These lectures by one of the most influential and original philosophers of the twentieth century constitute a sustained argument for the philosophical basis of romanticism, particularly in its American rendering. Through his examination of such authors as Emerson, Thoreau, Poe, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, Stanley Cavell shows that romanticism and American transcendentalism represent a serious philosophical response to the challenge of skepticism that underlies the writings of Wittgenstein and Austin on ordinary language.
Stanley Cavell was an American philosopher. He was the Walter M. Cabot Professor of Aesthetics and the General Theory of Value at Harvard University. He worked in the fields of ethics, aesthetics, and ordinary language philosophy. As an interpreter, he produced influential works on Wittgenstein, Austin, Emerson, Thoreau, and Heidegger. His work is characterized by its conversational tone and frequent literary references.
Some great moments here, and Cavell isn't as annoying as he is elsewhere. Quotes I liked:
"If Descartes is philosophizing, and if these passages are essential to his philosophizing, it follows that philosophy is not exhausted in argumentation. And if the power of these passages is literary, then the literary is essential to the power of philosophy; at some stage the philosophical becomes, or turns into, the literary." (109)
"It is what Emerson calls conviction, calls being convicted by his words, ready by them, sentenced. To acknowledge that I am known by what this text knows does not amount to agreeing with it, in the sense of believing it, as if it were a bunch of assertions or as if it contained a doctrine. To be known by it is to find thinking in it that confronts you." (118)
"If the responsibility for speech is suffocating, you might think of enacting a deed so horrible that speech seems impossible; you might choose to become a monster. (Here it may be worth comparing Wittgenstein's speculation concerning what a private language would be.)" (141)
"My idea is that what in philosophy is known as skepticism (for example, as in Descartes and Hume and Kant) is a relation to the world, and to others, and to myself, and to language, that is known to what you might call literature, or anyway responded to in literature, in uncounted other guises--in Shakespeare's tragic heroes, in Emerson's and Thoreau's 'silent melancholy' and 'quiet desperation,' in Wordsworth's perception of us as without 'interest,' and in Poe's 'perverseness.' Why philosophy and literature do not know this about one another--and to that extent remain unknown to themselves--has been my theme it seems to me forever." (155)
"(From such trivial cases one may glimpse the following speculation arising: if a narrative is something told, and telling is an answer to a claim to knowledge, then perhaps any narrative, however elaborated, may be understood as an answer to some implied question of knowledge, perhaps in the form of some disclaiming of knowledge, or avoidance of it.)" (83-84)
"I also take modern skepticism to be philosophy's expression or interpretation of the thing known to literature... in melodrama and in tragedy. (By the thing known in melodrama and in tragedy I mean, roughly, the dependence of the human self on society for its definition, but at the same time its transcendence of that definition, its infinite insecurity in maintaining its existence.)" (174)
Cavell and Charles Taylor are my favourite living philosophers. Cavell has such a nuanced sensibility that incorporates art, poetry, literature - almost anything - into the quest to make up one's self into what one most desires - with discipline. It's hard to explain Cavell without just advising someone to read him. He's so unique and clear. But he's also prone to rampant use of the semi-colon. Just saying.