Third World. Happily, however, the three principal executives of the period, Khrushchev, Eisenhower and Kennedy, come across as rational men, none of them intent on eliminating their geopolitical rival.
As represented herein, Khrushchev comes across as a convinced Marxist-Leninist who genuinely believed that, with arms control, the Soviet Union could actually catch up with the USA as regards the standard of living. Sadly, that was not to be, arms control not going much beyond the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Soviet resources being drained in its often futile attempts to play military catch up and to curry favor with the Third World. Happily, however, the three principal executives of the period, Khrushchev, Eisenhower and Kennedy, come across as rational men, none of them intent on eliminating their geopolitical rival.
February 4, 2012
ALEKSANDR FURSENKO'S and TIMOTHY NAFTALI'S KHRUSCHEV'S COLD WAR is one of the best books written on the Soviet leaders life in recent years and incorporates many newly declassified documents to present a new and detailed account on the Soviet leaders life. It is mostly a book about his time in charge during the cold war. The authors do not go back into his childhood or spend much time following his leaving power. It is a political and diplomatic history of his life looking at his failures and accomplishments while in charge of the Soviet Union. It furthers what most researchers on Russia have found recently that if ever the term paper tiger applied, it was to Soviet Russia. Khrushchev made the best of his lack of economic resources and tired to compete as a power on the world stage with few economic developments and a falling standard of living for the Russian people which he constantly worried about. From Hungary to the Cuban Missile Crises with Berlin, southeast Asia and the middle east inbetween this book covers the salient moments in his career with lucid detail and thoughtful analysis. For those who want to learn more about this time in the Soviet Union's history and more about the man who dominated it this is an excellent book to start with
October 1, 2012
“Khrushchev's Cold War” documents Nikila Sergeyevich Khrushchev's career, from his rise to power in 1955 to his fall in 1964. During this period some of the most monumental crises occurred in the Suez, Berlin, Iraq, and Cuba.
The book robbed me of many misconceptions, especially regarding the power of emerging countries in the Cold War. I had thought of the United States and the Soviet Union as two players pushing about unresisting pieces. But in reality these pieces had minds and agendas of their own. For example, take Nasser, the leader of Egypt. The Soviet Union courted him, but he wanted the U.S.'s weapons, so for the longest time Nasser played the super powers off each other, using their mutual distrust. Even once on the same side, countries didn't just go along with their superpower sponsors. They got tetchy, rebelled, and then had to be calmed down by ambassadors.
Scholars, of course, have been well aware of the dynamics between emerging countries and the superpowers. What makes Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali’s book stand out are the authors’ unique sources. The authors obtained access to Khrushchev's private records and also recordings of the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the top-secret Soviet decision making body of the Soviet Union. Together these records give unparalleled insight into the Soviet Union and the attitude of Khrushchev at the time.
Khrushchev, it turns out, had an ambitious, reckless, dynamic personality that deeply influenced his foreign policy. Born to a peasant Russian family, and raised with little schooling, Khrushchev first became prominent in Russia due to his loud opinions on agriculture and industry. Even as leader, meeting the basic needs of the Soviet Union remained forefront in his mind. The Soviet Union, Khrushchev said, was like “a hungry person who had just awakened and wanted to eat. Such a person would not wash his hands before eating.”
On his trip to America, Khrushchev visited the farm of Iowan Bob Garst. Garst's innovative farming methods and eagerness to better Soviet relationships struck a deep cord with Khrushchev, who later sent Soviet delegates to study there. Upon their return he bragged about them in the Presidium. “They have studied under Garst,” he said “they didn't go in vain, they really studied well.”
Khrushchev’s stubborn refusal to admit defeat pulled him through difficult times. Once the members of the Presidium voted him out of control. Before Khrushchev, no Soviet leader had survived this. But Khrushchev simply went out, rallied support, and hung on.
Apparent success in foreign policy bolstered his prideful streak. Khrushchev, the book explains, believed that Western countries had backed down during the Suez and Iraqi crises due to the Soviet Union’s nuclear threats.
Just as Khrushchev never understood the Western rational in many situations, the U.S. intelligence failed to comprehend Khrushchev's full motives. This was unsurprising considering the man's almost bipolar attitude, especially in foreign policy. For all that he preached and honestly worked towards detente, he also introduced the policy of meniscus – the term for the bubble of liquid on the top of a glass that does not spill over but easily could – which proposed to push tension so high that the other countries would give in from fear of breaking the tension and spilling the glass, causing a war. This policy stemmed from Khrushchev’s recognition of the Soviet Union as the weaker power. He decided the only way for the Soviet Union to stay on top was to apply continual pressure on the U.S. “Because if we don’t have Meniscus,” he said “we let the enemy live in peace.”
The leaders of the countries had a complex relationship. Khrushchev thought the U.S. to be composed of two separate sides, one that wanted peace, and one that wanted war. He thought Eisenhower genuinely wanted peace, but feared the hard-liners in the House and Senate, such as Nixon and Dulles. When the American surveillance plane crashed into Russia on May Day, Khrushchev struggled to reconcile it with his belief in Eisenhower. “I am a human being and I have human feelings,” he said. “I had hopes and they were betrayed.” Later he confessed “I don’t believe in Eisenhower now.”
As the book shows, neither leader wanted war. America vastly overestimated the Soviet Union's power and missiles. Khrushchev knew this, and soon realized he could use a nuclear ploy to intimidate his enemies. But he remained painfully aware of the gap between them. During his visit to America, when an American ambassador mentioned that the Soviets were ahead in many fields, especially strategic rockets, Khrushchev candidly replied “No, we're not, not really.” At the time no one heeded him.
In fact, Khrushchev possessed a huge inferiority complex with the U.S. - he chose to fly there in his biggest plane, even though it was an unsafe experimental one, just to make a strong impression.
Khrushchev’s often-immature attitude reveals itself in his rationale for putting missiles in Cuba, an act that resulted in the Cold War’s most tense moment. “The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear missiles,” Khrushchev reasoned, “and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you; we’d be doing nothing more then giving them a taste of their own medicine.”
The authors use a narrative, engaging style that sets the book above being a simple historic record. This is, simply, the Cold War through the eyes of Khrushchev, and it is his compelling personal that makes the book worth the time it takes to read.
In short: This is a fascinating book. It certainly fascinated me.
The book robbed me of many misconceptions, especially regarding the power of emerging countries in the Cold War. I had thought of the United States and the Soviet Union as two players pushing about unresisting pieces. But in reality these pieces had minds and agendas of their own. For example, take Nasser, the leader of Egypt. The Soviet Union courted him, but he wanted the U.S.'s weapons, so for the longest time Nasser played the super powers off each other, using their mutual distrust. Even once on the same side, countries didn't just go along with their superpower sponsors. They got tetchy, rebelled, and then had to be calmed down by ambassadors.
Scholars, of course, have been well aware of the dynamics between emerging countries and the superpowers. What makes Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali’s book stand out are the authors’ unique sources. The authors obtained access to Khrushchev's private records and also recordings of the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the top-secret Soviet decision making body of the Soviet Union. Together these records give unparalleled insight into the Soviet Union and the attitude of Khrushchev at the time.
Khrushchev, it turns out, had an ambitious, reckless, dynamic personality that deeply influenced his foreign policy. Born to a peasant Russian family, and raised with little schooling, Khrushchev first became prominent in Russia due to his loud opinions on agriculture and industry. Even as leader, meeting the basic needs of the Soviet Union remained forefront in his mind. The Soviet Union, Khrushchev said, was like “a hungry person who had just awakened and wanted to eat. Such a person would not wash his hands before eating.”
On his trip to America, Khrushchev visited the farm of Iowan Bob Garst. Garst's innovative farming methods and eagerness to better Soviet relationships struck a deep cord with Khrushchev, who later sent Soviet delegates to study there. Upon their return he bragged about them in the Presidium. “They have studied under Garst,” he said “they didn't go in vain, they really studied well.”
Khrushchev’s stubborn refusal to admit defeat pulled him through difficult times. Once the members of the Presidium voted him out of control. Before Khrushchev, no Soviet leader had survived this. But Khrushchev simply went out, rallied support, and hung on.
Apparent success in foreign policy bolstered his prideful streak. Khrushchev, the book explains, believed that Western countries had backed down during the Suez and Iraqi crises due to the Soviet Union’s nuclear threats.
Just as Khrushchev never understood the Western rational in many situations, the U.S. intelligence failed to comprehend Khrushchev's full motives. This was unsurprising considering the man's almost bipolar attitude, especially in foreign policy. For all that he preached and honestly worked towards detente, he also introduced the policy of meniscus – the term for the bubble of liquid on the top of a glass that does not spill over but easily could – which proposed to push tension so high that the other countries would give in from fear of breaking the tension and spilling the glass, causing a war. This policy stemmed from Khrushchev’s recognition of the Soviet Union as the weaker power. He decided the only way for the Soviet Union to stay on top was to apply continual pressure on the U.S. “Because if we don’t have Meniscus,” he said “we let the enemy live in peace.”
The leaders of the countries had a complex relationship. Khrushchev thought the U.S. to be composed of two separate sides, one that wanted peace, and one that wanted war. He thought Eisenhower genuinely wanted peace, but feared the hard-liners in the House and Senate, such as Nixon and Dulles. When the American surveillance plane crashed into Russia on May Day, Khrushchev struggled to reconcile it with his belief in Eisenhower. “I am a human being and I have human feelings,” he said. “I had hopes and they were betrayed.” Later he confessed “I don’t believe in Eisenhower now.”
As the book shows, neither leader wanted war. America vastly overestimated the Soviet Union's power and missiles. Khrushchev knew this, and soon realized he could use a nuclear ploy to intimidate his enemies. But he remained painfully aware of the gap between them. During his visit to America, when an American ambassador mentioned that the Soviets were ahead in many fields, especially strategic rockets, Khrushchev candidly replied “No, we're not, not really.” At the time no one heeded him.
In fact, Khrushchev possessed a huge inferiority complex with the U.S. - he chose to fly there in his biggest plane, even though it was an unsafe experimental one, just to make a strong impression.
Khrushchev’s often-immature attitude reveals itself in his rationale for putting missiles in Cuba, an act that resulted in the Cold War’s most tense moment. “The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear missiles,” Khrushchev reasoned, “and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you; we’d be doing nothing more then giving them a taste of their own medicine.”
The authors use a narrative, engaging style that sets the book above being a simple historic record. This is, simply, the Cold War through the eyes of Khrushchev, and it is his compelling personal that makes the book worth the time it takes to read.
In short: This is a fascinating book. It certainly fascinated me.
May 28, 2011
I know it's not likely that everyone will read a thick historical book like this, but I was completely fascinated by this account of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was entrancing. The way that Fursenko tied everything together into such a logical and intriguing story was truly satisfying. When people of my parents' generation recount the story, I never get the same tension that I did from this book. It made me nervous-- very nervous-- and I was so drawn into the story that when I suddenly hit the end of the book I couldn't believe it. What? That's the end? I wish there were another 100 pages or so but I suppose if there were, I would have lost interest. If you have any interest in Cold War history, this is a must read. This book went into my library and there it will remain. No selling this one back.
December 19, 2025
This book is mostly, though not exclusively, based on declassified Soviet documents. The Kindle edition, which I earlier downloaded, does not contain a hyperlinked table of contents or notes, so I ordered the paperback edition, which I received on October 30, 2025.
I have read, so far, the chapters on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the final chapter on Khrushchev's removal from office. I may not have time to read the earlier chapters in the near future. However, I rate this book five stars for its excellent research and interpretation of these Cold War developments.
I have read, so far, the chapters on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the final chapter on Khrushchev's removal from office. I may not have time to read the earlier chapters in the near future. However, I rate this book five stars for its excellent research and interpretation of these Cold War developments.
April 14, 2025
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali's 2006 Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary is a fascinating 5-star read for anyone interested in the Cold War.
We all know certain highlights of Nikita S. Khrushchev's exploits. The "kitchen debate" where he chided Richard Nixon, "You don't know everything, you know!"-- The infamous "We will bury you" quote-- The boorish pounding of his shoe at the United Nations-- His bold adventurism and then embarrassing withdrawal during the Cuban Missile Crisis-- All of these--along with Hungary, Sputnik, the U-2, Gagarin, Berlin, the Tsar Bomba--are part of the legend of a man larger than life, who seemed to make the course of world events tremble at his mere bluster or whim.
Fursenko and Naftali, however, go far beyond simply retelling what we already know. Using not only American and British government documents but also their research in the Russian archives opened after the fall of the Soviet Union, and even interviews with participants from both sides of the former Iron Curtain, Fursenko and Naftali offer a wealth of information and interpretations that richly increases our understanding of the tumultuous period of superpower relations from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s.
Khrushchev himself was a figure of contradictions, and hence a leader somewhat inscrutable. He could condemn the once-glorified Josef Stalin as one who "ruined the Party," "erased all that is holy in a human being," and "bent everything to his caprices," and yet several months later order Red Army tanks and troops to kill hundreds to put down a revolt in Hungary (page 123). Khrushchev truly did want nuclear disarmament, Fursenko and Naftali show--it was not simply a "peace offensive" made to score propaganda points and then be rejected by the West--but he would have allowed inspections "on Soviet soil only after the weapons had been destroyed" (page 291)...a literally incredible amount of Western trust thus being required in the era of the hydrogen bomb. He gave moral and, eventually, financial and even materiel support to revolutionary or emerging leaders in the Third World, even when they may have been more nationalist than actually socialist, and yet he rarely could he truly count on their gratitude, let alone political support.
Khrushchev was a committed Communist, but after "reach[ing] the disquieting conclusion" in 1956 that unrest in Poland and Hungary had been caused by government "failure to provide...adequate standards of living," he pumped an "emergency investment" into the 1957 budget to raise "Soviet standards of living, especially for the industrial working class,...to forestall political trouble" (pages 141-42). If people could see Communism working, Khrushchev reasoned, then they naturally would agree with it and would feel no desire to rebel or to flee, and the rest of the world ultimately would be converted by the shining example of the oh-so wonderful Soviet bloc. In a burst of enthusiasm, in 1957 speeches he proclaimed that the Soviet Union's economy would "overtake and surpass" anything in the West, and that by 1960 they would "catch up with the United States in per capita meat production"...which meant "almost a tripling" in a mere three years (page 145).
Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States, however, showed him firsthand the true level of wealth and plenty that a nation already primitive before being gutted by the Second World War simply could not achieve anytime soon. Perhaps catching up would take fifteen or twenty years, he realized (page 245). And although the Soviet leader had every confidence in the rightness of his nation's system, he "could not risk granting American-style democracy to [the] people" until those people could be certain, too--a certainty not yet guaranteed "so long as they were ill fed, poorly sheltered, and underemployed and the citizens of the West enjoyed a higher standard of living" (page 245).
Moreover, in the meantime the Soviet Union still needed to appear big and strong and bold to the outside world. Although the Red Army was huge, Khrushchev directed the navy to build "missile ships and submarines, rather than aircraft carriers" (page 77), thereby eschewing a powerful tool for force projection, and the Bison bomber intended to rival the American B-52 turned ended up with a range too short to reach the United States (page 39). The imagined "bomber gap" feared by American journalists, the public, and Congress, then--but of course not by President Eisenhower, who knew the facts via illegal U-2 overflights but could not reveal them--could only be a source of "glee" on the Soviet side (page 40), while in November 1959 Khrushchev boasted of having "such a stock of rockets, such an amount of atomic and hydrogen weapons, that if they attack us we could wipe our potential enemies off the face of the earth" (page 248). And in Cuba... Well, although "[t]o second-tier officials" Khrushchev referred to his movement of nuclear missiles to Cuba as being for defense of the island against U.S. aggression, he explained frankly in the Presidium, "This will be an offensive policy" (page 435), intended to threaten America and make the Soviet deterrent meaningful rather than mainly hollow threat.
Such are the paradoxes of the rule of Nikita S. Khrushchev, a man who, as much as he disagreed with the capitalist system, believed that peaceful coexistence and disarmament--especially once a President could be wooed away from the supposed vested interests always ready to torpedo efforts toward peace--were preferable to an expensive arms race, and ultimately would show the superiority of Communism. But this man, whose early program of de-Stalinization freed "the vast majority of the 2.5 million prisoners of the gulag" and yet who by 1957 had begun to crack down again on possible "dissenters" (page 141), believed that nuclear bluff and bluster could make the West abandon West Berlin and make the United States accept a new Soviet nuclear base just 90 miles from Florida.
Clearly, however, this was not the case, spin his retreats as winning gambits though he might. And the removal from power of the once-swaggering Khrushchev? After all his adventures, nominally it stemmed his single-handed elimination of the highly vocational eleventh year of Soviet education to leave only ten years of classes (page 532)--just don't imagine, though, that when, as Khrushchev put it, the members of the Presidium "gathered together and splatter[ed] shit on [him]" (page 538), there was no discussion of his foreign policy, too.
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali's Khrushchev's Cold War reveals so much more detail and nuance of this short and yet larger than life leader, and the era itself, than any of the old black-and-white photos and films ever could. Without apologizing for the man's outrages or his casual quashing of personal and political freedom, the book ably and entertainingly shows us how the other side thought and felt and planned during one of the most dangerous periods of postwar history.
We all know certain highlights of Nikita S. Khrushchev's exploits. The "kitchen debate" where he chided Richard Nixon, "You don't know everything, you know!"-- The infamous "We will bury you" quote-- The boorish pounding of his shoe at the United Nations-- His bold adventurism and then embarrassing withdrawal during the Cuban Missile Crisis-- All of these--along with Hungary, Sputnik, the U-2, Gagarin, Berlin, the Tsar Bomba--are part of the legend of a man larger than life, who seemed to make the course of world events tremble at his mere bluster or whim.
Fursenko and Naftali, however, go far beyond simply retelling what we already know. Using not only American and British government documents but also their research in the Russian archives opened after the fall of the Soviet Union, and even interviews with participants from both sides of the former Iron Curtain, Fursenko and Naftali offer a wealth of information and interpretations that richly increases our understanding of the tumultuous period of superpower relations from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s.
Khrushchev himself was a figure of contradictions, and hence a leader somewhat inscrutable. He could condemn the once-glorified Josef Stalin as one who "ruined the Party," "erased all that is holy in a human being," and "bent everything to his caprices," and yet several months later order Red Army tanks and troops to kill hundreds to put down a revolt in Hungary (page 123). Khrushchev truly did want nuclear disarmament, Fursenko and Naftali show--it was not simply a "peace offensive" made to score propaganda points and then be rejected by the West--but he would have allowed inspections "on Soviet soil only after the weapons had been destroyed" (page 291)...a literally incredible amount of Western trust thus being required in the era of the hydrogen bomb. He gave moral and, eventually, financial and even materiel support to revolutionary or emerging leaders in the Third World, even when they may have been more nationalist than actually socialist, and yet he rarely could he truly count on their gratitude, let alone political support.
Khrushchev was a committed Communist, but after "reach[ing] the disquieting conclusion" in 1956 that unrest in Poland and Hungary had been caused by government "failure to provide...adequate standards of living," he pumped an "emergency investment" into the 1957 budget to raise "Soviet standards of living, especially for the industrial working class,...to forestall political trouble" (pages 141-42). If people could see Communism working, Khrushchev reasoned, then they naturally would agree with it and would feel no desire to rebel or to flee, and the rest of the world ultimately would be converted by the shining example of the oh-so wonderful Soviet bloc. In a burst of enthusiasm, in 1957 speeches he proclaimed that the Soviet Union's economy would "overtake and surpass" anything in the West, and that by 1960 they would "catch up with the United States in per capita meat production"...which meant "almost a tripling" in a mere three years (page 145).
Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States, however, showed him firsthand the true level of wealth and plenty that a nation already primitive before being gutted by the Second World War simply could not achieve anytime soon. Perhaps catching up would take fifteen or twenty years, he realized (page 245). And although the Soviet leader had every confidence in the rightness of his nation's system, he "could not risk granting American-style democracy to [the] people" until those people could be certain, too--a certainty not yet guaranteed "so long as they were ill fed, poorly sheltered, and underemployed and the citizens of the West enjoyed a higher standard of living" (page 245).
Moreover, in the meantime the Soviet Union still needed to appear big and strong and bold to the outside world. Although the Red Army was huge, Khrushchev directed the navy to build "missile ships and submarines, rather than aircraft carriers" (page 77), thereby eschewing a powerful tool for force projection, and the Bison bomber intended to rival the American B-52 turned ended up with a range too short to reach the United States (page 39). The imagined "bomber gap" feared by American journalists, the public, and Congress, then--but of course not by President Eisenhower, who knew the facts via illegal U-2 overflights but could not reveal them--could only be a source of "glee" on the Soviet side (page 40), while in November 1959 Khrushchev boasted of having "such a stock of rockets, such an amount of atomic and hydrogen weapons, that if they attack us we could wipe our potential enemies off the face of the earth" (page 248). And in Cuba... Well, although "[t]o second-tier officials" Khrushchev referred to his movement of nuclear missiles to Cuba as being for defense of the island against U.S. aggression, he explained frankly in the Presidium, "This will be an offensive policy" (page 435), intended to threaten America and make the Soviet deterrent meaningful rather than mainly hollow threat.
Such are the paradoxes of the rule of Nikita S. Khrushchev, a man who, as much as he disagreed with the capitalist system, believed that peaceful coexistence and disarmament--especially once a President could be wooed away from the supposed vested interests always ready to torpedo efforts toward peace--were preferable to an expensive arms race, and ultimately would show the superiority of Communism. But this man, whose early program of de-Stalinization freed "the vast majority of the 2.5 million prisoners of the gulag" and yet who by 1957 had begun to crack down again on possible "dissenters" (page 141), believed that nuclear bluff and bluster could make the West abandon West Berlin and make the United States accept a new Soviet nuclear base just 90 miles from Florida.
Clearly, however, this was not the case, spin his retreats as winning gambits though he might. And the removal from power of the once-swaggering Khrushchev? After all his adventures, nominally it stemmed his single-handed elimination of the highly vocational eleventh year of Soviet education to leave only ten years of classes (page 532)--just don't imagine, though, that when, as Khrushchev put it, the members of the Presidium "gathered together and splatter[ed] shit on [him]" (page 538), there was no discussion of his foreign policy, too.
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali's Khrushchev's Cold War reveals so much more detail and nuance of this short and yet larger than life leader, and the era itself, than any of the old black-and-white photos and films ever could. Without apologizing for the man's outrages or his casual quashing of personal and political freedom, the book ably and entertainingly shows us how the other side thought and felt and planned during one of the most dangerous periods of postwar history.
March 3, 2024
Between 1953 to 1964, Nikita Khrushchev presided over a post-Stalinist Soviet empire that was party to an escalatory nuclear standoff with the West. With each turn of this tense game of cat-and-mouse, authors Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, both historians of the Cold War, describe the process of “action and reaction” between the global superpowers. KHRUSHCHEV’S COLD WAR presents this faceoff from the perspective of the erratic and blusterous Soviet Premier, who dangled the prospect of nuclear conflict to press Western powers to sue for peace. In exhaustive detail, supported by original archival insights, Fursenko and Naftali pull the curtain back on Khrushchev’s ambitious and aggressive ploy to court the West. From the 1956 Suez Crisis, 1960 U-2 Incident, Bay of Pigs invasion, Cuban Missile Crisis, and the persistent question about postwar Germany, the authors recount the Soviet hankering for a negotiated settlement and as the risks they were willing to wager to get to the negotiating table. KHRUSHCHEV’S COLD WAR reveals a Cold War chess match between an intransigent West and an impatient and insecure Soviet Union helmed by a figure the authors describe as being exceptionally provocative, daring, and, ironically, covetous of a lasting settlement with his Western adversaries.
December 3, 2018
Very well done. I wanted to learn a lot and I did. Narrowly focused on Khrushchev's years in power, which is what I wanted, if I wanted to hear about him visiting ice cream factories in the 1930s I would get a full fledged biography.
July 29, 2021
My First “Enemy”
I believe the first President an American child remembers will occupy a special and non-political image in that child’s mind, even as he/she moves to adulthood. For me, that President was Dwight Eisenhower. So if you buy that analogy, then the first “enemy” you can remember will also convey the emotional memory as an adversary into adulthood. And for me that was Nikita Khrushchev.
But as adults, we also have the opportunity to examine those immature images in the light of history and intellectual honesty.
Doing so a bit, thanks to this book, I find the former Soviet leader - still boorish at times - but a more psychologically and intellectually complex, less evil tyrant and more insecure and troubled.
If you’re interested in those troubled times, this is a challenging but fascinating read.
I believe the first President an American child remembers will occupy a special and non-political image in that child’s mind, even as he/she moves to adulthood. For me, that President was Dwight Eisenhower. So if you buy that analogy, then the first “enemy” you can remember will also convey the emotional memory as an adversary into adulthood. And for me that was Nikita Khrushchev.
But as adults, we also have the opportunity to examine those immature images in the light of history and intellectual honesty.
Doing so a bit, thanks to this book, I find the former Soviet leader - still boorish at times - but a more psychologically and intellectually complex, less evil tyrant and more insecure and troubled.
If you’re interested in those troubled times, this is a challenging but fascinating read.
April 3, 2008
Great updated history of Khrushchev
October 11, 2012
So Krushchev was crazy, but not in the way that is historically accepted... good book. Read it.
October 27, 2015
well-documented. This information is relatively recent.
April 22, 2017
An eye-opening look at a man shrouded in complexity...
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews