How the Red Sun Rose 【红太阳是这样升起的】is a fine-grained history of how Mao Zedong rose to power within the Chinese Communist Party from the early 1930s to the end of the Second World War. The author, Gao Hua 高华, a history professor at Nanjing University and never an official member of the party, wrote all this in his spare time. The translators, Stacy Mosher and Guo Jian, also deserve considerable praise for their work on such a lengthy and specialized text - fifteen years of inter-party conflict is not an easy task even for a seasoned translator.
With such a sensitive topic, it is no surprise that the book was quickly banned from publication on the mainland. It was published by the Chinese University Press of Hong Kong in 2000 and has been reprinted over thirty times since then.
The Chinese Communist Party did not start with Mao - it began in Shanghai in 1921. At that point, it was a bodge of urban intellectuals, army officers, and hardened peasant rebels. It only began to resemble its later form by the 1930s and 1940s in the dusty town of Yan'an in Shaanxi Province, after the long march, several military campaigns, and intense 'rectification' campaigns led by Mao himself. It took on the ideological backing and later the organizational structure of a party-state.
Mao, who started off as a regional representative in the party, worked to improve his position. After purging the (fictional) Anti-Bolshevik League in 1931, he was sidelined by more Soviet-aligned officials within the party by the mid-1930s. (He later got back at them by seizing all the CCP's radio equipment and controlling communications between Moscow and Yan'an). After the party suffered a series of military defeats, he seized control of the armed forces at the Zunyi Conference of 1935. The bulk of the history focuses on his total consolidation of power from 1937 onward.
A part of the inter-party struggle was ideological; being a Marxist-Leninist party, the CCP takes its ideological battles seriously. Mao distrusted the theoretical intellectuals - to him, bad theory was "dogshit". Gao emphasizes that one of the more foundational works of Marxist history was Joseph Stalin's "Short Course on the History of the Communist Party", which recasts all of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's history as a series of battles between the party and outside forces, internal saboteurs, and that class struggle only intensifies as the state moves towards socialism. Mao found much to admire in the book. He recast himself in the role of being always right, and that opposition was due to "empiricists", "dogmatism", "formalism", "book worship", "opportunists", and any number of intellectual sins. Ideology was not a series of beliefs, but a political weapon, where deviation from what Mao considered acceptable was a punishable offense.
That is not to say that Mao did not have his own set of beliefs to propose. What he most consistently felt and advocated was the "Sinification" of Marxism - of adjusting those foreign doctrines to suit what he felt was China's needs. As a careful student of Chinese history, he understood that China was still vastly rural and that any urban proletariat would be the only driver of rebellion - the peasantry was the more effective choice for that. His contribution, therefore, was combining Chinese nationalism with Marxism-Leninism.
The peak of the book is its discussion of the formal Rectification Movement of 1942-1944. He attracted Chinese intellectuals to Yan'an, and then unleashed a combined force of ideological 'thought work' with personal surveillance. Those at the conference, led by Mao's own head of secret police, Kang Sheng, were made to study some twenty-odd of Mao's works, report their own personal and familial history, report their own private conversations, report their own private thoughts, and write elaborate confessions of their own omissions and failures. To quote, their trousers were pulled down and their tails were cut off.
The campaign's most violent period was the "emergency rescue" movement, which only stopped with Soviet intervention and the looming threat of civil war. This was more violent than indoctrinating, with torture, forced confessions, mock executions, and party cadres killing themselves out of despair. The quotas of guilty officials to find parallels what Mao would resort to later in his career - where the Cultural Revolution has its beginnings in 1942, not just 1955.
There is much to learn about the party, its methods, and its history from this volume. One finds many of the figures here would play a role in the CCP for decades. Kang Sheng, whom the author compares to Lavrentiy Beria, would retain power for the rest of his life. Another one of Mao's most loyal followers, Liu Shaoqi, would be purged during the Cultural Revolution some twenty-five years later.
The book also overturns much of the historical record. Obviously, it goes against useful idiots like Edgar Snow, who think of the Yan'an period as an extended book club. But on the other hand, it also challenges more serious scholarship on the Cultural Revolution period, which saw its roots only extending back to the 1950s - that did not go far back enough.
On a final note, it invites connections between the CCP of 1942 and the CCP of 2020. China has changed beyond imagining over the past 60-odd years. China is not overwhelmingly rural, and the people are much richer. But in the doctrine of the party-state, of combining a touch of Marxism with Chinese nationalism, and the threats of encroaching surveillance and sweeping away old party elites are topics that are of further interest today.
I recommend this for any serious scholar of CCP history and contemporary politics.