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Statecraft: And How to Restore America's Standing in the World
In this wise and thought-provoking book, the renowned peace negotiator Dennis Ross shows that America's current foreign policy problems stem from the Bush administration's inability to use the tools of statecraft to advance our national interests. Ross explains that in the globalized world--with its fluid borders, terrorist networks, and violent unrest--statecraft is more necessary than ever. In vivid chapters, he outlines how statecraft helped shape a new world order after 1989. He shows how the failure of statecraft in Iraq and throughout the Middle East has undercut the United States and makes clear that only statecraft can check the rise of China and the danger of a nuclear Iran. He draws on his expertise to reveal the art of successful negotiation. And he shows how the next president could resolve today's problems and define a realistic, ambitious foreign policy. Statecraft is an essential book for our time (Walter Isaacson).
384 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2007
12 people are currently reading
156 people want to read
About the author
Dennis Ross
28 books21 followersDennis Ross, Middle East envoy for George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, is now a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Foreign Affairs called his first book, The Missing Peace, a major contribution to the diplomatic history of the twentieth century. (from the publisher's website)"
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
December 19, 2019
Another crafty salesman offering the public the best clothes the emperor has ever seen. The catch? The uninitiated can't see any of the cloth.
July 5, 2016
instructive, but not prescriptive.
January 7, 2018
In Statecraft, Dennis Ross describes actions taken by diplomatic officials and negotiators in four historic “conflicts” (I use quotes because not all were physically violent), provides an overview of what statecraft is and guidelines for pursuing it, and suggests how it may be used in the future on four major foreign affairs issues confronting America.
Unfortunately, the book is just boring. There are some great stories about backchannels – Ross had a close relationship with a counterpart in the Soviet Union during the 90’s. The State Department felt that it had reached substantial agreement with the Soviets on issues of German reunification and the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, only for the Soviets to take a tough stance publicly. In both instances, Ross’s contact sent him private messages explaining the infighting in the Soviet government and pleading with the Americans to take certain actions that would give the Soviet foreign ministry the political cover to move forward with the peaceful cooperation they had been working towards behind the scenes.
These anecdotes are riveting, but they are few and far between, and surrounded by dry academic speak about objectives and coalitions and bureaucratic organization and other dreadfully boring things. Often I would be jolted by the realization that I had just read the same sentence three times, and have a feeling of déjà vu that I was back in grad school, slogging through endless journal articles.
There are some interesting bits of foreshadowing. (Statecraft was published in 2007.)
“What emerged in the [Bush 43] administration was the perception that those who were on the other side of the ideological divide were not to be trusted. Their concerns were not to be taken seriously, their motivations were suspect, and therefore the questions or problems they raised shouldn’t be considered.” The “ideological divide” at issue here was between those who believed that Saddam was evil and the world needed to be rid of him, and those who worried about creating a power vacuum in a socially unstable country – but this text could have been lifted word-for-word from a post-election analysis of 2016.
The chapter on confronting radical Islam is one of the best (or should I say, one of the only interesting ones) in the book. Ross talks about Hamas winning hearts and minds in Palestine by providing social services (a tactic repeated years later by Islamic State). He suggests that the US can confront radical Islamic terrorism by offering competing services – the development aid as counterterrorism argument. While it’s an argument I tend to agree with, Ross says nothing about it that hasn’t been said with more detail and insight elsewhere. He goes on to give an intriguing suggestion as to how the US should pressure Mubarak to improve his human rights credentials by withholding a portion of American aid until he lifts the state of emergency (widely unpopular among the Egyptian public) that he had been using to jail dissidents. Writing this review from 2017, I can say that, hmm, yes, maybe we should have put more pressure on Mubarak. Ross’s examples and arguments both heavily foreshadow the Arab Spring and are made utterly irrelevant by it.
A final complaint I have is that the book does not always explain the background of the examples it uses. To illustrate the point that negotiators should try to demonstrate that they understand what is important to their counterparty, he uses the example of negotiations between Israel and Syria about the Golan Heights. Before reading this book, I had heard of the Golan Heights but really knew nothing about exactly where it was, why it was important, and what has happened there in modern history. After reading this book, I still do not know any of those things. The author basically assumes you are already well-versed on the entirety of international affairs since 1944.
I would not recommend this book to anyone unless they were pursuing a master’s degree in foreign affairs. And even then, it’s more likely that you’re going to be required to read it and use it mostly as a sleep aid.
Unfortunately, the book is just boring. There are some great stories about backchannels – Ross had a close relationship with a counterpart in the Soviet Union during the 90’s. The State Department felt that it had reached substantial agreement with the Soviets on issues of German reunification and the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, only for the Soviets to take a tough stance publicly. In both instances, Ross’s contact sent him private messages explaining the infighting in the Soviet government and pleading with the Americans to take certain actions that would give the Soviet foreign ministry the political cover to move forward with the peaceful cooperation they had been working towards behind the scenes.
These anecdotes are riveting, but they are few and far between, and surrounded by dry academic speak about objectives and coalitions and bureaucratic organization and other dreadfully boring things. Often I would be jolted by the realization that I had just read the same sentence three times, and have a feeling of déjà vu that I was back in grad school, slogging through endless journal articles.
There are some interesting bits of foreshadowing. (Statecraft was published in 2007.)
“What emerged in the [Bush 43] administration was the perception that those who were on the other side of the ideological divide were not to be trusted. Their concerns were not to be taken seriously, their motivations were suspect, and therefore the questions or problems they raised shouldn’t be considered.” The “ideological divide” at issue here was between those who believed that Saddam was evil and the world needed to be rid of him, and those who worried about creating a power vacuum in a socially unstable country – but this text could have been lifted word-for-word from a post-election analysis of 2016.
The chapter on confronting radical Islam is one of the best (or should I say, one of the only interesting ones) in the book. Ross talks about Hamas winning hearts and minds in Palestine by providing social services (a tactic repeated years later by Islamic State). He suggests that the US can confront radical Islamic terrorism by offering competing services – the development aid as counterterrorism argument. While it’s an argument I tend to agree with, Ross says nothing about it that hasn’t been said with more detail and insight elsewhere. He goes on to give an intriguing suggestion as to how the US should pressure Mubarak to improve his human rights credentials by withholding a portion of American aid until he lifts the state of emergency (widely unpopular among the Egyptian public) that he had been using to jail dissidents. Writing this review from 2017, I can say that, hmm, yes, maybe we should have put more pressure on Mubarak. Ross’s examples and arguments both heavily foreshadow the Arab Spring and are made utterly irrelevant by it.
A final complaint I have is that the book does not always explain the background of the examples it uses. To illustrate the point that negotiators should try to demonstrate that they understand what is important to their counterparty, he uses the example of negotiations between Israel and Syria about the Golan Heights. Before reading this book, I had heard of the Golan Heights but really knew nothing about exactly where it was, why it was important, and what has happened there in modern history. After reading this book, I still do not know any of those things. The author basically assumes you are already well-versed on the entirety of international affairs since 1944.
I would not recommend this book to anyone unless they were pursuing a master’s degree in foreign affairs. And even then, it’s more likely that you’re going to be required to read it and use it mostly as a sleep aid.
April 16, 2021
A good book with great thoughts, but the book is organized poorly. It lacks an ongoing connection between sections besides this very broad idea of “statecraft”. Some of the case studies are very interesting however, as well as the authors own specific opinions on American Foreign Policy.
March 26, 2018
An outstanding book by one of America’s finest diplomats and negotiators. It was instructive and enlightening.
June 29, 2016
The examples used by Mr. Ross are somewhat dated however they remain valid. The author describes how Statecraft both succeeded and failed (actually the lack of Statecraft). Good reading for those interested in foreign affairs or international relations. Relevant today given the different approaches to the subject by the two Presidential contenders.
November 26, 2008
I had the pleasant opportunity to listen to Dennis Ross speak. The book is a detailed and sobering look at the difficult work that is diplomacy and accents the stark difference between George Herbert Walker Bush and the already forgotten President's dearth of diplomacy
December 20, 2009
Very well done by Mr. Ross. After an introduction, he walks you through the successes and failures of statecraft in the former USSR, former Yugoslavia, Iraq 1, and Iraq 2, then draws broader lessons. A great treatment of the topic that blends war stories with broader insights.
Want to read
October 28, 2008Hmmm.
January 18, 2010
Statecraft: And How to Restore America's Standing in the World by Dennis Ross (2007)
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews