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The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic
“In spite of its short duration, the rise and demise of the United Arab Republic – the union between Egypt and Syria (1958–61) – is considered a seminal episode in the modern history of the Arab world. At the time, many Arabs hoped that the union would herald realization of the pan-Arab dream, but its disintegration shattered this dream beyond repair. With the wisdom of hindsight it is also clear that this episode had a significant, lasting impact on the evolution of Arab politics.” From the Foreword by Moshe Ma’oz, author of Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus
- GenresEgyptMiddle East
256 pages, Hardcover
First published September 1, 1999
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About the author
Elie Podeh
16 books2 followersElie Podeh (Hebrew: אלי פודה) is Lecturer in the Department of Islam and Middle Eastern Studies, at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Research Fellow at The Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace.
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May 28, 2025
The Decline of Arab Unity by Elie Podeh is a somewhat older (by academic standards), but widely-cited work on the history of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a three-year political and economic union between Egypt and Syria. The UAR is often relegated to a footnote in broader studies of the history of both regions, and waved off as a failed and doomed experiment, but the author attempts to treat to explore the union with more depth. While he does not reject the idea that it was doomed, he does apply more nuance on why this was the case and, rather than dismissing it outright, takes time to highlight all of the specific points of that failure.
Podeh’s introduction is fairly straightforward for an academic text, consisting primarily of a summary of the previous literature on the topic, along with a quick review of his sources. This section does more to highlight the structure of his analysis than elucidate a particular thesis, but this is a product of his overall goal of better understanding the UAR instead of making a singular argument. Also notable is his emphasis on diplomatic sources; with no meaningful access to Egyptian and Syrian archives at the time, his Arabic sources consist primarily of publicly-available material such as newspapers, which he acknowledges throughout the text as a factor that limits his ability to provide the Arab perspective. The first official chapter could also be considered an introductory one of sorts, as he takes time to define his main unit of analysis: elite politics. This is the closest he gets to a singular thesis, as he argues that elite politics are an important factor in both the creation and dissolution of the union.
Chapter two begins his primary narrative of the UAR and argues for a Syrian belief that a union with Egypt might resolve some of the country’s internal turmoil as driving the creation of the union. As a newly-forged nation seeking its identity, many believed that latching onto Egypt’s ideological stability, and particularly its Pan-Arabism in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, would help bring Syrians together. Podeh highlights Nasser’s reluctance – and the indifference of the average Egyptian – towards such a union, but also his inability to truly reject the idea, as he was using Pan-Arabism to support his legitimacy as a regional leader. His hand was essentially forced and, in February 1958, the union was declared. In the third chapter, the author explores the political foundations of this union and its relative success in instituting significant changes that most in Syria welcomed as pillars of stability.
In chapter four, Podeh begins to explore what he feels is a key factor in the dissolution of the union: economic integration. His overarching theme is that Nasser was rushed into copying changes that had been successful in Egypt, but were inappropriate for Syria. Coupled with a long-term drought, the author’s economic narrative is one of a consistent failure to integrate and an increasing alienation of the elites that had pushed for the establishment of the union. While many of the changes might have benefitted a new power base, such as the working class, their haphazard implementation prevented Nasser from truly growing his support in Syria. This theme continues into the fifth chapter, which also emphasizes how Nasser’s political transformations came to be seen increasingly as Egyptian dominance in Syria, rather than an attempt at equal union. Failures in economic integration and the frustration of the elites contributed to this perception.
By chapter six, Podeh argues that the decline of the UAR was beyond the point of no return. In order to combat growing dissent, Nasser had to tighten his political control, which in turn led to more complaints of Egyptian dominance. Also key here is the failure to create a cultural identity that was specific to the UAR, with most citizens considering themselves Egyptian or Syrian. This cultural factor is touched upon only slightly in the book, perhaps due to the lack of availability of Arabic-language sources and the fact that it was not a subject touched upon often by diplomatic archives. The seventh chapter continues an investigation into this topic from the economic perspective, highlight the continuing failures in that sphere.
Chapter eight focuses on the end result: Syrian’s secession. It provides a narrative of the collapse and argues that the average person was either supportive of dissolution or indifferent. Over the course of three years, the failures of the union overrode the limited philosophical enthusiasm for the project. The ninth chapter builds upon this, arguing that internal developments in Syria meant that Arab unity was no longer viable in addressing the political situation, as the factors that made the project attractive in the first place had dissipated. With the union’s failure to build enthusiasm for Pan-Arab unity in an era of nation-states, there was no hope for the emergence of a similar project in the future, even if Nasser used such rhetoric to maintain his legitimacy at home and abroad.
In his concluding chapter, Podeh maintains the narrative that the union was relatively doomed from the start, but offers more nuance to this argument by providing a detailed list of the problems, rather than simply painting it as a failure of the idea of Pan-Arabism as a whole. The overarching theme is that the union was created to address internal Syrian problems, rather than on the basis of a philosophical and popular belief in Arab unity. Nasser recognized the potential problems of a union at that time, but could not reject the idea, as it was the foundation of his own legitimacy. As such, he was rushed into duplicating his Egyptian policies in Syria without the time to adapt them to the Syrian situation. This led to a spiral wherein Nasser was perceived as attempting to dominate Syria and alienated the elites, who in turn furthered the argument of Nasser’s heavy-handedness. Overall, The Decline of Arab Unity presents a strong case and does very well in bringing together a handful of arguments into something comprehensible and satisfying. The major omission here is the lack of archival Arabic-language sources, which was a product of circumstance, rather than any fault of the author. It does give the book the strange feeling of discussing a topic with only limited perspective from the main subjects, and thus it would be nice to see a more updated work that takes advantage of the wider availability of Arab sources. Until then, however, this text is a good option for scholars seeking a better understanding of the UAR as a foundation for their own works.
Podeh’s introduction is fairly straightforward for an academic text, consisting primarily of a summary of the previous literature on the topic, along with a quick review of his sources. This section does more to highlight the structure of his analysis than elucidate a particular thesis, but this is a product of his overall goal of better understanding the UAR instead of making a singular argument. Also notable is his emphasis on diplomatic sources; with no meaningful access to Egyptian and Syrian archives at the time, his Arabic sources consist primarily of publicly-available material such as newspapers, which he acknowledges throughout the text as a factor that limits his ability to provide the Arab perspective. The first official chapter could also be considered an introductory one of sorts, as he takes time to define his main unit of analysis: elite politics. This is the closest he gets to a singular thesis, as he argues that elite politics are an important factor in both the creation and dissolution of the union.
Chapter two begins his primary narrative of the UAR and argues for a Syrian belief that a union with Egypt might resolve some of the country’s internal turmoil as driving the creation of the union. As a newly-forged nation seeking its identity, many believed that latching onto Egypt’s ideological stability, and particularly its Pan-Arabism in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, would help bring Syrians together. Podeh highlights Nasser’s reluctance – and the indifference of the average Egyptian – towards such a union, but also his inability to truly reject the idea, as he was using Pan-Arabism to support his legitimacy as a regional leader. His hand was essentially forced and, in February 1958, the union was declared. In the third chapter, the author explores the political foundations of this union and its relative success in instituting significant changes that most in Syria welcomed as pillars of stability.
In chapter four, Podeh begins to explore what he feels is a key factor in the dissolution of the union: economic integration. His overarching theme is that Nasser was rushed into copying changes that had been successful in Egypt, but were inappropriate for Syria. Coupled with a long-term drought, the author’s economic narrative is one of a consistent failure to integrate and an increasing alienation of the elites that had pushed for the establishment of the union. While many of the changes might have benefitted a new power base, such as the working class, their haphazard implementation prevented Nasser from truly growing his support in Syria. This theme continues into the fifth chapter, which also emphasizes how Nasser’s political transformations came to be seen increasingly as Egyptian dominance in Syria, rather than an attempt at equal union. Failures in economic integration and the frustration of the elites contributed to this perception.
By chapter six, Podeh argues that the decline of the UAR was beyond the point of no return. In order to combat growing dissent, Nasser had to tighten his political control, which in turn led to more complaints of Egyptian dominance. Also key here is the failure to create a cultural identity that was specific to the UAR, with most citizens considering themselves Egyptian or Syrian. This cultural factor is touched upon only slightly in the book, perhaps due to the lack of availability of Arabic-language sources and the fact that it was not a subject touched upon often by diplomatic archives. The seventh chapter continues an investigation into this topic from the economic perspective, highlight the continuing failures in that sphere.
Chapter eight focuses on the end result: Syrian’s secession. It provides a narrative of the collapse and argues that the average person was either supportive of dissolution or indifferent. Over the course of three years, the failures of the union overrode the limited philosophical enthusiasm for the project. The ninth chapter builds upon this, arguing that internal developments in Syria meant that Arab unity was no longer viable in addressing the political situation, as the factors that made the project attractive in the first place had dissipated. With the union’s failure to build enthusiasm for Pan-Arab unity in an era of nation-states, there was no hope for the emergence of a similar project in the future, even if Nasser used such rhetoric to maintain his legitimacy at home and abroad.
In his concluding chapter, Podeh maintains the narrative that the union was relatively doomed from the start, but offers more nuance to this argument by providing a detailed list of the problems, rather than simply painting it as a failure of the idea of Pan-Arabism as a whole. The overarching theme is that the union was created to address internal Syrian problems, rather than on the basis of a philosophical and popular belief in Arab unity. Nasser recognized the potential problems of a union at that time, but could not reject the idea, as it was the foundation of his own legitimacy. As such, he was rushed into duplicating his Egyptian policies in Syria without the time to adapt them to the Syrian situation. This led to a spiral wherein Nasser was perceived as attempting to dominate Syria and alienated the elites, who in turn furthered the argument of Nasser’s heavy-handedness. Overall, The Decline of Arab Unity presents a strong case and does very well in bringing together a handful of arguments into something comprehensible and satisfying. The major omission here is the lack of archival Arabic-language sources, which was a product of circumstance, rather than any fault of the author. It does give the book the strange feeling of discussing a topic with only limited perspective from the main subjects, and thus it would be nice to see a more updated work that takes advantage of the wider availability of Arab sources. Until then, however, this text is a good option for scholars seeking a better understanding of the UAR as a foundation for their own works.
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