Their unique relationship was based on linked national histories and partially shared nationality – Churchill was half American – similarities in class and education, a love for the navy, and a common belief in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon institutions. It was cemented by shared Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. On these foundations, Churchill and Roosevelt constructed a fighting alliance unlike any other in history. But at the heart of this special relationship, hidden by layers of secrecy, was a far-reaching sharing of intelligence that was the most sensitive touchstone of their mutual trust. In Roosevelt and Men of Secrets, David Stafford draws on recently declassified information and his own specialist understanding of intelligence to illuminate the relationship between two men who, as leaders and allies, were towering figures of twentieth-century history. Praise for Roosevelt and Men of ’Provides a great backdrop into the friendship and covert chess match between FDR and Churchill’ - Goodreads review ‘A swift, well-documented assessment of the relationship’s “volatile mix of friendship, rivalry and resentment”’ – Kirkus Reviews Educated at Downing College, Cambridge and the University of London, David Stafford is a historian and writer noted for his scholarly works on Churchill and World War II, British espionage and twentieth-century intelligence. He lives in British Columbia, Canada.
David Alexander Tetlow Stafford is projects director at Edinburgh University's Centre for the Study of the Two World Wars and Leverhulme Emeritus Professor in the University's School of History, Classics and Archaeology.
Stafford took his B.A. at Downing College, Cambridge in 1963. He then undertook postgraduate study at the University of London, taking an M.A. and finally his Ph.D. in history in 1968.
Beginning his career with government service, Stafford served in the British Diplomatic Service as a third secretary at the Foreign Office from 1967 to 1968, and then as second secretary in 1968. He then took up an appointment as research associate (1968–70) at the Centre of International Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
He then became assistant professor of history (1970–76) at Canada's University of Victoria in British Columbia. He was promoted to associate professor of history (1976–82) and finally professor of history (1982–84). He then became director of studies (1985–86) and executive director (1986–92) at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. From 1992 to 2000 Stafford became a visiting professor at Edinburgh University's Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, and then, from 2000, he became projects director at the Centre for the Study of the Two World Wars.
Stafford is particularly noted for his scholarly works concerning Winston Churchill and British intelligence, various aspects of the Second World War, and Twentieth Century intelligence and espionage with a focus on Britain. He now resides in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada.
He is a regular book reviewer, appearing in The Times (London), BBC History Magazine, The Spectator, The Times Literary Supplement, The New York Times, the Times Herald Tribune (Paris), and Saturday Night and the Globe and Mail (Toronto).
Chirp (BBC Audiobooks) 11 hours 24 min. Narrated by Richard McGonagle (A)
A fascinating book! I learned so much about the relationship between these two leaders and even more about the espionage and code breaking during WW Two. I even took notes! I didn't realize that Japan was at war with Great Britain and France and their colonies in Asia and Africa also. I didn't completely understand how financially exhausted the war left England. This book is great example of how a narrator can make history come to life. IMO Richard McGonagle did an exceptional imitation of the voices of both Churchill and Roosevelt.
Even if one has read classic works on World War II, Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets is a must-read for anyone interested in intelligence operations during that iconic conflict. It not only features familiar and well-documents stories gleaned from earlier volumes, but it builds upon more recently declassified information to give a truer and more complete version of some of those rumors and stories. For example, I am enough of a conspiracy buff to have believed (no matter how many sources contended that it wasn’t so) that Roosevelt knew in advance of the Pearl Harbor attack and allowed it to occur so that the U.S. would be drawn into the war over the objections of then (ironically enough) isolationist Republicans. Yet, deep down I know that whenever one is tempted to consider something a conspiracy or a breakdown in competence, one should choose the latter almost every time. So, when I believed in the past that the JN-25 code had been broken by our cryptographers and that JN-25 messages about Pearl Harbor had been intercepted and were in our hands (p. 116), I assumed (and you know what that does) that FDR knew. Instead, Stafford reveals rather, “The codebreakers were undermanned and short of resources, and their energies were heavily focused on Magic and the Battle of the Atlantic.” (p. 117) In short, this happened, despite signal intelligence, because of “tunnel vision” with regard to staffing and priorities.
So, pardon me if you’ve heard these before, but I didn’t realize that when the cypher was broken on a communique where Japanese Minister of War Tojo assured Hiroshi Oshima (a Japanese diplomat) that no attack on the Soviets was planned, FDR hared the intel with Stalin (p. 137). It had never occurred to me that Chou-en-lai had served as a British informant (p. 262). I either didn’t know or had forgotten that the Allies had wreaked vengeance on Admiral Yamamoto, planner of the Pearl Harbor attack, by assassinating him (p. 218). I didn’t realize that the U.S. was playing both sides against the middle in both the Yugoslavian and Greek civil wars (pp. 274-275). I didn’t recall ever reading before about the U.S. shooting down six British bombers in Indo-China because they were engaged in a covert action which hadn’t been communicated to the U.S. (p. 288).
The volume delineates inter-service rivalry between Britain’s intelligence communities and the U.S. intelligence communities throughout the book, but it was fascinating to see how the British had (in a document released shortly before this book was published in 1999) manipulated their intelligence cooperation so that whenever a colonial interest (India, Burma, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, etc.) was involved that Britain should be the “senior partner” with regard to intelligence operations (p. 287). “Wild Bill” Donovan of the OSS complained over and over again that the sole purpose of the British remaining in control was to thwart U.S. intelligence-gathering and covert activities.
Prior to reading Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets, I had read a lot about how close Churchill and FDR were (including the suggestion by one critic of Churchill that the relationship was “almost homosexual” – p. 240). Yet, I had never considered how much their views might diverge on some matters. In their opinions of Chinese leader Chiang-kai-shek, for example, they were widely different. Roosevelt saw him as a Chinese George Washington (p. 257) while Churchill “…was far less sure than Roosevelt that he would even survive as leader of China.” (p. 265). With such insights as these, Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets provides an interesting reading experience and deserves a place on one’s history shelf (as it will on mine).
Although this book was a slow slog the writing was good. Stafford peels back a slice of history not well understood and explains the US/Britain partnership has navigated and managed by Roosevelt and Churchill. I learned a good deal about secret intelligence and the role it played in WWII.
David Stafford certainly didn't skimp on the details. Lots and lots and lots of information on the secret war fought in WWII from Roosevelt and Churchill down about three levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy. I learned a lot but was not really taken by the style of writing. Too often, Mr. Stafford would take the reader down into a level of detail on minor points or lesser operations that did not, in the end, offer much greater insight. And his habit of circling back on topics, even specific references ("where are my golden eggs") three or four times was in the former confusing and the latter befuddling.
Nor do I think that Mr. Stafford met his stated aim of showing the Roosevelt, Churchill relationship in a particularly or dramatically different light than others have portrayed it. His intro leads the reader to believe that in the course of his writing he will show that R&C were not the "friends" we're led to believe they were, that there's was a somewhat complex almost vexing relationship. By the end of the book, I thought that indeed the relationship was complex but it was quite clearly a complex relationship between two very, very close friends. I mean these two men were as close as any I have known in or outside of politics. The complexity of the relationship and the fact that they had different goals and dramatically different political pressures upon them does nothing to undermine the obvious fact that these two were remarkably - almost incredibly - close, and that this friendship played a vital, unparalleled role in seeing that the prosecution of the war was so well coordinated between two of the three major allied powers. I found it odd that Mr. Stafford tried to parse the relationship to show that it was something that to my eyes it was not.
But I do appreciate and did enjoy learning about the impact and the extent of espionage throughout WWII. If Mr. Stafford left a stone unturned, I believe one would be hard pressed to find it. Equally interesting was his insight into the many players in the game, major and minor. Wild Bill Donovan, Harry Hopkins, Menze (sp?), Wilkerson - even Ian Fleming - a who's who of the spy game with a tail that extends well beyond the war.
Mostly about intelligence, as you might expect from David Stafford, who mainly writes spy histories. This book concentrates on the conflicts, compromises and co-operation between FDR and WSC in the field of intelligence, with particular reference to the relationship between Churchill's SOE and FDR's OSS. This narrow field might be disappointing to anyone hoping for a more general account of the relationship between the two leaders, but of itself this isn't a bad book at all. It eschews sensationalism, has a decent regard for evidence and the reliability or otherwise thereof, and is tolerably well written. However, it doesn't really add anything new to the story, and suffers somewhat from long digressions away from the main subject (one particularly dull passage relates at too much length the story of a 'covert operation' in Spain that seems to have achieved nothing except enriching various Francoite leaders). An interesting sidelight for students of the era, but hardly essential reading.
Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets by David A. T. Stafford has the WWII era as a backdrop but the focus is really on these two men and their relationship as leaders, statesmen, and Allies. They each had their own agendas to further their own country's interests; FDR wanted to keep the US out of the war and Churchill desperately wanted the support of the US to stop Hitler and free Europe from his grasp. When the Japanese attacked the US at Pearl Harbor everything changed. America entered the war on the side of Great Britain against the Japanese as well as Germany and Italy. However, unlike how Churchill saw this partnership working with America being England's junior partner since they had already been at war for some time, FDR quickly had the US in the driver's seat. Many of their previously secret communications are brought to light in this book and may have some surprises even for avid readers on WWII.
A book about the use of secret intelligence during World War II and how the leaders of Great Britain and the US managed and used it in their war strategy sounded a fair bit more interesting than it turned out to be. Maybe if your more of a WWII history buff than me you will find it more interesting, but for me it lacked any sort of a cohesive narrative.
Provides a great backdrop into the friendship and covert chess match between FDR and Churchill . Their mistrust for each other's intent helps shape their respective spy initiatives and partnership in the ww II efforts.
Chock full of interesting information about intelligence gathering during WWII. I learned a lot from it but got bogged down in the details after a while. The narrative doesn't keep the reader moving along very well.
This is an interesting book about the relationship between the two leaders of what would be great countries. The U.K.and U.S. Although they continue to say that the relationship is still something however this is the beginning of the relationship.
A great exploration of espionage and the relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill. Wide ranging, detailed and nuanced. Although I'm very familiar with WWII, the bribery of Spaniards to encourage Spain to keep out of it was new to me. I knew Roosevelt and Churchill both got on well and had many reservations but this deepened my knowledge and understanding of their complicated relationship.
A bit too breathless and willing to sacrifice historical accuracy to make minor episodes or decisions into Major, Defining Moments In The History Of The World. So much so that I set it down and shan't be picking it back up again.
Very informative a lot to absorb. Contains a lot of historical questions answed.
Very informative and lot to absorb. Contains a lot of historical questions Answered. Well worth the read & re read for any thing missed or not under stood.
this was an engrossing acct of Churchill /Roosevelt complex relationship and also the formation of both British and American secret intelligence. much of book focused on events swirling around somewhat behind the scenes at war time. so it's not just a book about ww2. I enjoyed this.
This author displayed the great leadership qualities of each man, along with the personality traits that diminished their effectiveness. I thought it was written without a bias.