Book: Eight Days at Yalta: How Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin Shaped the Post-War World
Author: Diana Preston
Publisher: Picador (16 October 2020); Pan Macmillan UK
Language: English
Paperback: 368 pages
Item Weight: 320 g
Dimensions: 13 x 2.9 x 19.6 cm
Importer: Pan Macmillan India
Price: 504/-
On the sunset of February 3, 1945, under cover of night, a fleet of Packards brought the two most authoritative leaders of the democratic world, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, to their target — a group of villas previously owned by the Russian tsar and high-flying aristocrats near the Black Sea resort of Yalta.
They called themselves the Argonauts, an allusion to the ancient warriors who had traveled to the Black Sea coast to recover the Golden Fleece from a dragon who never slept.
Their trophy was a resolution to the war that had engulfed the world; their dragon was their host, Joseph Stalin, once a promising Georgian poet and now a coldblooded dictator.
“Churchill, seventy in the previous November, was the oldest; Stalin, born in December 1878, was sixty-six; and Roosevelt, the youngest, would be sixty-three on 30 January 1945 as he journeyed to the conference……
The stresses and sprains of office and of the war had taken their toll on all three.
None was in predominantly good health, with that of Roosevelt being noticeably the poorest.
A stretch of polio in August 1921 had paralysed him from the waist down – a paralysis which he refused to believe was enduring and tried frequent therapies to assuage. Even in January 1945 he had a new masseur and healer, ex-prize fighter Harry Setaro, who told him ‘Mr President, you’re going to walk….”
Stalin suffered from constant psoriasis, tonsillitis, rheumatism and foot problems, among which was that two toes on his left foot were fused together.
His face was marked by boyhood smallpox. Following an infection his left arm hung stiff, adequately so for him to be declared out of shape for military service in the First World War.
In spring 1944 his aides had found him comatose at his desk from an unidentified cause. Although almost positively the fittest of the three, he had developed a hypochondriac’s sensitivity to any small health problem, almost certainly heightened by fears of poison and increasing paranoia in general.
Churchill was so overweight that in 1942 he had to have a new desk installed in his Cabinet war rooms beneath London’s Whitehall because he could not fit behind the previous one. All through his life he had been subject to melancholy which he likened to having ‘a black dog on one’s back’.
Churchill regularly took barbiturate sleeping pills. He had suffered a heart attack when visiting President Roosevelt over Christmas and New Year 1941/2 and had had several bouts of pneumonia.
Together the three men conducted the most enigmatic peace conference of the modern era.
They moved armies of millions and dispensed victors’ justice as they saw fit, deciding the fate of nations and sending millions of refugees east and west because they believed it would promote a lasting peace.
They created an institution to guard that peace and the interests of the victors. They left Yalta content but concerned.
Behind them lay thirty years ravaged by two world wars that had cost tens of millions of human lives. Before them was the indecision of the postwar world.
The contest of geopolitical aspirations, the clash of egos and value systems, and the jockeying for power among the most perceptive negotiators their nations could produce all played out in eight days at Yalta in February 1945.
The three leaders wondered about one another’s honesty and willingness to cooperate.
Would the alumni of the best private schools of Britain and America reach an understanding with the son of a Georgian shoemaker who had dropped out of an Orthodox seminary?
Would the two democratically elected leaders know how to handle the godfather of the Gulag?
The conference confronted its participants with never-ending moral dilemmas.
It was an emotional roller coaster that involved not only the leaders of the Grand Alliance but also their various subordinates, who fought for their countries’ interests and for the favor of their masters.
Long days and long nights ………………
Feelings of disappointment and regret dominated on both sides of the Cold War divide.
Yalta became a representation of mislaid chance, however differently perceived.
In the West, it came to be regarded as a milestone on the road to the “lost peace,” to cite a 1950s headline in Time magazine.
In the mainstream discourse of the McCarthy era, the word “Yalta” became a synonym for betrayal of freedom and the appeasement of world communism.
Who was accountable? Who was to be blamed?
That became a central question with the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s, when the two sides blamed each other.
There were also heated domestic debates.
In the United States the decisions taken at Yalta divided Republicans and Democrats. President Roosevelt and his advisers were accused not only of selling out Eastern Europe and China to Stalin but also of promoting communism at home.
The highly publicized trial of Alger Hiss, a member of the U.S. delegation at Yalta who was accused of spying for the USSR, raised the temperature of the debate.
Interviewed after his retirement for a book about his life, General George C. Marshall declined to make any substantive mention about his role at Yalta, definite that whatever he said would be turned against him.
Why would you read this book way in 2021? Well for the following reasons –
1) Controversy continues to this day, as to whether the price the Western leaders paid for the ‘golden fleece’ that was peace was too great, whether the constancy of Western Europe was bought at the cost of the loss of freedom in the East and whether the terms Stalin won for his agreement to enter the war against Japan were too generous, providing Soviet Communism with a grip in East Asia, and on the Korean Peninsula specially.
2) Many have thought so and have dated the beginning of the Cold War from Yalta. In 2005, President George W. Bush, speaking in Latvia, compared the Yalta agreements to the 1938 Munich Agreement and the Nazi Germany–Soviet pact of a year later and suggested Yalta had left Europe ‘divided and unstable’.
3) Thereby it ‘had been one of the greatest wrongs of history. . . Once again, when prevailing governments negotiated, the freedom of small nations was somehow dispensable.’
4) Even today, public debate continues to revolve around the 1950s-era questions of who sold out Eastern Europe and whether it was in America’s interest to persuade the USSR to join the war on Japan—a fact attested by the reaction of American foreign-policy pundits to a statement made in May 2005 by President George W. Bush, who compared the Yalta agreements to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.
Public debate on the Yalta Conference has so far failed to take account of two major developments: the end of the Cold War and access to formerly unavailable Soviet documents. It has also largely ignored the progress made by professional historians of the Second World War and the Cold War in the last two decades.
This book provides you with all the essential insights and answers many of the hitherto unsettled riddles of the Second World War.