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After the End of History: Conversations with Francis Fukuyama
Intimate access to the mind of Francis Fukuyama and his reflections on world politics, his life and career, and the evolution of his thought
In his 1992 best-selling book The End of History and the Last Man, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama argued that the dominance of liberal democracy marked the end of humanity’s political and ideological development. Thirty years later, with populism on the rise and the number of liberal democracies decreasing worldwide, Fukuyama revisits his classic thesis.
A series of in-depth interviews between Fukuyama and editor Mathilde Fasting, After the End of History offers a wide-ranging analysis of liberal democracy today. Drawing on Fukuyama’s work on identity, biotechnology, and political order, the book provides essential insight into the rise of authoritarianism and the greatest threats faced by democracy in our present world.
Diving into topics like the surprise election of Donald Trump, the destruction of social and political norms, and the rise of China, Fukuyama deftly explains the plight of liberal democracy and explores how we might prevent its further decline. He also covers personal topics and reflects on his life and career, the evolution of his thinking, and some of his most important books.
Insightful and important, After the End of History grants unprecedented access to one of the greatest political minds of our time.
In his 1992 best-selling book The End of History and the Last Man, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama argued that the dominance of liberal democracy marked the end of humanity’s political and ideological development. Thirty years later, with populism on the rise and the number of liberal democracies decreasing worldwide, Fukuyama revisits his classic thesis.
A series of in-depth interviews between Fukuyama and editor Mathilde Fasting, After the End of History offers a wide-ranging analysis of liberal democracy today. Drawing on Fukuyama’s work on identity, biotechnology, and political order, the book provides essential insight into the rise of authoritarianism and the greatest threats faced by democracy in our present world.
Diving into topics like the surprise election of Donald Trump, the destruction of social and political norms, and the rise of China, Fukuyama deftly explains the plight of liberal democracy and explores how we might prevent its further decline. He also covers personal topics and reflects on his life and career, the evolution of his thinking, and some of his most important books.
Insightful and important, After the End of History grants unprecedented access to one of the greatest political minds of our time.
224 pages, Hardcover
First published May 3, 2021
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July 30, 2021
Almost thirty years ago, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote The End of History and the Last Man, a highly influential and often misunderstood work of political philosophy that declared an end to history in the sense that humanity had discovered the final and optimal form of human government: liberal democracy.
Thirty years later, not only do we have competing political models in China and Russia, but we are also experiencing the weakening and decay of liberal democracies throughout the world (most notably in the US and Brittain) due to a resurgence in authoritarian populism, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism. As Robert Kagan put it, these recent developments seem to spell the end of the end of history.
Or are we simply misunderstanding Fukuyama’s original point?
In After the End of History, the reader gets to hear Fukuyama address this question himself. Through a series of interviews, Fukuyama defends and elaborates on his original thesis, in addition to reflecting on his classical education and early intellectual development, his research interests and published works, the current state of the world, and the future of history, granting the reader access to the mind of one of the greatest political theorists of our time.
As Fukuyama explains, confusion regarding “the end of history” thesis stems from misreading it as an empirical statement rather than as the normative statement it was intended to be.
Considered as an empirical statement, the end of history is interpreted to mean that, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, history itself was supposed to end and the world would inevitably become ever more liberal and democratic. Since this clearly didn’t happen, many consider the “end of history” thesis to be the prototypical modern example of a failed historical prediction.
But this is not what Fukuyama intended; as a normative statement, one can think of the term “history” in “the end of history” as a synonym for “development” or “modernization,” as in “the end of political development.” In this reading, humanity has simply discovered the most effective, stable, and universalizable political system that satisfies the majority of the citizenry’s needs. The various forms of authoritarianism and communism ultimately failed to produce successful societies in the way that liberal democracies can, and, therefore, humanity has found the ideal political system to strive for (even if, in practice, it isn’t universally achieved).
This normative interpretation is far more difficult to argue against. As Fukuyama said:
“The most significant criticism isn’t on the Left because most people on the Left had at that point given up on communism. Nobody was willing to argue that there’s a higher stage where we’re going to nationalize all private property and have a centralized Leninist state. There’s a species of criticism that says you still have these big contradictions in capitalism, and that you need to somehow move to a different economic system, but I’ve never really understood what the alternative is other than greater regulation of the capitalist system and stronger social protections. You can have a little more, you can have a little less, but you’re still basically within a market economy. The only alternative is getting to the point where you start seriously trying to abolish private property, and not very many people are willing to go that far except in certain limited sectors.”
Fukuyama makes a valid point here. If “the end of history” is simply suggesting that liberal democracy is the ideal system of government—but, for a host of reasons, one that the world will not necessarily adopt—then as a normative statement, the thesis is well-founded. There is simply no viable alternative that would be appealing to the majority of people, or that, historically, has been shown to work.
But ideal does not mean inevitable, and even once a country adopts a liberal democratic system, there is no guarantee that it can keep it or that it will function without issue. As Fukuyama said:
“The ‘last man’ sections of The End of History are all about what could go wrong in a successful liberal democracy. The problem is the fact that peace and prosperity will not ultimately be satisfying to many people who will continue to seek recognition and community. For this reason I said very clearly back then that neither nationalism nor religion would disappear from world politics, but few people remember that now.”
Unfortunately, few people today grant Fukuyama this more charitable interpretation, and “the end of history” is considered nothing more than another failed historical prophecy. But this is unfortunate, because Fukuyama’s larger point is that liberal democracy is the form of government that we should be striving to establish or trying to protect, not that it will inevitably appear throughout the world due to uncontested historical forces. That’s why Fukuyama dedicated a large portion of his subsequent career to studying how effective states are built and how to prevent their ultimate decay—a possibility the US now faces in dealing with right-wing extremism and Trump’s attacks on the institutions of democracy.
Fukuyama is hopeful that the strength of US institutions is enough to withstand the assaults from the right, that liberal democracy will win out in the end against authoritarian populism, and that a richer conception of freedom will develop that includes a sense of duty and obligation to others and to the common good. But, of course, no one can predict the future, and, as Fukuyama has always maintained, to preserve liberal democracy, we must fight for it against the forces that seek to destroy it from within.
What’s also interesting to note is how far left Fukuyama has turned in terms of his politics and economic positions. Once associated with the neoconservative movement, Fukuyama has, in his own words, “definitely moved further to the left.” Reflecting on the war in Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis—both products of certain conservative ideas—Fukuyama began questioning his more conservative positions, and now believes inequality to be a much more significant problem, recognizes the limits of the free market, and embraces more robust social welfare and redistribution policies. Fukuyama also believes that the idea of freedom without a corresponding sense of duty to others is an impoverished view that is fundamentally inconsistent with the country’s founding principles.
Hopefully, this book goes a long way in clarifying Fukuyama’s political positions and drives home the point that liberal democracy, while ideal, is not inevitable, and must be fought for and protected from those who wish to destroy it (which today come almost exclusively from the right).
Thirty years later, not only do we have competing political models in China and Russia, but we are also experiencing the weakening and decay of liberal democracies throughout the world (most notably in the US and Brittain) due to a resurgence in authoritarian populism, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism. As Robert Kagan put it, these recent developments seem to spell the end of the end of history.
Or are we simply misunderstanding Fukuyama’s original point?
In After the End of History, the reader gets to hear Fukuyama address this question himself. Through a series of interviews, Fukuyama defends and elaborates on his original thesis, in addition to reflecting on his classical education and early intellectual development, his research interests and published works, the current state of the world, and the future of history, granting the reader access to the mind of one of the greatest political theorists of our time.
As Fukuyama explains, confusion regarding “the end of history” thesis stems from misreading it as an empirical statement rather than as the normative statement it was intended to be.
Considered as an empirical statement, the end of history is interpreted to mean that, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, history itself was supposed to end and the world would inevitably become ever more liberal and democratic. Since this clearly didn’t happen, many consider the “end of history” thesis to be the prototypical modern example of a failed historical prediction.
But this is not what Fukuyama intended; as a normative statement, one can think of the term “history” in “the end of history” as a synonym for “development” or “modernization,” as in “the end of political development.” In this reading, humanity has simply discovered the most effective, stable, and universalizable political system that satisfies the majority of the citizenry’s needs. The various forms of authoritarianism and communism ultimately failed to produce successful societies in the way that liberal democracies can, and, therefore, humanity has found the ideal political system to strive for (even if, in practice, it isn’t universally achieved).
This normative interpretation is far more difficult to argue against. As Fukuyama said:
“The most significant criticism isn’t on the Left because most people on the Left had at that point given up on communism. Nobody was willing to argue that there’s a higher stage where we’re going to nationalize all private property and have a centralized Leninist state. There’s a species of criticism that says you still have these big contradictions in capitalism, and that you need to somehow move to a different economic system, but I’ve never really understood what the alternative is other than greater regulation of the capitalist system and stronger social protections. You can have a little more, you can have a little less, but you’re still basically within a market economy. The only alternative is getting to the point where you start seriously trying to abolish private property, and not very many people are willing to go that far except in certain limited sectors.”
Fukuyama makes a valid point here. If “the end of history” is simply suggesting that liberal democracy is the ideal system of government—but, for a host of reasons, one that the world will not necessarily adopt—then as a normative statement, the thesis is well-founded. There is simply no viable alternative that would be appealing to the majority of people, or that, historically, has been shown to work.
But ideal does not mean inevitable, and even once a country adopts a liberal democratic system, there is no guarantee that it can keep it or that it will function without issue. As Fukuyama said:
“The ‘last man’ sections of The End of History are all about what could go wrong in a successful liberal democracy. The problem is the fact that peace and prosperity will not ultimately be satisfying to many people who will continue to seek recognition and community. For this reason I said very clearly back then that neither nationalism nor religion would disappear from world politics, but few people remember that now.”
Unfortunately, few people today grant Fukuyama this more charitable interpretation, and “the end of history” is considered nothing more than another failed historical prophecy. But this is unfortunate, because Fukuyama’s larger point is that liberal democracy is the form of government that we should be striving to establish or trying to protect, not that it will inevitably appear throughout the world due to uncontested historical forces. That’s why Fukuyama dedicated a large portion of his subsequent career to studying how effective states are built and how to prevent their ultimate decay—a possibility the US now faces in dealing with right-wing extremism and Trump’s attacks on the institutions of democracy.
Fukuyama is hopeful that the strength of US institutions is enough to withstand the assaults from the right, that liberal democracy will win out in the end against authoritarian populism, and that a richer conception of freedom will develop that includes a sense of duty and obligation to others and to the common good. But, of course, no one can predict the future, and, as Fukuyama has always maintained, to preserve liberal democracy, we must fight for it against the forces that seek to destroy it from within.
What’s also interesting to note is how far left Fukuyama has turned in terms of his politics and economic positions. Once associated with the neoconservative movement, Fukuyama has, in his own words, “definitely moved further to the left.” Reflecting on the war in Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis—both products of certain conservative ideas—Fukuyama began questioning his more conservative positions, and now believes inequality to be a much more significant problem, recognizes the limits of the free market, and embraces more robust social welfare and redistribution policies. Fukuyama also believes that the idea of freedom without a corresponding sense of duty to others is an impoverished view that is fundamentally inconsistent with the country’s founding principles.
Hopefully, this book goes a long way in clarifying Fukuyama’s political positions and drives home the point that liberal democracy, while ideal, is not inevitable, and must be fought for and protected from those who wish to destroy it (which today come almost exclusively from the right).
October 4, 2021
After the End of History: Conversations with Francis Fukuyama, by Mathilde C. Fasting, is a fascinating book written in a conversational form. It breaks down the views and ideas of political philosopher Francis Fukuyama, famous (or infamous) for his oft misunderstood End of History and the Last Man, in which he posits that Liberal Democracy is the highest form of political organization. This analysis is often misquoted, however, as Fukuyama has, and continues to be, very flexible with his theories. Fukuyama is a fascinating scholar; he has moved steadily over the years from a neo-conservative viewpoint, to a centre-left stance. He worked with George H.W. Bush, for example, during his tenure as the President of the United States. Now he is critical of the War in Iraq and U.S. neoliberalism, and has been vocally opposed to the Republican Party since 2003, breaking decidedly with his old Conservative contemporaries. He has since written numerous books on political theory and cultural identity, critiquing Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations, which posits that religious and cultural identities are the main points of conflict in the post-Cold Wat era.
In this book Fasting, who is a Norwegian political theorist, asks Fukuyama a number of questions on specific topics, ranging from Liberalism in decline, COVID-19, political philosophy, China's rise, Islam and the Arab Spring, geopolitics, and growing populism in the West, to name a few. This is a wide ranging book, with some interesting questions and answers, done in the style of a Socratic Dialogue. It is interesting, illuminating, and touches on the ideas of a very influential political philosopher who is looking to rebuild the idea of political economy, and move away from the academic usage of economics in place of sociological and political theory. I would definitely recommend this book for a quick and simple read for those looking to learn more about Fukuyama, and those who are interested in some contemporary political theory and dialogue.
In this book Fasting, who is a Norwegian political theorist, asks Fukuyama a number of questions on specific topics, ranging from Liberalism in decline, COVID-19, political philosophy, China's rise, Islam and the Arab Spring, geopolitics, and growing populism in the West, to name a few. This is a wide ranging book, with some interesting questions and answers, done in the style of a Socratic Dialogue. It is interesting, illuminating, and touches on the ideas of a very influential political philosopher who is looking to rebuild the idea of political economy, and move away from the academic usage of economics in place of sociological and political theory. I would definitely recommend this book for a quick and simple read for those looking to learn more about Fukuyama, and those who are interested in some contemporary political theory and dialogue.
July 6, 2021
A great 2 hour read! Fukuyama’s insights are important, logical and detailed, whilst presenting solutions to a fundamental democratic crisis. This book provided me with many nuggets to use in my honours dissertation, thanks Francis Fukuyama.
June 22, 2021
Discussion of the book at the Review of Democracy
https://revdem.ceu.edu/2021/04/13/a-c...
https://revdem.ceu.edu/2021/04/13/a-c...
March 23, 2023
It's cool that Fukuyama is way more left-leaning than he was 20 years ago, and there's some genuinely interesting, logical analysis... and then there's sections where he states that Latin America isn't hasn't succeeded in establishing liberal democracies like the USA because they don't have a protestant heritage and corresponding virtues of cooperation and trust in institutions. Zero mention of the United Fruit Company, Panama, the CIA, Operation Condor, Nicaragua, or literally any coup attempt or US-backed military movements against democratic governments. He focuses so strongly on the critical importance of strong liberal democracies that there's a resulting blind spot around how those liberal democracies (mostly the United States) have undermined democracy internationally.
July 24, 2023
N-am citit nimic scris de Fukuyama, despre care știam câte ceva, ca tot omul oarecum cultivat. Cartea aceasta este un lung interviu, deci nu e scrisă de el, e scrisă de Mathilde Fasting, norvegiană, economist și istoric al ideilor, autoare de cărți ea însăși.
De ce mi-a plăcut. Păi întrebările m-au ajutat nu doar să aflu despre teoriile lui Fukuyama dezvoltate în cărțile alea necititite, dar și modul în care ele se mai aplică sau nu acum, la 30 de ani de la Sfârșitul istoriei. Mai mult decât atât, mi-a atătat modul în care se pun recent unele probleme globale, de genul imigrației. Fukuyama ne vorbește despre stat și instituțiile sale, despre statul iliberal care pare a se răspândi tot mai tare, despre democrația amenințată, despre sistemul american vs cel european, despre cum pare a arăta viitorul.
Mathilde și-a dorit să-l prezinte pe Fukuyama cititorilor norvegieni, o spune chiar ea în prefață, dar reușește să îl prezinte și cititorilor ca mine, de aiurea, Îmi place mult concizia lui Fukuyama și capacitatea sa de sinteză. Îmi plac întrebările care îl pun pe politolog să-și explice afirmațiile și teoriile prezentate în scrierile sale.
Având în vedere că Fukuyama a lucrat pentru Pentagon, că a contribuit direct la Doctrina Reagan, că a lucrat ca specialist în diverse administrații americane, că este un analist politic combinat cu un teoretician și profesor universitar, pune în perspectivă această carte. Fukuyama este un american, doamna Fasting este o europeană. Interesant de urmărit modul în care cele două tipuri de gândire se întâlnesc.
Acum, m-a făcut cartea asta că vreau să-l citesc pe Fukuyama? Da. Dar nu e musai să o faceți și voi. Pentru mine a fost o lectura extrem de valoroasă prin informațiișe noi pe care mi le-a furnizat și pentru relațiile între idei pe care le-a pus în valoare.
* e de 4,5, de fapt. :)
De ce mi-a plăcut. Păi întrebările m-au ajutat nu doar să aflu despre teoriile lui Fukuyama dezvoltate în cărțile alea necititite, dar și modul în care ele se mai aplică sau nu acum, la 30 de ani de la Sfârșitul istoriei. Mai mult decât atât, mi-a atătat modul în care se pun recent unele probleme globale, de genul imigrației. Fukuyama ne vorbește despre stat și instituțiile sale, despre statul iliberal care pare a se răspândi tot mai tare, despre democrația amenințată, despre sistemul american vs cel european, despre cum pare a arăta viitorul.
Mathilde și-a dorit să-l prezinte pe Fukuyama cititorilor norvegieni, o spune chiar ea în prefață, dar reușește să îl prezinte și cititorilor ca mine, de aiurea, Îmi place mult concizia lui Fukuyama și capacitatea sa de sinteză. Îmi plac întrebările care îl pun pe politolog să-și explice afirmațiile și teoriile prezentate în scrierile sale.
Având în vedere că Fukuyama a lucrat pentru Pentagon, că a contribuit direct la Doctrina Reagan, că a lucrat ca specialist în diverse administrații americane, că este un analist politic combinat cu un teoretician și profesor universitar, pune în perspectivă această carte. Fukuyama este un american, doamna Fasting este o europeană. Interesant de urmărit modul în care cele două tipuri de gândire se întâlnesc.
Acum, m-a făcut cartea asta că vreau să-l citesc pe Fukuyama? Da. Dar nu e musai să o faceți și voi. Pentru mine a fost o lectura extrem de valoroasă prin informațiișe noi pe care mi le-a furnizat și pentru relațiile între idei pe care le-a pus în valoare.
* e de 4,5, de fapt. :)
August 19, 2025
This book is deeply disappointing. It demonstrates that education and experience are meaningless when filtered through ideological extremism. By reducing the world to a simplistic binary—those who agree with your liberal-democratic views versus those you demonize—you undermine the integrity of your own argument. Intellectual rigor demands nuance; your work offers only dogma.
Rather than advancing understanding, this book serves as an example of “soft extremism,” cloaked in the language of reason but stripped of objectivity. It should be studied in universities not for its insights, but as a case study in how bias corrodes scholarship.
Reading it in 2025 makes its flaws even more glaring. The political and social developments in the United States have directly contradicted many of your claims. The American people resisted the narrative imposed by mainstream media and academic orthodoxy, proving their capacity for independent thought. They chose free minds and free souls over ideological conformity.
What you dismissed as resistance to “progress” has revealed itself instead as resistance to control. Far from being led by your brand of ideological certainty, Americans are now leading a broader awakening against it. History is already leaving your perspective behind.
Goodbye.
Rather than advancing understanding, this book serves as an example of “soft extremism,” cloaked in the language of reason but stripped of objectivity. It should be studied in universities not for its insights, but as a case study in how bias corrodes scholarship.
Reading it in 2025 makes its flaws even more glaring. The political and social developments in the United States have directly contradicted many of your claims. The American people resisted the narrative imposed by mainstream media and academic orthodoxy, proving their capacity for independent thought. They chose free minds and free souls over ideological conformity.
What you dismissed as resistance to “progress” has revealed itself instead as resistance to control. Far from being led by your brand of ideological certainty, Americans are now leading a broader awakening against it. History is already leaving your perspective behind.
Goodbye.
September 16, 2023
Fukuyama is all over the place and quite alive with his political analyses and insights. He continuously goes back to the ancient origins of politics and at the same time he looks forward to new possible solutions. He is interested in all the political systems of the world and has first-hand knowledge of most of them; even if he tends to favor the European ones. He used to be an involved Republican during the Reagan/Bush era, and eventually turned into a California Democrat – however the Republican/Democrat distinction is not much useful with someone like Fukuyama. He points out the transition from the classical economic-politics to the more recent one of identity-politics; where the only option for president is between characters like Trump or Hilary. In these series of interviews, he tends to go back to his “End of History” book in order to clarify, defend, acknowledge defeat, or to let go - as the 1989 optimism and the prospect of endless democracy inspired by America, ended up with the emergence of Trump and the attacks on the American democracy from within. The only problem with this book is that this is rather a series of interviews, and not a systematic one.
September 17, 2021
Francis Fukuyama is one of the great minds in the fields of political history and economics. I have read several of his books, and found them fascinating. I was drawn to this book, which is really a long interview of Fukuyama, covering topics both biographical and academic. The discussions were fairly recent, so we get to hear Fukuyama's take on Trump, Brexit, and many other current topics. I am amazed by his ability to converse so knowledgeably across so many fields. One downer was that I did this book on audio, and the audio version did not do it justice. It would seem natural in a book that was an interview to have at least to voices, and better three, one for the narrator, one for the interviewer and one for Fukuyama. unfortunately, this edition uses one voice which makes it very hard to follow who is speaking sometimes. In any case, the content is excellent. Highly recommended for anyone interested in current affairs.
June 1, 2024
After The End of History is an interesting read, even if you haven't read the original essay Fukuyama had written on the subject. There's a diverse range of topics explored: internal/external challenges to liberal democracies, scientific and technological conflicts with liberalism, and revisiting the neoconservative movement and some of its failures.
The interview format unfortunately doesn't allow for as much rigour as I'd hoped for on several subjects, as further interesting insights would've derailed the initial conversation. But to the author's credit they do a great job asking questions that provide context on subjects that the audience might not be familiar to.
4.25/5
The interview format unfortunately doesn't allow for as much rigour as I'd hoped for on several subjects, as further interesting insights would've derailed the initial conversation. But to the author's credit they do a great job asking questions that provide context on subjects that the audience might not be familiar to.
4.25/5
March 25, 2023
Most people would probably find this book to be very boring. Since I love political philosophy I found it very engaging. Mr Fukyama is very consistent in the way he thinks. Unlike a lot of politcal commentators he is not very ideological. If an idea is good he likes it but if it is bad he doesn’t.
He does not like Trump and I can’t blame him for that but He seemed to give Barack Obama a pass. In my opinion Obama was a total disaster even though he had the right Demeanor. For all of the Chaos Trump had he accomplished a lot of thing such as being tough on China. While he didnt go about it the right way he was right about Nato not being prepared (and not pulling their own weight) and he was right about Germany becoming too dependent on Russia for energy.
He does not like Trump and I can’t blame him for that but He seemed to give Barack Obama a pass. In my opinion Obama was a total disaster even though he had the right Demeanor. For all of the Chaos Trump had he accomplished a lot of thing such as being tough on China. While he didnt go about it the right way he was right about Nato not being prepared (and not pulling their own weight) and he was right about Germany becoming too dependent on Russia for energy.
December 10, 2022
A series of interviews of Francis Fukuyama, conducted by Mathilde Fasting, who runs a prominent liberal think tank in Norway. While the interviews are wide ranging and go between his first interests in classical literature before moving to Hegel and Kojeve and current events, Fukuyama is at pains to reassert that the "End of History" from his 1989 essay and later book are a "normative statement, not an empirical condition". To be fought for and defended, not inevitable.
December 5, 2021
I greatly enjoyed the book and was able to deepen my understanding of some of the complex political phenomena and concepts/ideas. As the book was written in a conversational manner and interviews between Mathilde Fasting and Prof Francis, every answer leads to the main point and so that you don't have to read relevant statistics or background stories.
April 23, 2025
As a former Republican, I love Fukuyama, but many of his complaints have turned out to be ironically wrong. Yes, there are many problems within the American right, but he does not see the same faults in the American left, or at least he doesn’t attribute those faults to nefarious ends where he does to the right.
March 21, 2022
This was bizarre! A compiled interview was done in 2021, yet Fukuyama spoke a great deal about Russia, China, and Ukraine. The conversation was wide ranging and largely wandering. Having not read his original work I was learning on the go.
March 29, 2022
Excellent summary of Fukuyama's thoughts on political order and political decay over a quarter century and a dozen books. Timely analysis of Ukraine's defiant stand against authoritarianism in the final chapter. The interview format works very well.
May 22, 2022
Good and short read of Fukuyama assessing the current state of the world vis a vis his theories about the End of History.
Clarifies the cultural essentialism that's at the core of some of his views, but a interesting read nonetheless.
Clarifies the cultural essentialism that's at the core of some of his views, but a interesting read nonetheless.
November 11, 2021
interesting stuff, makes me want to finish my masters in history
June 7, 2022
Wide ranging. Culture politics economics history philosophy. Fukuyama is for sure well read.
March 19, 2024
Very interesting indeed.
August 16, 2024
interesting to think about, at times a little overboard in its praise of fukuyama
February 27, 2025
O lucrare excelenta pentru antrenarea spiritului critic, ajuta mult de a intelege lumea in care traim!
April 14, 2025
Absolutely worthwhile, if only as a brief window into an informal view of Fukuyama's thinking in the 2020s, as well as the limitations his brand of liberalism faces when dealing with certain social and historical phenomena
June 23, 2024
"Eu aposto que o Fukuyama dava nas drogas."
- Beatriz Mestre, durante uma aula de Filosofia da História, com um dos professores mais importantes do país.
- Beatriz Mestre, durante uma aula de Filosofia da História, com um dos professores mais importantes do país.
Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews