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Military, War, and Society in Modern American History
The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003
Why did the United States invade Iraq, setting off a chain of events that profoundly changed the Middle East and the US global position? The Regime Change Consensus offers a compelling look at how the United States pivoted from a policy of containment to regime change in Iraq after September 11, 2001. Starting with the Persian Gulf War, the book traces how a coalition of political actors argued with increasing success that the totalitarian nature of Saddam Hussein's regime and the untrustworthy behavior of the international coalition behind sanctions meant that containment was a doomed policy. By the end of the 1990s, a consensus belief emerged that only regime change and democratization could fully address the Iraqi threat. Through careful examination, Joseph Stieb expands our understanding of the origins of the Iraq War while also explaining why so many politicians and policymakers rejected containment after 9/11 and embraced regime change.
282 pages, Kindle Edition
Published July 8, 2021
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129 people want to read
About the author
Joseph Stieb
1 book238 followersI'm an assistant prof of US Military History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Former professor at the Naval War College, Ohio State/Mershon postdoc, UNC-Chapel Hill Ph.D in history.
I've got a book with Cambridge University Press called the Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003. Fan of books, basketball, running, cats.
Former professor at the Naval War College, Ohio State/Mershon postdoc, UNC-Chapel Hill Ph.D in history.
I've got a book with Cambridge University Press called the Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003. Fan of books, basketball, running, cats.
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July 24, 2021This is my book! Obviously I have read it (at least 5 times lol), and I think it's pretty darn good. I won't tip the scales by giving it a rating, but I hope you will consider reading it. I tried very hard to eliminate jargon and make it accessible to non-experts. It is an especially good fit for people interested in the Iraq War, U.S. foreign policy, ideas in foreign policy, and U.S. politics, especially after the Cold War.
April 17, 2024
If you want a detailed and stimulating study on the roots of the Iraq War, look no further. The decision to invade Iraq has proven so baffling that an entire Wikipedia article is dedicated to the rationale for the war. Discussions about it tend to devolve into polemics about the Bush administration. The Iraq War is so intertwined with 9/11 in popular memory that it becomes harder with each passing year to place the invasion in a wider context. Joseph Stieb argues that to understand the 2003 invasion, we must first understand Iraq as an issue in 1990s American politics. Armed with an extensive bibliography and fresh interviews with relevant policymakers, he shows that what started out as a minority view in favor of regime change morphed into the consensus view well before 9/11.
Starting with the 1991 Gulf War, there were boosters for regime change. During the war, nearly every major newspaper had a regime change advocate (Charles Krauthammer at the Washington Post, William Safire at The NY Times etc). In addition, a strong minority of Democratic hawks broke with their party to support Bush’s call to war. The anticlimactic ending of said war was deeply unsatisfying to both the foreign policy establishment and the wider public. By January of 1992, 82 percent of Americans believed that leaving Saddam in power was a mistake. Al Gore declared that to “housebreak a cobra” was more achievable than a normal relationship with Iraq. These criticisms caused Bush Sr. to draw a harder public line on Iraq but behind the scenes there was little appetite for regime change, except the vague hope that a coup might topple Saddam. Democrats were keen to attack the Bush administration’s hesitancy on Iraq in the runup to the 1992 election but the same problem would dog Bill Clinton in his two terms.
Not wanting to expend precious political capital on foreign policy, Clinton adopted what the author dubs the “Clinton fudge”; an ambiguous strategy meant to signal a hard line to a domestic audience hungry for regime change, while also signaling flexibility to an international coalition tired of sanctions. Clinton did however show humility about America’s unipolar status, saying it “won’t last forever” and recognized the need to work in a multilateral framework.
While the idea was already floating around in think tanks, Clinton was the first president to link the threat of Iraqi WMD to terrorism. When he launched Operation Desert Fox in 1998 to force Saddam’s compliance with weapons inspections, he framed it in terms of “the innocent Japanese people that died in the subway when the sarin gas was released,” referring to a 1995 terrorist attack by a Japanese cult, and insinuated that if left unchecked, terrorists or drug runners could acquire Iraqi WMD. This foreshadowed the Bush administration’s talk of a “nexus” threat from Iraq. One poll cited shows 75 percent of respondents expected a terrorist attack on America directed by Iraq. With advocates for containment increasingly marginalized, the stage was set for congress to pass the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. This bill, which much previous scholarship has ignored, made the pursuit of regime change official US policy and signaled how deeply the consensus had taken hold. Despite this, virtually no one, even neoconservatives, pushed for a full blown invasion of Iraq.
That all changed after 9/11. With a newly increased tolerance for risk, the Bush administration came to see regime change and democracy promotion as both a moral and strategic imperative. The “debate” that played out in those critical 18 months is telling. The assumptions of the previous decade had baked in and greatly limited the scope of discussion and acceptable policy options. Stieb makes clear that while neocons were the primary architects of the invasion, they could not have taken America to war without the concurrence of the establishment to the core elements of the regime change consensus. With the exception of Barack Obama, the four Democratic nominees for president between 2004 and 2020 were senators who voted for the 2002 AUMF. The war was popular with the public and Democrats remembered that the Gulf War was a smashing American victory. With their eyes on the 2002 midterms and 2004 presidential race, they would not be caught off guard not supporting the next war. Their cynicism was not rewarded. Republicans kept the house and the presidency.
Even Colin Powell supported the basic goal of removing Saddam. Robert Byrd, who voted nay in the senate, chastised Congress for failing to conduct a substantive debate about Iraq, saying it was “not on the fundamental and monumental questions of whether and why” America should go to war, but how to “wordsmith” the use of force resolution to authorize an attack on Iraq.
The lack of introspection about Iraq from both the American political establishment and public only underscores the need for this book. It’s also quite readable even for someone without expert knowledge on the subjects at hand. Definitely pick this up if you want to know the true origins of the Iraq War disaster.
Starting with the 1991 Gulf War, there were boosters for regime change. During the war, nearly every major newspaper had a regime change advocate (Charles Krauthammer at the Washington Post, William Safire at The NY Times etc). In addition, a strong minority of Democratic hawks broke with their party to support Bush’s call to war. The anticlimactic ending of said war was deeply unsatisfying to both the foreign policy establishment and the wider public. By January of 1992, 82 percent of Americans believed that leaving Saddam in power was a mistake. Al Gore declared that to “housebreak a cobra” was more achievable than a normal relationship with Iraq. These criticisms caused Bush Sr. to draw a harder public line on Iraq but behind the scenes there was little appetite for regime change, except the vague hope that a coup might topple Saddam. Democrats were keen to attack the Bush administration’s hesitancy on Iraq in the runup to the 1992 election but the same problem would dog Bill Clinton in his two terms.
Not wanting to expend precious political capital on foreign policy, Clinton adopted what the author dubs the “Clinton fudge”; an ambiguous strategy meant to signal a hard line to a domestic audience hungry for regime change, while also signaling flexibility to an international coalition tired of sanctions. Clinton did however show humility about America’s unipolar status, saying it “won’t last forever” and recognized the need to work in a multilateral framework.
While the idea was already floating around in think tanks, Clinton was the first president to link the threat of Iraqi WMD to terrorism. When he launched Operation Desert Fox in 1998 to force Saddam’s compliance with weapons inspections, he framed it in terms of “the innocent Japanese people that died in the subway when the sarin gas was released,” referring to a 1995 terrorist attack by a Japanese cult, and insinuated that if left unchecked, terrorists or drug runners could acquire Iraqi WMD. This foreshadowed the Bush administration’s talk of a “nexus” threat from Iraq. One poll cited shows 75 percent of respondents expected a terrorist attack on America directed by Iraq. With advocates for containment increasingly marginalized, the stage was set for congress to pass the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. This bill, which much previous scholarship has ignored, made the pursuit of regime change official US policy and signaled how deeply the consensus had taken hold. Despite this, virtually no one, even neoconservatives, pushed for a full blown invasion of Iraq.
That all changed after 9/11. With a newly increased tolerance for risk, the Bush administration came to see regime change and democracy promotion as both a moral and strategic imperative. The “debate” that played out in those critical 18 months is telling. The assumptions of the previous decade had baked in and greatly limited the scope of discussion and acceptable policy options. Stieb makes clear that while neocons were the primary architects of the invasion, they could not have taken America to war without the concurrence of the establishment to the core elements of the regime change consensus. With the exception of Barack Obama, the four Democratic nominees for president between 2004 and 2020 were senators who voted for the 2002 AUMF. The war was popular with the public and Democrats remembered that the Gulf War was a smashing American victory. With their eyes on the 2002 midterms and 2004 presidential race, they would not be caught off guard not supporting the next war. Their cynicism was not rewarded. Republicans kept the house and the presidency.
Even Colin Powell supported the basic goal of removing Saddam. Robert Byrd, who voted nay in the senate, chastised Congress for failing to conduct a substantive debate about Iraq, saying it was “not on the fundamental and monumental questions of whether and why” America should go to war, but how to “wordsmith” the use of force resolution to authorize an attack on Iraq.
The lack of introspection about Iraq from both the American political establishment and public only underscores the need for this book. It’s also quite readable even for someone without expert knowledge on the subjects at hand. Definitely pick this up if you want to know the true origins of the Iraq War disaster.
December 30, 2021
An excellent and thorough examination of the American political discourse surrounding Iraq leading up to the 2003 invasion. The Regime Change Consensus is well researched and argued. Stieb convincing demonstrates how the American political winds moved inexorably toward regime change as the one solution to rule them all for the Saddam Hussein problem.
A must read for anyone seeking to understand the broader political context of the American military misadventure in Iraq.
A must read for anyone seeking to understand the broader political context of the American military misadventure in Iraq.
July 22, 2022
page six
Indeed, there were influential policy-makers, intellectuals, and politicians who still believed that a reinvigorated containment strategy could prevent Saddam from building WMD, keep his military weak, and stymie his regional ambitions. Figures such as former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, national security expert Richard Haass, and political scientist John Mearsheimer consistently held that Saddam did not directly threaten the United States, that containment had kept Iraq weak, and that with some adjustment containment could manage his threat to US interests in the region.
Indeed, there were influential policy-makers, intellectuals, and politicians who still believed that a reinvigorated containment strategy could prevent Saddam from building WMD, keep his military weak, and stymie his regional ambitions. Figures such as former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, national security expert Richard Haass, and political scientist John Mearsheimer consistently held that Saddam did not directly threaten the United States, that containment had kept Iraq weak, and that with some adjustment containment could manage his threat to US interests in the region.
May 1, 2025
4.5 stars
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