What do you think?
Rate this book
Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century
Warfare has migrated into cities. From Mosul to Mumbai, Aleppo to Marawi, the major military battles of the twenty-first century have taken place in densely populated urban areas. Why has this happened? What are the defining characteristics of urban warfare today? What are its military and political implications? Leading sociologist Anthony King answers these critical questions through close analysis of recent urban battles and their historical antecedents. Exploring the changing typography and evolving tactics of the urban battlescape, he shows that although not all methods used in urban warfare are new, operations in cities today have become highly distinctive. Urban warfare has coalesced into gruelling micro-sieges, which extend from street level – and below – to the airspace high above the city, as combatants fight for individual buildings, streets and districts. At the same time, digitalized social media and information networks communicate these battles to global audiences across an urban archipelago, with these spectators often becoming active participants in the fight. A timely reminder of the costs and the horror of war and violence in cities, this book offers an invaluable interdisciplinary introduction to urban warfare in the new millennium for students of international security, urban studies and military science, as well as military professionals.
288 pages, Paperback
Published October 11, 2021
21 people are currently reading
238 people want to read
About the author
Anthony King
8 books7 followersAnthony King was reader in sociology at the University of Exeter. He is now a Professor of War Studies at Warwick University.
In addition to his work on social theory, he has carried out extensive research on English and European football. He is currently researching European defence policy and capability. His work is currently specialising in the study of war and the armed forces and is particularly interested in the question of small unit cohesion.
In addition to his work on social theory, he has carried out extensive research on English and European football. He is currently researching European defence policy and capability. His work is currently specialising in the study of war and the armed forces and is particularly interested in the question of small unit cohesion.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
August 17, 2022
Outmanoeuvred — Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century (Anthony King)
What I assume to be an excellent primer (I’m no General) on modern warfare. Highly readable, King gives us a brief tour through some of the more important concepts in urban warfare today. Illustrations by way of example and historical context (and, at times, actual illustration) are weaved in, though Mosul is perhaps the example we dwell on the most.
My expertise is limited in this field so this review will mostly be a summary. Broadly, King identifies a condensation of warfare into localised “micro-sieges” taking place within cities rather than around them. At the same time, the tempo of these urban wars has slowed, extending from weeks and months into years.
The primary causes King identifies for concentration is the force ratio — that is, the ratio of soldiers to civilians in any urban space. Modern armed forces have professionalised and downsized over recent decades, weighing down on the numerator. Cities have exploded in both population and physical area, weighing on the denominator. These two effects have reduced force ratios from (what is generally considered an optimal range) 1:10-1:20 to 1:300-1:400. Smaller armed forces are no longer able to surround cities and cannot ignore the threat they pose if they are to operate in the field. Indeed, the field has become more lethal due to the development of precision munitions and global surveillance. All of this is contrary to typical explanations of the urbanisation of warfare where demography and asymmetry dominate: more people live in cities, thus they are more important, and cities offer cover to non-state actors neutralising the overwhelming power of conventional forces. I find King’s explanation to be more convincing, although demography and asymmetry obviously operate.
Cities are complex systems — although this is an analogy King argues against. He prefers to think of them as systems of social groups, or perhaps identities, which overlap, separate, or reform, and can differ in salience. This makes sense to me. Cities are also complex geographic spaces — not only is the physical infrastructure more complex and important but there is meaningful tactical space above and below the street level. The complex physical “battlespace” and reduced force ratios means armed forces need to mount a series of micro-sieges, or “bite-and-hold” operations. The complex social geography and reduced force ratios mean local partners (with varying degrees of regularity — from official armed forces to militias) are often required. While they offset numerical disadvantages and to enable more war fighting specialisation, they turn operational or tactical concerns into political and strategic ones. They often have differing interests and there is a requirement to negotiate. All of these facets of complexity slow down modern operational tempo. Indeed, this feeds into itself: the very architecture of the city is changed, with concrete walls compensating for reduced force sizes. This further slows tempo.
Information has also become a key part of the battlespace. Like cities, information warfare is both local and global. It’s local because armed forces need to obtain a degree of local legitimacy or consent in order to operate. Cities and their populations are now so big and complex that any strategist must contemplate their interests rather than ignoring them. For liberal states, global legitimacy is also a concern (and domestic electoral concerns). The eye of international media and NGOs, if a war is considered illegitimate, can severely reduce the space to operate. Considering the length of battles these days this is more important than ever: the need for local and international partnerships and hegemonic coalition-building are limited without legitimacy. Of course, this doesn’t hold for illiberal states like Russia or Syria who do not face a basic legitimation demand.
It’d be remiss of me not to mention social media: King devotes a few headings to it and sensibly does not overstate its importance. Social media is not (at least in the near-term) causal, but catalytic. Existing beliefs in existing social networks are more likely to drive action rather than computational propaganda campaigns. That being said, I am sure there is ample ground for further investigation in the field of political epistemology during wartime (at least at a tactical level).
There’s a funny chapter in the book where King recounts some application of postmodern theory to infantry tactics. “Autarkic units” “Walking through walls”, “a hyperreal approach to warfare for a postmodern age”, “urban operations have become quantum”. King does bring a punchline and some sense to it all: we have not seen a shift towards “fractal” (as King points out in a footnote, an incorrect use of the term, substitute “fractured”) manoeuvres. While modern CQB tactics (a legitimate advance as opposed to postmodern mouseholing) are useful, it is only against weak or surprised enemies in certain contexts. In general, we have seen the return of an ancient form of warfare — the siege — in a strange new guise. Weapons considered inappropriate for urban conflict — tanks — have become crucial mobile strongpoints in a micro-siege by micro-siege prolonged battle.
The last chapter focuses on some potential near-future scenarios: war in a megacity, robotic warfare, and nuclear armageddon. King discounts most of these. It seems to me that we will see longer, more protected, potentially frozen conflicts in major urban areas. Unfortunately, persistent low-moderate levels of conflict are as pernicious as short but highly violent wars.
I learnt a lot from this book. The prose is enjoyable to read, although it would benefit from a proofread (there are a few typos — nothing big). I would stop here first for an opinionated overview of modern warfare.
What I assume to be an excellent primer (I’m no General) on modern warfare. Highly readable, King gives us a brief tour through some of the more important concepts in urban warfare today. Illustrations by way of example and historical context (and, at times, actual illustration) are weaved in, though Mosul is perhaps the example we dwell on the most.
My expertise is limited in this field so this review will mostly be a summary. Broadly, King identifies a condensation of warfare into localised “micro-sieges” taking place within cities rather than around them. At the same time, the tempo of these urban wars has slowed, extending from weeks and months into years.
The primary causes King identifies for concentration is the force ratio — that is, the ratio of soldiers to civilians in any urban space. Modern armed forces have professionalised and downsized over recent decades, weighing down on the numerator. Cities have exploded in both population and physical area, weighing on the denominator. These two effects have reduced force ratios from (what is generally considered an optimal range) 1:10-1:20 to 1:300-1:400. Smaller armed forces are no longer able to surround cities and cannot ignore the threat they pose if they are to operate in the field. Indeed, the field has become more lethal due to the development of precision munitions and global surveillance. All of this is contrary to typical explanations of the urbanisation of warfare where demography and asymmetry dominate: more people live in cities, thus they are more important, and cities offer cover to non-state actors neutralising the overwhelming power of conventional forces. I find King’s explanation to be more convincing, although demography and asymmetry obviously operate.
Cities are complex systems — although this is an analogy King argues against. He prefers to think of them as systems of social groups, or perhaps identities, which overlap, separate, or reform, and can differ in salience. This makes sense to me. Cities are also complex geographic spaces — not only is the physical infrastructure more complex and important but there is meaningful tactical space above and below the street level. The complex physical “battlespace” and reduced force ratios means armed forces need to mount a series of micro-sieges, or “bite-and-hold” operations. The complex social geography and reduced force ratios mean local partners (with varying degrees of regularity — from official armed forces to militias) are often required. While they offset numerical disadvantages and to enable more war fighting specialisation, they turn operational or tactical concerns into political and strategic ones. They often have differing interests and there is a requirement to negotiate. All of these facets of complexity slow down modern operational tempo. Indeed, this feeds into itself: the very architecture of the city is changed, with concrete walls compensating for reduced force sizes. This further slows tempo.
Information has also become a key part of the battlespace. Like cities, information warfare is both local and global. It’s local because armed forces need to obtain a degree of local legitimacy or consent in order to operate. Cities and their populations are now so big and complex that any strategist must contemplate their interests rather than ignoring them. For liberal states, global legitimacy is also a concern (and domestic electoral concerns). The eye of international media and NGOs, if a war is considered illegitimate, can severely reduce the space to operate. Considering the length of battles these days this is more important than ever: the need for local and international partnerships and hegemonic coalition-building are limited without legitimacy. Of course, this doesn’t hold for illiberal states like Russia or Syria who do not face a basic legitimation demand.
It’d be remiss of me not to mention social media: King devotes a few headings to it and sensibly does not overstate its importance. Social media is not (at least in the near-term) causal, but catalytic. Existing beliefs in existing social networks are more likely to drive action rather than computational propaganda campaigns. That being said, I am sure there is ample ground for further investigation in the field of political epistemology during wartime (at least at a tactical level).
There’s a funny chapter in the book where King recounts some application of postmodern theory to infantry tactics. “Autarkic units” “Walking through walls”, “a hyperreal approach to warfare for a postmodern age”, “urban operations have become quantum”. King does bring a punchline and some sense to it all: we have not seen a shift towards “fractal” (as King points out in a footnote, an incorrect use of the term, substitute “fractured”) manoeuvres. While modern CQB tactics (a legitimate advance as opposed to postmodern mouseholing) are useful, it is only against weak or surprised enemies in certain contexts. In general, we have seen the return of an ancient form of warfare — the siege — in a strange new guise. Weapons considered inappropriate for urban conflict — tanks — have become crucial mobile strongpoints in a micro-siege by micro-siege prolonged battle.
The last chapter focuses on some potential near-future scenarios: war in a megacity, robotic warfare, and nuclear armageddon. King discounts most of these. It seems to me that we will see longer, more protected, potentially frozen conflicts in major urban areas. Unfortunately, persistent low-moderate levels of conflict are as pernicious as short but highly violent wars.
I learnt a lot from this book. The prose is enjoyable to read, although it would benefit from a proofread (there are a few typos — nothing big). I would stop here first for an opinionated overview of modern warfare.
November 13, 2022
This is one of the shittiest books I have ever had the displeasure of reading. The author rambles on like a student who is trying to hit a word count requirement on an essay, by repeating himself and mentioning irrelevant anecdotes. The contents of this book could be compressed into 1/4 the amount of pages.
This book is not about urban warfare at all, but rather about how a military should conduct itself on already occupied territory against a weak enemy, like the U.S in Iraq. There is no discussion about how a military would win a real war against another sovereign nation in an urban enviroment.
A lot of the problems have to do with the author not being a member of any military, in terms of seeing the armed forces as a expeditionary international police force which you use to feed the military-industrial complex and send to third world countries to seek out terrorists hiding in caves.
I.e, this implies that the author does not see war as a means to conclusively force a political end upon an enemy, such as the defence of one's nation, but rather that "war" and "warfare" is the 10-15 year occupation of a country on the other side of the world that lacks a proper State, the time constraint being introduced by the will of the taxpayer to further fund the project.
This book is not about urban warfare at all, but rather about how a military should conduct itself on already occupied territory against a weak enemy, like the U.S in Iraq. There is no discussion about how a military would win a real war against another sovereign nation in an urban enviroment.
A lot of the problems have to do with the author not being a member of any military, in terms of seeing the armed forces as a expeditionary international police force which you use to feed the military-industrial complex and send to third world countries to seek out terrorists hiding in caves.
I.e, this implies that the author does not see war as a means to conclusively force a political end upon an enemy, such as the defence of one's nation, but rather that "war" and "warfare" is the 10-15 year occupation of a country on the other side of the world that lacks a proper State, the time constraint being introduced by the will of the taxpayer to further fund the project.
January 10, 2022
Anthony King is not a professionally trained military person. Accordingly there is some lack of conceptual cohesion in his otherwise very interesting and very current book. Perhaps un-intentionally he leaves this reviewer somewhat confused with regard to the King-definition of warfare. The conundrum is associated with the fact that urban is more than physical terrain, it also relates to demography, power-structure and projection and a host of the multiple of other aspects that makes it so seemingly hard to understand and coherently describe contemporary warfare.
In some respects a rewrite towards a title like 'Modern War -in an urban context' would fit the current text better, since the author take the reader far beyond the classical the especially tactical/operational approach of how to fight in an urban environment.
That said it is a highly recommended and - as can be seen - thought stimulating read
In some respects a rewrite towards a title like 'Modern War -in an urban context' would fit the current text better, since the author take the reader far beyond the classical the especially tactical/operational approach of how to fight in an urban environment.
That said it is a highly recommended and - as can be seen - thought stimulating read
October 23, 2022
Not a bad starter for somebody new to thr subject but he makes a number of leaps based on naivety and has overly focused on reducing numbers leading to increase urban warfare. Some of the recent activity in Ukraine has made some of his ideas dated already.
November 19, 2024
A book that breaks down the relevant factors to consider when talking about warfare in urban areas - in cities. Clearly written from an American perspective. Lots of real examples from, unsurprisingly, the Middle East.
July 9, 2023
Good book, but some of the theories are now redundant following the war in Ukraine. He sees COIN as the future of urban warfare and ignores what conventional urban warfare may look like.
June 23, 2024
An okay book on the subject. Needs to be tighter. The lack of conciseness meant you need to speed-read through it to get to the gist. If this is your first foray into urban warfare, it's tolerable.
April 9, 2024
generally fantastic, with a spectacularly weak ending. the last two chapters just shouldn’t be in the book in their current form, especially serving as a pseudo-ending. would be a solid five stars without them
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews